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This analysis highlights the significant role that domestic actors play in determining the outcomes of economic sanctions. It models the behavior of the main opposition party during an economic sanction episode, and introduces two commonly used variables when considering the effectiveness of economic sanctions&mdash ; regime type and issue type&mdash ; from a different perspective. Using Bayesian probabilities and a two-stage game-theoretic approach, the analysis finds that states are more likely to impose economic sanctions related to security issues rather than to nonsecurity issues. The tendency to impose sanctions to coerce action on security-related issues is higher when opposition parties in the sanctioning state object to the sanctions. The findings demonstrate that sanctions are more effective when they are supported by the opposition in sender states, as well as target states. Consistent with the literature, this analysis finds that sanctions are more effective when they are targeted against democracies. The game results indicate that sanctions are more successful when they relate to security issues. This paper supplies policymakers with a simple criterion for economic sanctions successs comprised of the support of the opposition within the sender state, that the issue should be of high stakes, and there is support for the economic sanctions from a viable opposition within the target state.

During the Cold War, comparisons between the Soviet-led state-socialist bloc and democracies sparked scholarly controversy. Today, with China assuming the mantle of the most significant nondemocratic regime model, and with scholars pursuing innovative comparisons between China and other political systems (Duara and Perry 2018; Tsai 2016; Zhang 2013), it behooves us to revisit some of the questions that such comparisons pose. Specifically, when is it reasonable to pursue comparisons, what is their purpose, and what do they entail? In this short piece, I will address only some of the issues involved.

The People's Republic of China (PRC), the Special Administrative Region of Hong Kong, the Republic of China (Taiwan) and the Republic of Singapore represent different types of political regimes and provide a fascinating contrast concerning their performance with regard to the global conflict between liberal democracies and autocracies. This paper examines briefly their common historical backgrounds and provides a detailed analysis of common 'Asian' cultural features and popular support for democracy on the micro-level. It then systematically assesses their performance concerning liberal democracy and quality, governance scores, and socio-economic development. Finally, the reactions to the Covid-19 pandemic are documented showing again specific regime characteristics. We use most recent V-Dem, World Bank, United Nations Development Programme, World Values Surveys and similar data. The conclusions point to possible international consequences and the crucial position of Taiwan.

What effect do American military forces have on domestic regimes where they are hosted? America's unparalleled global position is well studied, but less attention has been paid to the effect of its global military presence on governance. We argue that American forces have an autocratizing effect on host nations in strategically valuable regions. In ambiguous or unfavorable information environments, the key driver of American policy is the strategic value of the location to American interests. American and host interests align in these cases, supporting regime survival where the location is critical to the United States and its global system of trade and military preeminence. This alignment produces increasing autocracy rather than simple regime stability. We test this hypothesis with data of American force deployments since 1950 and illustrate the causal mechanisms with case study analysis.

Abstract
What effect do American military forces have on domestic regimes where they are hosted? America's unparalleled global position is well studied, but less attention has been paid to the effect of its global military presence on governance. We argue that American forces have an autocratizing effect on host nations in strategically valuable regions. In ambiguous or unfavorable information environments, the key driver of American policy is the strategic value of the location to American interests. American and host interests align in these cases, supporting regime survival where the location is critical to the United States and its global system of trade and military preeminence. This alignment produces increasing autocracy rather than simple regime stability. We test this hypothesis with data of American force deployments since 1950 and illustrate the causal mechanisms with case study analysis.

ABSTRACT  This article reports on an attempt to duplicate the results of "Regime, Polity, and Economic Growth: The Latin American Experience," published in the Winter 1995 issue of Growth and Change. The original article used the Parks method to analyze cross section time series data, and concluded that after controlling for other relevant variables military governments have lower rates of economic growth than their civilian counterparts. Using data provided by the original researcher, and using various regression techniques including the Parks method, we were not able to reproduce the original results. We attribute this to problems in both the original data and regression techniques.

This analysis highlights the significant role that domestic actors play in determining the outcomes of economic sanctions. It models the behavior of the main opposition party during an economic sanction episode, and introduces two commonly used variables when considering the effectiveness of economic sanctions-regime type and issue type-from a different perspective. Using Bayesian probabilities and a two-stage game-theoretic approach, the analysis finds that states are more likely to impose economic sanctions related to security issues rather than to nonsecurity issues. The tendency to impose sanctions to coerce action on security-related issues is higher when opposition parties in the sanctioning state object to the sanctions. The findings demonstrate that sanctions are more effective when they are supported by the opposition in sender states, as well as target states. Consistent with the literature, this analysis finds that sanctions are more effective when they are targeted against democracies. The game results indicate that sanctions are more successful when they relate to security issues. This paper supplies policymakers with a simple criterion for economic sanctions successs comprised of the support of the opposition within the sender state, that the issue should be of high stakes, and there is support for the economic sanctions from a viable opposition within the target state.