The Country Opinion Survey in Myanmar assists the World Bank Group (WBG) in gaining a better understanding of how stakeholders in Myanmar perceive the WBG. It provides the WBG with systematic feedback from national and local governments, multilateral/bilateral agencies, media, academia, the private sector, and civil society in Myanmar on 1) their views regarding the general environment in Myanmar; 2) their overall attitudes toward the WBG in Myanmar; 3) overall impressions of the WBG's effectiveness and results, knowledge work and activities, and communication and information sharing in Myanmar; and 4) their perceptions of the WBG's future role in Myanmar.
This report is structured in three parts. Part one is a summary document, including: (i) an executive summary (ii) an introduction; (iii) a review of core concepts of reintegration that will be referred to in this study; (iv) a meta-analysis of reintegration process¬es in the Great Lakes Region (GLR) vis-à-vis the conceptual discussion; and (v) conclusions to the summary document. Part two (annex one) comprises an in-depth review and analysis of data on the reintegration process-es of ex-combatants across the GLR. Part three (annex two) is an in-depth analysis of community dynamics across the GLR. In brief, part one of the study is a meta-analytical and knowledge-focused piece that reflects more broadly on the detailed analysis of the datasets presented in annexes one and two, therefore, this part can be read as a freestanding report. However, it's worth noting that any reading will benefit significantly from exploring the detailed findings in annexes one and two.
Letter From The Representatives Of France, Kuwait, The Netherlands, Peru, Poland, Sweden, The United Kingdom Of Great Britain And Northern Ireland And The United States Of America To The United Nations Addressed To The President Of The Security Council ; United Nations S/PV.8217 Security Council Seventy-third year 8217th meeting Tuesday, 27 March 2018, 11.10 a.m. New York Provisional President: Mr. Blok . (Netherlands) Members: Bolivia (Plurinational State of). . Mr. Inchauste Jordán China. . Mr. Wu Haitao Côte d'Ivoire. . Mr. Dah Equatorial Guinea. . Mr. Ndong Mba Ethiopia. . Mr. Alemu France. . Mr. Delattre Kazakhstan. . Mr. Umarov Kuwait. . Mr. Alotaibi Peru. . Mr. Meza-Cuadra Poland. . Ms. Wronecka Russian Federation. . Mr. Nebenzia Sweden . Mr. Orrenius Skau United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland . Ms. Pierce United States of America. . Mrs. Haley Agenda The situation in the Middle East Report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of Security Council resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014), 2191 (2014), 2258 (2015), 2332 (2016) and 2393 (2017) (S/2018/243) This record contains the text of speeches delivered in English and of the translation of speeches delivered in other languages. The final text will be printed in the Official Records of the Security Council. Corrections should be submitted to the original languages only. They should be incorporated in a copy of the record and sent under the signature of a member of the delegation concerned to the Chief of the Verbatim Reporting Service, room U-0506 (verbatimrecords@un.org). Corrected records will be reissued electronically on the Official Document System of the United Nations (http://documents.un.org). 18-08569 (E) *1808569* S/PV.8217 The situation in the Middle East 27/03/2018 2/21 18-08569 The meeting was called to order at 11.10 a.m. Adoption of the agenda The agenda was adopted. The situation in the Middle East Report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of Security Council resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014), 2191 (2014), 2258 (2015), 2332 (2016) and 2393 (2017) (S/2018/243) The President: In accordance with rule 37 of the Council's provisional rules of procedure, I invite the representative of the Syrian Arab Republic to participate in this meeting. In accordance with rule 39 of the Council's provisional rules of procedure, I invite Mr. Mark Lowcock, Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator, to participate in this meeting. Mr. Lowcock is joining today's meeting via video-teleconference from Geneva. The Security Council will now begin its consideration of the item on its agenda. I wish to draw the attention of the members of the Council to document S/2018/243, which contains the report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of Security Council resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014), 2191 (2014), 2258 (2015), 2332 (2016) and 2393 (2017). Recalling the latest note by the President of the Security Council on its working methods (S/2017/507), I want to encourage all participants, both members and non-members of the Council, to deliver their statements in five minutes or less. Note 507 also encourages briefers to be succinct and focus on key issues. Briefers are further encouraged to limit initial remarks to 15 minutes or less. I now give the floor to Mr. Lowcock. Mr. Lowcock: As all members of the Council know, the Syrian conflict has now entered its eighth year. When weapons speak, civilians pay the price — a relentless price with horrific violence, bloodshed and unspeakable suffering. The past few months have been some of the worst yet for many civilians in Syria. Today I want to start with the situation in eastern Ghouta. Since the adoption of resolution 2401 (2018) on 24 February, military operations in eastern Ghouta, in particular air strikes, have reportedly killed more than 1,700 people. Thousands more have been injured. Attacks on critical civilian infrastructure, such as medical facilities, continue to be reported. There have been at least 28 reported attacks on health facilities since mid-February and more than 70 verified incidents since the beginning of the year. The World Health Organization has reported that attacks on health facilities, health workers and health infrastructure were recorded during the first two months of the year at three times the rate that we saw during 2017. In recent weeks in Damascus city, at least 78 people were reportedly killed and another 230 injured by shells fired from eastern Ghouta. That includes reports of at least 35 people killed and scores wounded on 20 March, when Kashkul market in Jaramana, a suburb in the south-eastern part of the city, was struck by a rocket. Tens of thousands of civilians have been displaced from Douma, Harasta, Sagba and Kafr Batna in recent days and weeks. So far, reports indicate that some 80,000 civilians have been taken to places in Damascus city and rural Damascus. Nearly 20,000 combatants and civilians have been transported to locations in north-western Syria. Nearly 52,000 civilians from eastern Ghouta are currently being hosted in eight collective shelters in rural Damascus. That displaced population has endured months of limited access to food, medical care and other essential items. In the words of the United Nations Humanitarian Coordinator, Ali Al-Za'tari, who met and spoke to some of them, those people are "tired, hungry, traumatized and afraid". Most of the collective shelters do not have the capacity or infrastructure to accommodate such large numbers of people. They are extremely overcrowded and severely lacking in basic water, sanitation and hygiene facilities. There are a number of serious protection concerns related to risks of gender-based violence, unaccompanied and separated children and restrictions on movement. The United Nations is not in charge of the management of those shelters. However, since 13 March, together with humanitarian partners, we have mobilized a rapid response to provide evacuees with basic support in close coordination with the Syrian Arab Red Crescent and other local partners. So far, more than 130,000 non-food items have been distributed, 130 emergency 27/03/2018 The situation in the Middle East S/PV.8217 18-08569 3/21 toilets have been installed, and water trucking services have been provided to most shelters. In addition, supplies to feed more than 50,000 people and a total of 38 mobile health teams and 18 mobile medical teams are currently providing support to those in need inside the shelters. Humanitarian organizations also need access to the people still trapped within eastern Ghouta, in particular in Douma, where fighting and siege continue. The United Nations and its partners are ready to proceed to Douma with food for up to 16,500 people, as well as health, nutrition, water, sanitation and hygiene supplies, but facilitation letters need to be signed by the Government of Syria. I reiterate the Secretary-General's call on all parties to fully respect international humanitarian law and human rights law in order to ensure immediate humanitarian access and guarantee the protection of civilians, including in relation to displacements and evacuations. The United Nations and its partners require unimpeded access to all those affected by the situation in eastern Ghouta. That means access to the areas where civilians remain, through which they transit and to which they exit, such as collective shelters, in order to ensure that effective protection mechanisms are in place so that we can deter any possible violations and provide remedial protection support. Eastern Ghouta is not the only place in which humanitarian needs continue to increase. In north-western Syria, in recent weeks, an estimated 183,500 people have been displaced by hostilities in Afrin district in Aleppo governorate. The majority — some 140,000 people — have fled to Tell Rifaat and the remainder have gone to Nubl, Al-Zahraa, Manbij, Hasakah and surrounding areas. That massive influx of internally displaced persons (IDPs) is putting a strain on host communities, which are already overwhelmed. Two days ago, on 25 March, an inter-agency convoy to Tell Rifaat delivered assistance for some 50,000 people. However, overall, humanitarian partners are still struggling to gain sustainable access to the area. Moreover, access to Aleppo city for IDPs from Afrin district is currently restricted. Of particular concern are medical evacuations that are urgently required for severely sick people to receive care in specialized hospitals in Aleppo city. Four deaths due to the lack of proper health care have already been reported. Between 50,000 and 70,000 people are estimated still to be in Afrin city. Humanitarian access to the city and its outer perimeters is possible through cross-border operations mandated by the Council. Today, the Government of Turkey told us that it is positively disposed towards such access, and we plan to run convoys in the very near future. We know that needs are very substantial. In Idlib governorate, the situation remains catastrophic, with almost 400,000 people displaced since mid-December. Local capacity to assist is overstretched. Thousands more people are now arriving there from eastern Ghouta, with no sites or shelters available for the vast majority of them. We have received reports of an increase in violence in Idlib in recent days. According to local sources, on 20 March air strikes hit an IDP shelter on the outskirts of Haas village in southern rural Idlib governorate, reportedly killing at least 10 displaced people and injuring another 15. On 21 March, air strikes on Kafr Battikh village, also in southern rural Idlib governorate, reportedly killed scores more. The next day, the central market in Harim town was hit by an air strike, reportedly killing 35 people, including many women and children. On 12 March, air strikes also resumed in southern Syria, with attacks being reported in and around Dar'a city. There have been no air strikes in those areas since an agreement was reached last year on the establishment of a de-escalation zone for parts of the south of the country. That therefore appears to be a major unwelcome development. Let me turn to Raqqa. On 19 March, we received approval from the Syrian authorities for an assessment mission to Raqqa city by the United Nations Mine Action Service, the United Nations Department of Safety and Security, the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs and the World Health Organization. As Council members know, we have been seeking agreement to that for some time. That was on 19 March. Three days later, on 22 March, the United Nations Department of Safety and Security deployed a team to conduct a security assessment. They report that while the city is considered calm and stable, considerable risk remains. Raqqa city is still highly contaminated with landmines, unexploded ordnances, explosive remnants of war and improvised explosive devices. We hope that access to Raqqa city will be possible for humanitarian aid deliveries via Qamishli, Manbij, Aleppo, Hamah S/PV.8217 The situation in the Middle East 27/03/2018 4/21 18-08569 and Homs, depending on operational and logistical arrangements. The United Nations and our partners are now preparing a humanitarian assessment mission, which is likely to take place next week. Next I shall address Rukban, on the Syria-Jordan border. United Nations partners received permission from the Syrian authorities on 8 March to organize a humanitarian convoy from Damascus to reach people in need along the Syria-Jordan border. Last week, on 19 March, the United Nations itself received permission to join that humanitarian mission. Preparations are ongoing, and a first humanitarian convoy is expected to deploy soon. As the Council knows, we have been seeking approval for that for many months. As we sit here today, almost at the end of the month, we have reached some 137,000 people in need through inter-agency convoys — that is, cross-line convoys sent to hard-to-reach and besieged areas — to Tell Rifaat, Al-Dar al-Kabirah and Douma. That is limited, incremental progress, compared to the first part of the year, thanks to the extraordinary efforts of the team on the ground and some of those around this table. But we are essentially just given crumbs — an occasional convoy here and there, often, coincidentally, shortly before our monthly briefings to the Council. A total of 5.6 million Syrians in acute need cannot live on crumbs, and with a quarter of the year gone, our level of access is currently far worse than it was this time last year. We need the support of all Council members and members of the International Syria Support Group humanitarian task force to do their part to exert their individual and collective influence over the parties. A few days ago, the Government of Syria and others asked for more United Nations help with humanitarian aid in eastern Ghouta. In response, we have, first, proposed that a team of United Nations emergency response experts be deployed to strengthen efforts on the ground. Visa requests for the team have been submitted. Secondly, we have confirmed a new allocation of $20 million from the Syria Humanitarian Fund, which is managed by my Office, for eastern Ghouta and those displaced from Afrin to provide shelter materials, improve sanitation for displaced people, ensure that safe water is available, provide life-saving medicines and medical services and put in place measures to enhance protection in relocation sites. The United Nations and its partners, on average, reach 7.5 million people every month with life-saving humanitarian assistance across the whole of Syria. Clearly, without that assistance, the situation would be even more catastrophic than it is now and the loss of life even greater. The United Nations has no money of its own to do those things. We can do them only because we receive voluntary contributions from our donors. I want to take this opportunity to thank everyone who has supported our appeal over the last year, including our top donors: the United States, Germany, the United Kingdom, the European Union, Norway, Canada, Japan, Denmark, Sweden, Qatar, Kuwait and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Resolution 2401 (2018) was adopted just over a month ago. I ask all in the Council to make the resolution a reality. Whatever the difficulty, the United Nations and its partners remain determined to follow through, for the sake of the Syrian people. The President: I thank Mr. Lowcock for his briefing. I shall now make a statement in my capacity as the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Kingdom of the Netherlands. Recently, a Dutch photographer working with Save the Children published a photo album featuring 48 Syrian children, all seven years old. Those photos were school portraits, like we all had taken when we were young. The children were born in Syria, but they had to flee. They are as old as the Syrian war, so they have never seen their country at peace. Their memories of their homeland are fading. Sometimes they cannot remember their country at all, nor their family members left behind. But by giving those young children a public face, the photographer has tried to restore some of the dignity sacrificed to a war in which all humanity seems lost. I have here a photo of Nour. Those children were relatively lucky; they were able to escape. At the same time, inside Syria, during seven years of war, thousands of children have been killed. I myself am a father, and I am certainly not the only parent in this Chamber. Images of children affected by war should leave no one unmoved. Despite any differences between us, we should at least have one thing in common: the belief that protecting children should come first. Yet, such protection is lacking. The Syrian crisis is, above all, a protection crisis — a grave violation of the long-established norm to protect civilians and their belongings in the time of war. 27/03/2018 The situation in the Middle East S/PV.8217 18-08569 5/21 Together, we — the international community — have expressed our determination to prevent conflict and save succeeding generations from the scourge of war. And where conflict cannot be prevented, we have agreed to regulate the conduct of warfare. One of the very first steps to that end was taken in Russia, almost 150 years ago. In Saint Petersburg, it was decided to forbid weapons that cause unnecessary suffering. Since those first steps, the body of international humanitarian law has grown considerably, including through the adoption of the Hague and Geneva Conventions. The imperative of those laws has always been to protect civilians in conflict, to spare them from disaster, save them from harm and respect their dignity. Sadly, what we see in Syria today is the exact opposite. Every day, many are showing total disregard for civilians. In eastern Ghouta, the Syrian regime and its allies, including Russia, have trapped hundreds of thousands of civilians and are relentlessly continuing their offensive. The United Nations has reported air strikes on densely populated areas, blatant attacks targeting hospitals and medical personnel, the use of starvation as a weapon of war and the use of chemical weapons. Many innocent children, women and men are suffering. They should be protected. Yet instead, families are seeing their homes destroyed, their loved ones killed and their dignity shattered. In Afrin, the effects of the Turkey-led offensive are clear for all to see: a worsening of the already precarious humanitarian situation, with more than 160,000 displaced people and a further obstacle to efforts to fight the Islamic State in Iraq and the Sham (ISIS). I ask Turkey not to extend its military activities to other border regions in Syria or Iraq. Four weeks ago, the Council adopted resolution 2401 (2018). It is telling that in 2018, the Council should need to spell out that warring parties should immediately lift all sieges in Syria and grant unimpeded humanitarian access to those in acute need. Those are by no means exceptional demands. They are basic obligations under international humanitarian law, developed over decades to instil minimum standards of human decency in warfare. Not even the presence of terrorists is an excuse for disregarding those standards. It is humiliating that the Council is unable to enforce those minimum standards. If the Council is not willing or able to do it, who is? With all that in mind, we should not forget that the responsibility, and indeed the obligation, to execute the Council's decisions lies with individual Member States. So what should be done? First, we should reaffirm these norms and enforce the relevant resolutions. We call on all parties to the Syrian conflict — including the Syrian regime, Russia, Iran, Turkey and armed opposition groups — to respect and implement the Council's decisions. Secondly, we must strengthen resolution 2401 (2018), with United Nations monitoring of the implementation of the ceasefire and with full access for fact-finding missions to sites and collective shelters housing internally displaced persons. These missions are ready to go; we need their impartial information. Thirdly, with regard to accountability, if there is to be any credible, stable and lasting peace in Syria, the current culture of impunity must end. All those guilty of crimes must be brought to justice. The perpetrators of crimes, including ISIS and Al-Qaida, must know that they are being watched, followed and identified. They must know that files are being compiled with a view to prosecuting them for crimes that may include genocide. They must know that one day they will be held accountable. We urge all States to increase their support for the International, Impartial and Independent Mechanism to Assist in the Investigation and Prosecution of Persons Responsible for the Most Serious Crimes under International Law Committed in the Syrian Arab Republic since March 2011, which aims to ensure that information about serious crimes is collected, analysed and preserved for future prosecutions. The Netherlands again calls on all Council members to support referring the situation in Syria to the International Criminal Court. What will become of the children in the photographs I mentioned? Will they one day be able to return to Syria? Like all children, they long for a normal life, for stability, for safety. The Syrian regime believes in a military solution. But there is none. There are no winners in this war. But it is clear who is losing — the ordinary people of Syria. In these most extreme circumstances we commend the incredible courage and perseverance of the humanitarian aid workers. It is up to us to restore credibility to the Council. It is up to us to ensure a negotiated political process, in which all Syrians and other relevant actors are represented. And it is up to us to end the agony and restore dignity and humanity to the people of Syria. I now resume my functions as President of the Council. S/PV.8217 The situation in the Middle East 27/03/2018 6/21 18-08569 I give the floor to those members of the Council who wish to make statements. Mr. Alotaibi (Kuwait) (spoke in Arabic): We welcome you, Sir, in presiding over this important meeting. I am delivering this statement on behalf of Kuwait and Sweden. At the outset, I would like to thank the Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator, Mr. Mark Lowcock, for his briefing. Today I will address three main areas: first, the status of the implementation of resolution 2401 (2018); secondly, measures needed to improve the humanitarian situation; and thirdly, the responsibility of the parties to implement the resolution. First, on the status of the implementation of resolution 2401 (2018), we are meeting today one month after its unanimous adoption by the Security Council, calling on all parties to cease hostilities without delay for 30 days following the adoption of the resolution. We deplore the fact that it has not yet been implemented. However, we must continue to do everything in our power to ensure the resolution's full implementation throughout Syria. The increased number of humanitarian convoys entering the besieged areas during the month of March shows that partial delivery was achieved by comparison to the complete deadlock in access in previous months. That indicates that progress can be made in implementing the resolution, and we must build on that progress. We affirm that the provisions of the resolution will remain valid beyond the first 30 days after its adoption. We look forward to continued reports from the Secretariat on the status of implementation through monthly briefings, as stipulated in the resolution. In that regard, we support the proposal for providing the Council with further regular updates. We appreciate the continued efforts of the United Nations to facilitate talks among all parties in eastern Ghouta with the goal of securing a ceasefire. We are particularly concerned about the continued military offensive by the Syrian authorities in eastern Ghouta, as well as air strikes on Dar'a and Idlib. The shelling of Damascus from eastern Ghouta is also a matter of concern. All of those acts of violence have claimed the lives of hundreds of innocent civilians. Secondly, on measures needed to improve the humanitarian situation, we must take the necessary measures to protect civilians fleeing eastern Ghouta and to improve the humanitarian situation in collective shelters. As we have said before, implementing the provisions of resolution 2401 (2018) is the only way to improve the humanitarian situation and to achieve tangible progress in that regard. Those provisions stipulate that there must be a cessation of hostilities and that access for humanitarian aid to reach the civilian population must be enabled. Regarding the humanitarian situation in eastern Ghouta, we have five points to convey to the relevant parties, which represent our special concerns about the protection of civilians. First, all evacuations must be voluntary. People must have the right to return and to choose safe places to go to. Secondly, any negotiations on the evacuation of civilians should include civilian representatives, such as local councils. Thirdly, humanitarian aid convoys should continue to enter eastern Ghouta for the benefit of those who decided to stay there. Those convoys should occur on a weekly basis, as stipulated in resolution 2401 (2018), according to the United Nations assessment of needs, including medical supplies, and with full access for United Nations staff. Fourthly, human rights violations, including detentions, disappearances and forced conscriptions, must end. Those are serious protection concerns for civilians staying in eastern Ghouta and for those leaving it. We therefore encourage the United Nations to register the names of those evacuated and their destinations and to reinforce its presence in the collective shelters for internally displaced persons, including through the use of monitors to protect them and prevent sexual violence. We call on the Syrian authorities to grant immediate permission for that. Fifthly, the deteriorating situation in the collective shelters for the internally displaced persons should be improved as quickly as possible as the number of new arrivals continues to rise. We are deeply concerned that the United Nations partners are bearing the brunt of a burden beyond their capacity. It will therefore be essential to make the maximum use of the United Nations, its staff and its resources in order to assist in managing the increasingly crowded collective shelters. We welcome the United Nations plans to increase staff on the ground to that end, and we encourage the United Nations to do the same for eastern Ghouta as soon as the security situation allows. We call on the Syrian authorities to grant visas for additional United Nations staff immediately. 27/03/2018 The situation in the Middle East S/PV.8217 18-08569 7/21 Thirdly, on the responsibility of the parties to implement the resolution, we have a collective responsibility, as members of the Council and, specifically, as parties with influence, to work with the Syrian authorities and urge them to implement the provisions of resolution 2401 (2018) according to international humanitarian law. We expect the guarantors of the Astana agreement, Russia, Iran and Turkey, to achieve progress towards the fulfilment of the commitments undertaken in the statement they issued on 16 March in advance of their summit meeting, to be held in Istanbul on 4 April. Those commitments include, first, ensuring rapid, safe and unhindered access for humanitarian aid to areas affected by the conflict; secondly, increasing their efforts, as guarantors of the ceasefire agreement, to ensure observance of the respective agreements; and thirdly, pursuing their efforts to implement the provisions of resolution 2401 (2018). In conclusion, we affirm our full commitment to continuing to follow up closely on the status of the implementation of the resolution in the monthly reports to the Council. We will spare no effort to make progress in its implementation. This month marks the beginning of the eighth year of the conflict in Syria. Sadly, there is still a need for an end to the violence, sustained humanitarian and medical aid through weekly convoys across conflict lines, evacuation operations, the protection of civilians and hospitals, and the lifting of the siege. Mrs. Haley (United States of America): I thank you, Foreign Minister Blok, for presiding over this meeting, and I thank Under-Secretary-General Lowcock for once again laying out the facts about what is happening in Syria. I also want to personally welcome Karen Pierce to the Council as the new Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom. I know all of us in the Chamber look forward to working with her. Today we have a very difficult subject to address: siege, starvation and surrender. That is the awful, unceasing rhythm of the Syrian war. As we meet today, the third step, surrender, is taking place in eastern Ghouta. After years of enduring siege and starvation, residents are surrendering eastern Ghouta. The terrible irony of this moment must be stated and acknowledged. In the 30 days since the Security Council demanded a ceasefire, the bombardment of the people of eastern Ghouta has only increased and now, at the end of the so-called ceasefire, eastern Ghouta has nearly fallen. History will not be kind when it judges the effectiveness of the Council in relieving the suffering of the Syrian people. Seventeen hundred Syrian civilians have been killed in the past month alone. Hospitals and ambulances are being deliberately targeted with bombs and artillery. Schools are being hit, like the one in eastern Ghouta that was bombed just last week, killing 15 children. Siege, starvation and surrender. I would like to ask my Security Council colleagues to consider whether we are wrong when we point to the Russian and Iranian forces working alongside Al-Assad as being responsible for the slaughter. Russia voted for the so-called ceasefire in Syria last month (see S/PV.8188). More than that, Russia took its time painstakingly negotiating resolution 2401 (2018), which demanded the ceasefire. If we watched closely during the negotiations, we could see our Russian friends constantly leaving the room to confer with their Syrian counterparts. The possibilities for what was going on are only two. Either Russia was informing its Syrian colleagues about the content of the negotiations, or Russia was taking directions from its Syrian colleagues about the content of the negotiations. Either way, Russia cynically negotiated a ceasefire that it instantly defied. Russia even had the audacity to claim that it is the only Council member implementing resolution 2401 (2018). How can that possibly be true when in the first four days after the so-called ceasefire, Russian military aircraft conducted at least 20 daily bombing missions on Damascus and eastern Ghouta, while the people of Syria remained under siege? The so-called ceasefire was intended to allow humanitarian access to sick and starving civilians. Russia even doubled down on its cynicism by proposing five-hour pauses in the fighting. It said that they were necessary to allow humanitarian convoys to get through, but Russian and Syrian bombs continue to prevent the delivery of humanitarian aid. Only after territory falls into the hands of the Al-Assad Government and its allies do they allow food and medicine to be delivered. Russia and Syria's rationalization is that they have to continue to bomb in eastern Ghouta in order to combat what they call terrorists. That is a transparent excuse for the Russians and Al-Assad to maintain their assault. Meanwhile, from the very beginning, the opposition groups in eastern Ghouta expressed their readiness to implement the ceasefire. They told the Council that they welcomed the resolution. Russia's response was to call those groups terrorists and keep pummelling S/PV.8217 The situation in the Middle East 27/03/2018 8/21 18-08569 civilians into submission, while the people of Syria continue to starve. Last week, after Syrian civilians had spent years barely surviving, an agreement was reached to allow them to leave eastern Ghouta. Who brokered it? Russia. So we see the cycle being completed. The people of eastern Ghouta are surrendering. That is the ugly reality on the ground in Syria today. Cynical accusations of bad faith from Russia will not stop us from speaking out, and their blatantly false narratives will not keep us from telling the world about Russia's central role in bombing the Syrian people into submission. Fifteen days ago, when it was apparent that the Russian, Syrian and Iranian regimes were utterly ignoring the ceasefire, the United States developed a plan for a tougher and more targeted ceasefire focused on Damascus city and eastern Ghouta. Despite overwhelming evidence that the ceasefire was being ignored, some of our colleagues urged us to give resolution 2401 (2018) a chance to work. Reluctantly, we agreed and put off introducing the resolution. Now, more than 80 per cent of eastern Ghouta is controlled by Al-Assad and his allies. Their deception, hypocrisy and brutality have overtaken the chance of a ceasefire in eastern Ghouta, and for that we should all be ashamed. If we were upholding our responsibility as a Security Council, we would adopt a resolution today recognizing the reality of what happened in eastern Ghouta. A responsible Security Council would condemn the Syrian authorities, along with Russia and Iran, for launching a military offensive to seize eastern Ghouta the same day that we called for a ceasefire. A responsible Security Council would condemn the Al-Assad regime for deliberately blocking convoys of humanitarian aid during its military campaign and removing medical items from convoys that attempted to reach eastern Ghouta. A responsible Security Council would recognize that the provision of humanitarian aid was never safe, unimpeded or sustained, and that there was no lifting of sieges. A responsible Security Council would express its outrage that at least 1,700 civilians were killed during a military campaign that it demanded to come to a halt — 1,700 civilians who should have been spared in the ceasefire we demanded, but who died on our watch. But we cannot. We cannot take those actions because Russia will stop at nothing to use its permanent seat on the Council to shield its ally Bashar Al-Assad from even the faintest criticism. And we cannot take those actions because instead of calling out the ways in which Al-Assad, Russia and Iran made a mockery of our calls for a ceasefire, too many members of the Council wanted to wait. That is a travesty. This should be a day of shame for every member of the Council and it should be a lesson about what happens when we focus on fleeting displays of unity instead of on what is right. For those who think otherwise, the people of eastern Ghouta deserve an explanation. Mr. Delattre (France) (spoke in French): At the outset, I would like to thank Mark Lowcock for his briefing and to commend him on his tireless efforts and those of his team in their response to the urgent and severe humanitarian situation in Syria. To address that urgency and severity, a month ago almost to the day the Security Council adopted resolution 2401 (2018). We thus collectively and unanimously demanded that all the parties to the conflict cease hostilities throughout the country to allow for sustained and unimpeded humanitarian access to civilians in need and for medical evacuations. A month later, what is the situation? Not only has resolution 2401 (2018) not been implemented, but the humanitarian situation in Syria has worsened. The civilian population is living in despair, trapped between bargaining and fighting, particularly in eastern Ghouta. Over the past few weeks, not only has the fighting has not subsided; it has doubled in intensity, with a land offensive launched by the regime, supported by its allies Russia and Iran. The carefully planned offensive was unremitting, using the double strategy of terror and parallel negotiations that was used in Aleppo to obtain the surrender of combatants and the displacement of civilians. For a month there has not been a single day when eastern Ghouta, which has been besieged and starved for years, has not suffered indiscriminate shelling by the regime and its supporters. They have systematically bombed schools and hospitals and killed more than 1,700 civilians, including more than 300 children. Those deaths are the result of a deliberate strategy of the Syrian regime to forcibly bend an entire population, annihilate any form of opposition and remain in power. Nothing should justify breaches of international humanitarian law. Not one humanitarian convoy has been authorized to enter eastern Ghouta since 15 March, and almost no humanitarian assistance has 27/03/2018 The situation in the Middle East S/PV.8217 18-08569 9/21 been delivered in recent weeks. Meanwhile, there are immense needs among those still in eastern Ghouta, the majority of whom are women and children. For several days we have been witnessing forced evacuations of populations from eastern Ghouta, which could constitute crimes against humanity and war crimes. We have demanded humanitarian access to eastern Ghouta in order to provide assistance to people in their own homes, where they wish to stay as long as the ceasefire allows. That was the reason for the adoption of resolution 2401 (2018). Instead, we have witnessed just the opposite — an escalation of violence to force a massive displacement of civilians. Bombing has forced civilians, approximately 80,000 people, to flee. The displacement of people from eastern Ghouta is an integral part of the military strategy of the Syrian regime to force the opposition to capitulate. Once again, civilians are the primary victims. As I said, those forced displacements could constitute crimes against humanity and war crimes. Evidence of such crimes will be collected, preserved and used. We were clear on that point during the Arria-formula Council meeting with the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights a few days ago. Some 55,000 civilians are now in eight collective camps managed by the Syrian regime around eastern Ghouta, without water or electricity and in disastrous sanitary conditions. Their lot has not improved; their hell has simply moved a few kilometres away. We are extremely concerned about the fate of those civilians who now live in overcrowded conditions, with no assurances of protection or security, with no guarantee that they will return home. How do we protect civilians in the situation I have just described? It is absolutely urgent to protect those who can still be protected. Although the 30-day cessation of hostilities demanded by resolution 2401 (2018) has still not been implemented, that demand remains, more urgent and relevant than ever. The resolution is still the framework for our collective action. In that regard, and in line with the briefing just given by Mark Lowcock, I would like to underscore three vital demands. First, it is indispensable and urgent that humanitarian convoys be allowed to enter eastern Ghouta daily and with adequate security. Although humanitarian needs are great, the regime continues to deliberately block aid. United Nations convoys must be able to enter and make deliveries. Fighting must cease long enough to allow for delivery, unloading and distribution of supplies, including of medical assistance. The second demand concerns civilians who remain in Ghouta, who have the right to emergency humanitarian assistance and to protection. Aid must reach them where they are. To that end, the United Nations and its international and local humanitarian partners must be able to work safely on site to assess the needs of those populations. It is an obligation under international humanitarian law, but it is the minimum required to provide tangible assistance to those concerned. The protection that is due them under international humanitarian law must be unconditionally guaranteed. In that regard I call again on the responsibility of all actors with influence on the Syrian regime. The third demand, which has taken on new importance in recent days, is for assistance to be provided to the displaced civilians in camps outside Ghouta. Very concretely, that means that those populations, who have been forced to leave everything behind in order to survive, must be assured of their safety, access to basic necessities and a chance to return home when they so desire. Care must be taken that they are not threatened with retaliation, threats or persecution of any kind. In order to ensure that they are protected, the United Nations and its partners must be able to escort civilians who have been evacuated from their point of departure to their destination in the collective shelters. The United Nations and its partners must be granted continuous access to civilians living in those camps. We hope that the United Nations can strengthen its support to displaced persons who have fled eastern Ghouta. That would call for an increase in the number of international staff on site. We hope that approval will be granted to that end as soon as possible. It would also call for security guarantees for humanitarian workers. The situation in Afrin is also extremely worrisome. A great many civilians are in a critical situation. More that 180,000 people have been displaced. A single convoy was authorized, yesterday, which is insufficient given the tremendous needs of the population. Ongoing fighting in Afrin has forced the Syrian Democratic Forces to halt operations against Da'esh, whose threat, as we all know, has not dissappeared. Our position on the issue is the same. The legitimate concerns of Turkey with regard to the security of its borders cannot in any way justify a lasting military presence deep inside Syria. S/PV.8217 The situation in the Middle East 27/03/2018 10/21 18-08569 More than ever, we need the fighting to end. We call on all parties on the ground to conclude the negotiations under way and respect a cessation of hostilities. We support the efforts of the Special Envoy for Syria, Mr. Staffan de Mistura, and his commitment to resuming the Geneva process and to reaching a lasting political solution in line with resolution 2254 (2015) that starts with the establishment of an inclusive constitutional committee, under the auspices of Mr. De Mistura. It is the only way to end the Syrian crisis. It is absolutely essential to work on both the humanitarian and political fronts. I appeal on behalf of France, first, to those who can make a difference on the ground, starting with Russia. It is never to late to save lives. Let us be well aware that without urgent, decisive action, the worst is undoubtedly yet to come in the form of a worsening and enlargement of the conflict. The time has come for us to learn seriously the lessons of the Syrian tragedy. This tragedy is the illustration of a new global disorder where the rappelling ropes have disappeared due to a lack of strong international governance, a lack of a power of last resort and a lack of convergence among key actors — to which we add the well-known attitude of Russia. In other words, if we want to avoid other tragedies of this type in future, it is essential to structure the multipolar world in which we now find ourselves around a robust multilateralism embodied by a reformed United Nations. It is the only alternative to the fragmentation of the world and the return to the zones of influence — and our history teaches us all the dangers of that — and it is with the settlement of the Syrian crisis, which is our priority today and which is the emergency before us, one of the other challenges of our generation. Ms. Pierce (United Kingdom): I thank you, Mr. President, both for being here today to underscore the vital importance of this topic and, in particular, for your very powerful statement. The United Kingdom supports your call for a referral of the situation in Syria to the International Criminal Court. I also wish to express our thanks to the Under- Secretary-General for his continued efforts to keep the Security Council informed of the toll that hostilities are having on civilians in Syria. We also thank him for the heroic efforts of all his teams on the ground. Their efforts are much supported by most of us on the Council. The Under-Secretary-General's briefing eloquently underscores why it is essential that the Council comes together to agree on concrete steps to allow the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs to fulfil its mandate to ensure humanitarian assistance and protection for everybody who needs it. Ambassador Haley has laid the situation bare, Ambassador Delattre has set out the regime's intentions, and Ambassador Alotaibi has focused on the need for protection and registration. I support their calls. I will not rehearse a catalogue of suffering that we have heard expressed so eloquently today, but that omission should not be taken as any indication that the United Kingdom is not as horrified as others by what is happening on the ground. Specifically, it is diabolical that access is actually worse in the face of such suffering. Diabolical is a strong word, but there are no others to describe what is happening. The worst destruction and suffering has continued in eastern Ghouta. Those who support Al-Assad have not taken steps to help stop the violence. Instead, Al-Assad and his supporters have violated the strong words of the Security Council in resolution 2401 (2018), making mockery of the Council's authority, as Ambassador Delattre stated. Since 11 March, an estimated 100,000 people have left eastern Ghouta and are in makeshift reception sites in rural Damascus. Thousands more have been bused to Idlib. Because there is no independent monitoring nor provisions for civilian safety, those fleeing and those staying remain vulnerable and at risk of mistreatment and abuse by the regime, including being detained, disappeared or separated from their families. Humanitarians, health workers and first responders on the ground report that the regime is deliberately targeting them. That is illegal, and those who help the Al-Assad regime are complicit in that illegality. The situation continues even for those who are left behind. An estimated 150,000 civilians remain in eastern Ghouta. They suffer from acute food shortages and lack of medical supplies. They are afraid, and above all they remember how the regime punished the civilians who fled from eastern Aleppo in December 2016. That is why Ambassador Alotaibi's call for protection and registration is so urgent. We welcome United Nations plans to scale up support to deal with the dire situations in the internally displaced persons camps and collective shelters. We call on Russia to use its influence with the regime to 27/03/2018 The situation in the Middle East S/PV.8217 18-08569 11/21 ensure that the United Nations and its partners can also provide assistance and protection for those who remain in eastern Ghouta. Whether civilians choose to stay or leave, it is essential that they be protected against attack and have access to the essentials to survive. This is not just a plea on the grounds of humanity; it is a requirement under international humanitarian law. It is the job of the Council and all members of the Council to uphold international humanitarian law. Those who side with the regime in its actions are themselves guilty of violating that law. In concluding, I would like to highlight two further areas. The suffering of the Syrian people continues in Idlib, where civilians have been under attack by regime forces for many years. More than a million internally displaced Syrians live there, including those who have fled eastern Ghouta. In Afrin, we recognize Turkey's legitimate interest in the security of its borders, but at the same time we remain concerned about the impact of operations on the humanitarian situation, and my Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary have raised the need for protection of civilians and access with President Erdoğan and his Ministers. It was good to hear from the Under-Secretary-General that there may at last be signs of progress in Afrin. After seven years of conflict, over 13 million people are in need of humanitarian assistance in Syria. The Al-Assad regime has created the situation and is now preventing humanitarian actors from relieving some of the horror it has inflicted. We call on Russia to use its influence to ensure that at a minimum the United Nations can fulfil its mandate to ensure humanitarian assistance and protection for Syrians on the basis of need, regardless of any other considerations. I was at Geneva in 2012. I think we all feel that that was a huge missed opportunity, in the light of events. The situation has escalated every year since that time, and, as the Under-Secretary-General said, the level of access is worse. The Council has a small opportunity to put measures in place to reduce the risk of reprisals. As you said, Mr. President, if the Security Council cannot do it, who can? Mr. Umarov (Kazakhstan): I join others in thanking Under-Secretary-General Lowcock for his comprehensive briefing. I also wish to welcome the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, His Excellency Mr. Stephanus Abraham Blok, who is presiding over today's meeting. Kazakhstan remains committed to all Security Council resolutions aimed at solving humanitarian issues in Syria. We believe that it is most important to preserve all possible humanitarian-access modalities, including cross-border assistance, which are indispensable in bringing humanitarian aid to millions of people in Syria. Implementing resolution 2401 (2018) is a collective responsibility, with each Council member and State Member of the United Nations playing a significant role. We must all continue to do everything we can to ensure full implementation across Syria. We look forward to continued reporting on the implementation of resolution 2401 (2018) to the Council through the regular Syria briefings and reports of the Secretary- General, as stipulated in the resolution. Urgent attention must be focused on long-term humanitarian assistance, with the assurance of safe humanitarian access by the United Nations and other aid agencies, and evacuation of the wounded. We commend the sterling contribution of the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, the World Health Organization and the Syrian Arab Red Crescent for their provision of increased medical supplies and life-saving services, including surgical procedures. In that regard, we welcome the increase in humanitarian convoys gaining access to besieged areas in Syria in March, compared to previous months. It is necessary to take note of the worrisome humanitarian situation in Syria, as fighting in different parts of the country are causing massive displacement. We endorse the appeal of the United Nations to help stem the catastrophic situation for tens of thousands of people, from both eastern Ghouta and Afrin. We look forward to the next round of talks, to be held in mid-May in our capital, Astana, where the stepping up of efforts to ensure observance of the relevant agreements will be addressed. We also believe that the dialogue between Under- Secretary-General Mark Lowcock and the Government of Syria should be ongoing. We reiterate that all obligations under international humanitarian law must be respected by all parties. A further United Nations needs-assessment mission to these troubled areas, similar to that which Under-Secretary-General Lowcock led recently, may be required very soon. The Syrian authorities must cooperate fully with the United Nations and relevant humanitarian organizations in S/PV.8217 The situation in the Middle East 27/03/2018 12/21 18-08569 facilitating the unhindered provision of humanitarian assistance and thereby mitigating the suffering. Lastly, we are of the view that the crisis in Syria can be resolved only through an inclusive and Syrian-led political process, based on the Geneva communiqué of 30 June 2012 (S/2012/522, annex), subsequent Security Council resolutions and relevant statements of the International Syria Support Group. Mr. Meza-Cuadra (Peru) (spoke in Spanish): We appreciate the convening of this meeting and the briefing by Mr. Mark Lowcock, Under-Secretary- General for Humanitarian Affairs, on the humanitarian situation in Syria. We also welcome your presence here today, Sir, in presiding over our meeting. Peru deeply regrets that violence and human suffering continue to characterize the situation in Syria, 30 days after the humanitarian ceasefire demanded by the Council. Resolution 2401 (2018) remains in full force, and we consider that the Syrian Government and other actors with the capacity to influence developments on the ground are obliged to ensure its full implementation. The ceasefire should be immediate and enable unrestricted access to humanitarian assistance throughout Syrian territory. While there has been some limited progress in that regard, the delivery of humanitarian assistance must be continuous and unrestricted. In view of the Council's responsibilities in line with international law and international humanitarian law, Peru will continue to advocate for the protection of civilians in all conflicts and humanitarian crises. An indeterminate number of Syrian citizens, including thousands of women and children, have been driven out of eastern Ghouta by the violence. We note with concern that the shelters in the vicinity of Damascus cannot cope and that they lack food, clean water and medical supplies. We must remember that international humanitarian law has mandatory provisions for the evacuation of civilians. It is also compulsory to take measures to safeguard private property from looting and destruction. Syrian citizens must be able to return to their homes and businesses when security conditions improve. We must also protect the majority of the remaining population in eastern Ghouta, who are particularly vulnerable to reprisals, forced recruitment and sexual violence. We are also concerned about the humanitarian situation in Afrin, Idlib and Raqqa, among other areas of Syria. The responsibility to protect civilians cannot be conditional or subordinated to political or strategic interests. We highlight the efforts of the United Nations and other humanitarian agencies, such as the Red Cross and the Red Crescent, to assist people in such a difficult situation. They have our full support. Given the intensification of violence in recent weeks and its devastating consequences for the population, we must once again reiterate how urgent it is to make progress towards achieving a political settlement on the basis of resolution 2254 (2015) and the Geneva communiqué (S/2012/522, annex). In that regard, we hope that progress will soon be made in the establishment and composition of the constitutional committee agreed on in Sochi. All the Syrian parties, and especially the Government, must engage constructively in this. Mr. Alemu (Ethiopia): We thank Under-Secretary- General Lowcock for his comprehensive briefing. We want to express our appreciation to the United Nations and humanitarian partners for their continued selfless and courageous service in providing assistance to all Syrians in difficult circumstances. We remain concerned about the humanitarian crisis in all the areas of Syria where it is prevalent. As the Under-Secretary-General said, the Syrian war has entered its eighth year, bringing unspeakable suffering to the people of the country. The escalation of violence that we witnessed last month in eastern Ghouta and other parts of the country has been a source of extremely grave concern. According to the statement issued on 21 March by the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, shelter, protection, water and sanitation remain the key priority humanitarian needs of the internally displaced. In that regard, we thank the United Nations and its humanitarian partners for providing much-needed assistance. Alleviating the suffering of Syrians requires urgent and coordinated action on the part of all actors, while respecting the relevant resolutions of the Council, particularly resolution 2401 (2018). It was encouraging that the Council unanimously adopted resolution 2401 (2018), demanding a cessation of hostilities throughout Syria for at least 30 days so as to ensure the safe, unimpeded and sustained delivery of humanitarian aid and medical evacuations. In that regard, while much remains to be done to fully implement the resolution, compared to the previous month there has been positive 27/03/2018 The situation in the Middle East S/PV.8217 18-08569 13/21 action, including aid delivery to some of the areas that are especially badly affected and difficult to reach. The conflict has also diminished in intensity in some areas, according to the report of the Secretary-General (S/2018/243). However, this does not mean that the action taken has been sufficient. We therefore stress that it is vital to redouble our efforts to do everything possible to fully and comprehensively implement the resolution with a sense of urgency and enhanced political will. We believe that what the people of Syria need is a cessation of hostilities, along with protection and access to basic goods and services. All of those demands are contained and affirmed in resolution 2401 (2018). All Syrian parties should therefore respect and fully implement resolution 2401 (2018), and all States that have influence over the parties should try to bring the maximum pressure to bear on them, with the ultimate objective of helping to fully operationalize the resolution, which was adopted unanimously by the Council. In that regard, we hope that the Astana guarantors, Russia, Turkey and Iran, will play their role in implementing resolution 2401 (2018), strengthening the ceasefire arrangements and improving humanitarian conditions, as stated in their final statement of 16 March. In addition, while we acknowledge that the United Nations and its humanitarian partners have been able to reach millions of Syrians using all modes of aid delivery, the fact remains that humanitarian access, particularly inter-agency convoys, remains a critical challenge. In that connection, it is absolutely vital to ensure safe, sustained and need-based humanitarian access so that life-saving aid can reach all Syrians in need. Let me conclude by reaffirming that only a comprehensive political dialogue, under the auspices of the United Nations, can ultimately end the humanitarian tragedy in Syria. We reiterate our position that the only solution to the Syrian crisis is a political solution based on resolution 2254 (2015). We support the continued efforts of the Special Envoy and encourage all Syrian parties to engage with him constructively and meaningfully in order to revitalize the Geneva intra-Syrian talks and support the establishment of a constitutional committee, in line with the outcome of the Sochi congress. We fully concur with the Secretary- General, who states, in his report of 20 March, "Political efforts to bring the war to an end must be accorded priority and redoubled by all parties to the conflict." (S/2018/243, para. 48) While the primary responsibility for resolving the conflict lies with the Syrians themselves — a principle that is firmly embedded in resolution 2254 (2015) — the Council also has an important role to play in supporting the efforts in a spirit of unity, which we believe can have a positive impact on the ground in alleviating the suffering of all Syrians. That may be a tall order, in the light of the fragmentation that Ambassador Delattre mentioned earlier. However, the effort must be made. Mr. Inchauste Jordán (Plurinational State of Bolivia) (spoke in Spanish): We welcome your presence, Sir, and the fact that you are presiding over the work of the Security Council today. We would also like to thank Mr. Mark Lowcock, Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs, for his briefing. We support him in the difficult work with which he is entrusted. We must once again express our regret that this conflict has continued for eight years and that we are still witnessing the ongoing sieges and violence being endured by the Syrian people, particularly women and children. In addition to living with the psychological consequences of the situation, they urgently need humanitarian assistance. We unequivocally condemn the ongoing bombardment of civilian infrastructure such as hospitals and schools, and the military activities in residential areas in the cities of Damascus, Afrin and Idlib, as well as in eastern Ghouta. They have only led to more civilians being killed, wounded and displaced. According to the most recent report of the Secretary General (S/2018/243), between December and February alone, there were 385,000 internally displaced persons and 2.3 million people living in besieged and hard-to-reach areas. We regret that so far there are still obstacles preventing the full implementation of resolution 2401 (2018). We call on all parties involved to make every effort to ensure the effective implementation of the resolution throughout Syria in order to facilitate the safe, sustained and unhindered delivery of humanitarian aid and services, as well as to enable the medical evacuation of those who are seriously ill or injured. In addition, according to the same report, since October 2017, 86,000 civilians have returned to the city of Raqqa, of whom 20,000 arrived in February alone. Regrettably, 130 civilians have died and 658 have been seriously injured by explosive remnants of war and anti-personnel mines. In that regard, we would like to highlight the visit by the United Nations mission to Raqqa last week. We reiterate that the work of clearing S/PV.8217 The situation in the Middle East 27/03/2018 14/21 18-08569 anti-personnel mines and explosive remnants of war is crucial to facilitating the safe return of the displaced. While it does not reflect what has gone on throughout Syrian territory, it is important to highlight the recent delivery of humanitarian aid through convoys, of which the first, on 5 March, was to Douma in eastern Ghouta, bringing food for more than 27,000 people. We also believe that cross-border assistance is an important part of the response to the situation, and we highlight the food assistance to 2 million people and the dispatch by the United Nations to areas of northern and southern Syria of 449 trucks carrying aid for 1 million people. We welcome the efforts of the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, all the humanitarian agencies concerned and the Russian Federation that have enabled humanitarian assistance to be delivered to various populations, in particular in eastern Ghouta, which three convoys recently entered. We call for that assistance to continue as safely as possible. In that regard, we believe it is important to strengthen the dialogue and coordination among the humanitarian agencies, the United Nations and the Syrian Government in order to facilitate the entry of convoys and humanitarian aid workers, as well as the safe and dignified return of refugees and internally displaced persons. We emphasize the dangerous work of the personnel of the various agencies and humanitarian assistance bodies, whose staff risk their own lives in carrying out their dangerous work on the ground. We therefore reiterate the importance of full respect for international humanitarian law and international human rights law. We want to take this opportunity to reiterate how important it is to build on the political momentum following the commitments made at the Syrian National Dialogue Congress in Sochi. That should be the channel for reinforcing the Geneva process, led by the United Nations in the context of resolution 2254 (2016). We hope for the speedy implementation of the Sochi outcome and, as a result, the establishment of a constitutional committee that can facilitate a viable political transition. In that regard, we support the results of the latest Astana meeting, which enabled the agreements establishing de-escalation zones to be strengthened. We hope they will be reflected on the ground so as to reduce the violence and meet the urgent humanitarian needs. We condemn any attempt to foment fragmentation or sectarianism in Syria and believe that it is the Syrian people who must freely decide their future and their political leadership in the context of their sovereignty and territorial integrity. Finally, we reiterate that the only way to resolve the conflict is through an inclusive, negotiated and agreed political process, led by and for the Syrian people, and aimed at achieving sustainable peace on their territory without foreign pressure of any kind. Mr. Nebenzia (Russian Federation) (spoke in Russian): We would like to welcome you as you preside over the Council today, Sir. We also welcome Ms. Karen Pierce, Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom, who is now here with us. We thank Mr. Lowcock for his briefing. The difficult humanitarian situation continues in a number of areas in Syria. The Russian Federation has been taking active steps to normalize things, including within the framework of the implementation of resolution 2401 (2018). While some here may not like it, it is a fact that we are the only ones who have been making concrete efforts to implement resolution 2401 (2018). Since we first established humanitarian pauses, with the assistance of the Russian Centre for Reconciliation of Opposing Sides in the Syrian Arab Republic, and the participation and oversight of the United Nations and the Syrian Arab Red Crescent, nearly 121,000 people have been evacuated, on a strictly voluntarily basis — let me stress that — from eastern Ghouta. Many of them have talked about how difficult it has been for them to live under the repressive regime established by the armed group militants. Civilians continue to flee eastern Ghouta through the Muhayam-Al-Wafedin humanitarian corridor. There is real-time video of this running on the Russian Defence Ministry's official website. In just the past few days more than 520 civilians have left Douma. Russian agencies have organized the distribution to them of hot food, food kits and individual food rations, as well as bottled drinking water. Yesterday alone, Russian military doctors treated 111 civilians, including 42 children. At the same time, the Russian Centre for Reconciliation continues to organize the return of residents of Saqba and Kafr Batna. On 24 March, as a result of an agreement reached by the Centre with leaders of illegal armed groups, another checkpoint was opened for fighters and their family members to leave from Harasta, Arbin, Zamalka, Ain Terma and Jobar. In the past few days, militias from the Ahrar Al-Sham 27/03/2018 The situation in the Middle East S/PV.8217 18-08569 15/21 and Faylak Al-Rahman groups and their relatives have been evacuated along the corridor and bused to Idlib governorate. In three days, more than 13,000 people were evacuated from Arbin alone. However, many have decided to remain, taking advantage of the presidential amnesty. Incidentally, there have been active efforts to plant stories about detentions and torture and possibly even executions. They are lies. The Syrian police are ensuring that these operations are safe, under the oversight of specialists from the Russian Centre for Reconciliation and representatives of the Syrian Arab Red Crescent. Yesterday 26 Syrian soldiers and civilians who had been taken prisoner by Faylak Al-Rahman were freed. In our view, those facts clearly attest to the difficulty and extent of the work being done by the Russian specialists on the ground, in communication with the Syrian authorities and the leaders of the armed groups. There are some members of the Security Council who prefer wasting their time on inflammatory speeches and letters making groundless claims about our country, probably to conceal their own unwillingness to do anything constructive to implement resolution 2401 (2018) in cooperation with the groups they sponsor. At the same time, yesterday the fighters from Jaysh Al-Islam who remain in Douma detonated four mines yesterday in several districts in Damascus. Six civilians died and another six were wounded. Al-Mazraa, a residential neighbourhood in the capital was shelled earlier. As a result of mine explosions around the Al-Fayhaa sports complex, a 12-year-old boy died and seven children were injured. Hundreds of people have died from mine explosions in Damascus overall. This is apparently the message that the militants are sending every day about the willingness to implement the ceasefire that they loudly proclaimed in their famous letter to the Secretary-General. I want to again point out the importance of clarifying the data used in the Secretary-General's report (S/2018/138), including on possible attacks on civilian infrastructure and the victims of such attacks. Where does that information come from? The February report has a footnote that mentions various United Nations agencies and departments of the Secretariat. The main source cited is the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, which does not have a staff presence on the ground. The big question, and what we are trying to get to the bottom of, is who is providing the United Nations staff with this kind of information? Is it the anti-Government groups and terrorist accomplices like the White Helmets? But they are interested parties. So why is there only a sprinkling of the information provided by the Syrian authorities? We call on the United Nations, humanitarian organizations and States to deliver urgent assistance to help the people who are evacuating eastern Ghouta. It is also essential to strengthen the United Nations presence around the humanitarian corridors. The Syrians need immediate assistance with the infrastructure reconstruction that the Syrian Government has begun in the liberated residential areas of eastern Ghouta. We would like to ask Mr. Lowcock to oversee that issue personally. We also hope that as soon as possible the coalition will create the conditions and provide the necessary security guarantees enabling a United Nations assessment mission to be sent to Raqqa and humanitarian convoys to the Rukban camp. The Syrian authorities gave their official consent to this some time ago, as Mark Lowcock confirmed today. We should note that we were shocked by the recent reports that more than 2,000 civilians may have died during the coalition forces' assault on Raqqa. Let me ask it once again — where were the weeping and wailing and calls for humanitarian aid then? We have noted the statistics in the Secretary-General's report on the numbers of people who have returned to Raqqa, but we would like to see similar information on other parts of Syria and the country as a whole. How many people are returning to their permanent homes? We would like to propose to the United Nations representatives that they designate the areas where those indicators are the highest as a priority for the delivery of humanitarian assistance and monitor how effectively it is being implemented. We also think it would be appropriate to include information on reconstruction assistance in the reports. Resolution 2401 (2018) stipulates that Syrian districts, including those that have been liberated from terrorists, need support in restoring normal functioning and stability. One of the key areas in that regard is mine clearance. We get the feeling that external donors are losing interest in delivering assistance to residents in areas under Syrian Government control. We are seeing signals from some capitals that only opposition-held enclaves should be helped. Such double standards go completely against the core principles of neutrality and impartial humanitarian assistance. We hope that we are wrong about this and that Mr. Lowcock will refute the S/PV.8217 The situation in the Middle East 27/03/2018 16/21 18-08569 possibility of such a trend. But if our suspicions are borne out, how does the United Nations intend to deal with the issue? Just the other day a meeting of senior officials was held in Oslo under the auspices of the United Nations and the European Union to address the humanitarian situation in Syria. No representatives of the Syrian authorities were invited. How does Mr. Lowcock view the prospect of another assessment of the humanitarian situation in Syria without the participation of its official representatives? Does he consider that a productive format? That is a very urgent question considering that the forthcoming second donor conference is scheduled for the end of April in Brussels. I would also like to ask Mr. Lowcock what is known at the United Nations about the facts of sexual services being provided in exchange for humanitarian assistance in the context of cross-border operations. There is information about that in the November report of the United Nations Population Fund, and the BBC did a journalistic investigation of the issue. If this issue is known about, why is it avoided in the Secretary- General's reports? And if it is not known about, it should be investigated. We hope that in close cooperation with the Syrian authorities and consideration of their views, the United Nations will agree on an emergency humanitarian response plan for this year as soon as possible, with an emphasis on the delivery of assistance to liberated areas. Ms. Wronecka (Poland): I would like to welcome you here today, Sir, and to commend the presidency's leadership. I would also like to thank Under-Secretary- General Mark Lowcock for his comprehensive but once again alarming update. Like many around this table, we share a sense of urgency on this issue, especially following the adoption of resolution 2401 (2018), which we adopted unanimously a month ago. Unfortunately, we have to recognize that it has not been implemented in the first 30 days since its adoption. We are meeting again when there has been no substantial change on the ground and the fighting is far from over. The military offensive in Syria continues and the human suffering is growing as a result. Any action, even against terrorists, cannot justify attacks on innocent civilians and civilian infrastructure, including health facilities. That must stop, and the parties to the conflict must strictly comply with their obligations under international humanitarian law. Accountability for serious violations is a requirement under international law and central to achieving sustainable peace in Syria. As indicated in the last report of the United Nations-mandated Commission of Inquiry, there is a need for the international community to take a broader view of accountability and to take urgent steps to ensure that the needs of Syrian conflict victims for justice and accountability are met both immediately and in the long term. We call upon all parties to alleviate the suffering of the civilians, including children, by granting them free and safe access to humanitarian assistance, including voluntary medical evacuation, which should be strictly overseen by the United Nations and the implementing partners in order to ensure the voluntary character of the process. While discussing evacuations, let me underline that people must have the right to return and to a safe location for settlement. Any evacuation negotiations should also include civilians. Humanitarian aid convoys to eastern Ghouta must continue for those who choose to stay. We would like to stress that all actors should use their full influence to immediately improve conditions on the ground. We urgently call for the cessation of hostilities in the whole of Syria. Attacks against civilians, civilian property and medical facilities must stop in order to alleviate the humanitarian suffering of the Syrian people. Some small positive steps have taken place, such as a larger number of humanitarian convoys reaching the besieged areas in March, especially when compared to previous months, when humanitarian access was almost completely blocked. That improvement shows that it is possible to make progress, although much more is needed. In that context, we call on Russia, Iran and Turkey — as the European Union did, and as the High Representatives did through their respective ministers after the Foreign Affairs Council of the European Union in February — to fulfil their obligations and responsibilities as Astana guarantors. It is also important to note that the cessation of hostilities may also provide a chance for the peace talks under the auspices of the United Nations in Geneva to gain momentum so that a political solution may finally be reached. Once again, let me underline that we should seek to reach an intra-Syrian framework political agreement, in line with Council resolution 2254 (2015). In that connection, we strongly believe that the conclusions of the Congress of Syrian 27/03/2018 The situation in the Middle East S/PV.8217 18-08569 17/21 National Dialogue in Sochi could and should be used to advance the Geneva process, especially with regard to the creation of a constitutional committee by United Nations Special Envoy Staffan de Mistura. In conclusion, let me stress the necessity of maintaining the unity of the Council on the question of the full implementation of the humanitarian resolution across Syria. The civilian population of Syria has already suffered too much. The adoption of the resolution was just the beginning of the process. We call on all with influence on the ground to take the necessary steps to ensure that the fighting stops, the Syrian people are protected and, finally, our joint humanitarian access and necessary medical evacuations continue. Mr. Ndong Mba (Equatorial Guinea) (spoke in Spanish): We welcome Mr. Stef Blok, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands, to New York. We take this opportunity to congratulate him for the commendable presidency of the Netherlands during the month of March. The Republic of Equatorial Guinea is grateful for the holding of this informative meeting, which enables us to once again assess humanitarian resolution 2401 (2018), which we approved one month ago. We thank Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs Mark Lowcock, who, as he always does, has just given us a very informative and detailed briefing on the developments on the ground in Syria. The 30-day ceasefire throughout Syria, established under resolution 2401 (2018) in order to carry out humanitarian operations, has expired. Despite the diplomatic efforts of the United Nations team in Syria, violence has increased in eastern Ghouta, in Damascus, in Idlib and in Afrin, where there is an ongoing Turkish military offensive. Daily air strikes and bombardments have increased, including in residential areas, among Government forces, opposition forces and non-State armed groups, making it difficult to ensure the protection of all civilians and the immediate, secure and sustained provision of humanitarian aid. That excessive resurgence of violence, orchestrated by the various parties, only serves to exacerbate and aggravate the already grim humanitarian situation in those conflict zones. As we have reiterated, the solution to the humanitarian crisis in Syria is tightly linked with a ceasefire. The prolongation of the conflict can only further aggravate the tragic humanitarian situation, which in turn creates greater instability and negatively affects neighbouring countries that take in the millions of refugees fleeing the war. As the Secretary-General underlines in his 20 March report: "Our common objective" — and one of high priority — "should be to alleviate and end the suffering of the Syrian people. What the Syrian people need immediately has been made abundantly clear and affirmed in resolution 2401 (2018). Civilians need a cessation of hostilities, protection, access to basic goods and services" — and access to humanitarian and sanitary assistance — "and an end to sieges." (S/2018/243, para. 48) All parties involved in the Syrian crisis must accept that none of them can achieve a military victory. Government forces, opposition forces and armed groups must accept that no matter how much death and destruction they cause in their country, there will be no victor but rather one single loser — the Syrian people. Similarly, national parties and international partners that have significant political and geostrategic interests and that have the capacity to exercise their influence on their respective allies must redouble their efforts and political commitments in order to bring sustainable peace and stability to the country. Any party that insists on political red lines that block the necessary commitments must also consider the setback caused by the loss of innocent human lives. It is evident that the Council has not entirely reached its goal by unanimously adopting resolution 2401 (2018). The Republic of Equatorial Guinea will support any humanitarian initiative that seeks to definitively put an end to the suffering of the Syrian people. In conclusion, I renew the tribute of the Republic of Equatorial Guinea to Mr. Lowcock and to the entire humanitarian team of the United Nations for their noble and tireless work in Syria to provide relief to the Syrian people living through a humanitarian catastrophe. Mr. Dah (Côte d'Ivoire) (spoke in French): Like others, my delegation would like to welcome Mr. Stef Blok to New York and to congratulate him on the holding of the current meeting in the Security Council. My delegation also wishes to thank Mr. Mark Lowcock, Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs, for his informative briefing on the humanitarian situation in Syria. S/PV.8217 The situation in the Middle East 27/03/2018 18/21 18-08569 As we are all aware, the war in Syria has unleashed one of the most serious humanitarian crises in recent history and continues to have a devastating impact on the Syrian people. My country remains particularly concerned about the attacks and bombings, including those against hospitals and civilian infrastructure, that continue to punctuate the daily lives of people subjected to forced displacement in the areas of Afrin, Idlib and eastern Ghouta. Côte d'Ivoire condemns those actions and calls on the parties to take the steps necessary to protect people, civilian infrastructure and humanitarian personnel. More than a month after its unanimous adoption by members of the Security Council, resolution 2401 (2018), on which so much hope was pinned, has fallen woefully short of our expectations, much to our regret. The fact is that the demand for an immediate cessation of hostilities to allow safe and unhindered delivery of humanitarian aid and related services, as well as medical evacuation of the seriously ill and wounded, in accordance with relevant international humanitarian law, has still not been adhered to, despite our joint efforts. The ongoing fighting has forced hundreds of thousands of civilians to flee to camps and makeshift shelters where living conditions are extremely difficult. Côte d'Ivoire calls once again for the effective implementation of resolution 2401 (2018) with a view to resuming the delivery of humanitarian aid, including medical evacuations from besieged areas and camps for internally displaced persons, in order to ease the suffering of people in distress. We urge the Council to overcome its differences and to demonstrate unity in order to ensure the effective implementation of the resolution, which is more relevant than ever. My delegation reiterates its belief that the humanitarian situation will not improve unless significant progress is made at the political level, as the two issues are closely linked. We therefore encourage the parties to prioritize political dialogue and resume peace talks in the framework of the Geneva process, in accordance with the road map established by resolution 2254 (2015). Mr. Wu Haitao (China) (spoke in Chinese): I thank Under-Secretary-General Lowcock for his briefing. China commends the active efforts of the relevant United Nations agencies to alleviate the humanitarian situation in some areas of Syria. The conflict in Syria is in its eighth year and has caused terrible suffering for the people of Syria. The humanitarian situation in parts of the country has recently deteriorated. China calls on all parties in Syria to put its country's future and destiny, as well as its people's safety, security and well-being first, cease hostilities and violence without delay, resolve their differences through dialogue and consultation and ease the humanitarian situation in Syria as soon as possible. United Nations humanitarian convoys have now gained access to eastern Ghouta in order to deliver aid supplies to the people there. China welcomes Russia's establishment of temporary truces in eastern Ghouta, opening up a humanitarian corridor for Syrian civilians. As a result of the efforts of the parties concerned, some ceasefire agreements have been reached and a large number of civilians evacuated through the corridor. In the circumstances, it is important to continue to promote the implementation of resolution 2401 (2018) so as to alleviate the humanitarian situation in areas such as eastern Ghouta. China welcomes the meeting between Foreign Ministers held by Russia, Turkey and Iran in Astana, and commends Kazakhstan for hosting the meeting. We hope that the upcoming meeting of the Heads of State of the three countries and the next round of the Astana dialogue will contribute positively to restoring the ceasefire momentum in Syria and supporting the Geneva talks. The international community should continue to support the role of the United Nations as the main mediator, and back Special Envoy de Mistura's diplomatic efforts to relaunch the Syrian political process. Syria's sovereignty, independence, unity and territorial integrity must be respected, and all Syrian parties must be encouraged to reach a political solution to the Syrian issue, based on the principle of the Syrian-led and Syrian-owned peace process, and in accordance with resolution 2254 (2015), with a view to fundamentally easing the humanitarian situation in Syria and continuing to advance the counter-terrorism agenda, as mandated by the Council's resolutions. The Council should remain united on the Syrian issue and speak with one voice. China stands ready to work with the international community and to contribute actively and constructively to a political settlement of the Syrian issue. 27/03/2018 The situation in the Middle East S/PV.8217 18-08569 19/21 Mr. Orrenius Skau (Sweden): As the representative of Kuwait has already delivered a joint statement on our behalf, I will make my remarks very brief. One month ago, the Council adopted resolution 2401 (2018) by consensus, in response to the deafening calls for action to address the horrific humanitarian situation in Syria. Today we have heard around this table a continued commitment to moving forward with the implementation of that important resolution. I wanted to speak last in order to identify some points of convergence. From the discussion today, I believe that there are a number of critical areas where there is broad agreement within the Council. First, we all share a deep disappointment and sense of dissatisfaction and frustration with the lack of implementation. While a limited increase in access for humanitarian convoys shows that progress is possible, much more is needed. The resolution remains in force and all parties remain obliged to comply. Secondly, we have heard a common concern about the continuing hostilities throughout the country, particularly the ongoing military offensive in eastern Ghouta. Those who leave the area should do so voluntarily, with the right to return and a choice of safe places to go to. At the same time, humanitarian aid convoys must continue to support those who choose to remain. Thirdly, we agree that efforts to strengthen the protection of civilians must be stepped up by the United Nations and its partners, both inside eastern Ghouta and for those leaving and in the collective shelters. I want to emphasize that preventing sexual and gender-based violence should be an integral part of those efforts. We condemn the attacks in February that affected health facilities. Many colleagues also reiterated today that resolution 2401 (2018) applies across the whole of the country. I just wanted to mention our concern about the Turkish operation in Afrin and the statements that Turkey has made about expanding its military operations in the north, beyond Afrin. We are also concerned about the protection of civilians fleeing Afrin, as well as the difficult conditions for those remaining. We call on all relevant parties, especially Turkey, to ensure the protection of civilians and facilitate cross-border and cross-line humanitarian aid deliveries, as well as freedom of movement, for internally displaced persons. The need for the full implementation of resolution 2401 (2018) remains as urgent today as when it was adopted. As Ambassador Alotaibi has said, we will spare no effort in making progress on the implementation of resolution 2401 (2018). We will continue to work actively and tirelessly to that end, be creative in considering possible further steps, and remain ready to reconvene the Council at any time should the situation warrant its renewed action. We are convinced that the unity of the Council, as difficult as it may be, is the only way to effectively make a real difference on the ground and alleviate the suffering of the Syrian people. For our part, even when terribly frustrated, we will never give up trying to achieve that change. The President: I now give the floor to the representative of the Syrian Arab Republic. Mr. Ja'afari (Syrian Arab Republic) (spoke in Arabic): At the outset, I would like to convey the condolences of the Government and people of my country to my colleague on the Russian Federation delegation in the wake of the tragic incident that claimed children's lives in the commercial centre in Kemerovo. A few minutes ago, I was checking the list of the States members of the Security Council and I realized that two — only two — of its 15 members have embassies in Damascus. That is why the statements made by the representatives of those two countries offered the most accurate description of the humanitarian situation in my country. They were able to provide an objective and fair assessment of the situation there. In late 2016, right here in the Chamber (see S/PV.7834), we announced the good news to our people in Syria that the Syrian Government would liberate eastern Aleppo from armed terrorist groups, and as a Government, an army and a responsible State we have done just that. Today we announce to our people the good news that the time has come to liberate all of eastern Ghouta from these armed terrorist groups. We declare that we will liberate the Golan, Afrin, Raqqa, Idlib and the rest of our occupied territory because, as a State, we reject the presence on our territory of any illegal armed group or occupying Power, regardless of the excuses, just like all other States represented in the Council. Such victories would not have been possible if we had no just cause. They would not have been possible without the sacrifices made by the Syrian Arab Army, the support of our people and the support of our allies and friends. S/PV.8217 The situation in the Middle East 27/03/2018 20/21 18-08569 Facts that have come to light recently with the liberation of eastern Ghouta from armed terrorist groups again prove what we have always told the Council since the first day of the global terrorist war waged by Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Israel, Turkey, the United States, the United Kingdom and France against my country. We said that the suffering of Syrians is the result of the practices of armed terrorist groups against civilians. The testimonies of the tens of thousands of our people leaving eastern Ghouta underscore that those groups have continued to deprive them of their freedom, destroy their livelihoods, disperse their families and prevent them from leaving to areas under State control in order to continue using them as human shields. They have seized control of humanitarian assistance in order to distribute it to their supporters or sell it to civilians at exorbitant prices. They have also targeted the safe corridors allocated by the Government with explosive bullets and mortar shelling, which has led to the death of dozens of people, including some Palestinian brethren. We have borne witness to a state of hysteria in recent days and weeks in the Council as the Syrian Government has sought to exercise its sovereign right, combat terrorist groups and eliminate terrorists in Syria in order to restore security and stability to all Syrians and implement Council resolutions against terrorism. That state of hysteria proves that the States supporting those terrorist groups have never sought to end the suffering of Syrians. They have sought only to perpetuate and prolong their suffering in order to blackmail the Syrian Government, at the political and humanitarian levels, and save terrorists from their certain deaths. I would like to assure the supporters of terrorism, some of whom are present in this Chamber, that the plan that they have promoted for the past seven years has failed. Their plan was to deny that the Islamist takfiri groups were terrorists and instead present them as moderate Syrian opposition. That plan has failed. Eastern Ghouta has not fallen, as my colleague the representative of the United States stated. It was liberated in the same way we liberated eastern Aleppo. It is terrorism that has fallen in eastern Ghouta, not civilians. As the representative of the United States said, today should be a day of shame for the supporters and sponsors of terrorism and terrorist groups. They have supported those terrorist groups for years in order to topple the Syrian Government by force in favour of Islamist takfiri groups. Such actions have led to considerable suffering among the Syrian people, and I have proof of it. Two days ago, at the Senate Armed Forces Committee, led by Senator Lindsey Graham, the Chief of Central Command, General Joseph Votel, stated that "the change of the Government in Syria by force in favour a number of Islamist opposition groups has failed". The Security Council has to date held 49 formal meetings to discuss the so-called humanitarian situation in Syria and a number of informal emergency and Arria Formula meetings. The Council has read reports and heard briefings that were replete with falsehoods that senior officials of the United Nations sought to present in order to serve the policies of some influential Western countries that are members of the Council and to pressure the Syrian Government. Such reports and briefings were completely devoid of professionalism and objectivity. They have failed to take note of the attacks on the sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity of the Syrian Arab Republic, including the attacks by the international coalition, led by the United States, and those by the Turkish regime and the Israeli occupying force. Those same parties have also sought to provide all kinds of support to terrorist groups associated with Da'esh, the Al-Nusra Front and other militias fabricated in those countries. After 49 reports and hundreds of meetings, briefings and thousands of working hours, some countries continue to refuse to recognize that the humanitarian crisis in Syria is the result of an external investment in terrorism and unilateral coercive measures. Forty-nine reports have been issued, and I say today that my words are falling on deaf ears. People from the Netherlands say that beautiful flowers have thorns. The Netherlands is famous for its flowers. Perhaps that saying reflects the situation on the ground. Mr. Lowcock stated that the Kashkul was targeted by a missile but he did not specify its origin. He said there are eight shelters for those leaving eastern Ghouta. He did not mention the efforts of the Syrian Government to host the 150,000 civilians leaving eastern Ghouta. He does not know who manages those shelters. Perhaps aliens are taking care of the 150,000 civilians. Mr. Lowcock stated that the United Nations, its partners and the Syrian Red Crescent are helping people from Ghouta. He did not mention the Government at all. If the Government has no role to play, why ask it to help the Council? Why does the Council request its approval for the entry of humanitarian convoys? Mr. Lowcock stated that 153,000 people left Afrin and went to Tell 27/03/2018 The situation in the Middle East S/PV.8217 18-08569 21/21 Rifaat because of military operations. Who forced 153,000 people to leave Afrin? Was it not Turkey that forced them to leave? Was it not the Turkish aggression against Afrin that forced these people to leave? Mr. Lowcock mentioned the Syrian Government only once, saying that it approved the delivery of humanitarian assistance to the Rukban camp. He did not say that the United States was behind the obstacles preventing the deployment of the humanitarian convoy in question. The United States occupies the Rukban camp and the Tanf area. I will not go into detail now for the sake of time. I will not even go into the details of the forty-ninth report of the Secretary-General (S/2018/243). I will give only one example to prove that the report lacks objectivity and impartiality. The report devotes nine paragraphs to the suffering of civilians in eastern Ghouta and the damage to the infrastructure there as a result of Government military operations, as the report claims — nine paragraphs. As for the situation of the 8 million civilians in Damascus, the targeting by terrorist groups of the capital with more than 2,500 missiles, the killing and injury of thousands, and the destruction of homes, hospitals and clinics, the report dedicates only one sentence to Damascus. The report says, "Attacks on residential neighbourhoods of Damascus also continued from eastern Ghouta, resulting in deaths, injuries and damage to civilian infrastructure." (S/2018/243, para. 8) We hope that the United Nations will not adopt in eastern Ghouta the same approach that it has taken in previous situations by not providing support to the areas liberated or achieving reconciliation. We hope that the United Nations will adopt a new approach in line with the Charter and international law, based on full coordination and cooperation with the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic, which is the only party concerned with the protection and support of Syrians. We hope that the United Nations will not succumb to the dictates of certain influential Western countries in the Council that run counter to humanitarian action, the Charter and international law. During the past week alone, the Syrian Ministry of Commerce has distributed 4,000 tons of food to civilians leaving eastern Ghouta. I am not sure about the sources mentioned by the representative of France, because France does not have an embassy in Damascus. So its sources of information cannot be credible. In conclusion, the States sponsoring terrorism have instructed armed terrorist groups to use chemical weapons once again in Syria. I ask the Council to pay attention to this information. They asked them to fabricate evidence, as they have in the past, in order to accuse the Syrian Government. We sent this information to the President of the Security Council yesterday. According to that information, this theatrical act will be produced by the intelligence agencies of these countries, and the starring roles will be the White Helmets. The production will be directed by foreign media. This theatrical act will take place this time in the areas close to the separation line in the Syrian occupied Golan. Terrorist groups will use poison gas against civilians in Al-Harra. Afterwards, the injured will be moved to the hospitals of the Israeli enemy for treatment there. Council members can already imagine the testimony that will be offered by doctors of the Israeli occupation forces. The information we submitted also refers to another theatrical act in the villages of Habit and Qalb Lawza in the suburbs of Idlib, where a number of satellite transmitters and foreign experts have been spotted. This time, the cast will include women and children from an internally displaced persons camp on the Syrian-Turkish border. Once again, I provide the Council with this serious information. The President: There are no more names inscribed on the list of speakers. I now invite Council members to informal consultations to continue our discussion on the subject. The meeting rose at 1.15 p.m.
El mundo con los ojos puestos en Barack Obama Varios medios informan al respecto: "The Economist": "Challenges facing Barack Obama: Obama's world. How will a 21st-century president fare in a 19th-century world?": http://www.economist.com/displaystory.cfm?story_id=12551938 "The economic crisis: Wolves at the door. Financial mess and gathering recession dominate Barack Obama's economic agenda": http://www.economist.com/displaystory.cfm?story_id=12551926 "The presidency: Signed, sealed, delivered. Barack Obama owes his victory to blacks, Hispanics, the young, women of all races, the poor and the very rich": http://www.economist.com/world/unitedstates/displaystory.cfm?story_id=12566893 "El País" de Madrid: "El primer cara a cara entre Obama y Bush, frente a la Casa Blanca": http://www.elpais.com/articulo/internacional/primer/cara/cara/Obama/Bush/frente/Casa/Blanca/elpepuint/20081110elpepuint_4/Tes"El mundo que espera a Barack Obama: Las guerras de Irak y Afganistán y la crisis con Irán y Rusia son las prioridades - La nueva Administración es partidaria de rebajar las sanciones contra Cuba": http://www.elpais.com/articulo/internacional/mundo/espera/Barack/Obama/elpepuint/20081110elpepiint_1/Tes"Le Monde":"Barack Obama annonce un plan de relance":http://www.lemonde.fr/elections-americaines/article/2008/11/08/barack-obama-annonce-un-plan-de-relance_1116415_829254.html#ens_id=863164"CNN":"Bushes welcome Obamas to White House": http://edition.cnn.com/2008/POLITICS/11/10/obama.bush/index.html"CNN" presenta sitio con links a artículos relacionados a la victoria de Barack Obama:http://topics.edition.cnn.com/topics/barack_obama"MSNBC":"Obama planning U.S. trials for Gitmo detainees: President-elect has described camp as 'sad chapter in American history'": http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/27640617/"Who will be Obama's top diplomat?: The next secretary of state will face challenges in Iraq, Russia, Pakistan": http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/27678239/"El Tiempo" de Colombia:"Barack Obama y George Bush se reunieron por dos horas para alistar cambio en la Casa Blanca": http://www.eltiempo.com/mundo/euycanada/home/barack-obama-y-george-bush-se-reunieron-por-dos-horas-para-alistar-cambio-en-la-casa-blanca_4656194-1"BBC":"Obama meets Bush at White House": http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/us_elections_2008/7720137.stm"Times":"Bush 'rebuffed Obama on car industry bailout'": http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/us_and_americas/article5130170.ece"Times" presenta sitio con links a artículos relacionados a la victoria de Barack Obama:http://timesonline.newspaperdirect.com/epaper/viewer.aspx"La Nación":"Obama, en busca de un posible acercamiento a Afganistán e Irán: Según publica el diario The Washington Post citando a asesores de presidente electo, la estrategia "más regional" se pondría en marcha al comienzo del mandato": http://www.lanacion.com.ar/nota.asp?nota_id=1068879"Barack y Obama, los nombres de moda: La obamamanía llega a los bebes": http://www.lanacion.com.ar/nota.asp?nota_id=1068764"Obama ya puso un pie en la Casa Blanca: Se reunió con Bush para iniciar la complicada transición": http://www.lanacion.com.ar/nota.asp?nota_id=1068759"Consejos para el presidente electo: Por Andrés Oppenheimer": http://www.lanacion.com.ar/nota.asp?nota_id=1068731"Obama pretende trasladar a los presos de Guantánamo a EE.UU.: Sería el primer paso para cumplir su promesa de cerrar la controvertida cárcel": http://www.lanacion.com.ar/nota.asp?nota_id=1068728"China Daily":"Bush, Obama all smiles during White House visit": http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/world/2008-11/11/content_7192994.htm"El Mercurio" de Chile:"Matrimonio Bush recibió con sonrisas a los Obama en la primera visita a su nueva casa":http://diario.elmercurio.com/2008/11/11/internacional/_portada/noticias/2C1E60CF-E333-4C8B-AA6B-1D8435085F1B.htm?id={2C1E60CF-E333-4C8B-AA6B-1D8435085F1B}"Time":"Time" presenta sitio con links a artículos relacionados a la victoria de Barack Obama:http://www.time.com/time/politics AMERICA LATINA "CNN" informa: "Flooding, heavy rains delay Honduras elections": http://edition.cnn.com/2008/WORLD/americas/11/05/honduras.elections.ap/index.html"El Tiempo" de Colombia anuncia: "Huracán 'Paloma' se esfuma sobre Cuba sin dejar víctimas pero sí 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'deaths'": http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/7721253.stm"El Tiempo" de Colombia anuncia: "Oposición rechaza cómputos de elecciones municipales en Nicaragua, donde sandinistas llevan ventaja": http://www.eltiempo.com/mundo/latinoamerica/home/oposicion-rechaza-computos-de-elecciones-municipales-en-nicaragua-donde-sandinistas-llevan-ventaja_4654457-1"El País" de Madrid plantea: "Calderón nombra a un abogado como nuevo secretario de Gobernación de México: Fernando Francisco Gomez Mont sustituirá a Juan Camilo Mouriño, quien falleció la semana pasada en un accidente aéreo en Ciudad de México": http://www.elpais.com/articulo/internacional/Calderon/nombra/abogado/nuevo/secretario/Gobernacion/Mexico/elpepuint/20081110elpepuint_13/Tes"CNN" anuncia: "New Mexico interior minister named after deadly crash": http://edition.cnn.com/2008/WORLD/americas/11/10/mexico.interior.ministry/index.html"El Mercurio" de Chile informa: "Calderón y Uribe acuerdan crear un frente común contra la delincuencia transnacional: Mandatarios fortalecerán cooperación en lucha antidrogas, seguridad y justicia.": http://diario.elmercurio.com/2008/11/11/internacional/_portada/noticias/C828EDE7-B5C1-4892-BA3F-958EA29AEAF1.htm?id={C828EDE7-B5C1-4892-BA3F-958EA29AEAF1}"CNN" informa: "FARC rebels to exchange letters on hostages": http://edition.cnn.com/2008/WORLD/americas/10/28/colombia.farc/index.html"El Universal" de Méjico plantea: " Preparó las FARC a jóvenes para infiltrarlos en universidades: La escuela de formación hacía parte de los frentes de las FARC y durante la instrucción a los jóvenes les designaban la universidad a la que debían ingresar": http://www.eluniversal.com.mx/notas/554657.html"El Mercurio" de Chile informa: "Jorge Enrique Botero, periodista que escribe sobre la guerrilla colombiana: "Las FARC han recibido este año los golpes más grandes de toda su historia"": http://diario.elmercurio.com/2008/11/11/internacional/internacional/noticias/BA1A228F-15B7-4C7C-8AC2-558AC883539D.htm?id={BA1A228F-15B7-4C7C-8AC2-558AC883539D}"El Tiempo" de Colombia anuncia: "Hugo Chávez ordena tomar militarmente aeropuerto de estado gobernado por disidente": http://www.eltiempo.com/mundo/latinoamerica/home/hugo-chavez-ordena-tomar-militarmente-aeropuerto-de-estado-gobernado-por-disidente_4655811-1"La Nación" publica: "Militariza Chávez un aeropuerto regional : Ofensiva del mandatario contra el gobernador de Sucre": http://www.lanacion.com.ar/nota.asp?nota_id=1068724"El Universal" de Méjico publica: "Muestran a Lugo documentos sobre víctimas de dictadura": http://www.eluniversal.com.mx/notas/554636.html"La Nación" informa: "Uruguay: el Senado aprobó la despenalización del aborto: Con 17 votos a favor dio luz verde a la polémica ley; Tabaré Vázquez, férreo opositor, podría vetarla":http://www.lanacion.com.ar/nota.asp?nota_id=1068827"El País" de Madrid plantea: "China busca tener peso político y comercial en Latinoamérica: Pekín fija como prioridades la energía y los minerales": http://www.elpais.com/articulo/internacional/China/busca/tener/peso/politico/comercial/Latinoamerica/elpepuint/20081110elpepiint_6/Tes ESTADOS UNIDOS / CANADA"La Nación" publica: " Palin dijo que espera la ayuda de Dios para llegar a la Casa Blanca: La ex candidata republicana a vicepresidenta no descartó ser electa en 2012; "si hay una puerta abierta para mí, entonces entraré por esa puerta", expresó":http://www.lanacion.com.ar/nota.asp?nota_id=1068801"El País" de Madrid informa: ""Bush cuela una ayuda de 108.000 millones a los bancos. El presidente saliente aprobó sin publicitar una rebaja de impuestos que alivia la situación de las entidades": http://www.elpais.com/articulo/economia/Bush/cuela/ayuda/108000/millones/bancos/elpepueco/20081110elpepueco_6/Tes"El Tiempo" de Colombia anuncia: "Comandos de E.U. pueden atacar a Al Qaeda en cualquier país del mundo": http://www.eltiempo.com/mundo/euycanada/home/comandos-de-eu-pueden-atacar-a-al-qaeda-en-cualquier-pais-del-mundo_4656193-1EUROPA"El País" de Madrid plantea: ""Alerta máxima" en la frontera de Melilla tras el nuevo intento de saltar la valla: Unos 150 inmigrantes han tratado de entrar en suelo español.- Es la quinta vez que sucede en el último mes": http://www.elpais.com/articulo/espana/Alerta/maxima/frontera/Melilla/nuevo/intento/saltar/valla/elpepuesp/20081110elpepunac_2/Tes"CNN" anuncia: "Police, migrants clash at border of Spanish enclave": http://edition.cnn.com/2008/WORLD/europe/11/10/migrants.spain.melilla.ap/index.html"El País" de Madrid informa: "Turquía reafirma su diplomacia en una región conflictiva: Quiere demostrar que sus relaciones de buena vecindad y su vocación de potencia regional no merman ni su alianza con Washington ni su anhelo de ingresar en el club europeo": http://www.elpais.com/articulo/internacional/Turquia/reafirma/diplomacia/region/conflictiva/elpepuint/20081110elpepuint_11/Tes"El País" de Madrid publica: "La UE retomará las negociaciones para un acuerdo estratégico con Rusia": http://www.elpais.com/articulo/internacional/Turquia/reafirma/diplomacia/region/conflictiva/elpepuint/20081110elpepuint_11/Tes"MSNBC" informa: "Report: Russian accident sub intended for India: Navy was allegedly to lease brand-new nuclear ship that suffered 20 deaths": http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/27642888/"BBC" plantea: "Medvedev bid to extend presidency: Russian President Dmitry Medvedev has sent to parliament a bill that extends the presidential term to six years from the current four, the Kremlin says.":http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/7722460.stm"MSNBC" anuncia: "Brown to call for new global financial system: U.K. leader to push for update to Bretton Woods agreement at G20 summit":http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/27640252/"Times": "Girl of 13 becomes youngest suicide bomber in day of carnage":http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/middle_east/article5126873.ece"Los Angeles Times" publica: "Britain's prime minister urges nations to tackle economy together: Gordon Brown calls for countries to boost the global economy, orchestrating stimulus packages and forging an international trade deal.": http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/world/la-fg-brown12-2008nov12,0,3095277.story"El Universal" de México informa: "Recuerda Europa 90 aniversario de fin de la Primera Guerra Mundial: El presidente francés Nicolás Sarkozy y el príncipe Carlos de Gran Bretaña asistieron a la ceremonia en la ciudad nororiental de Douaumont, cerca del sitio de la Batalla de Verdún donde murieron 300 mil soldados": http://www.eluniversal.com.mx/notas/554443.html Asia – Pacífico /Medio Oriente"El País" de Madrid plantea: "Al menos 28 muertos en un triple atentado en Bagdad: Cerca de 70 personas han resultado heridas a causa de dos coche bomba y un terrorista suicida": http://www.elpais.com/articulo/internacional/28/muertos/triple/atentado/Bagdad/elpepuint/20081110elpepuint_6/Tes"Time" informa: "Iraqi Soldier Kills 2 US Troops After Dispute":http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1858492,00.html"MSNBC" publica: "Netanyahu: Peace talks will continue if elected: Israel's opposition leader backs away from hints he would abandon talks": http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/27644796/"MSNBC" informa: "China says no progress made at Tibet talks: Dalai Lama accused of using demands for autonomy to split the country": http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/27637812/"BBC" anuncia: "Detained Chen in Taiwan hospital: A court proceeding against Taiwan's former President Chen Shui-bian has been suspended after he asked to be taken to hospital.": http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/7721468.stm"Time" informa: "Taiwan Arrests Former President":http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1858363,00.html"MSNBC" plantea: "Indonesia executes Bali bombers, fears revenge: 2002 attack left 202 dead, many of them foreign tourists":http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/27623145/"Time" analiza: "The Key to Afghanistan: India-Pakistan Peace":http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1857953,00.html AFRICA "CNN" publica: "Cholera spreads in Congo amid standoff": http://edition.cnn.com/2008/WORLD/africa/11/10/congo.fighting.cholera.ap/index.html"MSNBC" anuncia: "In Congo, drunken gunfire ruptures tense calm: Soldiers, rebels brawl as aid workers battle cholera among the displaced": http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/27637840/ "The Economist" analiza: "Congo: Murder, muddle and panic. As chaos and massacres overwhelm north-eastern Congo, diplomats and peacekeepers are struggling to get a grip": http://www.economist.com/world/mideast-africa/displaystory.cfm?story_id=12573363"CNN" plantea: "Singer, anti-apartheid icon Miriam Makeba dies": http://edition.cnn.com/2008/SHOWBIZ/Music/11/10/makeba.obit/index.html"BBC" anuncia: "UN cuts food rations in Zimbabwe: The UN food agency says it has had to start cutting rations to 4m people in Zimbabwe because of a lack of funds.": http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/7722631.stm"El País" de Madrid informa: "La UE aprueba la fuerza militar contra la piratería en Somalia: Entre ocho y diez barcos vigilarán el golfo de Adén con capacidad para utilizar la fuerza contra la piratería. -España contribuirá con dos barcos y un avión": http://www.elpais.com/articulo/internacional/UE/aprueba/fuerza/militar/pirateria/Somalia/elpepuint/20081110elpepuint_8/Tes ECONOMÍA"The Economist" presenta el informe semanal: "Business this week":http://www.economist.com/business/displaystory.cfm?story_id=12573661"Le Monde" plantes: "AIG et Fannie Mae enregistrent des pertes colosales": http://www.lemonde.fr/economie/article/2008/11/10/aig-et-fannie-mae-enregistrent-des-pertes-colossales_1117093_3234.html#ens_id=863164"MSNBC" informa: "Wall Street ends lower after rally fizzles out: Traders turn pessimistic about China's stimulus plan aiding America": http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/3683270/"MSNBC" anuncia: "Oil settles near $62 on shaky stock markets: Weakening greenback could be luring investors to purchase crude": http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/12400801/"BBC" publica: "Shares fall on more economy fears: Global shares have fallen sharply on renewed concerns that the world economy faces an extended downturn.": http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/7723127.stm "China Daily" informa: "Europe markets follow Asia down on economic fears": http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/world/2008-11/11/content_7195230.htm OTRAS NOTICIAS"El País" de Madrid anuncia: "Brasil e Italia analizan su posición ante el G20: Lula apuesta por recurrir "a menos analistas de mercado y a más analistas sociales" para crear un nuevo sistema económico": internacional http://www.elpais.com/articulo/internacional/Brasil/Italia/analizan/posicion/G20/elpepuint/20081110elpepuint_14/Tes"MSNBC" publica: "G20 urge government spending in face of crisis: They also say developing countries should have voice in decisions": http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/27630946/"MSNBC" informa: "Blueprints for Auschwitz camp uncovered: Plans, found in Berlin apartment, include drawing of gas chamber": http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/27648309/"BBC" analiza: "World recalls end of World War I": http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/in_depth/7721396.stm"La Nación" informa: "El mundo conmemora el fin de la Primera Guerra Mundial: Se cumplen 90 años del cese de fuego del gran conflicto bélico que tuvo alrededor de 20 millones de muertos; sentidos actos de Sarkozy, Bush y Obama":http://www.lanacion.com.ar/nota.asp?nota_id=1068936"Los Angeles Times" anuncia: "NASA ends Phoenix mission on Mars: After not hearing from the power-drained spacecraft in a week, officials believe it has gone to sleep -- permanently -- after lasting nearly three months longer than expected": http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/nation/la-sci-phoenix11-2008nov11,0,3821977.story
Issue 28.6 of the Review for Religious, 1969. ; EDITOR R. F. Smith, S.J. ASSOCIATE EDITORS Everett A. Diederich, S.J. Augustine G. Ellard. S.J. ASSISTANT EDITOR John L. Treloar, S.J. QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS EDITOR Joseph F. Gallen, S.J. Correspondence with the editor, the associate editors, and the assistant editor,.as well as books for review, should be sent to I~VIEW FOR RELIGIOUS; 612 Humboldt Building; 539 North Grand Boulevard; Saint Louis, Missouri 631o3. Questions for answering should be sent to Joseph F. Gallen, S.J.; St. Joseph's Church; 32~ Willings Alley; Philadelphia, Pennsylvania + + + REVIEW FOR RELIGIOUS Edited with ecclesiastical approval by faculty members of the School of Dt, imty of Saint Louis University, the editorial offices being located at 612 Humboldt Building, .539 North Grand Boulevard, Saint Lores, Missouri 63103. Owned by the Missouri Province Edu-cational Institute. Published bimonthly and copyright (~) 1969by REVIEW FOg REmnlous at 428 East Preston Street; Baltimore, Mary-land 21202. Printed in U.S.A. Second class postage paid at Baltimore, Maryland and at additional mailing offices. Single copies: $1.00. Subscription U.S.A. and Canada: $5.00 a year, $9.00 for two years; other countries: $.5.50 a year, $10.00 for two years. Orders should indicate whether they are for new or renewal subscriptions and should be accompanied by check or money order paya-ble to REVIEW FOR RELIGIOUS in U.S.A. currency only. Pay no money to persons claiming to represent REVIEW FOR RELIGIOUS. Change of address requests should include former address. Renewals and new subscriptions, where accom-panied by a remittance, should be sent to REVIEW FOR RELIGIOUS; P. O. BOX 671; Baltimore, Maryland 21203. Changes of address, business correspondence, and orders not accompanied by a remittance should be sent to REVIEW RELIGIOUS ; 428 East Preston Street; Baltimore, Maryland 21202. Manuscripts, editorial cor-respondence, and books for review should be sent to REVIEW FOR RELIGIOUS; 612 Humboldt Building; 539 North Grand Boulevard; Saint Louis, Missouri 63103. Questions for answering should be sent to the address of the Questions and Answers editor. NOVEMBER 1969 VOLUME 28 NUMBER 6 BROTHERS THOMAS MORE, C.F.X:, AND LEO RYAN, C.S.V. Development: A New Challenge to Religious In a majority of the articles written these days in religious journals, the emphasis has been largely on areas which are of great concern for those seeking ways to achieve renewal and adaptation in the religious life. As a result, new and valuable insights have been gained in such areas as government, the evangelical counsels, prayer, community, personal responsibility, the aposto-late, secularization, and formation. There is, however, one significant movement which has yet to be fully treated in journals written for re-ligious. And because this movement could elicit from the religious families in the Church a response corre-sponding to that which characterized the great move-ments in the past, we want to draw the attention of religious to this phenomenon so that it" can become a + growing part of the literature on renewal and adapta- + tion. This movement can best be described as development. Because development is still more or less in its infancy stage, only gradually emerging into a full-blown move-ment in society and in the Church, it is not our in-tention to give here a definition of the term. Instead, we want to describe a number of events and programs which will illustrate not only the potential dynamism of de-velopment but also the implications which it has for religious institutes. On January 6, 1967, Paul VI issued the motu proprio Catholicam Christi Ecclesiam setting up the Pontifical Justice and Peace Commission. The objective of this Commission would be "to arouse the people of God to 869 Thomas More, C.F.X., is superior general of the Xa-verian Brother~; Antonio Bosio 5; 00161 Rome, Italy. Leo Ryan, C.$.V., is general councilor of the Viatorian Fath-ers and Brothers; Via Sierra Nevada 60; 00144 Rome, Italy. VOLUME 2B, 1969 + 4. 4. Brothers More and Ryan REVIEW FOR RELIGIOUS full awareness of its mission at the present time, in order on the one hand, to promote the progress of poor nations and encourage international social justice, and on the other, to help underdeveloped nations to work for their own development." 1 Shortly after establishing this new curial organ, Paul VI issued his famous encyclical, Populorum progressio, which is the charter of the Pontifical Commission and its basic text. The call of the encyclical is to all the Church, which is to be educated, stimulated, and in-spired to action by it. Cardinal Maurice Gilroy of Quebec, president of the Pontifical Commission, and Monsignor Joseph Gremil-lion, its secretary, set about the arduous task of travel-ing throughout the world to create national commis-sions for justice and peace witkin bishops' corr[erences. After this work had been completed, the commission turned to the Union of Superiors General in Rome to solicit its support. Monsignor Joseph Gremillion per-sonally addressed the Union, urging it to establish con-tact with the Commission and to take an active role in the promotion of the aims of development within all the religious families of the Church. in May, 1968, the Union unanimously approved the writers of this article as its official liaison with the Pontifical Commis-sion. Now that the liaison committee has been in existence for one year, it is in a position to discern a number of trends which indicate the response religious institutes will make to development in the immediate future. The remainder of this paper will be devoted to an elabora-tion of these trends and a brief description of the more important programs from which these trends have is-sued. At the present time we see four trends in development which have significant implications for religious insti-tutes. It is very dear now that development has an ecumenical character. Second, because of the nature of development, religious institutes will be looking for- 1Father. Arthur McCormack makes the following clarification: "The name Justice and Peace must be understood in the following way: Justice means social justice within and between nations so that every human being should have conditions of life in keeping with his human dignity, which will enable him to progress towards a fully human development--to the fullness of a more abundant life~ and enable him also to make his contribution to building a new and better world. Peace is to be understood, not in the sense of main-raining peace or working for peace in the political or diplomatic sense, but in the sense of building peace--the new name for peace is development--producing the conditions that are fundamental for peace, a more just, humane, better world in accordance with para. 76 of the Encyclical, Populorum Progressio" ("The Pontifical Com-mission Justice and Peace," World Justice, v. 8 (1967), pp. 435-55). ward to training specialists in planning, sociology, tech-nology, and social justice. Towards this end, some re-ligious institutes are establishing within their general administration a secretariat for development, Third, there is a growing spirit of collaboration within re-ligious institutes, since it is evident that no religious family can tackle the problems with its own resources. Finally, there is a search for a new theology of develop-ment. 1. Ecumenical Character oI Development In the spring of 1968, the Pontifical Commission of Justice and Peace, the Catholic .Rural Life Society, under the direction of Monsignor Luigi Liguitti, SEDOS, FERES, and ISS2 sponsored a two-day seminar on the Church in developing countries at the theologate of the Oblates of Mary, Rome. This seminar was arranged specifically for superiors general and their curias to acquaint them with development. However, interest in the meeting was so great that it turned out to be a cross-section of some of the most important European bodies having a Third World orientation. At the meet-ing were representatives from several Roman Congrega-tions, the German mission-sponsoring agencies Adveniat and Misereor, Caritas Internationalis, Protestant ~6b-servers, sociologists, and a number of developing organi-zations from Italy, France, Germany, Belgium, and Hol-land. The Catholic-Protestant team under the direction of Canon Houtart (FERES) and Professor Egbert de Vries (ISS) gave the audience a report of their three-year Ford-funded study of the Churches' work in the four developing countries of India, Brazil, Indonesia, and the Cameroons, in the areas of education, medicine, and social work.3 But of far greater importance than any of the socio-logical findings of the three-year study of FERES-ISS was the ecumenical character of the study and the seminar. The meeting was tangible evidence of the growing spirit of collaboration between the Catholic Church and the World Council of Churches, especially in an area which was once the most sensitive one in ~SEDOS (Servizio di Documentazione e Studi) is a cooperative documentation and research venture on the part of about thirty superiors general in Rome. FERES (Federation Internationale des Instituts Catholiques de Recherches Socio-religieuses) is the inter-nationally well-known research center in Brussels. ISS (Institute for Social Studies) is the Protestant counterpart of FERES and is lo-cated at The Hague. 8 A report of this seminar has been published by SEDOS under the title, The Church in Developing Countries;.Via dei Verbiti, 1; Rome, Italy. ÷ ÷ Development VOLUME 28, 1969 871 4" 4" Brothers More and Ryan REVIEW FOR RELIGIOUS the past--the developing countries. It is not surprising, then, that one of the most important conclusions ac-cepted by the superiors general was that cooperation between the different denominations be extended. Moving quickly from theory to action, the superiors general of several congregations devoted to medicine shortly after the seminar entered into discussions with the Christian Medical Commission, a semi-auton-omous organism related to the World Council of Churches. As a result of a number of meetings between Mr. J. McGilvray of the Executive Committee of the CMC, Geneva, and these religious congregations, the CMC Executive Committee reached the important con-sensus this past March that five Roman Catholic con-sultants would be appointed to the Commission after nomination by the Secretariat for the Promotion of Christian Unity. These consultants were present at the Commission's general assembly in August of this year. A third example of ecumenical cooperation in de-velopment is of far greater significance, since it was mounted on a larger international stage. In 1967 the World Council of Churches and the Pontifical Commission of Justice and Peace formed the E~ploratory Committee on Society, Development and Peace (SODEPAX) as an experimental instrument for ecumenical collaboration. Father George H. Dunne, S.J., formerly of Georgetown University, was appointed by Dr. Eugene Carson Blake and Cardinal Maurice Roy as joint secretary of this committee. SODEPAX held a conference in April, 1968 on world cooperation for development in Beirut, Lebanon, to which it invited sixty specialists from all over the world. The participants were Protestants, Orthodox, Catholics, observer-consultants from intergovernmen-tal bodies, and two participants from the Muslim com-munity of Lebanon.4 The conference was the first attempt on the part of the World Council of Churches and the Roman Catholic Church to jointly study and plan the involve-ment of the Christian bodies for the betterment of society. It is a concrete example of the way churches will unite their moral forces towards achieving human dig-nity and world peace. One of the conclusions of the meeting states this objective in terms which make an appeal to all religious: This Report has suggested many ways in which the Churches, acting together, can foster development programs both in ¯ A report of this conference has been published under the title, World Development, the Challenge to the Churches; Publications Department; The Ecumenical Center; 150 Route de Ferney; Geneva, Switzerland. the advanced and developing countries. Joint action for de-velopment will serve basic Christian aims. To work for devel-opment is to express in particular measures the aspiration for brotherhood and human dignity for every individual. And it can also be a significant contribution toward a more orderly and peaceful world. Development can gradually reduce the gross imbalances which promote instability; working together can encourage a wider sense of community among mankind; and the strengthening of international agencies will create structures for common effort and order. These three examples of ecumenical collaboration in the field of development are growing evidences of the need for all religious institutes to work together with other Christian bodies to concert their actions for play-ing their part in the long task of building a more stable international order of well-being and peace for the whole human family. This ecumenical spirit should be built into the thinking and planning of general and provincial chapters, constitutions, formation programs, and the apostolic work of religious families. It should also be the concern of national conferences of re-ligious institutes. The work is of too vast proportions to be left to the interest of those few religious who have up until now been involved in development. 2. Specialists and International Vocation The second trend in development in religious com-munities is the deployment of personnel to act as specialists in the Third World, along with the estab-lishment within general curias of a secretariat for de-velopment. Shortly after the seminar on the Church in develop-ing countries, Misereor approached the superiors general with an offer to provide funds for the training of some specialists who would assist bishops' conferences in de-veloping countries in setting up offices of trained experts in planning. The offer came as a result of the dis-cussions at the seminar concerning the lack of the skills of planning for the proper deployment of dwin-dling personnel, the retooling of personnel for meeting the new needs of the day, and the necessity for co-operating with governments in national planning. The time had come, it was agreed, for religious com-munities to become deeply involved in this modern approach and to train experts who would have com-petency as well as apostolic zeal. After many months of discussions with the superiors general, Misereor agreed early this year to provide funds for the training of highly qualified development experts for the countries of Indonesia, East Africa, and the Congo. Other countries would be added as the pool of experts becomes larger. As the agreement was finally 4, 4, Development VOLUME 28, 1969 873 Brothers More ¯ and Ryan REVIEW FOR ~ELIGIOUS worked out, the funds are in the form of a scholarship for 'the trairiing of experts in the fields of social ac-tion, science, communication, cooperatives, trade unions, medicine, agriculture, and technology. These experts would be seconded to central advisory and coordinat-ing bodies in the selected countries and would devote themselves specifically to the analysis of the problems, the planning of a strategy, and the coordination of pro-grams with national planning. This new type of service would be rendered by the religious ~ommunities only at the invitation of interested bishops' conferences of one of the three countries. This proposal clearly indicates that as the religious communities become more involved in social action, they will need more experts in this field. It also be-comes increasingly clear that religious congregations will now turn their efforts towards promoting and edu-cating a corps of highly qualified men and women who will act not for their individual communities alone but in teams for ihe good o[ society. This task force con-cept of highly competent religious from different in-stitutes could be the most dramatic response of religious congregations to the challenges provided in the Third World. From what we have just said, it is evident that re-ligious will have to respond more promptly and in-telligently to what we would call the apostolate of internationalism. To act as specialists in the Third World, to become globally involved in development, re-llgious will be entering more actively into what Barbara Ward calls our planetary community, a community which. cuts across all the lines and barriers of nations and races. In such a community, religious ought to feel very much at home, especially since the vision of all founders of religious communities extended beyond the hori-zons of a particular country or culture. That spirit which inspired founders to send their men and women to meet the needs of mankind in all parts of the world must now impel their followers to send trained and competent personnel to participate in international bodies which are working to achieve the humaniza-tion' of mankind. This apostolic thrust could be as dramatic and far-reaching as the missionary journey of Francis Xavier to the Indies. There are a number of religious currently engaged in this international apostblate. Those we have met or know of are: Father John Schutte, S.V.D., who was recently appointed by Pope Paul as assistant to Mon-signor Joseph Gremillion, Secretary of the Pontifical Commission of Justice and Peace; Father Arthur Mc- Cormack, M.H.M., special consultant to the same Com-mission; Father Philip Land, S.J., Gregorian University, Rome; Father George H. Dunne, s.J., SODEPAX Joint Secretary, Geneva; Father Thomas F. Stransky, C.S.P., Secretariat for Promotion of Christian Unity; Mother Jane Gates, Superior General of the Medical Missionary Sisters, who is working with the World Council of Churches in the field of medicine; and Father Theodore M. Hesburgh, C.S.C. The first indication we have of a religious institute becoming serious about development and the promo-tion of the international apostolate is the derision of Father Pedro Arrupe, superior general of the Jesuits, to establish a secretariat for development within the curia of his general administration. Father Francis Ivern has been appointed by Father Arrupe to head this secretariat. Similar offices could be set up in many of the larger congregations of men and women. In the case of smaller units, it is quite possible that interested and competent religious could be, as a matter of policy, trained to take their place in general curias. Others could be as-signed to work on task forces, national bishops' con-ferences, international or national research centers, na-tional conferences of religious, and the pontifical or the national conferences of justice and peace. 3. Spirit of Collaboration It is quite evident from what has been said above that there is growing within religious congregations and institutes a greater spirit of collaboration to make the response called for by Populorum progressio and the objectives of the Pontifical Commission of Justice and Peace. Since the work of development is of such gigantic proportions, no one rellgious institute can unilaterally plan its involvement in it. No one individual religious, or even a cadre of them, can shoulder the heavy re-sponsibility of this new apostolate. It must be the work of all religious, or the efforts for the humanization of mankind will be considerably weakened. One model of collaboration already exists in Rome. It is an organization to which we have already re-ferred many times, namely, SEDOS. This voluntary organization of a number of superiors general, formed only six years ago on the initiative of a few missionary congregations, has in a short time given proof of the results that can flow ~om the spirit of collaboration. Within a span of just one year, for imtance, SEDOS has held a seminar on development, a symposium on the theology of development and mission, and a con-÷ ÷ ÷ Developme~ VOLUME 28, 1969 875 Brotmheurl s. RM~oarne REVIEW FOR.RELIGIOUS terence on intermediate technology. As noted already, it has worked out an agreement with Misereor to finance the education of a number of specialists for developing countries. It is also actively engaged in es-tablishing guidelines for a mutual exchange of ideas between the World Council of Churches and medical missionary congregations in the field of medicine. SEDOS is unique in a number of ways. Its member-ship consists of both men and women religious. Its ex-ecutive secretary is Father Benjamin Tonna, a secular priest from Malta, who is a professional sociologist. The director is Miss Joan Overboss, a multilingual expert from Holland. But its uniqueness lies principally in its spirit of co-operation among the superiors general in facing the new problems evolving from the Third World. Since there was no structure among religious institutes or in any Roman curial congregation to help religious fami-lies prepare themselves for their involvement in the work of development, superiors general united their forces to establish a documentation and research center which would enable them to convert from a family business to a modern and efficient concern. Thus, for the first time in the Church's history, religious congre-gations have banded together at the highest level to make their contribution in an area in which the Church in recent years has focused its principal at-tention. This same spirit of collaboration is evident in such countries as the Congo and Indonesia, where religious are working together with bishops' conferences in es-tablishing planning secretariats. Quite recently we read an appeal by the East African conference of religious to its membership to turn itself to the question of de-velopment and to form a task force that would assist the bishops' conferences in establishing a secretariat for development. If religious congregations are to involve themselves in this apostolate, this spirit of cooperation must con-tinue to grow. Many religious want to see their in-stitutes take decisive measures to execute the social objectives of Populorum progressio and to work actively to achieve the goals of the Pontifical Commission of Justice and Peace. The younger generation of religious also want to become actively engaged in working to create conditions within and between nations that are in keeping with the human dignity of man. But they need some concrete programs to give them direction. As a step towards establishing some programs, con-ferences of religious and individual institutes could give attention to the following suggestions made by the Pontifical Commission of Justice and Peace at the end of its first plenary meeting of March, 1967: 1. That Bishops' Conferences, teaching orders and all those concerned with education should be encouraged to include the teaching of international social justice in the curricula of schools, seminaries, universities and all institutions of learn-ing. 2. That retreats, sermons and specifically religious instruc-tion should emphasize the discussion of world justice, ~. That such curricula should be, where possible and suit-able, worked out on an ecumenical basis. 4. That competent study groups, again when suitable on an ecumenical basis, should continue the work of elaborating a doctrine of world-wide development and justice. 5. That lay groups of all kinds be invited to include world justice in their programs of adult education and, when com-petent to do so, assist the Commission in suggesting programs for the mass media. 4. A New Theology ot Development A concern very often expressed at the seminar on de-velopment alluded to above was that what was needed was an honest exchange of views on the theological foundation of development. In fact, one of the prin-cipal resolutions of the seminar asked the Congregation for Evangelization to put the theology of development on its agenda for its next meeting and for eventual presentation to the Holy Father as agenda for the next Synod of Bishops. Another resolution requested a sym-p. osium on mission and development. These two actions reveal that a theology of develop-ment has become a matter of urgency for religious. So long as the effort of missionaries was expended 'within the limits of a parish or a diocese, no special problem presented itself. But today the organization of develop-ment has become a much more complex affair; it has assumed the dimensions of whole nations, of entire continents, of the planetary community itself. While such a task calls for specialists, the ordinary missionaries run the danger of no longer seeing and understanding the role they are called on to play in the task of de-velopment. They stand, then, in perplexity when faced with the contradictory opinions of theologians. If some theolo-gians insist on the irreplaceable character of the proc-lamation of God's word and of the sacramental ministry, missionaries taken up with the tasks of development be-cause of the demands of the situations in which they find themselves and the concrete needs they daily encounter are troubled by an uneasy conscience. If other theologians stress the primary role of development, then those mis-sionaries whose tasks are those which belong to the more + + + Developmem VOLUME 28, Z969 8?7 traditional patterns of the apostolate begin to question the value of what they are doing. It was in response to this perplexity that the superiors general of SEDOS held a mission theology symposium in Rome this past April. Theologians from Europe and other parts of the world were invited to tackle this prob-lem first among themselves, and second in open discus-sions with the generals and their staffs.~ This symposium's importance lies in the fact that it has brought before religious congregations the theologi-cal dimensions of development, while adding to the growing literature on tlfis subject. This hard confronta-tion with the realities of development is a hopeful sign of growth within the Church and religious institutes. And instead of standing before the reality with perplex-ity and bewilderment, religious institutes, with their sense of global dedication, ought to be in the vanguard of working out a new theology of development. This mission theology symposium should set the pace for all religious families of the church. It has been our intention in this paper to draw the attention of religious to the phenomenon of develop-ment so that it can become a growing part of the litera-ture on renewal and adaptation. As a contribution to this literature on renewal, we have pointed out four major trends we have noted over the past year in the field of development as they affect religious institutes. The contribution religious can make to development, we are convinced, is enormous. The single attempts being made here and there must spring into a massive effort that will engage religious in a venture that has taken the center stage of the Church. If development is the new word for peace, it is a new challenge to religious. ~ Preparations are being made for the publication of the pro-ceedings of this symposium in various languages. The English edi-tion will be published by Maryknoll Publications. Brothers More and R~an REVIEW FOR RELIGIOUS JAMES A. CLARK Placing U. S. Personnel in Latin America Once a bishop or provincial decides to give manpower assistance to Latin America, he quickly discovers the dif-ficulties of attempting to find the wisest way to assign priests, brothers, or nuns to projects in Latin America. Since few authorities can agree on proper priorities for such placements, a superior is wise to recognize im-mediately that optimum, effective assignment of per-sonnel throughout Latin America represents an unat-tainable goal. In the past, assignment of American religious in the southern half of the hemisphere resulted from acciden-tal factors. The high ratio of Americans in Peru derived from the efforts of a zealous nuncio who welcomed them warmly. The large numbers of Americans in Guatemala result from a statistic that indicated that Guatemala had the worst proportion of priests to peo.ple of any Latin American country. Bewildered superiors anxious to respond to appeals of the Vatican to send missionaries to Latin America seized on this fact as a reason to send their subjects to Guatemala. Localized concentrations of Americans usually can be traced to a friendship begun at the Vatican Council between North and Latin Ameri-can Church leaders or through the bonds of a religious community existing in both halves of the hemisphere. The complexity of properly placing people in Latin America appears as a new problem because previously the allocating of workers to missionary lands did not require any accommodation with a structured Church in the foreign situation as is the case now in Latin America. One locale appeared as needy and worthwhile as another for apostolic laborers. The presence of a viable and strong Church in Latin America demands :extreme delicacy in interposing foreigners to serve that Church. Yet the need is so general and widespread in Latin America that from a spiritual point of view it has be- 4- ÷ James A. Clark is a staff member of the apostolic delegation at The Manor House in Rockcliffe Park; Oto tawa 2, Canada. VOLUME 28, 1969 879 come impossible for even the indigenous Church to ar-rive at a generally satisfactory set of realistic and valid preferences. Priorities which have aided in the distribution of financial grants are applicable in part to the appoint-ment of people even. though this latter commodity, people, raises mnch more profound questions since it is so much more precious and scarce in Latin America. This dilemma especially concerns diocesan priests be-cause the international 'religious communities already have a functioning system for distribution of their mem-bers. This arrangement, made under the auspices of the Holy See, has served for generations and enables provincials to provide staff for missionary areas without an agonizing analysis in each case. Those communities without Latin American branches and bishops entering the field for the first time find the subject distressingly difficult. The. Most Reverend Marcos McGrath, Second Vice- .President of the Bishops' Council for Latin America (GELAM), has encouraged even the religious communi-ties to refuse to cling to traditional apostolates and to become open to new forms of ministry: Priorities of needs in the churches of Latin America can be determined most effectively when undertaken by a national episcopal conference. Deciding who comes first is a difficult exercise in the spirit of collegiality because each bishop would like to see his diocese at the top of the list. But it is a necessary exercise and is of great assistance to those from abroad who want to know what the bishops as a whole think about the needs of their country. A listing of priorities may indeed be prepared, by a special committee named by the local bishops. Such an arrangement has been requested in some instances by various organizations of assistance. CELAM's continental sec-retariat of the Latin American bishops may indicate some gen-eral priorities of needs through its specialized departments. ÷ ÷ REVIEW FOR RELIGIOUS Several complex plans have been proposed to resolve the problem of placement. The secretariat of the U.S. Bishops' Committee for Latin America once devised a coordinating committee of ten expert advisers to counsel bishops on the proper method of allocating personnel for Latin America. However since the ten could not agree among themselves on how to achieve best results the committee never met and the plan died. The secretariat received requests from most of the ecclesiastical jurisdictions in Latin America (more than 600) and circulated these to bishops and superiors of religious houses. However, no attempt to provide criteria for selecting one petition over another ever appeared. Standard policy urged superiors to.visit potential recipi- ¯ ent areas personally, a rather unrealistic suggestion for harried superiors already overstocked with requests for their manpower. Naturally, bishops prefer to retain jurisdiction over their priests. For this reason the concept of a military ordinariate type structure to recruit, train, and appoint personnel in Latin America failed to receive widespread acceptance, since experience .with military chaplains alerted bishops to the fear of losing control of their sub-jects for the major portion of their ministerial lives. Several prominent churchmen, support attempts to permit diocesan priests to serve in a religious community on the missions through a temporary connection with a religious order. Only diocesan priests who have lived for any length of time in the house of a religious society can foresee the difficulties of this plan. In spite of abundant good will on the part of all involved there is no escaping the feeling on the part of the secular priest that he is a "junior" or "non-incorporated" subject, without status and without the possibility of participation in decision making sessions. Likewise, this association causes the priest to lose identity both at home and abroad as a diocesan priest serving temporarily on the missions. The entry of diocesan priests with previous parish ex-perience into missionary areas revealed the value of these men over those who went directly to the missions upon ordination without any experience in a normal parish situation to use as a barometer for their missionary en-deavors. A diocese-to-diocese setup is not workable because one diocese in the States cannot properly provide for train-ing, support, leave time, illness, vacations, and so forth of overseas staff. Yet a method must be found which preserves the interest of the home diocese which usually provides the financial wherewithal enabling the Latin American mission to function. Other proposals include appointing men for a time to a national conference of bishaps in a given country, in-cardinating priests temporarily into a Latin American diocese, or assigning them to the U.S. Bishops' Com-mittee for Latin America, which, in conjunction with the U.S. and Latin American bishops involved, could arrange for training and distribution of priests. Two countries have established national offices to deal with this issue, and bishops assigning men to either Chile or Brazil need only refer to the national offices for ad-vice. Several methods of providing diocesan priests to Latin America have sprung up among the 76 dioceses involved in this effort. 24 dioceses merely permitted priests to go to Latin America. 17 assumed responsibility to support the volunteer priests during their term of Latin Ameri- 4- 4- 4- Latin America can service but they make no provisions for the assign-ment of these priests. 34 accept the task of supporting a parish or several parishes in Latin America. In Boston, Richard Cardinal Cushing founded in 1958 a society to bring these diocesan priests together. Currently this St. James (the Cardinal's middle name) Society counts slightly more than 100 members from 30 dioceses in the U.S. and several European countries. This corps pro-vides pastoral services to a half million people spread across Peru, Ecuador, and Bolivia. It represents the best vehicle currently available for sending diocesan priests to Latin America. A similar organization for pooling nuns going to Latin America received attention at an inter-American meeting of Bishops at Georgetown University in 1959 but has failed to be implemented. In attempting to establish priorities, the national conferences of Bishops in Latin America have proved to be a boon although usually the primatial archbishop in a country tends to see his own needs first and with good reason for he usually presides over the largest metropoli-tan portion of that country. But rural bishops complain about the criteria when they witness most foreign ar-rivals remaining in the capital city. Both CELAM and the Pontifical Commission for Latin America have sought to provide a solution in this sensitive area but without success, as most attempts at coordination cause disputes over the choice of one diocese over another as beneficiary of American clerics. Originally the Pontifical Commission offered the facili-ties of the nunciatures throughout Latin America as clearing houses, but a.fear of Roman control of the en-tire movement impelled both donor and petitioner dioceses to bypass quietly any Commission services. As a former nuncio in Panama, the late Archbishop Paul Bernier commented on this question during his tenure on the Canadian Bishops' Commission for Latin America: lames A. Clark REVIEW FOR'RELIGIOUS I think there is a strong feeling against forming a society of any kind. Most of the bishops, if I understand well, insist on having and keeping an effort of the secular clergy as such with no affiliation, neither to the diocese ad quam nor to any particular religious or semi-religious society but to keep all of them [the priests] incardinated in the diocese a qua. If they don't want to stay there for more than five years, or if for any other reason they cannot remain, they come back to their own diocese just as if they were never out of it. I think that in Canada at least the impression of the bishops would be rather contrary to affiliating or incorporating our diocesan ~nd secular priests to any particular society. Most bishops would be willing, however, to send according to their abilities one or two, five or ten priests, to some form of, not a society, but a responsible organization which in the last analysis would be in the hands of the Episcopal Committee for that. Whoever accepts responsibility for such appointments will have need of some priorities or guidelines since the priestly requirements of Latin America could not be fulfilled if every priest in. the United States went to Latin America. Some principles to follow in this area would include the following points. The i~rst choice to be made is a selection of a category of work for a religious volunteey, that is, shall I send my priest (or brother or sister) to work as a catechist, teacher, parish worker, or what? The departments of CELAM indicate the critical apostolates which normally will have first call on foreign services: education, medi-cine, social service, relief, charity, seminary/vocational work, catechetics, student/university apostolates, and service to laborers. Next the superior must choose a geographical classifi-cation, that is, shall I send him (her) to serve on the con-tinental level with CELAM, or on the regional or na-tional level with the conferences of bishops, or to the diocesan and local level. Foreigners often function best in posts removed from the intimate personal relation-ship of priest-to-parishioner which reqmres sensitive cul-tural perception. Usually their North American organi-zational talents achieve widest impact on a broader scale at the continental, regional, or diocesan levels. Also a decision must be made as to whether to send personnel to the rural or urban locations. Many Mary-knollers in Latin America have regretted the decision made many years ago to spread Society members across the mountain ranges. The impact of an individual is broader in the cities. On the other hand Cardinal Cush-ing says that the revolution in Latin America will be born in the mountains and the Church ought to be there. At one time it was thought preferable to assign North Americans to dioceses with North American bishops at the helm. This principle has been subsequently disre-garded since it leads to a danger of creating a church within a church, one foreign and one native. The monster parishes which have arisen in Latin America as a resuh of abundant American material and personnel aid have become a source of distress for Latin Americans and embarrassment for North Americans. Parish A flooded with American assistance can only re-flect poorly on parish B which is struggling along with local resources only. OccasionaIIy a choice arises between placing people in projects underwritten by private industry or govern-÷ ÷ ÷ Latin America VOLUM~ 28~ 1969 883 4- 4- REVIEW FOR,RELIGIOUS 884 ments, for example, a company hospital or a state nor-mal school. These opportunities sometimes permit the assure, ption of responsibilities which would otherwise be financially prohibitive; on the other hand, alliance with a government or industrial concern can be severely det-rimental to the Church image and impact. .One essential requirement demands that the project given help be integrated into the local church structure. For this reason each local request must be approved by the national conference of bishops to insure that it co-ordinates with the national pastoral plan. From the viewpoint of the candidate to be sent to Latin America, if he or she speaks one of the languages of Latin America or has studied or served in a particular country naturally it is logical to assign the person to that place. All attempts to satisfy reasonable personal preferences will reduce the inevitable cultural shock suffered by v, olunteers. A first principle of sending people into Latin America is that they be sent as members of a team effort and never individually. The ability of the subject offering his services will sometimes be the final determinant of assignment; a seminary professor will not serve best in a slum parish nor will a Trappist normally function well in a mass communications program. Due to the profound social division in Latin America there is a need to predetermine whether personnel are to be placed in projects serving the wealthy or the im-poverished. In the latter case a realistic plan for external financing will normally be required. Projects which provide some hope of eventual self-sufficiency in regard to their staffing needs should be selected rather than those which will require permanent foreign workers. Realistic approaches to provide new solutions to basic religious problems of Latin America deserve special con-sideration. For examples, the novel approach to slum parish work of Father Andres Godin, a Canadian Oblate, in Lima, Peru; or that of American Oblate Edmund Leising who has developed a remarkable program in Brazil for promoting parish self-support through Ameri-can fund raising procedures; or the renowned apostolate of Father Leo Mahon in San Miguelito parish in Pan-ama who has discovered an entirely new process for parish effectiveness. These offer novel and successful approaches to stubborn problems. Similar examples of projects managed by Latin American priests themselves could be cited. Most superiors have the background to recognize that adequate and detailed financial arrangements must be agreed upon in advance by both sides to prevent animos-ity from developing on obscure financial responsibilities. The overall plan an agency presents ought to be ex-amined carefully to learn if it is realistically conceived. Experience in Latin America reveals that ill.constructed, idealistic proposals soon collapse. Those of us familiar with the problem of positioning personnel in Latin America are aware of the difficulties superiors face in this field. Hopefully some of the above remarks will assist the ongoing dialogue in this area and be of some assistance to those who seek to serve the Church by releasing people for work on the only Catholic continent of the globe. + + ÷ Latin America VOLUME 28, 1969 885 JOSEPH F. GALLEN, S.J. Comments on tl e Instruction on Formation Joseph F. Gallen, S.J., writes from St. Joseph's Church; $21 Willings Alley; Philadelphia, Penn-sylvania 19106. REVIEW FOR RELIGIOUS Prepostulancy Nothing is said in the Instruction on a prepostulancy period. Number 4 states that it would be worthwhile to consider whether the practice of going directly to the novitiate from such places as aspirancies, apostolic schools, or minor seminaries should be continued or whether an interval of probation should be had to develop the human and emotional maturity of the candidate. In the case of those obliged to a postulancy by canon 539, § 1, this development can be taken care of during the postulancy, which can last up to two years and also be made while residing outside any house of the in-stitute (n. 12). There is nothing in the Instruction for or against such places as aspirancies but, as is clear from what was said above, number 4 presumes that they will continue to exist. Postulancy (nn. 4; 10-2; 33) Importance. "Hence it follows that all institutes, even those that do not prescribe the postulancy, must at-tach great importance to this preparation for the novice-ship" (n. 4). Purpose. This is to judge the suitability and aptitude of the candidate; to give a preparation that will enable the noviceship to be made more fruitfully; to provide a gradual transition from secular to religious life; and to verify and complete, if necessary, the religious knowledge of the candidate (nn. 11-2). "Tentative" in number 11 of the Vatican English translation is not in the Latin text and "to formulate a. judgment" is to form a judgment. Power of general chapter. In institutes in which the postulancy is of obligation by common law (in insti-tutes of perpetual vows: all women but in those of men only lay brothers) or by the constitutions, the gen-eral chapter may keep in mind, for a better adaptation of the postulancy~ the following norms (n. 12): Duration. In institutes in which the postulancy is not obligatory by common or constitutional law, the general chapter may determine its nature and duration, which can vary for different candidates but should not be too brief nor ordinarily longer than two years. In institutes in which the postulancy is obligatory from common law, it must last at least six full months (c. 589, § I), and this minimum time is more probably retained in the Instruction; but the general chapters of these institutes may also follow the two-year limit, the principle that the time may vary for different candi-dates, and probably that the minimum time may be less than six months (n. 12). 1 do not think the right of canon 539, § 2, to prolong the postulancy for six months extends to a postulancy of two years. A postu-lancy longer than two years would not be very rea-sonable, especially since it can be varied within that time for the individual. Place. Preferably not in the novitiate house, and it can be profitable for it to be made wholly or in part outside a house of the institute (n. 12). The postulancy may therefore be so organized that the postulants con-tinue to reside in their homes or in such another place as a college. See also numbers 4 and 11. The latter speaks of a "gradual transition from lay life to that proper to the noviceship." Director. The postulants, wherever the postulancy is made, are to be under the direction of qualified re-ligious, between whom and the master of novices there is to be sedulous cooperation (n. 12). Dross. The determination of the dress of the postu-lants appertains to the general chapter (n. 33). How-ever, canon 540, § 2, had required simply that the dress of the postulants be modest and different from that of the novices. It could therefore have been secular but modest; special and uniform, but this was not neces-sary; religious, but different from that of the novices. Noviceship (nn. 4-5; 13-33) Maturity requisite Ior beginning noviceship (n. 4). The noviceship should begin when the candidate is aware of God's call and has reached that degree of human and spiritual maturity which will allow him to decide to respond to this call with sufficient and proper knowledge and responsibility: "Most of the difficulties encountered today in the formation of novices are usually due to the fact that when they were admitted they did not have the required maturity., it must ÷ ÷ ÷ Formation VOLUME 28, 1969 887 ÷ ÷ ÷ $. F. Gallen, S.l. REVIEW FOR RELIGIOUS 888 be affirmed that the age required for admission to the noviceship should be higher than heretofore" (n. 4). Place. The noviceship for validity must be made in a house legitimately designated for this purpose (n. 15) by the superior general with the consent of his council and according to the constitutions (n. 16). The superior general with the consent of his council and after consultation with the interested provincial may in a case of necessity permit also many novitiates in the same province (n. 17). When the small number of novices is not sufficient to promote community life, the superior general should, if possible, establish the novitiate in a community of the institute capable of aiding the formation of such a small group of novices (n. 18). To better meet some demands of their formation, the superior general may authorize that the group of novices be transferred during certain periods to another house of the institute designated by himself (n. 16). In particular and exceptional cases, the superior gen-eral with the consent of his council may permit that a candidate validly make his noviceship in a house of the institute other than the novitiate house, under the direction of a qualified religious acting as a master of novices (n. 19). Duration. For validity the noviceship must last for twelve months (n. 21). A continuous or interrupted absence from the noviti-ate group and house that exceeds three months ren-ders the noviceship invalid (ft. 22). In lesser absences the higher superior, after consulting the novice master and considering the reason for the absence, may in individual cases command an extension of the noviceship and determine its length, and this matter may also be determined by the constitutions (n. 22). Formative activity periods outside the novitiate house must be added to the required twelve months, nor may they be begun before a novice has spent three months in the novitiate (if the contrary is done, the noviceship be-gins only on the completion of the formative activity period) and must be so arranged that the novice spends a minimum of six continuous months in the novitiate, re-turns there at least a month before the first vows or other temporary commitment, and the time of the whole novice-ship extended in this manner may not exceed two years (n. 24). The noviceship amplified by such formative activity periods may not exceed two years, but this does not abrogate the right given to higher superiors in canon 571, § 2, to prolong the noviceship up to six months in a doubt about the suitability of a candidate. Such a prolongation is permitted in a noviceship of two years without formative activity periods. A higher superior for a just cause may permit first profession or commitment to be anticipated but not beyond fifteen days (n. 26). Formative activity periods. The general chapter by at least a two-thirds vote may experimentally enact, in keeping with the nature of the institute, one or more periods of formative activity outside the novitiate house, the number to be determined in practice accord-ing to the judgment of the master of novices with the consent of the higher superior, for the formation of the novices or, in some cases, for a better judgment of their aptitude for the life of the institute. Such periods may be used for one, several, or the entire group of novices. If possible a novice should not be assigned alone to these periods. In these periods the novices are under the direction of the master of novices (nn. 23, 25). "It must be emphasized that this formative activ-ity, which complements novitiate teaching, is not in-tended to provide the novices with the technical or professional training required for certain apostolic ac-tivities, training which will be afforded to them later on, but rather to help them, in the very midst of these activities, to better discover the exigencies of their vocation as religious and how to remain.faithful to them" (n. 5; see also n. 25). Separation of novices. There must be some separation between the novices and the professed religious, with whom, however, and with other communities, the novices may have contact according to the judgment of the master of novices. It appertains to the general chapter to decide, according to the nature of the institute and particular circumstances, what contacts may be had between the novices and the professed of the institute (n. 28). The use of the term "professed re-ligious" in the second sentence makes it sufficiently clear that there is no prohibition of contact between the novices and the postulants, as might be feared from the word "members" in the other two sentences of number 28. Studies during the noviceship. The general chapter may permit or command certain studies during the nov-iceship for the better formation of the novices, but doctri-nal studies should be directed to the knowledge and love of God and to the development of a more profound life of faith. From the twelve months of noviceship of number 21 all studies, even theological and philosophi-cal, made for obtaining diplomas or for acquiring a formation directed to preparation for fulfilling future Formation VOLUME 28, 1969 889 REVIEW FOR RELIGIOUS 890 duties are forbidden (n. 29). Provided doctrinal studies are directed to the spiritual life, as prescribed in the first sentence, it is probably not forbidden to receive credits for such studies when these can be had but the studies are not to be directed to the attaining of credits. There is no doubt that the prescription on doctrinal studies in this first sentence also applies only to the twelve months of noviceship of number 21, as is also true of the canonical legislation in canon 565, § 3, on this point, "even though the Latin text says "during the time of the noviceship," not "during the regular novitiate year," as in the English translation. The latter also has "all formal study programs" in the second paragraph whereas the Latin reads "all studies." Dress o] the novices. It appertains to the general chapter to determine the dress of the novices (n. 33). Number 33 speaks of the "habit of the novices and of other candidates for the religious life." It certainly had not been the practice nor is there any tendency to give a religious habit to postulants, and the meaning here of "habit" is "dress." No limitation is placed on the power of the general chapter to determine the dress of the novices and postulants. Canon 557 commands the wear-ing of the habit during the whole time of the noviceship, but it has also been maintained that the noviceship is an uncertain time and that the habit, to retain all its significance, should not be given to the novices. Noviceship lot another class. Unless the constitutions determine otherwise, a noviceship made for one class is valid for another (n. 27). The constitutions may de-termine the conditions regulating a transfer from one class to another (n. 27), Novice master. The novices are under the direction of the novice master who may seek the aid of other skilled helpers (n. 30). This is to be kept in mind with regard to a formation team. See also numbers 5, 12, 15, 23, 31, 32. Temporary Bond (nn. 2, 6-9; 34-8) A different temporary bond may be established and ]or all. Number 34 gives a faculty, not a precept, but in general language: "The General Chapter, by a two-thirds majority, may decide to replace temporary vows with some other kind of commitment as, for example, a promise made to the institute." The same general lan-guage is found in numbers 2, 6, 10, 24,' 37-8. The pos-sibility of the extension to all in the probation after the noviceship is not certainly excluded by other num-bers of the Instruction. A dil~erent bond should be introduced only a]ter most careful thought. The reasons are (1) number 34 demands a two-thirds vote of the general chapter to in-troduce a different bond and (2) number 7 explidtly re-quires such careful thought: "No institute should de-cide to use the faculty granted by this Instruction to replace temporary vows by some other form of commit-ment without having clearly perceived and weighed the reasons for and the nature of this change." A different bond in fairness, prudence, and proper regard [or sound spirituality should be introduced only [or those in whom the special immaturity exists. The reasons are (1) by vows a special consecration is had according to number 2: "Thus it is that religious pro-fession is an act of religion ~nd a special consecration whereby a person dedicates himself to God." (2) Be-cause according to number 7 temporary vows are com-pletely in harmony with the greater response to God so important at the beginning of the religious life and also enable the candidate to make the consecration proper to the religious state: "For him who has heeded the call of Jesus to leave everything to follow Him there can be no question of how important it is to respond generously and wholeheartedly to this call £rom the very outset of his religious life; the making of temporary vows is completely in harmony with this requirement. For, while still retaining its probationary character by the fact that it is temporary, the profession of first vows makes the young religious share in the consecration proper to the religious state." (3) Because immaturity is the sole reason given (n. 7) for substituting another temporary commitment: "In fact, more fre-quently now than in the past, a certain number [quidam] of young candidates come to the end of their novitiate without having acquired the religious ma-turity sufficient to bind themselves immediately by re-ligious vows, although no prudent doubt can be raised regarding their generosity or their authentic vocation to the religious state. This hesitancy in pronbuncing vows is frequently accompanied by a great awareness of the exigencies and the importance of the perpetual religious profession to which they aspire and wish to prepare themselves." (4) Possibly also because the desire for the different commitment was true only of some institutes (n. 7): "Thus it has seemed desirable in a certain num-ber o[ institutes that at the end of their noviceship the novices should be able to bind themselves by a temporary commitment different from vows, yet answering their twofold desire to give themselves to God and the institute and to pledge themselves to a fuller preparation for perpetual profession." Since the Instruction describes temporary vows as a consecration that is special, proper to the religious state, and in harmony with the greater ÷ ÷ ÷ VOLUME 28. 1969 89! + ÷ .~. Fo Gallen, $J. REVIEW FOR RELIGIOUS 89~> response to God, it at least seems unfair, imprudent, and without regard for sound spirituality to deprive a novice of temporary vows when he has all the quali-ties requisite for making them, that is, when he is not affected by the special immaturity described in number 7. ¯ Some observations on this immaturity. Is this im-maturity proper to the young or is it the emotionalism that is today found in many older religious, and which the young often manifest only after continuous contact with such older religious? Isn't there a movement at this moment in the United States to give the vote to those who are eighteen years of age because the young are now more politically mature? In more than thirty states it has been the law that a girl of eighteen may marry without the consent of her parents. Is there any widespread tendency at present to change this very general law because of the immaturity of the ~young? Don't some hold that the greater physical development of modern youth argues to a greater psychological de-velopment? Does one frequently and without indoctri-nation encounter a novice who is judged to have a certain religious vocation (see also c. 571, § 2) but is too immature to take temporary vows? What factual and ob-jective investigations were made in the United States to prove the existence of such immaturity? Isn't it true that such immaturity would occur with regard to the temporary vow of chastity, not of poverty or obedience? Prescinding now from the obligation of the different commitment, don't the commandments of God still bind such a candidate and under serious sin in a violation of chastity? The simplest and most appropriate different com-mitment would be a promise to the institute to observe poverty, chastity, and obedience because (1) neither the form nor the object of the different commitment is determined in the Instruction (see n. 34) but (2) in numbers 7 and 35 the Instruction at least says it is fitting that the dit~erent commitment should in some way refer to the exercise of the three evangelical counsels, for example in number 7: "Whatever form such a temporary commitment may take, it is in keeping, with fidelity to a genuine religious vocation that it should in some way be based on the requirements of the three evangelical counsels." and (3) more directly and even categorically in number 13 the Instruction apparently says that the novice is to make profession of the evangeli-cal counsels at the end of the noviceship by temporary vows or other temporary commitment: ".that a novice.may implement the evangelical counsels of chastity, poverty, and obedience, the profession of which 'either by vows or by other sacred bonds that are like vows in their purpose' he will later make." This number of the Instruction is talking of a novice and therefore o[ the first consecration, which can be either vows or another temporary commitment. There is no alternative for the profession of perpetual vows. Other forms and objects of commitment are possible. The form and object of members in the strict sense of secular institutes is: "By making profession before God of celibacy and perfect chastity, which shall be confirmed by vow, oath, or consecration binding in conscience, according to the constitutions; by a vow or promise of obedience.by a vow or promise of poverty." (Provida Mater Ecclesia, February 2, 1947, Art. III). Some of the different forms of commitments in societies of common life without public vows are annual private vows of poverty, chastity, and obedience and the service of the poor; private perpetual vows of poverty, chastity, and obedience; promise of fidelity to the observance of the rule and constitutions; perpetual promise of observ-ance of common life and poverty; perpetual agreement to obey the rule of the institute; perpetual oath of perseverance and obedience; and perpetual oath and promise of perseverance and obedience,x The societies of common life more £requently encountered are the Daughters of Charity of St. Vincent de Paul, Eudists, Josephites, Maryknoll Missionaries, Oratorians, Pallot-tine Fathers, Paulists, Precigus Blood Fathers, Sulpicians, Vincentians, and White Fathers. Is one who makes a di1~erent temporary commitment in a state of perfection, in the religious state, a re-ligious, and a member of his institute? This is at least a very basic question and with wide implications. The negative arguments are that the Instruction nowhere says that one who makes a different temporary commit-ment is a religious and that canon 488, 7°, demands public vows to constitute a religious. On the other hand (1) vows are required only by canon law, not by divine law or the nature of the matter,2 to constitute a re-ligious, and the Instruction derogates from this canon law, as will be seen from the following arguments: (2) number 36 states absolutely that the subject is united with his institute and absolutely that he is obliged to observe its law; (3) the Instruction throughout does not differentiate between such a commitment and temporary vows (see nn. 2, 6, 10, 24, 34, 37-8); (4) num-ber 10 states explicitly that the temporary commitment is not the noviceship. If an entirely new state were being 1 See also Beste, lntroductio in Codicem, 497; Guti~rrez, Gora-mentarium pro religiosis, 38 (1959), 312-3. =See Goyeneche, De religiosis, 10-11; Guti~rrez, op.cit., 29 (1050), 72-3. ÷ ÷ ÷ VOU, JME 25, 89~ REV;EW FOR RELIGIOUS introduced distinct from that of the noviceship and temporary vows, this should have been dearly stated in the Instruction. (5) The probationary periods can last for thirteen years. This seems in itself to be un-reasonable if the subject does not become a member of the institute until the end of such time. The professed of temporary vows are members by first profession. The present canon law does not permit a duration of tempo-rary vows longer than six years, and canon 642, § 2, likens a professed of six years of temporary vows to one of perpetual vows. (6) During this prolonged time the institute would not be held in the case of such a subject to the norms of dismissal for professed but could dismiss him almost in the manner of a novice, whereas the pro-fessed of temporary vows would have also a right of sus-pensive recourse against his dismissal. Nor would canon 643, § 2, on the charitable subsidy apply, nor canon 646 on an automatic dismissal. (7) There would be an evident distinction in the rights and obligations of these subjects and the professed of temporary vows even though both would be in the same factual state of proba-tion. It is true, as number 7 states, tl~at "the profesz sion of first vows., makes the candidate share in the consecration proper to the religious state." Such a consecration, however, is required only by canon or human law, which can therefore enact that other suitable forms of commitment would also constitute a candidate in the religious state and make him a re-ligious, as also because such a candidate is always des-tined for this proper consecration in perpetual profes-sion. Religious women are nuns and their institutes are religious orders even though no one in fact has solemn vows provided at least some are destined for solemn vows from the particular law of the institute. Public vows would also remain proper to the religious state and to religious institutes since they are not had either in societies of common life nor in secular institutes. I therefore believe that the subject in a different temporary commitment is in a state of perfection, in the religious state, is a religious, and a member of his institute, but the question should be authoritatively serried by the Holy See. In the contrary opinion, those in a different temporary commitment are in a state that is neither noviceship nor profession, one also for which we have no parallel, and consequently a state of deep obscurity at least juridically. Determination o~ details b) the general chapter (n. 36). In virtue of canon 543 only a higher superior is competent to admit to the noviceship and to any re-ligious profession. The same canon demands a vote of the council or chapter for admission to the novice- ship, first temporary, and perpetual professions. The gen-eral chapter should require the deliberative vote for admission to the first temporary commitment and pre-scribe for renewals and prolongation of. such a com-mitment the same vote as is enacted in the constitutions for these acts with regard to temporary profession. The same policy should be observed concerning the superior competent for permitting an anticipated renewal of the temporary commitment, for exclusion from renewal or from the profession of perpetual vows (c. 637), and for the vote of the council in this case. The superior general with at least the advice of his council should be given the faculty of consenting to the dissolution of the com-mitment by the subject, to so consent to the request of the subject at any time during a commitment, who can then be immediately admitted to temporary vows, and with the consent of his council from the institute. Reception of ment is not necessary because it (c. 1308, § 1), and the consent of to dismiss a subject the different commit-is not a public vow the institute was suf-ficiently given and expressed in the admission to the commitment or its renewal. The general chapter could prescribe reception since such a repeated consent of the institute is not contrary to common law. The formula of the vows will have to be changed for a different commitment, for example, a promise will be to the institute, not to God as is a vow. Even if the new com-mitment does not have obedience as its express object and is therefore not productive of another obligation of obedience, superiors, as the head of the institute or of its parts, possess at least the same authority that they have over a novice and, if the Holy See decides that a different commitment is on the same juridical level as temporary vows, they possess the same authority as over a professed but without the added title to exact obedi-ence from the vow (c. 501, § 1; 502). Ganons whose application is obscure. The applica-tion of the following canons to those in a different temporary commitment should also be decided by the Holy See: responsibility for debts, 536, §§ 2-3; canonical examination, 552; dowry, 547-51; making of cession and disposition regarding personal patrimony and a civilly valid will, 569; retreat before first profession, 571, § 3; profession of a novice in danger of death. Requisites for a valid profession, exclusive of recep-tion, the necessity of three years of temporary vows, and understanding the derogations regarding a valid novice-ship in the Instruction, 572; age for profession, 573; deliberative vote for first profession, 575, § 2; written declaration of profession, 576, § 2; no intervals between renewals or perpetual profession, 577, § 1; 575, § 1; ÷ ÷ Formation VOLUME 28, 1969 895 ~. F. Gallen, S.]. REVIEW FOR RELIGIOUS 896 enjoyment of the same indulgences, privileges, spiritual favors, and suffrages, obligation of observing rules and constitutions, active and passive voice and computation of time for obtaining either, 578; illiceity and invalidity of acts contrary to the vows, 579. Acquisition of property by a professed of simple vows, change of cession and disposition, 580; renuncia-tion of personal patrimony, 581; 583, 1°; change of will, 583; 2°. Common obligations of clerics in canons 124-42, 592; obligation of common life, 594; obligation of wear-ing habit, 596; cloister, 597 ft.; religious duties, 595; right of exempt correspondence, 611; enjoyment of privileges of first order by nuns, 613, § 2; enjoyment of clerical privileges of canons 119-23, 614. Transfer to another religious institute or monastery, 632-5; 544, § 5; right of professed of temporary vows to leave at the end of a temporary profession, 637; ex-claustration, 638-9; effects of secularization, 640-3; compensation may not be sought for services given to the institute, 643, § 1; charitable subsidy, 643, § 2; laws on fugitives, 644, § 3; 645; 2386; automatic dismissal, 646; dismissal of a professed of temporary vows, 647-8; provisional return to secular life, 653. Six professed constitute a formal house, 488, 5°; precedence from first profession breaking a tie in elec-tions, 101, § 1, 1°; first profession as date of computing eligibility for office, 504; 559, §§ 1-2; prohibition of being members of third orders secular, 704; prohibi-tion of being a sponsor in baptism and confirmation, 766, 4°; 796, 3°; special jurisdiction necegsary for the confessions of religious women, 876; funerals of religious, 1221; 1124, 2°; permission for writings, 1386, § 1; punish-able for violations of common life, 2389. Obligation o[ observing the evangelical counsels. If the Holy See decides that a different temporary com-mitment is on the same juridical level as the profession of temporary vows, the evangelical counsels must be observed at least with the same obligation as the con-stitutions, no matter what be the object of the different temporary commitment because (1) not only does num-ber 36 impose after the new commitment "the obliga-tion of observing the Rule, constitutions and other regulations of the institute" and therefore a fortiori also the obligation of observing the evangelical coun-sels as more essential and important for a state of complete Christian perfection but also and more pro-foundly because (2) the observance of the evangelical counsels is necessary from the nature of a state of per-fection, as can be seen from the following direct and clear statements of only three Popes and Vatican II: "The religious orders, as everyone knows, have their origin and raison d'etre in those sublime evangelical counsels, of which our divine Redeemer spoke, for the course of all time, to those who desire to attain Christian perfection" (Leo XIII, December 23, 1900). "When the only-begotten Son of God came into the world to re-deem the human race, he gave the precepts of spiritual life by which all men were to be directed to their appointed end; in addition, he taught that all those who wished to follow more closely in His footsteps should embrace and follow the evangelical counsels" (Pius XI, March 19, 1924). "It is true that by the apostolic constitution Provida Mater Ecclesia we declared that the form of life, which is followed by secular institutes, is also to be accepted as a state of perfection publicly recognized, because the members are bound in some way to the observance of the evangelical counsels" (Pius XII, July 13, 1952).3 Vatican II affirmed: "Thus, although the religious state constituted by the profession of the evangelical counsels does not belong to the hierarchical structure of the Church, nevertheless it belongs in-separably to her life and holiness." 4 Moral obligation of a new temporary commitment. It might seem that a general chapter could also completely determine this (see n. 36), but number 34 gives a promise to the institute as an example of such a com-mitment. We are to presume words in such a document are being used in their proper sense, and in such a sense a promise produces a moral obligation. In a merely private promise to God or man, the one making the promise can oblige himself only to a light obliga-tion in light matter but in serious matter he can assume either a light or a grave obligation. May a general chapter, therefore, define the moral obligation of the new temporary commitment, for example, a promise to the institute, as only light? It could do so if it is decided by the Holy See that such a commitment is not on the same juridical level as temporary vows. Could it do so if the level is the same? Such a definition is not excluded by the nature of a commitment or promise purely in itself nor by the explicit wording of the Instruction. The light obligation can also be urged from the reason for permitting a different commitment, that is, the immaturity of a candidate. It would not 8Courtois, The States of Perfection, Dublin: 1961, M. H. Gill and Son, nn. 33, 130, 403, 474; see also Schaefer, De religiosis, n. 125; Beste, op.cit., 328; Padri Claretdani, II diritto dei religiosi, n. 3; Fanfani, II diritto delle religiose, n. 2; Bastien, Directoire canonique, nn. 9, 14; Creusen, Religious Men and Women in Church Law, nn. 4-5; Guti~rrez, ibid., 63-4, 67. ' Abbott-Gallagher, The Document~ of Vatican II, 75. 4" 4" 4" Formation VOLUME 28, 1969 89~ ]. F. Gallen, $.$. REVIEW FOR RELIGIOUS seem very practical to enact that such a candidate does not have to take the added serious obligation of a re-ligious vow if he must assume the added serious obli-gation of another form of commitment. On the opposite side it can be well maintained from the nature of the matter that it would be incongruous for the funda-mental obligations of a permanent state of life to be only light. Above all there is a reply given by the Sacred Congregation of Religious, May 19, 1949, in an entirely parallel case and in general language to the effect that the bonds assumed by the members of secular insti-tutes cannot be light in their general nature.~ The pur-pose and nature of secular institutes are given as the reason for this doctrine. A secular institute is an apos-tolic state of complete Christian perfection, and the reasoning of the Sacred Congregation appears to me to apply, at least equally, if not afortiori, to religious in-stitutes. In effect this would mean, in the promise we have advocated to the institute to observe poverty, chastity, and obedience, the same light or serious obliga-tion that is had in the religious vows. The document reads: 1. The obligations which are contracted by members in the strict sense (Art. III, §§ £ and 3) for the full pursuit of the juridical state of perfection in secular institutes (Art. III, § 2), if they are to correspond to the purpose and nature of the institute, cannot be light in their general nature and under every respect (ex genere suo atque ex omni parte). 2. On the other hand, the bonds on which this state of perfection rests, are considered so to oblige in conscience that the obligations thus produced must be called grave in their general nature (ex genere suo). 3. In individual cases, an obligation must be considered grave only when its matter must be considered as certainly grave according to the constitutions and the common teaching regarding equal or similar bonds. Moreov,er, according to the well-known rule of law (Reg. 30 in VI°), 'In obscure matters, one is obliged to Iollow only the least obligation," it cannot be affirmed in a doubtful case that an obligation is grave or more grave, for example, on the ground that an obligation arises from or is reinforced by the formal virtue of religion. 4. Just what is the nature of the bonds assumed in individual institutes and what is the precise mode of obligation---e.g., in addition to justice and fidelity, is there also and, if so, to what degree, an obligation from the virtue of religion--must be learned from the constitutions, which should give an accurate presentation of the matter, and from the formula of consecra-tion or incorporation in which the bonds are expressed. 5. Even when it is certain that there is a formal obligation arising from the virtue of religion, since there is question of vows or bonds which, although they are not fully private, nevertheless, in law, cannot be called public in the strict and specific sense and do not effect a public consecration of the' "Bouscaren-O'Connor, Canon Law Digest /or Religious, 167-8; see also Commentarium pro religiosis, 28 (1949): Larraona, 199-200; Fuertes, 292-8. person, the malice of sacrilege must not be attributed to their violation. Duration oI probation after the noviceship. The gen-eral chapter is to determine this but it is to be no less than three nor longer than nine years (n. 37). I find it difficult to see why a period longer than five years should be generally prescribed (n. 6). The total possible probationary period, that is, 2 years of postulancy, 2 of noviceship, and 9 of temporary commitment, can thus be 13 years. This would ordinarily mean perpetual profes-sion at the youngest only at the age of 30 or 31 years. Would we advise marriage only at 30 or 317 The gen-eral chapter may permit a prolongation in individual cases of a prescribed time, e.g., five years, up to the full nine years or may limit the power of prolonging, e.g., to only one year (n. 37). Precise length of dil~erent commitment. This may be made in the one act for the full length of the interval before perpetual profession, for example, five years; or for a briefer period, for example, three years, to be re-newed for two years on its expiration or to be followed by temporary vows (n. 34). The provision of canon 577, § 2, of permitting a renewal of temporary vows to be an-ticipated but not by more than a month may be also applied to the renewal of a different form of temporary commitment. Such an anticipation is permissible £rom the nature of a commitment and is not excluded by the Instruction. Must also a di~erent temporary commitment be ac-companied by the intention of renewing and of admit-ting to a renewal on its expiration? If the decision of the Holy See is that the juridical level of temporary vows and other temporary commitments is the same, the answer is in the affirmative. The explanation of the necessity of this intention in temporary vows has been the following. The religious life has ever and now de-mands stability or permanence. From its concept it is a state of life in the same way as the clerical or married state. A state of life is something that contains the note of stability or permanence. The exact permanence re-quired is defined by the Church as follows: solemn vows or simple perpetual vows are sufficient but not neces-sary; the minimum requisite is simple temporary vows. Therefore, an institute in which all the members make only annual professions of poverty, chastity, and obedi-ence fulfills this requisite. The Church further requires that temporary vows be renewed on their expiration (c. 488, 1°). This implies an intention on the part of both the religious making temporary profession and the superior admitting to this profession that, iI no obstacle ÷ ÷ ÷ Formation VOLUME 28, 1969 899 ]. F. Gallery, REVIEW FOR RELIGIOUS 900 occurs in the meantime, the vows will be renewed on their expiration. It is evident that the same necessity of this intention and its explanation apply to a different temporary commitment since the necessity of the inten-tion is required not from vows as such but from the fact that the religious state is 'a state of life and demands stability.6 Lastly, such an intention is required in secular institutes, in which the bond can be vow, oath, consecra-tion, or promise: "The bond by which the secular insti-tute and its members in the strict sense are to be united must be: 1o Stable, according to the constitutions, either perpetual or temporary but to be renewed at its expira-tion (c. 488, 1°) . ,, 7 ConIusion on temporary vows. Tkis is the appropriate place to mention the extensive confusion that has existed on temporary vows in this whole matter of a different commitment. Many talked as if a temporary vow were a most unusual and even a contradictory thing. Evidently they did not know that temporary vows were mentioned in canon law (c. 131.1) as also in practically any manual of moral theology and in canonical works that included the treatment of the vows. It was also frequently stated that the intention of renewing and of admitting to renewal on their expiration was a contra-diction of the temporary duration of such vows. This again was ignorance. The intention was not and could not have been absolute, which would have been clearly contrary to the probationary nature of the period of temporary vows. It was a conditional intention to renew the vows i[ no obstacle intervened in the meantime, S and this obstacle, if not always, would practically always have been the discovery by the institute or the subject that he or she had no vocation. There was almost an equal number of statements that a temporary profession was invalid if at the time a religious had the intention of not renewing or a superior of not admitting to a renewal on the expiration of a temporary profession. Canon 572 does not list such an intention among the requisites for a valid religious profession. Canon 488, 1°, does not append an invalidating clause to the necessity of this intention as required by canon 11. A requirement for liceity only will also sufficiently fulfill the required stability. An invalidating law according to canon 15 does not exist in a doubt of law, and there is certainly a doubt o See Larraona, op. cit., 2 (1921), 137, 209; 28 (1949), 205; Schaefer, op.ciL, n. 128; Jone, Commentarium in Codicem iuris canonici, I, 387; Padri Clarettiani, op.cit., nn. 3, 6; Vermeersch-Creusen, Epitome iuris canonici, I, n. 580; Goyeneche, op.cit., 9-10; De Carlo, Jus religiosorum, n. 2. ~ Provida Mater Ecclesia, Bouscaren-O'Connor, op.cit., 151. aSee Larraona, op.cit.o 2 (1921), 209 and note 81; 28 (1949)~ 205; Guti~rrez, ibid., 90. of law in the present caseP There was also a great deal of talk merely about promises, as if a vow were not a promise. Nor was there too much knowledge of sanctity of life and of the relation of the evangelical counsels and of vows to this sanctity. Sacred orders may not be conferred belore perpetual profession (n. 37; c. 964, 4°). For a just reason a higher superior may permit that a first profession be made outside the novitiate house (n. 20). The Instruction does not mention the commitment presumably because it is held that the prescription on place of canon 574, §1 applies only to vows. Readmission of one who legitimately left either after completing temporary vows or other commitment or a[ter being [reed from either. He may be readmitted by the superior general with the consent of his council, who is not obliged to prescribe another noviceship, nor an-other postulancy (c. 640, § 2), but is obliged to enjoin a previous period of probation and also a period of tem-porary vows or other commitment not less than a year nor less than the time that remained to be spent in this temporary probation before perpetual profession when the subject left. The superior general may prescribe a longer period of temporary vows or other commitment (n. 38). Immediate preparation for perpetual proIession and similar periods during tbmporary vows or other commit-ment. It is desirable that perpetual profession should be preceded by a sufficiently long immediate preparation something in the manner of a second noviceship. The duration and other aspects are to be determined by the general chapter (nn. 9, 35). It is also desirable that periods of withdrawing to prayer, meditation, and study be established during the time of temporary vows or other commitment (n. 25). Section IlL Application of the special norms. The par-ticular provisions axe called norms because they have been enacted for experimentation (VII). They are in effect from January 6, 1969 (VII). The norms and direc-tives of the Instruction appertain only to religious in-stitutes; other institutes of common life may but are not obliged to follow them (n. 3). Common law (canon law, laws enacted after the Code of Canon Law, laws of Vatican II, and postconciliar laws) remains in effect un-less derogated by this Instruction (I). The faculties granted by this Instruction may in no way be delegated g See Schaefer, op.cit., n. 128; Jone, op.cit., 387; Guti~rrez, ibid., note 65; Vermeersch, Periodica, 31 (1932), 122 ft.; Goyeneche, Corn. mentarium tyro religiosis, 16 (1935), 315-6; Vidal, De religiosis, n. 9, holds for invalidity. 4- 4- ÷ VOLUME 901 ~. F. Gallen, $.]. 902 to another (II), but they may be used by those who legiti-mately take the place of the superior general when there is no superior general or he is legitimately prevented from acting (IV). The same principle is true of the vicars of other higher superiors since they are actually exercising the office of the higher superior when accord-ing to the constitutions they take the place of a higher superior, such as a provincial, in the vacancy of the office, in his absence, or when he is otherwise impeded from fulfilling the duties of his office. There is nothing of such importance in the faculties granted in the Instruc-tion to higher superiors that would merit the exclusion of vicars from the exercise of such faculties. An abbot at the head of a monastic congregation is also to be understood under the name of superior general in this Instruction (III). In the case of nuns dedicated exclu-sively to the contemplative life, special norms shall be inserted into the constitutions and submitted for ap-proval, but the norms in numbers 22, 26-7 may be ap-plied to them (V). I[ the special general chapter has already been held, the superior general and his council acting collegially,x° after a careful study of all circumstances, are to decide whether a general chapter should be convoked to deliber-ate on the faculties granted to it or whether it would be preferable to await the next general chapter (VI). If they decide against the above convocation but also that the use of the faculties granted to the general chapter is urgent for the good of the institute, they, again acting collegially, have the power of putting all or some of the same faculties in use until the next gen-eral chapter provided they have previously consulted all other higher superiors and their councils and have ob-tained their two-thirds affirmative vote. These other higher superiors should have it at heart to consult previ-ously the professed of perpetual vows. In institutes with no provinces, the superior general must consult the l~rofessed of perpetual vows and obtain the affirmative vote of two-thirds OgI). The following appertain to the general chapter: with a two-thirds vote: to introduce periods of formative ac-tivity in the noviceship (n. 23) and a different tempo-rary commitment (n. 34); with the vote prescribed by the constitutions: to make determinations for the pos-tulancy (n. 12); to decide on the permissible contacts of the novices (n. 28); to permit or command studies during the noviceship (n. 29); to determine the dress of the novices and other candidates (n. 33); to determine the duration of the probation between the noviceship See REVIEW FOR RELIGIOUS, 19 (1960), 131-2. and perpetual profession and other aspects of the same probation (nn. 35-6-7); and experimentally to enact other matters that imply a change in the constitutions, for example, in numbers 16, 22, and 27. The following appertain to the superior general: with the consent of his council: the institution of a novitiate (n. 16) and of many novitiates in the same province, having consulted the interested provincial (n. 17); the making of the noviceship in a house that is not a noviti-ate house (n. 19); the readmission of one who legiti-mately left either after completing temporary vows or other commitment or after being freed from either (n. 38); alone: to permit the group of novices to reside for a time in another house designated by him (n. 16); to per-mit a small group of novices to make their noviceship in a house more suitable for community life (n. 18); with the council acting collegially: to decide on the calling of a general chapter to implement the Instruction or to permit, without a general chapter, the use of the facul-ties granted in the Instruction, after consulting all other higher superiors and their councils and having obtained the affirmative vote of two-thirds of them or of the pro-fessed of perpetual vows when the institute does not have provinces (VI). The following appertain to higher superiors: alone: to permit first profession outside the novitiate house (n: 20); to permit that first profession be anticipated but not beyond fifteen days (n. 26); after consulting the master of novices: to decide on a supplying of absence of a novice of less than three months (n. 22); and it is rec-ommended that higher superiors below the superior general previously consult the professed of perpetual vows on the use of faculties of the Instruction without having a general chapter (VI). Spiritual principles of the Instruction. In the intro-duction to the Instruction, the Sacred Congregation for Religious and Secular Institutes stated that the reason Vatican II gave no small measure of attention to reli-gious was that the Church might have a greater abun-dance of spiritual strength and be better prepared to proclaim the message of salvation to the men of our age; quoted Lumen gentium, numbers 44-5, to the effect that the state of the evangelical counsels appertains to the sanctity of the Church and that the practice of these counsels is uniquely effective for the perfection of the love of God and of the neighbor; spoke of the duty of religious institutes to renew their spiritual, evangelical, and apostolic lives; recalled that no loss was to be per-mitted in the basic values of the religious life; and de-clared the necessity of defining again the principal as-pects of this life. Formation VO'LUME 28, 1969 9O3 I. F. Ga//en,~$.l. REVIEW FOR REI.~G~OU$ 90; In the first section, which treats of principles and criteria, the Sacred Congregation reaffirmed that pro-fession of the evangelical counsels is a total consecration of one's person to God; that both from the teaching of the Church and the nature of this consecration the vow of obedience appertains to the essence of religious pro-fession; that by this consecration the religious exercises the perfection of apostolic charity, even though the apostolate is not the primary purpose of religious pro-fession; and that it may not be said that the nature of religious profession is to be changed or its proper de-mands lessened. The Sacred Congregation stated that the noviceship retains its irreplaceable role in formation; that novices are to be taught the cohesive unity that should link contemplation and apostolic activity; and that this unity is one of the fundamental and primary values of apostolic institutes. The achievement of this unity requires a~proper un-derstanding of the realities of the supernatural life and of the paths leading to a deepening of union with God in the unity of the one supernatural love for God and for man, finding expression at times in the solitude of inti-mate communing with the Lord and at others in the generous giving of self to apostolic activity. Young reli-gious must be taught that this unity, so eagerly sought and toward which all life tends in order to find its full development, cannot be attained on the level of activity alone, or even be psychologically experienced, for it resides in that divine love which is the bond of perfec-tion and which surpasses all understanding. The attainment of this unity, which cannot be achieved without long exercise of self-denial or without persevering efforts toward purity of intention in action, demands in those institutes faithful compliance with the law inherent in the spiritual life itself, which con-sists in arranging a proper balance of periods set aside for solitude with God and others devoted to various activities and to the human contacts which these in-volve (n. 5). The Sacred Congregation maintained that suitable maturity was required that the religious state be a means of perfection and not a burden too heavy to carry, as also the desirability that the perpetual con-secration to God of perpetual vows be preceded by a sufficiently long immediate preparation spent in recol-lection and prayer that could be like a second novice-ship. The second section of the Instruction is on special or particular norms and contains the following spiritual ideas and principles. The novices are to develop that union with Christ which is to be the source of all their apostolic activity; conformably to the teaching of our Lord in the gospel, the formation of the noviceship con-sists especially in initiating the novices gradually into detachment from everything not connected with the kingdom of God; that they learn to practice humility, obedience, poverty, to be instant in prayer, to maintain union with God, along with a soul receptive to the inspirations of the Holy Spirit, and to be mutually and spiritually helpful to one another in a sincere and un-feigned charity; they are to study and meditate on Holy Scripture; to be formed in the spiritual doctrine and practice required for the development of a supernatural life, union with God, and the understanding of the re-ligious state; they are to be initiated into the liturgical life and the spiritual discipline proper to their own in-stitute; they are to be given the occasions for striving to preserve faithful union with God in the active life; for the novices there is to be a balancing of periods of ac-tivity and of those given to recollection in prayer, medi-tation, and study to stimulate them to remain faithful to it throughout life, and a similar balancing is desirable during the years of formation before perpetual profes-sion. The Instruction reaffirmed the principle of the spiritual life and of Perfectae caritatis, number 8, that apostolic activity must have its source in intimate union with Christ and that therefore all the members should seek God only and above all, and unite contemplation by which they adhere to Him in mind and heart with apostolic love, in which they are associated with the work of redemption and strive to spread the kingdom of God; that novices are likewise to be formed in purity of intention and love for God and man; to learn to use this world as if they did not use it; realize that devotion to God and man demands a humble control of self; culti-vate the necessary human and spiritual balancing of the times given to the apostolate and the service of men and of the properly prolonged periods, in solitude or in com-munity, dedicated to prayer and to the meditative read-ing of the Sacred Scriptures. By fidelity to this most necessary and important program in all such institutes, the novices will gradually develop a peaceful union with God, which comes from conformity to the will of God. They must learn to discern the divine inspirations in the duties of their state, especially those of justice and charity. A mutual confidence, docility, and openness are to be fostered between superiors, the master of novices, and the novices that the master may be able to direct the generosity of the novices to a complete gift of themselves to God and lead them gradually to discern in the mys-tery of Christ crucified the demands of true religious + + + Formation VOLUME 28, 1969 905 obedience, and in this manner inspire them to an active and responsible obedience. The Instruction affirms with sufficient emphasis that the religious s~ate is different from secular institutes and from the state of the laity. ~. F. Gall~, $.1. REVIEW FOR RELIGIOUS SISTER MARY PATRICIA NORTON A New Form Community oJ Religious Government The custom that has been traditionally followed in women's religious communities of focusing all authority, responsibility, and decision-making in one person at the local, regional, and generalate level has, we believe, been a custom that grew up as a result of historical circumstances. When some of the original women's re-ligious communities were founded, there was a com-paratively small number of the members that were well educated. There has, of course, always been a local, regional, and general council to assist and advise the superior; but in actual practice the superior has gen-erally led an overburdened existence, weighed down by the responsibility of major decisions. Since the founding of the early communities, the pic-ture has changed dramatically. The rank and file sisters are no longer uneducated followers. Vatican Council II has told us that the Holy Spirit breathes up ~rom below, that is, He speaks and points out the way through the person of each and every member of the community. In the summer of 1967, the 48 Maryknoll Sisters working in Korea, considering the problems of the past, the directions of the future, and the urgings of Vatican Council II (that "all members of the community have a share in the welfare of the whole community and a responsibility for it"--~om the Decree on Ap-propriate Renewal o[ Religious Life, n. 14), began to draw up a new plan for regional government. This plan was to provide for sharing more broadly the burdens of responsibility, participation of every member in the decision-making and planning of community affairs, and to foster in each member a mature spirit of initiative and involvement. The experiment is at present under way with three elected members now jointly sharing the responsibilities that had previously belonged to the regional superior. 4, 4, Siste~ Patricia Norton is missioned at the Maryknoll Hospital; P.O. Box 77; Pusan, Korea. VOLUME 28, 1969 907 REVIEW FOR RELIGIOU$ (Note: The work of the Maryknoll Sisters in Korea is designated as a regional unit.) No one of these is superior to the others in authority or responsibility. Each one is responsible in the area that has been allotted to her: Personnel, Administration-finance, and Planning-research respectively. These three sisters are known as the Regional Team. Although each one has her area of responsibility, she does not bear this burden alone. Each of these team members has a corresponding committee of 4 regular members and one alternate member. Each committee meets once a month and the results of these meetings constitute the agenda for the meeting of the Regional Team (the three team leaders). The Regional Team also aims at meeting monthly as high priority has been placed on the value of close and frequent communications. It is felt that real participation of each and every mem-ber of the region is dependent on the thoroughness of these communications. In addition to the monthly meetings of both team and committees, good communications are fostered by availa-bility of the minutes of the Regional Team, of each of the three committees, and the publication of the agenda before each meeting. With the publishing of the agenda, each sister is invited to respond with her ideas, sugges-tions, objections, and so forth to any item on the agenda. This is one technique to insure participation by every individual. Furthermore, all those sisters who are neither mem-bers of the team nor of one of the committees become members of an interest area. The latter means that the sister has indicated her interest in one of the areas, follows the activities of that committee in par-ticular, and is ready at any time to fully participate. The Maryknoll Sisters are divided among six houses in Korea. In the event that one of these houses does not have a particular committee member, one of the in-terest area members acts as contact person for that house. Planning for this experiment began in early Fall of 1967. It was formally inaugurated at a regionwide work-shop in October of that year. Since that time it has undergone several evaluations resulting in both minor and major changes. What so far have been the advantages and disad-vantages in regard to this experiment? Some of the disadvantages: ---outsiders who have contacts with the Maryknoll Sisters do not understand it; --it is expensive (train travel and postage) and time consuming; ---it deprives the other sisters of that leisure they used to have while the superior did all the work. Some of the advantages: --it takes the heavy, burden from the shoulders of one person and spreads it" out over the shoulders of all; --it provides for the utilization of the ideas, inspira-tions, and talents of each person rather than just two or three; --it provides for decisions to be made at the level at which they are carried out; --it helps to uncover and develop leadership qualities in a wider spectrum O[ persons; ---it allows for a more truly Christian li[e [or each sister as a completely participating person, con-scious of her own role of responsibility for the success or failure of Maryknoll works in Korea; ---it cuts down dissatisfaction and provides a channel for rectifying any dissatis[actions that may occur. The comment was made by one observer: "It deprives the religious of that necessary sacrifice involved in obedience to a superior." Those who have been living ¯ this experiment would strongly differ. Obedience is not a vanished thing. It is merely the focus that has changed. Decisions are made through group-to-group or individ-ual- to-group dialogue and the individual remains open and ready to obey the results of this dialogue. It is now two years since the initial idea for this type of government was discussed. Since that time there have been many pros and cons, many wrinkles to be ironed out. It has been said by informed sources that such an arrangement Without ultimate responsibility resting in one person can never be a success. The Maryknoll Sisters are willing to concede that this may be true. But they are not willing to concede without an earnest trial. ÷ ÷ ÷ VOLUME 28, 1969 9O9 WILLIAM A. HINNEBUSCH, O.P. Origins and Development oJ Religious Orders William A. Hin-nebusch, O.P., teaches ecclesiastical history at the Do-minican House of Studies; 487 Michi-gan Avenue, Waahington, D.C. REVIEW FOR RELIGIOUS 910 An# attentive study of the origins and history of reli-gious orders reveals that there are two primary currents in religious life--contemplative and apostolic. Vatican II gave clear expression to this fact when it called on the members of every community to "combine contem-plation with apostolic love." It went on to say: "By the former they adhere to God in mind and heart; by the latter they strive to associate themselves with the work of redemption and to spread the Kingdom of God" (PC, 5). The orders1 founded before the 16th century, with the possible exception of the military orders, recognized clearly the contemplative element in their lives. Many of them, however, gave minimum recognition to the apos-tolic element, if we use the word "apostolic" in its pres-ent- day meaning, but not if we understand it as they did. In their thinking, the religious life was the Apos-tolic life. It reproduced and perpetuated the way of living learned by the Apostles from Christ and taught by them to the primitive Church of Jerusalem. Since it was lived by the "Twelve," the Apostolic life included preaching and the other works of the ministry. The pas-sage describing the choice of the seven deacons in the Acts of the Apostles clearly delineates the double ele-ment in the Apostolic life and underlines the contem-plative spirit of the Apostles. The deacons were to wait on tables; the Apostles were to be free to devote them-selves "to prayer and the ministry of the word" (Acts 6:~4~). ¯ This is the text of an address given to the annual meeting of United States major superiors of men religious held in June, 1968, at Mundelein, Illinois. x I use the words, "order," "monasticism," and their derivatives in a wide sense to include all forms of the religious life. In its strict sense "monasticism" applies only to the monks and does not extend to the friars and the clerks regular. There were, however, exceptions to the general rule that monks did not engage in the ministry. An Eastern current of monasticism, influenced by John Chrysostom, viewed missionary work as a legitimate activity of the monk; and, as we shall see, many Western monks shared this conviction. Nevertheless, missionary activity did not become an integral part of monasticism. Even after most monks became priests, they considered their vocation to lie within the monastery where they could contemplate and dedicate themselves to the service of God. Since the clergy did not embrace the religious life, with the ex-ception of those of Eusebius of Vercelli and Augustine of Hippo, the ministerial element remained generally absent from the religious life until the development of the canons regular. In itself the life of the monks was exclusively contemplative. "Tradition assigns no other end to the life of a monk than to 'seek God' or 'to live for God alone,' an ideal that can be attained only by life of penance and .prayer. The first and fundamental manifestation of such a vocation is a real separation from the world." Yet in the thinking of the monks and of the friars, who integrated apostolic activity into the religious life, their prayer, contemplation, and example were mighty forces working for the upbuilding of the Body of Christ. Foundation o[ Monasticism Though other Scriptural elements contributed to the origin of monasticism, the concept of the Apostolic life was the decisive force. This truth has been demon-strated by historians who have been studying this point for over half a century; it has recently been dis-cussed scripturally by Heinz Schiirmann, professor of New Testament exegesis at Erfurt. The historians show how the life of the Apostles and the primitive Christians influenced the origins and growth of monasticism; Schiirmann makes clear that the constitutive elements of the religious life were taught to and demanded of the Apostles by Christ. Religious life is rooted in the key Biblical texts that record the calling and formation of the Apostles. These passages determine the character of the Apostolic office and the relationship of the Apostles to Jesus. They are to be with Him, listen to Him, and follow Him. His call is rigorous and imperious. He demands commitment without reserve. Negatively, this requires a complete break with one's previous life: family, wife, home, and oc-cupation; positively, it establishes the Apostles in a state of total availability. Abandoning their possessions, their means of livelihood and, like the lily and raven, trusting completely in divine providence, they follow Christ, + ÷ ÷ Religious Orders VOLUME 28, 1969 9]] W. A. Hinnebusch, 0~. REVIEW FOR RELIGIOUS 912 putting themselves in a student-teacher, servant-master relationship to Him. All .the features of their new life with Him are already conveyed in brief in Mark's ac-count of their call: And going up a mountain, he called to him men of his own choosing, and they came to him. And he appointed twelve that they might be with him and that he might send them forth to preach (3:13-5). In this text, too, we find the first s~atement of the contemplative and apostolic elements that reappear in the religious life. They are "to be with him." Here is the contemplative element. They are "with him," devoting themselves to the "one thing necessary"--listening to His word. Yet in hearing and learning .they are made ready so "that he might send them forth to preach." As Schiirmann summarizes it: First they hear and learn, then they teach and act: "Preaching isonly one part of their life and its follows from the other." The Apostles enter irrevocably into a community of life with Jesus. They share His life and destiny: eat with Him, walk the dusty roads with Him, serve the people with Him, undergo His trials, conflicts, persecu-tions. They must be ready to hate and even to lose their lives for His sake. He wants total obedience, one based on their "faith in Him who calls and proposes the word of God in an entirely unique fashion. Their following of Christ becomes understandable only as a permanent state of profession of faith., fit] opens up a new pos-sibility of existence, a new manner of being-in-the-world, a new 'state' of life." Though the Apostles take no vows, their life is that of the three counsels. Christ imposes no greater moral de-mands on them than on all the other believers, but they alone live this close community life with Him. Not all who declare for Christ are chosen by Him to follow Him in this intimate, permanent way. Obviously Mary, Martha, and Lazarus do not. Others asked to be ad-mitted into the group of disciples but were not accepted. Mark (5:18-19) describes one case: As Jesus was getting into the boat, the man who had been afflicted by the devil began to entreat him that he might re-main with him. And he did not allow him, but said to him, "Go home to thy relatives, and tell them all that the Lord has done for thee, and how he has had mercy on thee." (See also Mt 11:28, Mk 3:35, Lk 12:8-9, 10:38-42, 9:61-2.) Being with Christ constantly, hearing His word, com-pletely obedient to His wishes, separated from family, home, and occupation, the Apostles enter a new form of existence that signifies. The prime purpose of their spe-cialized following is to declare themselves openly for Him, so that all might come to believe in Him. In a strikingly visible way their intimate following pro-claims to the Jewish world that the one thing necessary is to hear the word of Christ and to keep it. Their visi-ble, stable following becomes a sign to the world. Only after they have made this permanent commitment are they sent out to preach and to act. At every step in monastic history, whether in its ori-gins, renewals, or creation of new forms, the Apostolic life taught by Christ to the Twelve, and by them to the primitive Christian community of Jerusalem, was the leading and most powerful influence. The Gospel texts and those in the Acts of the Apostles that describe the primitive community were decisive in creating the con-cept of monasticism and in fashioning its life and usages. In the Jerusalem community we find fraternal unanim-ity, common ownership of possessions, fidelity to the teachings of Christ, common public prayer, intense pri-vate prayer. The following passages embody all these features: Now the multitude of the believers were of one heart and soul, and not one of them said anything he possessed was his own, but they had all things in common (Acts 4:32). And they continued steadfastly in the teaching of the apostles, and in the communion of the breaking of bread and in the prayers. And all who believed were together and held all things in common. And continuing daily with one accord in the temple, and breaking bread in. their houses, they took their food with gladness and simplicity of heart, praising God and being in favor with all people (Acts 2:42-7; see also 1:14, 3:1, 6:4,34; Mt 10:gff). The ministry of the word, evangelical preaching of salvation, was c~irried out by the Apostles (Mk 6:6-13; Acts 6:4), a mission that entailed indefatigable journey-ing (Mt 10:7if; Mk 6:6-13; Acts 6:4). Only the pre-dominately lay character of early monasticism delayed the full realization of the ministerial mendicant orders. For centuries monks examined and lovingly scruti-nized the texts. The power that they exercised over monastic founders is illustrated by the passage where Athanasius describes the origin of Antony's vocation in his Life of Antony: As he was walking along on his way to Church, he col-lected his thoughts and reflected how the Apostles left every-thing and followed the Savior; also how the people in Acts sold what they had and laid it at the feet of the Apostles for distribution among the needy; and what great hope is laid up in Heaven for such as these. With these thoughts in his mind he entered the church. And it so happened that the Gospel was being read at that moment and he heard the passage in which the Lord says to the rich man: "If thou wilt be perfect, ¯ go sell all that thou hast, and give it to the poor; and come, follow me and thou shalt have treasures in heaven," 4- 4- Religious Orders VOLUME 28~ 1969 W. A. Hinnebusch, O.P. REVIEW FOR RELIGIOUS As though God had been speaking directly to him, An-tony left the church, sold what he had, gave it to the poor, and went into the desert. During subsequent centuries the Scriptures lost none of their influence over monasticism. The Apostolic texts led to much more than the abandonment of riches and fleeing the world; they provided a complete program of life in community. Explaining the origins of monasti-cism about 1122 A.D., Abbot William of Saint-Thierry shows how the meditation of hundreds of years had sys-tematized the Scriptural influence: We come to this spiritual sbciety of which the Apostle Paul spoke to the Philippians (2:1-5; 3:17) in praise of the regular discipline and of the sublime joy of brothers living together in unanimity. To do justice to this discipline it is necessary to return to its beginning in the time of the Apostles, since it was the Apostles themselves who instituted it as their own way of life, according to the teaching of the Lord. Unless it was the grace of the Holy Spirit which gave them power from above to live together in such a way that all would have but one heart and one soul, so that everything would be held in common, and all would be continually in the temple in a spirit of harmony. Animated by a great !ove for this form of life instituted by the Apostles, certain men wished no longer to have any other house or any other lodging than the hbuse of God, the house of prayer. All that they did they did according to a common program, under a common rule. In the name of the Lord they lived together, possessing nothing of their own, not even their bodily strength, nor were they even masters of their own will. They lay down to sleep at the same time, they rose up together, they prayed, they sang Psalms, they studied together. They showed the fixed and changeless will of being obedient to their superiors and of being entirely submissive to them. They kept their needs to a minimum and lived with very little; they had poor clothes, a mean diet, and limited everything according to a very precise rule. Influence o[ Cassian Soon after Antony went into the desert, the influence of the Scriptures on monastic origins was enhanced by a misconception of Eusebius and Jerome, who mistakenly believed that the Apostolic life of the primitive Jerusa-lem community was followed in Alexandria, Rome, and other centers. Writing a century later, Cassian developed this misconception and found in it th~ explanation of the rise of monasticism: The conversion of the Gentiles forced an abandonment of the Apostolic way by the ma-jority of Christians, even by the clergy. More zealous souls refused to give it up and founded communities to perpetuate it. This theory was very fruitful in its effects when it was coupled with the example of Antony and Pachomius, the founder of the cenobitic life, who were inspired by the Scriptures alone. This fusion constituted a powerful op- erative force in the development of monasticism for many centuries. Scarcely any monastic 'author was read so continuously as Cassian. As late as the thirteenth cen-tury, St. Dominic was reading his Conferences. Con-stantly read and reread, Cassian's books [ashioned the medieval--and our ownnmonastic life. The Holy Spirit at Work in the Church The truth underlying Cassian's error is the almost simultaneous appearance of the religious life everywhere that the Church took root. The origin of the monastic life was a spontaneous manifestation of the Holy Spirit impelling Christians to live the life of the counsels taught by Jesus. Antony was merely the first to emerge, thanks to Athanasius, from the anonymity that conceals the virgins, celibates, and ascetics who preceded him. The impetus of the Spirit is seen particularly in the early acceptance of the virginal life by both men and women as a prime means of following the Master. From the end of the first century there are references to ascetics who lived continently "in honor of the flesh of Christ." After the third century virgins were looked upon as "the most illustrious portion of the flock of Christ" and were considered the spouses of Christ. Perfect continence, to-gether with voluntary poverty and austerity of life, was a constitutive element of the ascetical life that began to develop in the second century. Though these ascetics lived in their homes, sometimes holy women, widows, and virgins formed small communities that were marked by considerable personal freedom. The general reverence of the Church for chastity when Antony became a hermit about 300 A.D. accounts in large measure for the immediate wide diffusion of the eremitic and cenobitic forms of monasticism throughout the Christian world. The dynamic power of the Holy Spirit has been con-stantly operative during the history of the religious life. Here again there is a link with the early community of Jerusalem. These Christians, as we find their record in Acts, were very conscious of the action of the Spirit in their lives and apostolic works. Theirs was a life lived in the ~lan of the Spirit, as Vicaire remarks. ImmediateIy after describing the primitive community, the Acts of the Apostles goes on to say: "And great grace was upon them all" (4:33). This grace made itself visible even by miracles: "And many wonders and signs were done through the apostles" (2:43). When William of Saint-Thierry, whom I quoted a few pages back, described monastic origins, he manifested the awareness the monks had that the charismatic power of the Spirit was at work among them. In William's think-ing it was the "grace of the Holy Spirit which gave [the ÷ ÷ 4. Religious Orders VOLUME 28, 1969 W. A o Hinnebusch~ O.P. REVIEW FOR RELIGIOUS Apostles] power from above to live together in such a way that all would have but one heart and one soul, so that everything would be held in common . '~ Cen-turies before, Gregory the Great, writing his Dialogues within fifty years of the death of Benedict, described the great patriarch of Western monasticism as the ideal "man of God," the spiritual father who was entirely under the guidance of the Holy Spirit. The attention paid to the miracles worked by the founders and great figtires of monastic history is not merely a thoughtless emphasis on the secondary but was motivated by. the belief that the true monk, living in community, possesses an extraordinary grace for radiat-ing sanctity and contributing to the upbuilding of the B6dy of Christ. He can even receive from the Spirit the power of working miracles. The present-day interest in the charismatic character of the religious life and the charismatic founders is a legitimate, more explicit, recognition of the power of the Spirit working through all the years of monastic history. His role in the religious life deserves more attention and should awaken in us a great hope in the future of the religious life. Antony the Hermit Monasticism entered the pages of history close to the year 300 A.D. when Antony, the great hermit, gave away his possessions and retired to the Egyptian desert. The holiness and ordered discipline of his life, characterized by solitary contemplation and a severe but lofty and well-balanced asceticism soon brought other hermits to him for direction. Great colonies of solitaries arose under Antony's direction, especially at Pispir, where he lived, and at Nitria and Scete. These disciples lived alone like their master. Antony found so many imitators because of his moral greatness at a time of growing wickedness in the contemporary world. When Constantine ended the per-secutions and began to favor Christianity, the consequent lowering of the moral level of Christian life stimulated the development of a powerful ascetical movement, in-spired by the Gospels, on the ~ringes of the populated world. Antony became the model of the movement, especially after the appearance of his Life, written by Athanasius in 357 A.D., a year after Antony died. Gre-gory of Nazianzen called it "a rule of monastic life in the form of a narrative." Athanasius, who had known Antony personally and had seen him often, considered "the life of Antony an ideal pattern of the ascetical life." He intended to hold up Antony as the exemplar of the consecrated life and induce his readers to imitate what they saw. The work enjoyed a~tonishing success and was shortly translated into various languages. Antony, earnestly desiring to die the death of a martyr, went to Alexandria in 311 A.D., when the persecution of Maximin Daja broke out, to minister to the confessors in the mines and prisons, not thinking it justified to turn himself over to the authorities. When his hopes were dis-appointed, Antony returned to his desert cell where "he was a daily martyr to his conscience, ever fighting the battles of the faith. For he practiced a zealous and more intense ascetic life." With this short passage Athanasius enriched monasticism at its very birth with a positive view of asceticism and the renunciations involved in the life of the counsels. Antony's life in the desert was a substitute martyrdom and the monk the successor to the . martyr, a concept that remains alive to this day. Pachomius the Cenobite The weakness of the ei:emitical life lay in the minimal opportunity for practicing charity. Pachomius remedied this defect when he formed a genuine fellowship based on the communal charity inherent in Christianity. He composed the first monastic Rule, in it establishing the economic and spiritual bases for the common life and providing for community government. A younger con-temporary of Antony, Pachomius first served an appren-ticeship under the hermit Palaemon. Then about the year 320 A.D. he established a monastery at Tabennisi on the right bank of the Nile. Other monasteries soon followed, so that when he died, nine for men and two for women were under his guidance. These foundations were large settlements of monks who were organized into smaller groups according to the kind of agricultural work they did or the crafts they practiced. They lived a disciplined life, practiced individual poverty and de-tachment in essential matters, supported themselves by remunerative work, gathered for prayers morning and evening, and observed the three counsels, though they took no vows. Numerous biographies testify to the esteem in which Pachomius was held and the extent of his in- ~uence. Basil the Great The eremitical and cenobitic types of monasticism spread quickly both in East and West. Basil the Great, who benefited from the experience of the previous half century bf monastic experience, became the lawgiver of Eastern monasticism when he wrote his Longer R
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In an era of unprecedented technological advancement, digital transformation is revealing its enormous potential, but also presenting new challenges. At its core, it represents a catalyst for innovation, igniting advancements that enhance productivity and propel economic growth. Thus, harnessing its transformative power holds the promise of unlocking new opportunities, solving complex challenges and ultimately shaping a more inclusive and sustainable future for humanity. However, rapid technological progress has ushered in a new era of interconnectedness and interdependence, where nations are increasingly reliant on digital systems and networks to power their economies and safeguard their national security. In this regard, the intersection of technological advancement and the amplification of geopolitical tensions has brought into sharp focus the myriad threats that countries face in the contemporary landscape. Among others, cyberattacks, in particular, have grown more sophisticated, transcending national borders and necessitating collaboration and partnerships among nations to protect against such threats. These challenges have prompted all major actors – both public and private – to intensify their efforts to protect their data and digital assets. They are devising and implementing a variety of risk management strategies. The empirical evidence shows that the most effective and resilient cybersecurity policies and approaches are those tailored to specific risks and security requirements. Individual organisations need to adopt the cybersecurity measures most appropriate for the challenges they face, based on a careful risk assessment. This requires the adoption of internationally recognised cybersecurity frameworks and standards that are based upon the principles of risk management and that are relevant across sectors to strengthen consistency and continuity among interconnected sectors and throughout global supply chains. Cybersecurity threats are transnational by definition and as such they can be countered effectively only through global mechanisms aimed at risk reduction and trust building. A primary objective of multilateral cooperation should be the adoption of interoperable policy frameworks that promote international harmonisation and consistent cybersecurity mechanisms. The G7 can provide a fundamental impulse for this cooperation at the global level by encouraging the development and implementation of risk-based, consensus-driven frameworks, standards and risk management best practices. A commitment to these internationally recognised cyber risk management approaches and frameworks can advance economic security and enhance cyber resilience across the ecosystem.The G7's past initiatives Recognising the enduring and constantly shifting landscape of cyber threats at a global level, the G7 has tried to adopt measures to confront these challenges head-on, with a particular focus on the financial sector. In 2015, the G7 Cyber Expert Group (G7 CEG) was established as a multi-year working group responsible for coordinating cybersecurity policy and strategy among G7 member countries. The G7 CEG also serves as a channel for sharing information, establishing a common understanding of the threat landscape, and facilitating incident response by implementing risk mitigation measures. To this end, the G7 CEG organises annual incident response exercises[1] and quadrennial cross-border cyber simulations. It also produces reports on specific cybersecurity issues relevant to the financial sector.[2] In October 2016, the G7 Fundamental Elements of Cybersecurity for the Financial Sector (G7FE) were published. The objective was to enhance the resilience of the financial system by providing a set of cybersecurity practices and assisting private and public entities in developing and implementing cybersecurity policies and operational frameworks.[3] During Germany's G7 presidency, two additional reports were drawn up by the G7 CEG, setting out fundamental elements for risk management. The G7 Fundamental Elements of Ransomware Resilience for the Financial Sector contain specific recommendations for financial market agents, focusing on how they can address the increasing threat of ransomware attacks (a type of malware that prevents from accessing devices and the data stored on it, usually by encrypting files).[4] Moreover, the G7 Fundamental Elements for Third Party Cyber Risk Management in the Financial Sector addresses new cybersecurity risks stemming from the increasing use of service providers by financial institutions.[5] Private and public entities in the financial sector have increasingly relied on third-party relationships to support their business operations, resulting in a notable increase in the use of ICT providers in recent years. However, reliance on third parties should be coupled with robust third-party risk management to address ICT supply chain risks to individual firms. Systemic cyber risks to the financial sector may need to be addressed in a more comprehensive, holistic approach involving public and private sector stakeholders from government, supervisors, financial firms and technology companies. During Japan's Presidency in 2023, the Ministerial Declaration of the G7 Digital and Tech Ministers' Meeting, held prior to the Hiroshima Summit, addressed several important digital security issues beyond the financial sector. These included the need for international cooperation to provide secure and resilient digital infrastructure for developing and emerging economies, given their growing dependence on digital technology. The Institutional Arrangement for Partnership (IAP) was endorsed by G7 governments at G7 Hiroshima 2023. The IAP is an international mechanism for operationalising Data Free Flow with Trust (DFFT) and represents an advancement in cross-border data flow. As today's global digital economy is fuelled by data, integrating both privacy and security measures for personal and sensitive data is paramount to safeguarding them against potential cyberattacks. Failure to do so could render them vulnerable targets for malicious exploitation. Bringing governments and stakeholders together, IAP aims to ensure "principles-based, solutions-oriented, evidence-based, multistakeholder and cross-sectoral cooperation".[6] The IAP is hosted by OECD and is composed of the Secretariat, located within OECD, and project-based Working Groups, merging together government officials, stakeholders and experts. Besides G7 initiatives, while comparatively limited in scope compared to them, some actions within the G20 context are also noteworthy. For example, the G20 under India's leadership adopted non-binding High-level Principles aimed at bolstering safety, security, resilience, and trust in the digital economy to support businesses.[7] The United Nations is another major global player. The UN Security Council convened on 4 April 2024, specifically to address cyber-related issues. Hosted by the Republic of Korea and co-hosted by Japan and the United States, the session delved into the theme of the "Evolving Cyber Threat Landscape and Its Implications for the Maintenance of International Peace and Security".[8] The discussion brought attention to the narrowing gap between low-intensity, financially motivated cybercrimes and disruptive, large-scale cyberattacks, underscoring the urgent need for further proactive measures to address these evolving threats.Looking ahead There are three areas in which the G7 can do more to address cybersecurity concerns. First, it can step up its support for the ongoing attempts to harmonise cybersecurity strategies between its member states with an eye to wider agreements in more inclusive bodies such as the G20 and the UN. Second, it should endorse efforts to establish common criteria to assess the trustworthiness of digital service providers that facilitate cross-border data flow. Third, in pursuing such goal, it should promote a wider and more systematic involvement of key stakeholders, including major industry actors as well as others that have expertise in cybersecurity, data protection and privacy. Therefore, the G7 should consider undertaking further initiatives aimed at coming to a common understanding of what constitutes digital trust, with the goal of establishing a multilateral framework based on shared trustworthiness criteria. This framework would serve the purpose of addressing the cybersecurity, privacy and national security concerns while providing governments with a common basis by which to assess the trustworthiness of companies providing digital services and infrastructure such as cloud computing. To that end, the G7 should call for the Data Free Flow with Trust (DFFT) Experts Group at the Institutional Arrangement for Partnership (IAP) to form a workstream that will focus on the technical work necessary for developing a multilateral framework on trustworthiness. It should call for the creation of an expert working subgroup within the IAP's DFFT expert group with the task of mapping out potential criteria to assess the trustworthiness of digital service providers. The G7 should also set up an ad hoc G7 group at the ministerial level to evaluate those criteria with the view of advancing and adopting a dedicated multilateral framework. The G7 should also provide a forum for discussing and undertaking initiatives aimed at fostering cooperation among national bodies responsible for developing cybersecurity strategies. All G7 members have set up cybersecurity agencies to address cyber threats. Harmonising their strategies would greatly contribute to address transnational cyberattacks. The G7 should act as a key promoter of closer cooperation between national cybersecurity agencies through such activities as joint assessment of risks associated with the new technologies, sharing of best practices and coordination of standardisation efforts.Ettore Greco is Executive Vice President of the Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI) and also Head of the Multilateralism and Global Governance programme of the institute. Federica Marconi is Researcher in IAI's Multilateralism and Global Governance programme.[1] European Central Bank, G7 Cyber Expert Group Conducts Cross-Border Coordination Exercise in the Financial Sector, 23 April 2024, https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/pr/date/2024/html/ecb.pr240423~de1afe7ceb.en.html.[2] US Department of the Treasury website: G7 Cyber Expert Group, https://home.treasury.gov/node/970671.[3] G7 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors, G7 Fundamental Elements of Cybersecurity for the Financial Sector, 11 October 2016, https://www.ecb.europa.eu/paym/pol/shared/pdf/G7_Fundamental_Elements_Oct_2016.pdf.[4] German Federal Ministry of Finance, G7 Countries Adopt Reports on Cybersecurity, 13 October 2022, https://www.bundesfinanzministerium.de/Content/EN/Standardartikel/Topics/world/G7-G20/G7-Presidency/g7-reports-on-cybersecurity.html.[5] Ibid.[6] G7, Ministerial Declaration - The G7 Digital and Tech Ministers' Meeting, 30 April 2023, point 13, https://g7g20-documents.org/database/document/2023-g7-japan-ministerial-meetings-ict-ministers-ministers-language-ministerial-declaration-the-g7-digital-and-tech-ministers-meeting; Digital Agency website: Institutional Arrangement for Partnership (IAP), https://www.digital.go.jp/en/dfft-iap-en.[7] G20, G20 New Delhi Leaders' Declaration, 9 September 2023, https://g7g20-documents.org/database/document/2023-g20-india-leaders-leaders-language-g20-new-delhi-leaders-declaration.[8] Allison Pytlak and Shreya Lad, "The UN Security Council Discusses Cyber Threats to International Security", in Stimson Commentaries, 15 April 2024, https://www.stimson.org/?p=92869.
The present study, in a politically sensitive manner, narrates and interprets the related facts with the armed conflict between 1998 and 2001, on the sidewalk El Salto, of the municipality of El santuario , located in the subregion of the Near East Antioquia. This territory went to be object of dispute between armed actors, because of their strategic role as a doorway to the corridor transit connecting the region to the North-East and the Magdalena Medio. In the area, the guerrilla and paramilitaries, in addition to making an armed presence, regulated trafficking in narcotic drugs, generated pressure on the reservoirs and extended their presence and instigation on the Medellín-Bogotá motorway, the circulation channel of all economic activity between this important region and the center of the country. Likewise, this subregion has been a high potential of agricultural, tourist and industrial production activities, being the epicenter for air traffic, hosted at José Maria Cordova Airport. The Oriente is one of the areas of the country where the conflict has been heightened and where the systematic violence of the armed actors was concentrated, Massacres, threats, forced displacement, targeted killings and illegal retains along with the incursions to urban helmets, the Operation of each other By. Long periods of time, the population of the area suffered the scourge of war, not counting with the presence of the State, beyond military interventions that increased zozobrae of peasants and locals in a countless municipalities, corrections and sidewalks. While the interest in a political study is to address reality social and political analysis, recognition of the situation in question is imperative for comprehensive political analysis by civil society, called by analysts from the time that this study "population" is dealing with civil", to designate communities of citizens who were not involved in the conflict, but they were his victims. In this spectrum of the study, emphasis was placed and an initial question was chosen: is it? factable to understand, through historical memory, the status of victims of the armed conflicts of citizens who developed their daily lives on a sidewalk? There are many research of high academic value that study fenomenon of the Oriente region, from descriptive, explanatory and interpretative; but there is still a great deal of need for such a discussion as the one proposed in this research: resort to victims of a small village and to know a voice alive; and appealing to historical memory, the experiences experienced by those citizens are not represented in the hegemonic versions of the State. Citizens who were doubly victimized: by the State itself, through the National Army, and by guerrilla and/or the paramilitars. The study also seeks to recognize what effects it has brought to the attention of the Commission these citizens' lives were initially displaced and then uprooted, carrying in his living the imprint of tragedy, after two decades for me, as the author of this study, it was a re-created challenge, in passages. Narratives, my status as a resident of El Salto, when I was a minor i was involved in the war games where I lived and my family environment, and then, When i joined displaced victims. Today, as a student of the master's in Political Studies, I assume the imperative task, as a social communicator and journalist, to give society a testimony from my memories and life history as a victim, seeking to provide it cristalisation of a society that creates and works for peace and reconciliation in times of post-agreements the families of El Salto lived the conflict, seeing how overnight they were violated by force of each of the boots, rifles and authoritarian speeches of the armed actors, who rotated them as "facilitators" of the enemy, without giving space to the narration of the ununderstandable: a forced invasion of their lives and their fields, to their estates and their "animals". After suffering from the pain of deaths from relatives and friends of a lifetime, they had to run away, abandon their properties and, in this way, their peasant life, due to violent and systematic actions that broke the different armies. The terror caused by the locals and the forced movement of families led to uproot that, with time passing, it was a part of their life . No chance to chose, they had to move to another kind of life, the inhospite, modern, and other that they had to fit. In their capacity as victims of the conflict, they only had the memory resource as a mechanism of resistance, non-acceptance, living in melancholy and longing for the place where they were violently expelled. finally, over the years, they aspire to the non-repetition of war and violence from the Colombian armed conflict. ; El presente estudio, de orden politológico, narra e interpreta los hechos relacionados con el conflicto armado ocurridos entre 1998 y 2001, en la vereda El Salto, del municipio de El Santuario, ubicado en la subregión del Oriente cercano antioqueño. Este territorio fue objeto de disputa entre los actores armados, por su papel estratégico como puerta al corredor de tránsito que conectaba la región con el Nordeste y el Magdalena Medio. En la zona, la guerrilla y los paramilitares, además de hacer presencia armada, regulaban el tráfico de estupefacientes, generaban presión sobre los embalses y extendían su presencia e instigación sobre la autopista Medellín-Bogotá, canal de circulación de toda la actividad económica entre esta importante región y el centro de país. Igualmente, esta subregión ha contado con un alto potencial de actividades agropecuarias, turísticas y de producción industrial, siendo epicentro de tráfico aéreo, por alojar el Aeropuerto José María Córdova. El Oriente antioqueño es una de las zonas del país donde el conflicto ha sido álgido y donde se concentró la violencia sistemática de parte de los actores armados, siendo las masacres, las amenazas, los desplazamientos forzados, los asesinatos selectivos y los retenes ilegales, junto con las incursiones a cascos urbanos, el modus operandi de unos y otros. Por largos periodos de tiempo, la población de la zona sufrió el flagelo de la guerra, sin contar con la presencia del Estado, más allá de intervenciones militares que aumentaban la zozobra de campesinos y lugareños de un sinnúmero de municipios, corregimientos y veredas. Si bien el interés en el marco de un estudio de orden político es abordar la realidad social y política, para el análisis político integral es imperativo reconocer la situación vivida por la sociedad civil, llamada por los analistas de la época que aborda este estudio "población civil", para designar a las comunidades de ciudadanos que no hacían parte del conflicto, pero eran sus víctimas. En este espectro del estudio, se hizo énfasis y se optó por una pregunta inicial: ¿es factible comprender, a través de la memoria histórica, la condición de víctimas del conflicto armado de ciudadanos que desarrollaron su vida cotidiana en una vereda? Pues existen un sinnúmero de investigaciones de gran valor académico que estudian el fenómeno de la región del Oriente antioqueño, desde lo descriptivo, explicativo e interpretativo; pero aún hacen mucha falta abordajes como el que se propone en esta investigación: recurrir a las víctimas de un pequeño poblado y conocer de viva voz, y apelando a la memoria histórica, las experiencias vividas por aquellos ciudadanos no representados en las versiones hegemónicas del Estado. Ciudadanos que fueron doblemente victimizados: por el propio Estado, a través del Ejército Nacional, y por la guerrilla y/o los paramilitares. Este estudio tiene, además, la pretensión de reconocer qué efectos trajo para la vida de estos ciudadanos haber sido inicialmente desplazados y luego desarraigados, llevando en su vivir la impronta de la tragedia, luego de dos décadas. Para mí, como autora de este estudio, se constituyó en un reto re-crear, en pasajes narrativos, mi condición de habitante de la vereda El Salto, cuando era una menor de edad envuelta en los juegos de guerra en que vivía mi entorno familiar; y cuando, luego, me sumé a las víctimas desplazadas. Hoy, como estudiante de la maestría en Estudios Políticos, asumo la imperiosa tarea, como comunicadora social y periodista, de entregar a la sociedad un testimonio desde la memoria y la historia de vida como víctima, procurando aportar a la cristalización de una sociedad que crea y trabaje por la paz y la reconciliación en tiempos de los pos-acuerdos. Las familias de El Salto vivieron el conflicto, viendo cómo de la noche a la mañana fueron violentadas por la fuerza de las botas, los fusiles y el discurso autoritario de cada uno de los actores armados, quienes los rotularon como "facilitadores" del enemigo, sin dar espacio a la narración de lo no comprensible: una invasión forzada a sus vidas y a sus campos, a sus fincas y a sus "animalitos". Luego de padecer los vejámenes y el dolor de las muertes de familiares y amigos de la vereda de toda una vida, tuvieron que huir, abandonar sus propiedades y, con ello, su vida campesina, debido a las acciones violentas y sistemáticas que infringieron los diferentes ejércitos. El terror provocado en los lugareños y el obligado desplazamiento de las familias llevó al desarraigo que, con el transcurrir del tiempo, se configuró en sus vidas. Sin oportunidad de elegir, tuvieron que transitar a otro tipo de vida, a la inhóspita urbe, moderna y ajena, a la que tuvieron que adecuarse. En su condición de víctimas del conflicto, solo les quedó el recurso de la memoria como mecanismo de resistencia, de no aceptación, viviendo en melancolía y añoranza del lugar de donde fueron expulsados de manera violenta. Finalmente, con el transcurrir de los años, aspiran a la no repetición de los hechos de guerra y violencia del conflicto armado colombiano. ; Maestría
p. 1011-1031: "An act for the King's most gracious, general, and free pardon." ; p. 1003-1006: "An act to enlarge the time limited by an act of the last session of Parliament, for restraining the use of the Highland dress; and to enable heirs of tailzie, guardians, tutors, curators, and trustees in Scotland, to sell lands to the crown." ; p. 991-999: "An act for taking away the tenure of ward holding in Scotland, and for converting the same into blanch and feu holdings; and for regulating the casualty of non-entry in certain cases; and for taking away the casualties of single and life-rent escheats, incurred there by horning and denunciation for civil causes; and for giving to heirs and successors there a summary process against superiors; and for discharging the attendance of vassals at head courts there; and for ascertaining the services of tenants there; and for allowing heirs of tailzie there to sell lands to the crown for erecting buildings, and making settlements in the Highlands." ; p. 983-986: "An act for declaring valid such acts as have been done by Thomas Paulin, as one of the principal land coal-meters of the city and liberty of Westminster, between the twenty ninth day of September last and the eighth day of November following." ; p. 975-978: "An act to indemnify persons who have omitted to qualify themselves for offices and promotions within the time limited by law; and for allowing further time for that purpose." ; p. 967-972: "An act to continue several laws for prohibiting the importation of books reprinted abroad, and first composed or written and printed in Great Britain; for preventing exactions of the occupiers of locks and wears upon the river Thames westward, and for ascertaining the rates of water carriage upon the said river; and for better securing the lawful trade of His Majesty's subjects to and from the East Indies; and for the more effectual preventing all His Majesty's subjects trading thither under foreign commissions; and relating to rice, to frauds in the customs, to the clandestine running of goods, and to copper ore of the British plantations; and for the free importation of cochineal and indico; and for punishment of persons destroying turnpikes, or locks, or other works erected by authority of Parliament." ; p. 959-962: "An act to prevent the return of such rebels and traitors concerned in the late rebellion, as have been, or shall be pardoned on condition of transportation; and also to hinder their going into the enemies country." ; p. 943-954: "An act to continue several laws relating to the manufactures of sail-cloth and silk; to give further time for the payment of duties omitted to be paid for the indentures or contracts of clerks and apprentices, and for better securing the payment of the said duties; and declaring that prize ships lawfully condemned shall be deemed British built ships; and for allowing prize goods to be landed and secured in proper ware-houses, without payment of any duty, until it can be determined whether they are fit for exportation or home consumption." ; p. 935-939: "An act to extend the provisions of an act made in the thirteenth year of His present Majesty's reign, intituled, An act for naturalizing foreign protestants, and others therein mentioned, as are settled, or shall settle in any of His Majesty's colonies in America, to other foreign protestants who conscientiously scruple the taking of an oath." ; p. 911-931: "An act for taking away and abolishing the heretable jurisdictions in that part of Great Britain called Scotland; and for making satisfaction to the proprietors thereof; and for restoring such jurisdictions to the crown; and for making more effectual provision for the administration of justice throughout that part of the United Kingdom, by the King's courts and judges there; and for obliging all persons acting as procurators, writers, or agents in the law in Scotland to take the oaths; and for rendering the union of the two kingdoms more complete." ; p. 903-906: "An act to enforce the execution of an act of this session of Parliament, for granting to His Majesty several rates and duties upon houses, windows, or lights." ; p. 879-900: "An act for vesting in His Majesty the estates of certain traitors, and for more effectually discovering the same, and applying the produce thereof to the use of His Majesty, and for ascertaining and satisfying the lawful debts and claims thereupon." ; p. 871-875: "An act to revive, continue, and amend an act made in the ninth year of the reign of His late Majesty King George the First, intituled, An act for clearing, depthening, repairing, extending, maintaining, and improving the haven and piers of Great Yarmouth; and for depthening and making more navigable the several rivers emptying themselves at the said town; and also for preserving ships, wintering in the said haven, from accidents by fire." ; p. 863-867: "An act for granting a duty to His Majesty, to be paid by distillers, upon licences taken out by them for retailing spirituous liquors." ; p. 835-859: "An act for the relief and support of maimed and disabled seamen, and the widows and children of such as shall be killed, slain, or drowned in the merchants service." ; p. 831-832: "An act for the ease of sheriffs with regard to the return of process." ; p. 807-826: "An act for granting to His Majesty a certain sum of money out of the sinking fund, for the service of the year One Thousand seven hundred and forty seven; and also for enabling His Majesty to raise a further sum of money for the uses and purposes therein mentioned; and for the further appropriating the supplies granted in this session of Parliament; and for applying a certain sum of money, for defraying the charge of the allowances to several officers and private gentlemen of the two troops of horse guards, and three regiments of horse, lately reduced, for the year One thousand seven hundred and forty seven; and for continuing the bounties on the exportation of British and Irish coarse linens." ; p. 799-802: "An act to indemnify persons who have omitted to register their letters of attorney, appointing them agents for prizes, within the time limited by law; and for allowing further time for that purpose." ; p. 791-794: "An act to enable His Majesty to allow to the residuary legatees of Sir Joseph Jekyll, knight, late master of the rolls, deceased, part of the legacy given by his will to the use of the sinking fund." ; p. 775-788: "An act to enable the parishoners of the parish of Saint Andrew Holborn, in the city of London and county of Middlesex, to purchase a convenient piece of ground, for an additional burying-ground, for the use of the said parish; and to enable the said parishioners to raise such sum and sums of money, as shall be necessary for that purpose." ; p. 763-770: "An act for uniting the two colleges of Saint Salvator and Saint Leonard, in the University of Saint Andrews, pursuant to an agreement for that purpose." ; p. 731-759: "An act for continuing the term, and enlarging the powers granted by an act passed in the twelfth year of His late Majesty's reign, intituled, An act for repairing and widening the roads from the city of Gloucester to the city of Hereford; and for repairing other roads in the county of Gloucester." ; p. 727-728: "An act for allowing persons impeached of high treason, whereby any corruption of blood may be made, or for misprision of such treason, to make their full defence by council." ; p. 711-722: "An act to confirm an agreement made by the rector and vestrymen of the parish of Saint James, within the liberty of Westminster, for enlarging the churchyard of the said parish; and for other purposes therin mentioned." ; p. 671-706: "An act for repairing the road leading from Catherick Bridge, in the county of York, to Yarm in the said county; and from thence to Stockton in the county of Durham; and from thence through Sedgefield, in the said county of Durham, to the city of Durham." ; p. 659-667: "An act for founding and building a chapel in Wednesfield, in the parish of Wolverhampton, in the county of Stafford." ; p. 651-654: "An act for reviving and continuing an act passed in the sixth year of the reign of His late Majesty King George the First, intituled, An act for laying a duty of two penny Scots, or one sixth part of a penny sterling, upon every Scots pint of beer or ale vended or sold within the town of Bruntisland, and liberties therof, for increasing the publick revenue of the said town, and for other purposes therein mentioned." ; p. 611-647: "An act for repairing the high road leading from the town of Stockton upon Tees, to Darlington, and from thence through Winston to Barnard Castle, in the same county." ; p. 591-607: "An act for the better securing the payment of shares of prizes taken from the enemy, to the Royal hospital at Greenwich; and for preventing the embezzlement of goods and stores belonging to the said hospital." ; p. 559-588: "An act for repairing the road leading from Cirencester, in the county of Gloucester, to Birdlip's Hill, in the said county." ; p. 539-554: "An act for building a bridge cross the river Thames, from the parish of Walton upon Thames in the county of Surry, to Shepperton in the county of Middlesex." ; p. 531-534: "An act for holding the summer assizes, and sessions of the peace, for the county of Norfolk, in the city and county of Norwich, until a new shire house can be built for the said county of Norfolk; and for building a new shire house on the Castle Hill in the same county; and for raising money on the said county for that purpose." ; p. 519-527: "An act for relief of such of His Majesty's loyal subjects, in that part of Great Britain called Scotland, whose title deeds, and writings were destroyed or carried off by the rebels, in the late rebellion." ; p. 511-514: "An act for the better adjusting and more easy recovery of the wages of certain servants; and for the better regulation of such servants, and of certain apprentices." ; p. 479-506: "An act for the better preservation and improvement of the river Wear, and port and haven of Sunderland, in the county of Durham." ; p. 471-475: "An act for enlarging the term and powers granted by two acts of Parliament, for laying a duty of two penny Scots upon every pint of ale and beer brewed and vended within the town of Dundee, and the liberties and suburbs thereof, for the purposes in the said acts and this present act mentioned." ; p. 459-466: "An act for enlarging the term and powers granted by several acts of Parliament passed for repairing the highways between Wymondham and Attleborough, and from Wymondham to Hetherset, and from the mouth of Wigmore Lane, to Hall Walk Gate in Attleborough, in the county of Norfolk; and for amending the other roads adjoining to the highways directed to be repaired by the said former acts, and making the said acts more effectual." ; p. 439-454: "An act for repairing, improving, and maintaining the publick conduits, and other waterworks, belonging to the town of Southampton ; p. 431-436: "An act for opening, cleansing, repairing, and improving the haven of Southwould in the county of Suffolk." ; p. 395-426: "An act for repairing the road from Sunderland near the Sea, to the city of Durham, in the county of Durham." ; p. 355-390: "An act for repairing the high road leading from the city of Durham, in the county of Durham, to Tyne Bridge in the said county." ; p. 315-350: "An act for punishing mutiny and desertion; and for the better payment of the army and their quarters." ; p. 283-312: "An act for granting to His Majesty several rates and duties upon coaches, and other carriages therein mentioned; and for raising the sum of one million, by way of lottery, to be charged upon the said rates and duties." ; p. 251-280: "An act for repairing the high road leading from the north end of the Cow Cawsey, near the town of Newcastle upon Tyne, to the town of Belford, and from thence to Buckton Burn, in the county of Northumberland." ; p. 227-246: "An act for enlarging the term and powers granted by an act passed in the thirteenth year of the reign of His late Majesty King George the First, for repairing, widening and amending the road leading from Warrington to Wigan in the county of Lancaster; and also for amending and repairing the road leading from a place called Earl's Kill, in Warrington aforesaid, to the toll-bars in Wallgate, in Wigan aforesaid." ; p. 195-222: "An act for enlarging the term and powers granted by an act passed in the twelfth year of the reign of His late Majesty King George the First, intituled, An act for repairing the roads leading from the western part of the parish of Shenfield, to Harwich in the county of Essex, and the road leading from Chelmsford in the said county, to Sudbury in the county of Suffolk, and from Margretting to Malden in the county of Essex, and from Colchester to Langham in the same county; and for repairing other roads adjoining to the same roads." ; p. 179-191: "An act to continue and make more effectual two acts of Parliament; one passed in the twelfth year of the reign of Her late Majesty Queen Anne, and the other in the first year of the reign of His present Majesty, for repairing the highways between the Bear Inn in Reading and Puntfield in the county of Berks; and for amending other roads in the last act mentioned." ; p. 155-175: "An act for continuing the duties upon malt, mum, cyder, and perry, in that part of Great Britain called England; and for granting to His Majesty certain duties upon malt, mum, cyder, and perry, in that part of Great Britain called Scotland; and for applying a certain sum of money therein mentioned, towards the supply for the service of the year One thousand seven hundred and forty seven." ; p. 147-150: "An act to continue, explain, and amend an act made in the last session of Parliament, intituled, An act to enable His Majesty to make rules, orders and regulations, more effectually to prevent the spreading of the distemper which now rages amongst the horned cattle in this kingdom." ; p. 107-143: "An act for repealing the several rates and duties upon houses, windows, and lights; and for granting to His Majesty other rates and duties upon houses, windows, or lights; and for raising the sum of four millions four hundred thousand pounds by annuities, to be charged on the said rates, or duties." ; p. 7-102: "An act for granting an aid to His Majesty by a land tax, to be raised in Great Britain, for the service of the year One thousand seven hundred and forty seven." ; p. 3-4: "An act for the further continuing an act made in the last session of Parliament, intituled, An act to impower His Majesty to secure and detain such persons as His Majesty shall suspect are conspiring against his person and government." ; The paging and caption title of each act follow ; Contains 52 acts, each with a duplicate of the t.-p. quoted. Nos. 15-52 printed 1747 ; Initials ; Blank leaves included in paging ; Mode of access: Internet.
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Sommer, Sonne, Strand - Zypern ist eine Ferieninsel geworden, auf der viele Touristen Urlaub machen. In Nikosia können Tourist*innen in hippen Läden shoppen gehen, die schöne Altstadt genießen und lecker Essen gehen. Aber aufgepasst! Mitten in der Hauptstadt stehen Friedenstruppen der Vereinten Nationen und überwachen die grüne Linie. Der schöne Schein trügt und erinnert an die vergangenen blutigen Ereignisse zwischen den beiden Volkstruppen. Eine Reise nach Nikosia ist nicht nur mit Urlaub verbunden, sondern auch eine lebendige Geschichtsstunde, denn die Insel ist bis heute geteilt. Dennoch ist die Lage entspannter geworden, die Grenzen sind geöffnet und EU-Bürger*innen können mit ihrem Personalausweis problemlos den Südteil hin zum Nordteil überqueren. Der folgende Beitrag beschäftigt sich mit der Friedenssicherung durch die Vereinten Nationen. Die Friedenssicherung hat sich zu einem zentralen Auftrag der Vereinten Nationen entwickelt und soll am Fallbeispiel Zypern erläutert werden. Dabei gliedert sich die Arbeit in fünf Teile. Zu Beginn wird auf den Kontext der UN-Friedenssicherung im allgemeinen eingegangen. Anschließend wird Bezug auf die Charta der Vereinten Nationen genommen und der Prozess und die Verantwortlichkeit der Friedensmissionen geklärt. Im Folgenden werden die ersten Friedensmissionen beleuchtet und reflektiert. Dabei wird der Zypernkonflikt historisch eingeordnet. Ob die Vereinten Nationen im Fall Zypern richtig gehandelt oder den Konflikt nur auf Eis gelegt haben, ist eine Kontroverse. Um diese zu verstehen, müssen die Hintergründe des Konfliktes beleuchtet werden, welches im nächsten Kapitel geschieht. Weiter wird auf die Mitwirkung der UNO an einer Lösung des Konfliktes eingegangen. Hier sollen die Schwierigkeiten und Erfolge beleuchtet werden. Zum Schluss wird anhand von ausgewählten Praxisbeispielen der UNFICYP gezeigt, wie die Friedensmission vor Ort ablief. Die Probleme und Erfolge der Friedenstruppen werden betrachtet, ebenso werden die Konzepte der Vereinten Nationen, die in die Praxis umgesetzt wurden, auf ihre Standhaftigkeit überprüft. Friedenssicherung durch die Vereinten NationenIm folgenden Abschnitt wird das Konzept der Friedenssicherung vorgestellt und in seinen einzelnen Stufen dargestellt. Die Friedenssicherung ist, zusammen mit der Durchsetzung der Menschenrechte, ein zentraler Auftrag der Vereinten Nationen. Diese Ziele hängen direkt miteinander zusammen (vgl. Mathis, 2013). Es gibt festgeschriebene Grundsätze, die von den Mitgliedern beachten werden sollten; die folgenden stehen in unmittelbarem Zusammenhang der Friedenssicherung der Vereinten Nationen: Die Pflicht zur friedlichen Streitbeilegung, das allgemeine Verbot der Androhung und Anwendung von Gewalt und das Interventionsverbot. Ausnahme beim Gewaltverbot ist die Selbstverteidigung und die vom Sicherheitsrat erlassenen militärischen Zwangsmaßnahmen. Der UN-Sicherheitsrat nimmt hier das Gewaltmonopol ein. Durch das Interventionsverbot dürfen souveräne Staaten sich nicht in innere Angelegenheiten einmischen. Der UN-Sicherheitsrat kann deshalb nicht in innerstaatliche Konflikte und Menschenrechtsverletzungen eingreifen (Ebbing 2012, vgl. S. 3f). Dabei trägt der UN-Sicherheitsrat die Verantwortung für die internationale Sicherheit und den Weltfrieden; dieser kann bindende Entscheidungen für Mitgliedsstaaten treffen (vgl. Deutsche Gesellschaft für die Vereinten Nationen e.V.). Alle UNO-Missionen zur Friedenssicherung und die Entsendung von UN-Soldaten gingen auf die Entscheidung des Sicherheitsrates zurück. Zu betrachten ist, dass durch Menschenrechtsverletzungen Konflikte gestärkt werden und diese in bewaffneten Konflikten und Kriegen enden können. Außerdem kommt es in Kriegen zu Menschenrechtsverletzungen wie z.B. durch Folter, Ermordung von Zivilisten oder sogar Verbrechen gegen die Menschlichkeit, wie Völkermord (vgl. Mathis, 2013). Ein zentrales Gremium für das UN- Konfliktmanagement, welches anhand der UN-Charta entscheidet, ob es sich um einen Friedensbruch oder um einen Bruch der internationalen Sicherheit handelt, ist etabliert. Hier werden Maßnahmen beschlossen, um die internationale Sicherheit und den Weltfrieden wieder herzustellen (vgl. Deutsche Gesellschaft für die Vereinten Nationen e.V.). Mathis zeigt auf, dass die Friedenssicherung eine signifikante Anzahl an Aspekten aufweist und durch das Grundprinzip nicht direkt in bewaffnete Konflikte eingegriffen wird. Zu aller erst gibt es die Prävention, wirtschaftliche Hilfe, Sicherung von Menschenrechten, Verhandlung in Konflikten, Sanktionen gegen Staaten, die völkerrechtswidrig handeln oder völkerrechtliche Vereinbarungen nicht einhalten, wie die Ablehnung von ABC-Waffen. Der Sicherheitsrat kann hierbei Empfehlungen zur friedlichen Streitbeilegung nach Kapitel VI der Charta aussprechen. Darüber hinaus kann es zu Zwangsmaßnahmen nach Kapitel VII kommen. Dabei kann es sich um nicht-militärische, aber auch um militärische Maßnahmen handeln (Deutsche Gesellschaft für die Vereinten Nationen e.V.). Hinzu kommt, dass der UN-Sicherheitsrat einen Krieg völkerrechtlich legitimieren kann (vgl. Mathis, 2013). Während eines Krieges werden Verhandlungen für einen Waffenstillstand geführt, es wird humanitäre Hilfe geleistet, und die Zivilbevölkerung wird durch UN-Soldaten zu schützen versucht. Selbst nach einem Krieg sorgen die UN-Soldaten für die Sicherung des Waffenstillstandes und die Einhaltung von Friedensvereinbarungen. Dabei steht der Schutz der Zivilbevölkerung permanent im Vordergrund. Ein Wiederaufbau, eine Entwaffnung und Abrüstung wird gefördert und schwere Kriegsverbrechen werden geahndet (vgl. ebd.). In einer Resolution wird vom Sicherheitsrat über die Größe und das Mandat einer Friedensmission entschieden, und anhand regelmäßiger Berichte durch den Generalsekretär kann das Mandat verlängert oder geändert werden (vgl. ebd.). Nun soll geklärt werden, wie genau eine Friedensmission abläuft und wer die Verantwortung trägt. Für die Friedensmissionen ist das Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) zuständig; dieses plant die Mission und führt diese durch. Dabei werden sie vom Department of Political Affairs (DPA) unterstützt, dieses beteiligt sich vor allem bei diplomatischen Bemühungen. Eine Einsatzleitung (Force Commander) vor Ort wird vom Generalsekretär bestimmt. Dieser verfügt ebenso auch über die ausführende Leitung der Friedensmission (vgl. Deutsche Gesellschaft für die Vereinten Nationen e.V). Aus Kapitel VII der Charta geht eine starke Anteilnahme der Mitgliedstaaten hervor. Diese Staaten sollen auf Grundlage von Sonderabkommen Streitkräfte zu Verfügung stellen. Dabei sollte erwähnt werden, dass noch kein Sonderabkommen zustande gekommen ist. Festzustellen ist, dass die Anforderungen von den Vereinten Nationen zu hoch und den praktischen Möglichkeiten voraus sind (Gareis/Varwick 2014, vgl. S.117). Gareis analysiert, dass das kollektive Interesse der VN-Mitgliedstaaten oft zu gering ist, um ihre Streitkräfte aus der Hand zu geben und das Leben der Soldaten zu riskieren (vgl. ebd.). Daraus folgt, dass die Vereinten Nationen kein schnelles und effektives Sicherheitssystem besitzt. Die Vereinten Nationen sind "eine unvollkommene, reformbedürftige, aber doch in vielen Bereichen eminent wichtige internationale Organisation" (ebd. S. 356). Voraussetzung für den Erfolg der Vereinten Nationen ist, dass die Staaten multilaterale Strategien zur Problemlösung bevorzugen. Nur dann können die Vereinten Nationen eine Rolle in der internationalen Politik spielen. Die Mitgliedstaaten sind in der Praxis selten bereit, ihre Außenpolitik in die Hände der Vereinten Nationen zu legen. Die großen und mächtigen Staaten neigen dazu, unilateral vorzugehen. Staaten wollen alleine und, wenn notwendig, gegen andere Staaten handeln, um ihre eigenen Interessen zu verfolgen und zu maximieren. Auch wenn nur im Einzelfall unilateral gehandelt wird, entsteht dadurch trotzdem ein Bruch und gegenseitiges Vertrauen wird schwierig (vgl. ebd.). Aufgrund dessen haben sich alternative Formen der Friedenssicherung entwickelt. Diese müssen einerseits dem veränderten Kriegs- und Konfliktgeschehen standhalten und den Souveränitätsansprüchen der Mitgliedsstaaten. Eine eigene UN-Friedenssicherung sind beispielsweise die Blauhelme, welche durch Auslegung von Kapitel VII der Charta vom Sicherheitsrat seit den 1950er Jahren entsendet werden. Dabei bestehen die Blauhelme in der Regel aus unbewaffneten bis leicht bewaffneten Truppen und Beobachtern. Zu ihren Aufgaben gehört unter anderem die Überwachung der Einhaltung von Waffenstillständen oder dem Friedensvertrag. Die Neutralität steht dabei an oberster Stelle (vgl. Gareis 2015). Die ersten Friedensmissionen der Vereinten Nationen Im Mittelpunkt dieses Abschnittes stehen die Anfänge der Friedenssicherung. Dabei wird die Entwicklung beleuchtet und reflektiert. Weiterhin findet eine Einordnung der Friedenssicherung auf Zypern statt. Die Überwachung des Waffenstillstandes nach dem ersten arabisch-israelischen Krieg 1948 war der erste große Einsatz in der Entstehungsphase der Friedenssicherungen. Die nächste größere Mission bestand aus der Überprüfung des Waffenstillstandes zwischen Indien und Pakistan. Gareis stellt fest, dass es sich ebenfalls um eine zwischenstaatliche Auseinandersetzung handelte. Diese Mission wurde vom VN-Haushalt bezahlt und dauert bis heute an. Daraus entwickelte sich eine zweite Phase der Friedenssicherung, die Behauptungsphase von 1956-1967 mit neun Einsätzen (Gareis/Varwick 2014, vgl. S.127f). In die Behauptungsphase zählte der Einsatz der Friedenstruppen in Zypern, auf den im späteren Abschnitt des Blogbeitrages eingegangen wird. "Erstmals übernahmen die UN zeitweilige Autorität über ein Territorium auf dem Weg zur Unabhängigkeit, ergänzte zivile Polizei zu einer Friedensoperation, wurde in einen Bürgerkrieg verwickelt, führte einen Einsatz im größeren Ausmaß durch und erlaubte den Blauhelmen das Tragen von Waffen." (Jett 2000, S.23f), neue Aufgaben wurden erkannt. Die Vereinten Nationen bekamen zudem immer mehr Macht, aber hatten damals schon mit ersten Problemen zu kämpfen. Das klassische peacekeeping entstand durch die erste Notstandsgruppe der Vereinten Nationen, der United Nations Emergency Force (UNEFI) beim Einsatz in Ägypten. Hier kam es zu Schwierigkeiten, es konnte im Sicherheitsrat keine einstimme Verurteilung der israelischen Aggression und der ägyptischen Verstaatlichung erreicht werden. Durch das Veto von Großbritannien und Frankreich wurde der Sicherheitsrat lahmgelegt. Die Uniting for Peace-Resolution schaltete die Generalversammlung ein, welche auf den Einsatz von Friedenstruppen drängte. Eigentlich wäre laut Kapitel VII Artikel 24 Abs. 1 der UN-Charta der Sicherheitsrat zuständig gewesen, jedoch waren die Konfliktpartien freiwillig mit einem Einsatz einverstanden. Neben Frankreich und der UdSSR verweigerten einige Staaten die finanzielle Unterstützung. Dieses Problem vertiefte sich nochmal beim Einsatz im Kongo; hier wurde die Verantwortung für die Friedenserhaltung beim Sicherheitsrat gesehen. Folglich wurde der Internationale Gerichtshof eingeschaltet, welcher sowohl dem Sicherheitsrat als auch der Generalversammlung eine Zuständigkeit zusprach (vgl. Sucharipa-Behrmann 1999). Die Autoren stellten fest, dass sich aus der Kongo-Krise ein "akzeptiertes Miteinander dieser beiden Organe" (Gareis/Varwick 2014, S.129) entwickelte, wobei "der Sicherheitsrat die Initiative und Entscheidungsbefugnis stärker an sich gezogen hatte"(Gareis/Varwick 2014, S.129). Zu erkennen war außerdem eine zunehmende Bedeutung des Generalsekretärs, welcher über mehr Spielraum verfügte. Die UNEF-Mission ging durch wichtige Grundprinzipen der Notstandsgruppe durch den Generalsekretär in die Geschichte der internationalen Friedenssicherung ein. Hinzu kam der Konsens der Konfliktparteien, welcher beschlossen wurde und besagt, dass klassische Blauhelm-Soldaten nicht gegen den Willen eines Staates eingesetzt werden dürfen. Dadurch wurde eine Toleranz der Truppen gefördert und eine Bereitschaft für eine Zurverfügungstellung der Truppen, durch die Mitgliedstaaten, geschaffen. Dies waren die Grundlagen für das Modell des klassischen peacekeeping vom Generalsekretär Hammarskjöld (vgl. ebd.). Zu diesem Zeitpunkt wurde zudem die Verantwortlichkeit durch die Leitung des Generalsekretärs beschlossen. Aufgrund dessen entstand die DPKO im VN-Sekretariat. Außerdem wurde ein Budget für jede Friedensmission festgelegt, welches durch die Mitgliedstaaten gefüllt wird. Besonders wichtig ist die Unparteilichkeit der eingesetzten Truppen, welche mit dem Konsensprinzip einhergeht. Aus diesem Grund sollten die Truppen eine ausgewogene regionale Zusammenstellung haben (vgl. Auswärtiges Amt). Darüberhinaus wurde der Einsatz von Waffen zur Selbstverteidigung und zur Durchsetzung der Mission erlaubt. Hier besteht eine Problematik, die am folgenden Beispiel gezeigt werden soll: Bei der Kongo-Operation (1960-1964) sollte für den Rückzug belgischer Truppen aus der Republik Kongo gesorgt werden. Es kam zu einer Ausweitung des Mandats, wodurch ein Bürgerkrieg verhindert und die Regierung beim Aufbau ihres Amtes unterstützt werden sollte. Dafür gab es zum ersten Mal die Legitimation der Waffengewalt im Bezug auf das auszuführende Mandat (Gareis/Varwick 2014, vgl. S.131). Das führte dazu, dass die UNEF dadurch selbst zu Konfliktpartei wurde und sich in die innerstaatlichen Konflikte verwickelte. Der Einsatz wurde im Sommer 1964 beendet, aufgrund dessen, dass die Regierung Kongos einer Mandatsverlängerung nicht zustimmte. Dabei sollte man nicht außer Acht lassen, dass die Vereinten Nationen aus diesem Einsatz ihre Konsequenzen zogen. Zum einen wurden keine großen und komplexen Missionen die nächsten drei Jahrzehnte durchgeführt (vgl. ebd.). Zum anderen waren die Ziele der Friedenssicherung fortan bescheidener. Zudem kehrte man zu den Prinzipien von Hammarskjöld zurück und sicherte sich die Zustimmung der Konfliktparteien vor einem Einsatz. Zusätzlich wurden die Friedensmissionen vom Sicherheitsrat nun beobachtet (vgl. ebd.). An dieser Stelle wird nur kurz auf den Zypern-Einsatz eingegangen, um ihn in die Geschichte der Friedenssicherung der Vereinten Nationen einzuordnen. Der Zypern Einsatz gilt als klassisches peacekeeping und hält bis heute an. Nach Bellamy und Williams versteht sich unter klassischem peacekeeping die Phase zwischen einem Waffenstillstand und dem Abschluss einer politischen Konfliktlösung. Hier gibt es eine Unterstützung der zwischenstaatlichen Friedenssicherung (vgl. ebd. S. 127). Durch eine Resolution des Sicherheitsrats wurde im März 1964 die UNFICYP-Mission eingerichtet. Eine Kampfhandlung zwischen der griechisch-zypriotischen und der türkisch-zypriotischen Volksgruppe sollte verhindert werden. Trotz der Friedensmission kam es zur Teilung der Insel, es gab einen Waffenstillstand und zahlreiche Bemühungen zur Vermittlung durch den Generalsekretär. Seit 1974 wird die Pufferzone von der UNFICYP überwacht und das Mandat ab 1964 jedes halbe Jahr verlängert. Kritik an dem Einsatz gibt es durch die permanente Anwesenheit der Soldaten, wodurch der Eindruck erweckt wird, dass es keine Notwendigkeit einer Friedenslösung gibt.Durch den Einsatz der Bewachung des Waffenstillstandes zwischen dem Irak und Iran (UNIIMOG) und dem Abzug der UdSSR Truppen aus Afghanistan (UNGOMAP), wurde "eine Renaissance des peacekeeping eingeleitet" (vgl. ebd. S.132). Gareis verweist darauf, dass diese "Gute-Dienst-Missionen" vom Sicherheitsrat nur gebilligt und nicht mandatiert wurden. Alles in allem zeigt sich ein durchwachsenes Bild der Friedensmissionen in den ersten vier Jahrzehnten. Festzuhalten ist, dass jede Mission ein Einzelfall ist und separat betrachtet werden sollte. Hinzu kommen die Vorstellungen der UN-Charta, welche in der Realität nahezu utopisch umzusetzen sind. Die Blauhelme wurden zum innovativen Instrument. Ihre Aufgabe ist die Konfliktberuhigung und nicht die Konfliktlösung. Diese Aufgabe konnte in vielen Missionen erreicht werden. Bedenklich ist, dass diese häufig nur mit einer dauerpräsenten Lösung, wie in Zypern erreicht wurden (vgl. Mathis). Durch den Brahimi- Bericht von 2000 gab es neue Perspektiven in der Friedenssicherung der Vereinten Nationen. Diese beinhalten die folgenden drei Kategorien: die Konfliktvermeidung, Konfliktmanagement und die Konfliktnachsorge. Dabei gibt es erstens eine Neuorientierung für die politischen und strategischen Rahmenbedingungen. Zweitens muss das DPKO für eine personelle und strukturelle Voraussetzung der Friedensmission sorgen. Zudem gibt es für die Mitgliedstaaten konkrete geforderte Leistungen (vgl. Gareis/Varwick 2014, vgl. S.146). Hintergründe des ZypernkonfliktsUm den Zypernkonflikt verständlicher zu gestalten, werden zunächst die politischen Hintergründe beleuchtet. Der Zypernkonflikt ist die Folge der britischen Kolonialpolitik, denn bis 1960 war Zypern eine britische Kolonie (vgl. Gürbey 2014). Der Wunsch nach "Enosis", die Vereinigung mit Griechenland, wuchs unter den griechischen Zyprioten seit dem 19. Jahrhundert. Auf Grundlage der Tatsache, dass Großbritannien die Ionischen Inseln an Griechenland zurückgab, hofften die griechischen Zyprioten auf einen ähnlichen Ausgang. Dieser Wunsch wurde jedoch nicht erfüllt und deshalb gab es schon seit 1931 größere Unruhen, welche die diktatorische Führung unterdrückte (vgl. ebd.). Großbritannien nutzte Zypern geostrategisch. Zypern wurde zum Royal-Air-Force-Stützpunkt für Atombomber und Ansatzpunkt für Spionageflüge im Kalten Krieg (vgl. ebd.). Auf Grund dieser Entwicklung war Zypern für Großbritannien unverzichtbar. Deshalb begann der Unabhängigkeitskampf, bei dem die orthodoxe Kirche eine bedeutende Rolle einnahm. Der Erzbischof Makarios III. nötigte die griechische Regierung, den Zypern-Fall vor die UNO zu bringen (Gorgé 1986, vgl. S. 130). Der britische Premierminister Eden versuchte "die griechische Ambition [...] durch türkische zu neutralisieren" (Richter 2010), also die Türkei miteinzubeziehen und damit beide Länder gegeneinander auszuspielen (vgl. Gürbey 2014). Die türkische Position war glasklar; falls sich beim Status Zypern etwas ändern würde, wäre der Friedensvertrag von Lausanne ungültig und Zypern würde wieder der Türkei gehören. 1922 wurde Frieden mit den Briten geschlossen und sie erhielten die formelle Anerkennung ihrer Herrschaft über Zypern (vgl. Gründer). Richter beschrieb, dass das taktische Manöver Londons aufging und ein neuer griechisch-türkischer Konflikt ausgelöst wurde. Es kam dazu, dass die "divide et impera" Politik Großbritanniens auf die Volksgruppe ausgeweitet wurde. Daraus folge 1956 der griechisch-türkische Minoritäten Konflikt, wobei die Opfer die Istanbuler Griechen waren. Gleichzeitig misslang das Suez-Abenteuer der Briten und Zypern verlor für sie an strategischem Wert. Des Weiteren kam Druck aus den USA, welche die NATO durch die griechisch-türkischen Streitereien gefährdet sahen. Folglich einigten sich Griechenland und die Türkei 1959 zu einer "Scheinlösung" in Zürich. Gleichzeitig wurde der Konflikt nur zwischen den NATO-Verbündeten beigelegt. Wie schon erwähnt, gelang Zypern 1960 die Unabhängigkeit; der innerzypriotische Konflikt blieb jedoch bestehen und verschärfte sich in den nächsten Jahren noch mehr (vgl. Richter 2009). Im Folgenden wird die Position der Bevölkerung verdeutlicht. Die griechischen Zyprioten fordern "Enosis" und die türkischen Zyprioten "Taksim", die Teilung der Insel. Mit der Unabhängigkeit der Insel begann der griechische und türkische Nationalismus auf Zypern (vgl. ebd.). Problematisch waren die Mütterländer, welche den Zypern-Konflikt als nationale Frage ansahen und deshalb enormen Einfluss hatten. Dieser Einfluss wurde durch den Schutz der eigenen Volksgruppe legitimiert (Gorgé 1986, vgl. S. 130f). Zum einen gab es die Strategie von Griechenland; diese war eine Internationalisierung des Konfliktes, um den Druck gegen die Türkei aufzubauen. Dem gegenüber wollte die Türkei den Teilungsprozess forcieren und in seinem Bestand sichern. Ab 1963 gab es blutige Unruhen, weil die griechisch-zypriotische Führung die Verfassungsrechte der türkischen Zyprioten einschränken ließ. An diesem Punkt griffen die USA und die Vereinten Nationen ein und verhinderten eine Eskalation (vgl. Gürbey 2014). Mitwirkung der Vereinten Nationen an einer Lösung des KonfliktesAb 1964 gab es ein Friedensmandat der Vereinten Nationen, durch das eine Sicherung des Burgfriedens gewährleistet werden sollte. Das Wiederaufflammen von Kämpfen sollte verhindert werden, um die Kommunikation der beiden Volksgruppen zu ermöglichen. Die Friedenstruppe UNFICYP wurde vom Sicherheitsrat gesendet und sollte "nach besten Kräften eine Wiederaufnahme von Kämpfen zu verhindern und, soweit notwendig, zur Erhaltung und Wiederherstellung von Recht und Ordnung und zur Rückkehr normaler Lebensbedingungen [in Zypern] beizutragen" (Menning 1974, S.172). Dabei wurde für die Friedenstruppen die zypriotische Nationalgarde und die reguläre türkische Armee zum Konfliktpartner, nicht die bewaffneten Volksgruppen. Außerdem musste die UNFICYP aufpassen, dass lokale Befreiungsversuche nicht als Einmischungsversuche oder Provokation aufgefasst wurden.Festzuhalten ist, dass von 1964 bis Juni 1974 die UNFICYP ein erfolgreicher Vermittler der beiden Volksgruppen war, sodass 1973 eine Kürzung des Mandats stattfand. Auch weil Griechenland und die Türkei einwilligten, dass sie schlichtend auf ihre Volksgruppe einwirken (Menning 1974, vgl. S.172). Der Konflikt spitze sich jedoch wieder zu, im Halbjahresbericht von 1974 erklärte der Generalsekretär, dass weiterhin Misstrauen und Kampfbereitschaft herrscht. Ein Klima von trügerischer Sicherheit war entstanden, die Friedenstruppen wurden als Friedensersatz wahrgenommen, obwohl das Problem ungelöst blieb (Menning 1974, vgl. S.173). Dabei hatte Waldheim in seinem Jahresbericht 1973/74 darauf hingewiesen, dass Friedenseinsätze nicht als Selbstzweck der Vereinten Nationen dienen sollten und "daß eine Friedenssicherungsaktion nicht zu einem Nachlassen der Bemühungen, eine Lösung zu finden, führen dürfe, denn wenn die Konfliktursachen nicht beseitigt werden, könnten sie schließlich das Fundament, auf dem sich die Friedenssicherung aufbaue, zerstören." (Menning 1974, S.173). So kam es 1974 zu einem Putschversuch der Griechen, um die Insel an Griechenland anzubinden. Dieser wurde von dem griechischen Militär ausgelöst und richtete sich gegen die Regierung unter Präsident Makarios. Es gab Differenzen zwischen ihm und der Militärjunta, weil Makarios linksgerichtet war und einen individuellen Kurs mit Zypern vorhatte. Dabei reagierte die Türkei mit einer Invasion. Die Situation eskalierte und die Türkei eroberte fast 40 Prozent der Insel. Die UNFICYP konnte die Angriffe der türkischen Truppen nicht abwehren. Dennoch konnten einige lokale Angriffe auf die Bevölkerung verhindert werden. Außerdem blieb die "Green Line" bestehen und die Kontrolle der Hauptstadt aufrechterhalten. Zudem wurde auf die Forderung von Waldheim eingegangen, welcher in seinem halbjährlichen Bericht Verstärkung angefordert hatte. Im Jahr 1974 stockte die UNFICYP die Zahl der Soldaten von 2.188 auf 4.400 auf. Die Minimierung seit 1971 bis Mitte 1974 war im Nachhinein ein sicherheitspolitischer Fehler der Vereinten Nationen. Nach dem Krieg legte die UNFICYP zwei separate Waffenstillstandslinien fest. Eine UN-Pufferzone wurde von Morphou bis nach Famagusta eingerichtet (vgl. Lugert 2018). Aufgrund dieser Tatsachen war eine Konsolidierung einer Teilung der Inseln der einzige Ausweg. Von nun an gab es einen griechisch-zypriotischen Süden und einen türkisch-zypriotischen Norden. Die Türkei rief 1983 die Unabhängigkeit Nordzyperns aus, dieser Teil wird immer noch nur von der Türkei als Staat anerkannt und wirtschaftlich und politisch gefördert. Der UN-Sicherheitsrat erklärte die Unabhängigkeitserklärung für ungültig und rief andere Staaten dazu auf, dasselbe zu tun (vgl. Gürbey 2014). Faustmann brachte zum Ausdruck, dass Zypern der Ruf als "Friedhof der Diplomatie" (vgl. Faustmann 2009) zusteht. Wie er zu dieser Aussage kam, wird im Weiteren erklärt. Schon im November 1974 forderte die Vereinten Nationen eine Resolution, welche zunächst einen Rückzug der auswärtigen Truppen und die Rückkehr von Flüchtlingen beinhaltete. Darüber hinaus forderten beide Volksgruppen eine Verhandlung unter dem Schutz der Vereinten Nationen. Faustmann wies darauf hin, dass eine Rückkehr zur Verfassungsordnung von 1960 unmöglich für beide Parteien war (vgl. ebd.). Beide Parteien hatten klare Vorstellungen, so forderten die türkischen Zyprioten eine politische Gleichheit als Grundprinzip, allerdings wollte die griechische Seite auch eine Berücksichtigung ihrer prozentualen Bevölkerungsmehrheit von 82% Prozent (vgl. ebd.). In drei Verhandlungsrunden trafen sich die Konfliktparteien unter der Schutzherrschaft der Vereinten Nationen in New York. Nach zähen Verhandlungen kam es 1977 zu einem Abkommen und 1979 zur Erweiterung des Dokuments (vgl. Gürbey 2014). Das Abkommen umfasst die Grundprinzipien einer Wiedervereinigung, die High Level Agreements. Darin wird postuliert, das Zypern als bizonale, bikommunale Föderation wiedervereinigt und entmilitarisiert werden sollte. Außerdem wurden Grundfreiheiten, wie Bewegungs- und Niederlassungsfreiheit und ein Recht auf Eigentum bestimmt. Das Abkommen gestand den türkischen Zyprioten dabei ein einheitliches Territorium zu, wobei die Größe strittig blieb (vgl. Faustmann 2009). Die Ergebnisse der Abkommen zusammengefasst, wird deutlich, dass eine Vereinigung mit Griechenland und eine Teilung ausgeschlossen wurde. Trotz der Unterzeichnung des High Level Agreements kam es zum Stillstand der Verhandlungen. Erst durch die Bemühungen der Vereinten Nationen fanden erneute Verhandlungen statt.Der griechisch-zypriotische Präsident Kyprianoú setzte auf die eigene Internationalisierungskampagne und die Vereinten Nationen. Denktaş forderte die Unabhängigkeit Nordzyperns, sein Streben wurde bestärkt, als eine Resolution der Vereinten Nationen zugunsten der griechischen Seite entschied (vgl. ebd.). Erkennbar wird, wie schwer es für die Vereinten Nationen ist, neutral zu bleiben und beiden Seiten gerecht zu werden. Denktaş führte die türkische Lira als Währung ein und errichtete eine Zentralbank, weiterhin blieb er bei seiner Forderung von einer Unabhängigkeit Nordzyperns. Es kam dazu, dass er am 15. November 1983 die Türkische Republik Nordzypern ausrief. Erst als sich die Beziehung zwischen Griechenland und der Türkei verbesserte, konnten 1988 neue Verhandlungen auf Basis der High Level Agreements beginnen (vgl. ebd.). Man erkannte die wichtige Rolle der beiden Mutterländer, die enormen Einfluss auf die Verhandlungen und die Situation nahmen. Außerdem ließ man eine zu große Einmischung der Vereinten Nationen auch nicht zu, mit den "Set of Ideas" von Generalsekretär Boutros Boutros-Ghali war Denktaş nicht einverstanden. Er forderte Verhandlungen ohne die Vereinten Nationen, weil diese kein Recht für solch umfassende Lösungsvorschläge hätten. Jedoch kam es nie zu Verhandlungen ohne die Vereinten Nationen. Erneute Gespräche endeten 1990, weil die Republik Zypern der EU betreten wollte. Denktaş und die Türkei glaubten, dass die EU keine Konfrontation mit Ankara wollte und der Beitrittsantrag kein Erfolg haben würde, dennoch drohten sie mit einer Annexion des Nordens. Als klar war, die EU würde Zypern auch ohne Lösung des Konflikts aufnehmen, fanden 2002 erneute Verhandlungen unter der Schirmherrschaft der Vereinten Nationen statt. Zugunsten kam diesen die neue AKP-Regierung unter dem linken Oppositionspolitiker Mehmet Ali Talat, welche von der status-quo-Politik abwich und auch Denktaş und seine Nachfolger verschwanden mehr und mehr. Auf türkischer-zypriotischer Seite entstand erstmalig eine moderate Politik. Die griechische Seite wählte mit Tassos Papadopoulos einen Hardliner zum Präsidenten (vgl. ebd.). Dennoch wurden erstmals umfassende Kernpunkte eines politischen Lösungsplans erarbeitet, welcher Anfang 2004 freigestellt wurden, der sogenannte Annan-Plan. Dieser beinhaltete folgendes: "Vom Parlament gewählte Regierung, bestehend aus vier griechischen und zwei türkischen Zyprioten; kollektive Führung mit Vetorechten für beide Volksgruppen; Zwei-Kammern-Parlament nach 1978er Modell; 27 Prozent des Territorium für den Norden; Ambivalenz: Gründung eines neuen Staates durch zwei gleichberechtigte Staaten (wie von der türkischen Seite gefordert, von der griechischen Seite aber als möglichen Ausgangspunkt für eine spätere Abspaltung abgelehnt) oder Umwandlung der bestehenden Republik Zypern in einen neuen Staat (wie von der griechischen Seite gefordert); Ambivalenz: Föderation oder Konföderation; Rückkehr von mehr als der Hälfte der Flüchtlinge unter griechisch-zypriotischer Verwaltung und Umsiedelung von mehreren zehntausend türkischen Zyprioten; Staatsangehörigkeit für mehr als 45 000 türkische Einwanderer, erhebliche und dauerhafte Beschränkungen bei der Rückkehr der griechischen Flüchtlinge und der Niederlassungsfreiheit im Norden; Dauerhafte griechische und türkische Militärpräsenz; Griechenland und die Türkei bleiben zusammen mit Großbritannien Garantiemächte mit Interventionsrecht." (ebd.). Im April 2004 stimmten beide Volksgruppen über den Wiedervereinigungsplan ab. Diese Gelegenheit wurde verpasst, denn 76 Prozent der griechischen Zyprioten stimmten dagegen, weil einige von ihnen hofften, durch den Beitritt in die EU ein besseres Abkommen zu erhalten (vgl. Gürbey 2014). Demgegenüber stand allerdings das türkisch zypriotische Ergebnis des Referendums, welches mit 65 Prozent für eine Wiedervereinigung stimmte. Die Vereinigung Zyperns scheiterte und damit auch der Annan-Plan. Trotzdem trat am 1.Mai 2004 der griechisch Zypriotische Teil der EU bei. Allerdings stellt völkerrechtlich gesehen ganz Zypern EU-Territorium dar, wobei der nördliche Teil ausgegrenzt ist (vgl. ebd.). Seitdem werden immer noch Verhandlungsprozesse unter Aufsicht der Vereinten Nationen geführt. Espen Barth Eide ist seit 2014 der Sonderbeauftragten für den Zypernkonflikt,. Durch ihn gab es eine Einigung, dass eine dritte entscheidende Verhandlungsphase geführt werden soll. Dennoch ging die letzte Verhandlungsrunde für eine Lösung des Zypernkonflikts am 07.07.2017 ohne Ergebnis zu Ende. Hier waren auch die Repräsentanten der sogenannten Garantiemächte Griechenland, Großbritanniens und der Türkei mit dabei. Nun sollen auf Empfehlung von VN-Generalskretär Guterres erstmals eigene Vorstellungen betreffend einer Fortführung des Verhandlungsprozesses gebildet werden (vgl. Auswärtiges Amt 2018). UNFICYP- Praxisbeispiel für die Leistungen und Probleme der Friedenssicherung Zypern wird durch eine 180 Kilometer lange grüne Line geteilt, welche auch durch die Hauptstadt Nikosia verläuft. Diese Pufferzone wird von den Friedenstruppen der UNFICYP überwacht. Die Waffenstillstandslinie wurde hart umkämpft, sodass sie vor allem in Nikosia nicht gerade verläuft, sondern vor- und zurückspringt. Dadurch ist die Überwachung des Status quo für die UN-Soldaten noch mehr erschwert (Ehrenberg 1991, vgl. S. 1). Seit dem Bürgerkrieg von 1963/64 gab es auf Zypern lange keinen dauerhaften Frieden. Wie schon beschrieben, haben die Sonderbeauftragten des UN-Generalsekretärs schon seit 1964 viele Verhandlungen gestartet, aber immer noch keinen dauerhaften Frieden erreicht. Dabei kam immer wieder der Vorwurf auf, die Vereinten Nationen würden den Kern des Problems nur auf Eis legen und damit könne kein Frieden entstehen (vgl. Gürbey 2014). Unter diesen Umständen versuchen die Friedenstruppen, der Bevölkerung so viel Normalität wie möglich zu gewährleisten. Die Hoffnung, dass durch einen Generationenwechsel sich das Problem von selbst lösen würde, trat nicht ein. Das zeigte sich gerade auf der griechisch-zypriotischen Seite; hier waren die Jugendlichen ernüchtert, weil sich der politische Stillstand nicht überwinden ließ (Ehrenberg 1991, vgl. S.1f). Ein Beispiel hierfür war die Versammlung von 3000 Schülern im November 1988 an der Pufferzone. Sie wollten gegen die türkischen Truppen demonstrieren. Dabei durchbrachen einige von ihnen die grüne Linie, konnten dann aber von UN-Truppen gestoppt werden, bevor sie die türkisch-zypriotischen Truppen erreichten (vgl. ebd. S. 2). Die Jugendlichen bewarfen die UN-Soldaten dabei mit Steinen, Flaschen, Holzstücken und Dachziegeln. Die griechisch-zypriotische Polizei griff erst nach Kommando der UNFICYP-Oberkommandanten ein und räumte mit den UN-Truppen den Platz. Hier ist kritisch anzumerken, dass in der Presse nicht die UN-Soldaten die Helden waren, sondern die Schüler, welche ihr Land zurückerobern wollten. Dabei sollte nicht außer Acht gelassen werden, dass auch die türkisch-zypriotische Seite der UNFICYP die Schuld gab; diese hätten nicht rechtzeitig reagiert (vgl. ebd. S. 2). Demonstrationen wie diese waren kein Einzelfall zu dieser Zeit, ein halbes Jahr später kam es zu einer Frauendemonstration, bei der die UNFICYP noch machtloser war. Auch hier verhielt sich die griechisch-zypriotische Polizei sehr passiv. Die UN-Soldaten wurden von Männern, die am Rand standen, angegriffen. Zudem hatten sich griechisch-orthodoxe Kirchenmänner unter die Frauen gemischt (vgl. ebd. S. 2). Insgesamt zeigt sich, wie schwierig es die Friedenstruppen hatten. Sie mussten sowohl Blutvergießen verhindern und die Konfliktparteien auseinander halten als auch ihre eigene Akzeptanz aufrechterhalten. An diesem Beispiel wird auch deutlich, dass die Friedenstruppen ungerechtfertigte Kritik einstecken mussten. Im folgenden Beispiel wird auf den Waffengebrauch eingegangen. Wie kritisch dieser ist, zeigte sich anhand der Todesschüsse in Athienou Ende Mai 1988. Die Waffen dürfen nur zur Selbstverteidigung gebraucht werden, zum Schutz für das Leben anderer UN-Angehöriger oder Personen, die zu verteidigen sind. Dafür ist immer die Zustimmung des ranghöchsten Soldaten vor Ort nötig (Gareis/Varwick 2014, vgl. S. 117). Athienou gehörte zur griechisch-zypriotischen Seite, war zur damaligen Zeit aber ein umstrittenes Gebiet. Ein türkischer Soldat nahm eine Familie in ihrem Haus als Geiseln. Bevor die UN-Soldaten überhaupt eintrafen, bewegten sich zwei Nationalgardisten auf das Haus zu. Der Geiselnehmer schoss auf die beiden, sodass einer schwer verletzt liegen blieb. Die Nationalgardisten forderten Verstärkung an, ohne Rücksprache mit der UNFICYP. Währenddessen bargen die UN-Soldaten den Verletzten. Die türkischen Streitkräfte wurden nicht über die Geiselnahme informiert. Die UN-Soldaten räumten das Feld, als die griechisch-zypriotische Anti-Terror-Einheit eintraf. Diese stürmte das Haus und tötete den türkischen Soldaten gezielt, obwohl die Geiseln zu diesem Zeitpunkt schon geflohen und in Sicherheit waren (Ehrenberg 1991, vgl. S.3). Ehrenberg erklärte, die UNFICYP hätte eingreifen können. Ob es so klug gewesen wäre, die griechischen Zyprioten mit Androhung von Waffengewalt an der Verletzung der Pufferzone zu hindern, stellt er in Frage. Hieraus ergab sich die Konsequenz, dass die Erwartungen an die UNFICYP viel zu hoch waren, nur aufgrund der Tatsache, dass sie bewaffnet waren. Hier stellt sich die Frage, ob der Waffengebrauch die Sicherheit erhöht und dadurch die Funktion der UN-Soldaten entlastet. Außerdem konnte man beobachten, dass die UN-Friedenstruppen oftmals mindestens einer Konfliktpartei unterlegen waren. Dabei sollte kritisch hinterfragt werden, inwiefern militärische Überlegenheit die politischen und diplomatischen Absichten von Friedenstruppen fördern würde. Dies scheint fraglich, denn würde militärische Übermacht diese nicht eher zerstören (vgl. ebd. S.3ff)? FazitFestzuhalten bleibt, dass die Friedenssicherung als zentraler Auftrag der Vereinten Nationen gesehen werden kann. In direktem Zusammenhang mit der Durchsetzung der Menschenrechte, weil diese Ziele untrennbar sind und einander beeinflussen. Durch das Interventionsverbot wird eine Einmischung in innere Konflikte durch die Charta ausgeschlossen. Der Sicherheitsrat kann deshalb nicht in innerstaatliche Konflikte und Menschenrechtsverletzungen eingreifen. Daraus folgt, dass es zu aller erst zu Präventionsmaßnahmen kommt; daneben kann der Sicherheitsrat Empfehlungen zur friedlichen Streitbeilegung nach Kapitel VI der Charta geben. Es kann aber auch zu Zwangsmaßnahmen nach Kapitel VII kommen. Dementsprechend steht der Schutz der Zivilbevölkerung permanent im Vordergrund. Allgemein und in Bezug auf die Friedenssicherung gilt für die Vereinte Nationen, dass das Verhalten der Mitgliedstaaten entscheidend ist. Die Vereinten Nationen bieten zwar einen Rahmen, bei dem sich Staaten und ihre Interessen annähern können, aber die Staaten müssen diesen nutzen, um durch Lernprozesse Fortschritte zu machen. Darüber hinaus dürfen die Vereinten Nationen nicht zu viel versprechen; dies gilt gerade im Punkt der Friedenssicherung. Ihre Ankündigung ist oftmals höher als die Möglichkeiten und Aspiration der Mitgliedsstaaten. Andersherum dürfen die Erwartungen an die Vereinten Nationen nicht abwegig sein, sie sind keine Weltregierung. Dennoch bilden sie einen Rahmen für gemeinsame Lösungsansätze. Ziel der vorliegenden Arbeit war es ebenfalls zu erklären, wer für die Friedenssicherung zuständig ist. Dabei wurde festgestellt, dies geschieht durch das Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), welches die Missionen plant und durchführt. Unterstützt werden sie vom Department of Political Affairs (DPA), welches sich vor allem um diplomatische Bemühungen kümmert. Durch eine Einsatzleitung (Force Commander) vor Ort gibt es noch eine ausführende Leitung der Friedensmission. Deutlich wird die Problematik, dass die Vereinten Nationen keine eigenen Streitkräfte haben. Es kam noch nie zu einem Sonderabkommen in Bezug auf die Streitkräfte. Hier wird deutlich, dass die Anforderungen der Vereinten Nationen an ihre Mitgliedsstaaten zu hoch und den praktischen Möglichkeiten voraus sind. Dafür entwickelten die Vereinten Nationen alternative Formen, wie z.B. die Blauhelme. Zusammenfassend lässt sich sagen, dass es eine Entwicklung bei der Friedenssicherung der Vereinten Nationen gab. Eine Zuständigkeit für die Friedenserhaltung wurde durch den Internationalen Gerichtshof dem Sicherheitsrat und der Generalversammlung zugesprochen. Durch die vergangenen Einsätze wurde außerdem beschlossen, dass die Friedensmissionen vom Sicherheitsrat beobachtet werden. Und die Bedeutung und Verantwortung des Generalsekretärs nahm immer mehr zu. Durch Generalsekretär Hammarskjöld sind wichtige Grundprinzipen der Notstandsgruppe in die Friedenssicherung eingegangen. Daraus folgt der Konsens der Konfliktparteien, wodurch klassische Blauhelm-Soldaten nicht gegen den Willen eines Staates eingesetzt werden dürfen. Dieser Konsens führt dazu, dass die Mitgliedstaaten ihre Truppen eher bereitstellen und die Toleranz der Blauhelme gestärkt wird. Festgestellt wurde außerdem die Wichtigkeit von einer ausgewogenen regionalen Zusammenstellung der Truppen, damit die Unparteilichkeit gewahrt werden kann. Zielsetzung der vorliegenden Arbeit war es, die Friedenssicherung anhand vom Zypern-Konflikt zu schildern, dafür wurden die die politischen Hintergründe beleuchtet. Hier kann man festhalten, es gab unheimlich viele beteiligte Parteien. Zum einen Großbritannien, weil Zypern bis 1960 eine britische Kolonie war und geostrategisch genutzt wurde. Dann Griechenland, die Türkei und die griechischen und türkischen Zyprioten. Es ist zu erkennen, dass Großbritannien die beiden Mütterländer gegeneinander ausspielte. Sie sahen den Zypern-Konflikt als nationale Frage und übten deshalb enormen Einfluss aus, dieser wurde durch den Schutz der eigenen Volksgruppe legitimiert. Durch die Unabhängigkeit Zyperns ab 1960 wurde der innerzypriotische Konflikt nicht gelöst, sondern noch mehr verschärft; dieser endete in blutigen Unruhen. Seit 1964 gibt es ein Friedensmandat der Vereinten Nationen, wodurch das Wiederaufflammen von Kämpfen verhindert werden soll. Wie dieser Blogbeitrag gezeigt hat, musste die UNFICYP darauf achten, dass lokale Befreiungsversuche nicht als Einmischungsversuche oder Provokation aufgefasst wurden. Von 1964 bis Juni 1974 war die UNFICYP ein erfolgreicher Vermittler der beiden Volksgruppen, sodass es 1973 eine Kürzung des Mandats gab. Diese Kürzung erzeugte aber ein Klima von trügerischer Sicherheit, wobei die Friedenstruppen als Friedensersatz wahrgenommen wurden, obwohl das Problem ungelöst blieb. Hier wirft man den Vereinten Nationen vor, dass es zu einem Nachlass der Friedensbemühungen kam und die Friedenseinsätze als Selbstzweck genutzt wurden. Deshalb kam es für viele überraschend, als die Griechen 1974 durch einen Putschversuch die Insel an Griechenland anbinden wollten. Man stellte fest, dass die Minimierung der Blauhelme seit 1971 bis Mitte 1974 als sicherheitspolitischer Fehler der Vereinten Nationen gesehen werden kann. Offen bleibt die Frage, ob die Vereinten Nationen den Krieg 1974 hätten verhindern können. Nach dem Krieg war eine Konsolidierung, eine Teilung der Insel der einzige Ausweg.Von Faustmann bekommt Zypern den Titel "Friedhof der Diplomatie". Festhalten lässt sich, dass es etliche Verhandlungen durch die Vereinten Nationen gab und der Konflikt bis heute nicht gelöst wurde. Auch ein Grund dafür sind die klaren Vorstellungen der beiden Parteien, so forderten die türkischen Zyprioten eine politische Gleichheit als Grundprinzip und die griechische Seite eine Berücksichtigung ihrer prozentualen Bevölkerungsmehrheit. Ein Abkommen konnte im Jahre 1977 erreicht werden und eine Erweiterung 1979, hier wurden die Grundprinzipien einer Wiedervereinigung, die High Level Agreements festgehalten. Es kam immer wieder zum Stillstand der Verhandlungen, welcher meistens erst durch die Bemühungen der Vereinten Nationen unterbrochen wurde. Die Regierungen der beiden Volksgruppen trugen auch dazu bei, dass sich die Verhandlungen so schwierig gestalteten. Erkennbar wird, wie schwer es für die Vereinten Nationen war, neutral zu bleiben und beiden Seiten gerecht zu werden. Erneute Gespräche brachen 1990 ab, weil die Republik Zypern der EU beitreten wollte. Als klar war, die EU würde Zypern auch ohne Lösung des Konflikts aufnehmen, fanden 2002 erneute Verhandlung unter der Schirmherrschaft der Vereinten Nationen statt. Es gab einen Erfolg, denn es wurden erstmals umfassende Kernpunkte eines politischen Lösungsplans erarbeitet, welcher Anfang 2004 fertiggestellt wurde, der sogenannte Annan-Plan. Im April 2004 wurde in den beiden Volksgruppen über den Wiedervereinigungsplan abgestimmt. Diese Gelegenheit verpasste man, weil die griechischen Zyprioten dagegen stimmten. Die Vereinigung Zyperns scheiterte und damit auch der Annan-Plan. Die stille Hoffnung, dass durch ein Generationenwechsel sich das Problem von selbst lösen würde, trat nicht ein. Festzuhalten ist, dass die Friedenstruppen den Zivilisten soviel Normalität wie möglich gewährleisten wollen. Die UN-Soldaten mussten in der Vergangenheit viel einstecken, sie wurden z.B. bei Demonstrationen attackiert oder in der Presse schlecht dargestellt. Insgesamt zeigt sich, wie schwierig es die Friedenstruppen haben. Sie müssen sowohl Blutvergießen verhindern als auch die Konfliktparteien auseinander halten und zum anderen ihre eigene Akzeptanz aufrechterhalten. Ebenso im Zypern-Konflikt wurde die Erlaubnis zum Gebrauch von Waffen zur Selbstverteidigung kontrovers diskutiert. Dadurch waren die Erwartungen an die UNFICYP teilweise zu hoch. Umstritten bleibt, ob der Waffengebrauch die Sicherheit erhöht und dadurch die Funktion der UN-Soldaten entlastet. Hinzu kam die Tatsache, dass die UN-Friedenstruppen oftmals mindestens einer Konfliktpartei unterlegen waren. Dabei stellt sich die Frage, inwiefern militärische Überlegenheit die politischen und diplomatischen Absichten von Friedenstruppen fördert. Die Vereinten Nationen geben den Konflikt nicht auf und führen immer noch Gespräche, nun auch mit der Beteiligung von den sogenannten Garantiemächten Griechenland, Großbritannien und der Türkei. Wünschenswert wäre eine Lösung des Konfliktes, hierfür reicht nicht allein das Engagement der Vereinten Nationen, sondern der Wille und ein Einsatz auf beiden Seiten ist notwendig. Dennoch gibt es eine Freizügigkeit trotz der Trennung. Die Trennungslinie ist keine Außengrenze, sondern hier wird die Freizügigkeit der Bürger*innen gewährleistet. Dadurch können EU-Bürger*innen und somit auch griechische und türkische Zyprioten*innen diese Linie an sieben Übergängen mit dem Personalausweis passieren. Literaturverzeichnis:Textquellen:Auswärtiges Amt: ABC der Vereinten Nationen. Edition Diplomatie, hg. Von Günther Unser, 7. Auflage, Berlin 2011, S. 57.Ehrenberg, Eckhart (1991): Die UNFICYP: Praxisbeispiel für Leistungen und Probleme der Eriedenssicherung vor Ort, In: Vereinte Nationen 1/1991, vgl. S.1-6.Gareis, Sven Bernhard/ Warwick, Johannes (2014): Die Vereinten Nationen, hg. Verlag Barbara Budrich Opladen & Toronto, 5.Auflage, vgl. S.111-148.Gorge, Remy (1986): Zypern und die Mutterländer, In: Vereinte Nationen 4/86, vgl. S.130-134.Jett, Dennis C. (2000): Why Peacekeeping Fails, In: New York, vol. S.23f.Menning, Gerhard (1974): Zypern-Mitwirkung der UNO an einer Lösung des Konflikts, In: Vereinte Nationen 6/74, vgl. S.172-176.Sucharipa-Behrmann, Lilly (1999): Die friedenserhaltende Operation der Vereinten Nationen, In: Cede/Sucharipa-Behrmann 1999, vgl. S. 232-239.Internetquellen:Auswärtiges Amt (2018): Aktuelle Lage im Zypernkonflikt, unter: https://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/de/aussenpolitik/laender/zypern-node/-/210292 (eingesehen am 26.09.2020).Auswärtiges Amt (2020): UN-Friedensmissionen und deutsches Engagement, unter: https://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/de/aussenpolitik/internationale-organisationen/uno/04-friedensmissionen-un/205586 (eingesehen am 26.09.2020).Deutsche Gesellschaft für die Vereinte Nationen: Organe der UN-Friedenssicherung, unter: https://frieden-sichern.dgvn.de/friedenssicherung/organe/ (eingesehen am 26.09.2020).Faustmann, Hubert (2009): Die Verhandlungen zur Wiedervereinigung Zyperns: 1974 - 2008, unter: https://www.bpb.de/apuz/32118/die-verhandlungen-zur-wiedervereinigung-zyperns-1974-2008 (eingesehen am 26.09.2020).Gareis, Sven Bernhard (2015): UNO – Stärken und Schwächen einer Weltorganisation, unter: https://www.bpb.de/izpb/209686/uno-staerken-und-schwaechen-einer-weltorganisation?p=1 (eingesehen am 26.09.2020).Gürbey, Dr. Gülistan (2014): Der Zypernkonflikt, unter: https://www.bpb.de/internationales/europa/tuerkei/185876/der-zypernkonflikt (eingesehen am 26.09.2020).Lugert, Alfred (2018): Der Fall Zypern - Teil 3, unter: https://www.truppendienst.com/themen/beitraege/artikel/der-fall-zypern-teil-3/#page-1 (eingesehen am 26.09.2020).Mathis, Edeltraud: Friedenssicherung als zentraler UN Auftrag, unter: https://www.brgdomath.com/politik-wirtschaft/gerechtfertigter-krieg-tk19/uno-und-un-weltsicherheitsrat/ ( eingesehen am 26.09.2020).Mehr zu den Wiedervereinigungs-Verhandlungen (2010), unter: http://friedensbildung.de/inhalt-der-ausstellung/zypern/verhandlungen/ (eingesehen am 26.09.2020).Richter, Heinz (2009): Historische Hintergründe des Zypernkonflikts, unter: https://www.bpb.de/apuz/32116/historische-hintergruende-des-zypernkonflikts?p=all (eingesehen am 26.09.2020).
This study aims to perform a comparative analysis of Turkey and Indonesia's foreign policy on Palestine Issue and Syria Crisis in particular. It also reviews both countries' foreign policy toward the Middle East since their declaration of becoming Republic states in general. As foreign policy theory, neoclassical realism is applied. It then discusses changing dynamics and analyses influential factors shaping Turkey and Indonesia policies of Palestine Issue and Syria Crisis at the unit and systemic level of analysis. It summarises that the factors of leaders' perceptions upon international and regional systemic changing trends and pressures as well as state powers have become influential factors. In case of Palestine issue, during 2004-2016, Turkish domestic politics has undergone domestic transformations namely first public opinion and civil society's roles influence the foreign policy. Before the AKP party came to power, a determinant actor of Turkey's foreign policy was the military. However, the military role then decline. Instead, the role of non actor states including civil society and non-government organizations have increased. Domestic public opinion has been marked by a re-emergence of common historical and cultural senses under Ottoman heritages. This factor then results in a reactive engagement of Turkey to the Middle East. Second, the emergence of civilian leader as a new actor of foreign policy. The mechanism of foreign decision-making then shifted v following a decline of military influence. An active civilian control emerged and domestic political structure rebuilt. It resulted in multi-actor of foreign policy such as NGO, think tanks, etc. They contribute as the new tool of Turkish soft power. Third, leader factors. Leaders play roles in attracting international public opinion. Turkish leader's opinion perceives that no permanent peace of region without peace in Palestine. They also put an emphasis to a strategic importance of Muslim world. Therefore Turkey needs to re-engage into the regional issues. Fourth, an increase of Islamist factor. Re-involvement of Muslim groups into domestic politics serves a democratic equality for all parties. Turkish NGO with Islamist outlook also rises as a pressure group, thus it impacts on the concern to the Palestine issue. They put a large concern to the sensitivity of Jerusalem status and nature as a holy city for Muslims especially a concern to who will control that holy city.Fifth, a proactive foreign policy. the Israel-Palestine conflict that perceived as the heart of regional instability results in proactive foreign policy into the settlement of Palestine issue. In regional level, the main source of regional conflict is the Palestine-Israel conflict. In sum, Turkey conducts a balancing policy during the AKP administration regarding Palestine issue. Indonesia sets the aspiration of an active engagement policy in the Middle East. It could be seen such as a presence of special of the Middle East diplomatic mission, Indonesia government recognition and support to Hamas after won the parliament election for Gaza strip, the efforts to be honest broaker in Palestine-Israel conflict, and an official representation in Ramallah. Indonesia also is officially consistent to adopt a nonrecognition policy of the state of Israel. Indonesia has undergone several diplomatic efforts in regional and international level to support the recognition of the state of Palestine and proposed on humanitarian approach by providing a continuation of humantarian aids for Palestinians. In comparison with Turkey, during 2004-2016, Indonesia has undergone transition era to civil democracy era. It has turn into a democracy process and reach democratic stability in post-transition. In democratic era of Indonesia, anti-colonialism spirit of 1945 Constitution has been continued as a historical basis of Indonesia's engagement. Besides, Indonesian government accomodates Muslim aspiration through the presence of Islamist considerations into the state's foreign policy. An increase of Islamist factor in domestic politics namely Islamist-oriented aspirations in domestic public opinion. There a high level of sensitivity upon the issues including the Jerusalem issue in which Al-Aqsa mosque vi placed on as one of prominent issues, beyond Palestinian refugee issue and Israel occupation on Palestinian lands for the Indonesian Muslim groups and government. In other words, there interplay between Muslim groups and Indonesian government in regard to deal with Palestine issue. A major of Indonesian Muslims and government officially are united to struggle for Palestinians. Other Islamist factors are Muslim groups as the moral force. Muslim groups put pressure if the government behave in passive response to the Islamist issues. An example of strong and harsh pressures of all segment Muslim groups over any initiative of opening diplomatic ties with Israel by Indonesian governments, so it is often suspended by eventually cancelled. In addition, an increasingly role of Islamist parties as well as new Indonesia's international orientation and identity have affected a continuity of nonrecognition policy towards Israel and supporting Palestine in accordance with two-state solution. In the level of international, the wave of democratization policy leads to the emergence of democratised foreign policy. Indonesia's democratised foreign policy has been conducted through various diplomatic efforts creating an active involvement of nonstate actors. After the Syrian revolution in 2012 escalated, it has turned into a civil war. The emergence of various non-state actors such the ISIS, the PYD-YPG, and other militant or radical groups, as well as direct intervention of regional and international powers sparked the conflict much more escalated. These have posed direct threat to Turkey and challenged Turkey's Middle East policy, notably in Syria. Therefore, Turkey's Syria policy has changed from soft power to hard power approach. Several domestic influential factors shaping Turkish policy first a humanitarian dimension of crisis namely the influx of refugees results in an open door policy. Since 2011, Syria conflict has sparked refugee waves to Turkey. As a direct neighboring countries, it had been demanded by international community and domestic humanitarian nature to open the borders and secure the people. Second, the security threat in Turkey-Syria's borders. Assad regime's military policy against the Syrian oppositions and the development of the crisis with an engagement various non-state armed groups (the YPG-PYD, ISIS, other moderate and radical groups) that began in 2013 have made the situation more complicated. Due to their activities strived to claim the sovereignty and conducted terror attacks, hence those have posed threats to Turkish national security and territorial integrity. Another risk is the influx of foreign terrorist fighters across the border through Turkey on their way to and from Syria. vii Even, probably they reside in Turkey as a third country before returning to home countries. So, it also has to dealt with the way to send them back to countries of origin. In the international level, the most influential factors are first the international and regional actors' engagement into the conflict. Since 2015, there has increased the international interventions. Foreign countries and non state actors' involvement have created the strategic pattern of alliance and enmity among global and regional powers as well as non-state actors. Second, the rise of ISIS. This terror organization posed the threat to Turkish national security through multiple suicide bombings. Third, the emergence of the PYD threat. This group has taken benefits of Syria conflict through controlling the Syrian Kurds, self-proclaiming several cantons and establishing a sphere of influence or terror corridor in northern Syria bordering Turkey. On the other hand, Indonesian government policy towards the Syria crisis can be explained through the influencing factors as follow. First, a commitment to non-alignment with any military bloc as one of basic ideas of the principle of Independent Foreign Policy. In Syria conflict, Indonesia prevents from any engagement of the multilateral and bilateral military pact with Syria and major powers. Instead, it prefers to strengthen ties rely on peaceful coexistance. Given, Indonesia has a critical and substansial roles in the establishment of the NAM, so it positions itself to commit the basic spirit of nonalignment. Second, the leader perceptions. Indonesia stance is sided with neither the Assad regime nor the oppositions while it adopts non-interference into Syria's domestic politics. In other words, Indonesia's official stance is neutral. This stance is meant it fighting against any colonialism and violation forms caused by the regime under the world peace and security. Indonesia government not interpret the neutral stance as a neutral politic that means not to care to the crisis but conducts policy in a way of achieving its national interest. Third, the protection of Indonesian citizens in Syria as a foreign policy's priority. In order to pursue this goal, Indonesian government is still opening diplomatic representatives in Damascus, Aleppo and Latakia. This representatives has main task to protect, defend and secure them until they are repatriated to Indonesia. No matter who rules, it will cooperate in line with its strategic interests still remain there. Moreover, the influential factors in international level are first the ISIS and Indonesian foreign fighters dimension. Indonesia was also targeted by the ISIS through multiple ISIS-linked and inspired terror attacks. Besides, ISIS also is defined as a threat as the possible terror attacks conducted by Indonesia-origined foreign fighters return to home. viii The potential threats of the presence of the ISIS' supporters and recruits in Indonesia is revival of local extremist groups' sleep cells that probably conducting terror attacks, promoting inter and intra religious conflict, fulfilling the lack of local militant group's capability, recruiting the new cadres targeting youth cadres. Second, Indonesia's role within the framework of the OIC. Despite, Indonesia is the world's majority Muslim populated country and an active actor in the OIC, in fact, Indonesia has no significant role on Syria crisis. It has only played the limited role due to several factors namely a minor actor in term of regional geopolitics and the lack of experience upon the regional complex politics. It remains to manage limited bilateral ties with Syria government. In sum, it tends to conduct a passive foreign policy on Syria crisis. In conclusion, Turkey has adopted and preferred to choose humanitarian and political-oriented approach towards Syria crisis. However, after several international developments rised which put risks to its national security, Turkish foreign policy has then shifted to propose a security-oriented approach. It combines soft and hard powers in formulating process of the foreign policy. Meanwhile, Indonesian government also has put forth primarily humanitarian approach in dealing with the humanitarian crisis in Syria while suggesting such political solution stance in order to solve that crisis with optimalizing the way of diplomacy. Indonesian leaders stance is to prevent a military approach. When it is evaluated on the basic principle of Indonesian foreign policy namely independent and active principle, Indonesia is independent but not active. In this context, these basic principles determine it not enter a formal alliance, further not interferring and involving into other state's domestic problems. Instead, it should actively encourage bilateral cooperations with other countries. In addition, it demonstrates a status quo of Indonesia's independent and active foreign policy in a pragmatic way. In this situation, it might recognise that there is a gap between its aspiration and capability to play wider global roles especially in participating to the conflict resolution of the Middle East region. Indonesia government and Muslim group tend to stand in opposite in case of Syria crisis. Indonesian government tend to position in moderate stance and keep in status quo of non-interference policy upon the domestic problem of Syria. For Indonesian goverment, there several reasons why Indonesia still continue to open its diplomatic representative and develop bilateral ties in Syria while most countries closed their diplomatic office in Damascus. First, historical relations between Syria and Indonesia. Syria was the first countries which recognized Indonesia's independence. Second, Indonesia avoids to be ix perceived by Syria regime of getting involved into Syria's domestic issue especially Syria's territorial sovereignty. Third, respect to Syria as a member of the NAM. In which the NAM adopts non-interefere policy as an agreement amongst member states. While Indonesia considers the NAM was birth and insipired by the Bandung Conference with its "Dasasila Bandung" whose an important principle is to respect other state territorial sovereignty. In other words, Indonesia has been trying to play a normative international role in case of Syria crisis. In sum, Indonesian political power might not be powerful yet in affecting the conflict resolution directly compared to other international and regional actors such as Turkey might be has. ; Bu tez çalışmasında, Türkiye ve Endonezya'nın Filistin Sorunu ve Süriye Krizi'ya yönelik dış politikasını karşılaştırmalı bir analizini amaçlanmıştır. Ayrıca cumhuriyet devletleri olma ilan etmelerinden dolayı iki ülkenin Orta Doğu'ya yönelik dış politikalarını incelemiştir. Dış politika teori olarak neoklasik realizm uygulanmıştır. Daha sonra Filistin Sorunu ve Süriye Krizi'nin Türkiye ve Endonezya politikalarını birim ve sistematik analiz düzeyinde şekillendiren, değişen dinamikleri ve analiz etkenleri tartışılmıştır. Liderlerin uluslararası ve bölgesel sistemik değişen eğilimleri, baskıları ve devlet iktidarı üzerindeki algılarının etkili faktörler haline geldiğini özetlenmiştir. Filistin meselesinde, Türkiye'de 2004-2016 yılları arasında iç siyaseti, içsel dönüşüme uğramıştır. İlk olarak kamuoyu ve sivil toplumun rolleri dış politikasına etkilenmesidir; AKP partisi iktidara gelmeden önce, Türkiye'nin dış politikasında asker belirleyici aktörü olarak olmuştur. Fakat, daha sonra askerinin rolü azalmıştır. Bunun yerine sivil toplum ve sivil toplum örgütleri de dahil olmak üzere devlet dışı aktörlerinin rolü artmıştır. Osmanlı mirası altındaki ortak tarihsel ve kültürel duyuların yeniden ortaya çıkmasıyla iç kamuoyunu dikkat çekmektedir. Dolayısıyla Türkiye'nin Orta Doğu'ya yeniden aktif katılımını sonuçlanmaktadır. İkinci olarak sivil liderin yeni dış politika aktörü olarak ortaya çıkmasıdır. Askeri etkinin azalmasından sonra dış karar vermenin mekanizması değiştirilmiştir. Aktif bir sivil kontrolunu ortaya çıkmış ve iç siyasi yapını yeniden inşa edilmiştir. Dolayısıyla STK, düşünce kuruluşları, vb. gibi dış politikaları ortaya çıkmasına neden olmuştur. Türk yumuşak gücünün yeni aracı olarak katkıda bulunmuştur. Üçüncü olarak ise lider faktörleridir. Liderler uluslararası kamuoyunun çekme rolü oynamaktadır. Türk liderinin Filistin'de barışsız bölgenin kalıcı barışı olmadığını algılanmıştır. Onlar da Müslüman dünyasının stratejik önemine vurgulanmıştır. Bu nedenle, Türkiye'nin bölgesel meselelerine yeniden girmesi gerekmektedir. Dördüncüsü, İslamcı faktörün artışıdır. Tüm taraflar için demokratik bir eşitliğe Müslüman grupların iç politikaya yeniden dahil olmasını hizmet etmektedir. İslamcı bakış açısıyla Türk STK'sı da bir baskı grubu olarak yükselmektedir. Dolayısıyla Filistin meselesine de etkilenmektedir. Kudüs'ün statüsü ve doğasının Müslümanlara karşı kutsal bir şehir olarak hassasiyetini, özellikle de kutsal şehri kimin kontrol edeceğine yönelik kaygısını dile getirmektedir. Beşinci olarak, proaktif bir dış politikasıdır. Bölgesel düzeyde, bölgesel çatışmaların ana kaynağı Filistin-İsrail çatışmasıdır. Bölgesel istikrarsızlığın kalbi olarak algılanan İsrail-Filistin çatışması, Filistin sorununun çözümü için proaktif bir dış politikasını sonuçlanmıştır. Özetle, Türkiye'nin AKP yönetimi sırasında Filistin meselesiyle ilgili bir dengeleme politikası yürütülmüştür. Endonezya'nın Ortadoğu'da aktif bir katılım politikası arzusunu belirlenmiştir. Bunlar da, Orta Doğu diplomatik misyonunun özel bir varlığı, Endonezya hükümetinin Gazze şeridindeki parlamento seçimlerini kazandıktan sonra Hamas'a tanınması ve desteklenmesi, Filistin-İsrail çatışmasında dürüst bir aracı olma çabaları ve Ramallah'da resmi bir temsilcidir. Ayrıca, Endonezya İsrail devletinin tanınmayan bir politikasını resmi olarak tutarlı ile benimsemektedir. Endonezya'nın Filistin devletinin tanınmasını desteklemek ve Filistinlilere insancıl yaklaşımların sürdürülmesini sağlayarak insani yaklaşımı önermek için bölgesel ve uluslararası düzeyde çok sayıda diplomatik çabalarını sarf etmiştir. Türkiye ile karşılaştırıldığında, Endonezya'da 2004-2016 yılları arasında, sivil demokrasi dönemine geçiş dönemi geçirilmiştir. Geçiş dönemi sonrasında demokrasi sürecine dönüşmüş ve demokratik istikrara ulaşılmıştır. Endonezya'nın demokratik döneminde, Endonezya'nın angajmanı tarihsel temeli olarak 1945 Anayasasının antisömürgecilik ruhunu devam etmiştir. Ayrıca, devletin dış politikasında İslamcı faktör varlığının sayesinde Endonezya hükümeti Müslümanların isteklerini karşılamaktadır. İç siyasette İslamcı faktörün artması, iç kamuoyunda İslamcı odaklı hedeflenmiştir. Filistinli xii mülteci meselesinin ve Filistin toprakları üzerinde İsrail işgalinin ötesinde, Endonezya Müslüman grupları ve hükümeti için El-Aksa camisinin yer aldığı Kudüs meselesi de dahil olmak üzere ön plana çıktığı önemli konular arasında yüksek düzeyde hassasiyet vardır. Başka bir deyişle, Filistin meselesiyle ilgili olarak Müslüman gruplar ve Endonezya hükümeti arasında karşılıklı etkileşim vardır. Endonezyalı Müslümanların büyük bir kısmı ve hükümetin resmen Filistinliler için mücadele etmeyi birleşmişlerdir. Diğer İslamcı faktörlerin ahlaki güçü, Müslüman gruplarıdır. İslamcı meselelere pasif bir şekilde tepki gösterdiğinde Müslüman gruplar hükümete baskı yapmışlardır. Endonezya hükümetleri tarafından İsrail ile diplomatik ilişkilerin kurulmasına ilişkin herhangi bir girişimde, tüm müslüman gruplarının güçlü ve sert baskılarından dolayı çoğu zaman iptal edilmiştir. Buna ek olarak, yeni Endonezya'nın uluslararası yönelimi ve kimliğinin yanı sıra İslamcı partilerin giderek artan bir rolü, İsrail'e karşı tanınmayan bir politikasının sürekliliğini etkilemiştir ve Filistin'i iki devletli çözümlere uygun olarak desteklemiştir. Uluslararası düzeyde ise, demokratikleşme politikasının dalgası demokratikleşmiş dış politikanın ortaya çıkmasına yol açmaktadır. Endonezya'nın demokratik dış politikası, devlet dışı aktörlerin aktif katılımını sağlayan çeşitli diplomatik çabalarla gerçekleştirilmiştir. 2012 yılında Süriye devrimi arttıktan sonra bir iç savaşa dönüşmüştür. İlk olarak, IŞİD, PYD-YPG ve diğer militan veya radikal gruplar gibi çeşitli devlet dışı aktörlerin ortaya çıkması ve aynı zamanda bölgesel ve uluslararası güçlerin doğrudan müdahalesi, çatışmayı daha da tırmandırmıştır. Bunlar Türkiye'ye doğrudan tehdit oluşturup özellikle Süriye'deki Türkiye'nin Orta Doğu politikasına meydan okumuştur. Bu nedenle, Türkiye'nin Süriye politikası yumuşak güçten sert güç yaklaşımına dönüş olmuştur. Türk siyasetini şekillendiren birçok içi faktör, öncelikle insani bir kriz boyutu, yani mülteci akının açık kapı politikasını sonuçlanmaktadır. 2011 yılından itibaren Süriye krizinin mülteci dalgalarını Türkiye'ye ateşlemiştir. Doğrudan komşu ülkeler olarak, Türkiye'yi sınırları açmak ve halkı güvence altına almak için uluslararası toplum ve yerel insani yardımlar tarafından talep edilmiştir. İkinci olarak Türkiye-Süriye sınırlarında güvenlik tehdidi oluşmuştur. Esad rejimi'nin Süriye muhalefetlerine karşı yürüttüğü askeri politika ve krizin gelişmesiyle, 2013 yılında başlayan devlet dışı silahlı grupların (YPG-PYD, IŞİD, diğer ılımlı ve radikal gruplar) durumu daha da kriziye karmaşık hale getirmiştir. Egemenlik iddiasında bulunma ve terör saldırıları yürütme çabaları nedeniyle, Türk ulusal güvenlik ve toprak bütünlüğüne tehdit oluşturmuştur. Başka bir risk ise, Süriye'ye gidip xiii çıkarken yabancı terörist savaşçıların Türkiye üzerinden sınır ötesi girişidir. Hatta, ülkelerine muhtemelen dönmeden önce Türkiye'de üçüncü bir ülke olarak yaşamışlardır. Bu yüzden, onları menşe ülkelerine geri gönderme yolunu da ele almak zorunda kalmaktadır. Uluslararası düzeyde ise, en etkili faktörler öncellikle uluslararası ve bölgesel aktörlerin çatışmaya girmesidir. 2015 yılından beri uluslararası müdahalelerini arttırmıştır. Yabancı ülkeler ve devlet dışı aktörlerin katılımı, küresel ve bölgesel güçlerin yanı sıra devlet dışı aktörler arasındaki ittifak ve düşmanlığın stratejik modelini oluşturmuştur. İkincisi, IŞİD'in yükselişidir. Bu terör örgütü, birçok intihar saldırısı ile Türk ulusal güvenliğine tehdit oluşturmuştur. Üçüncü olarak, PYD tehdidinin ortaya çıkışıdır. Bu grup Süriyeli Kürtleri kontrol ederek, birkaç kantonu ilan ederek ve Türkiye sınırındaki kuzey Süriye'de bir etki alanı veya terör koridoru kurarak Süriye çatışmasından yararlanmıştır. Öte yandan, Endonezya'nın Süriye krizine yönelik politikası, aşağıdaki gibi etkileyen faktörler aracılığıyla açıklanabilir. Birincisi, Bağımsız Dış Politika ilkesinin temel fikirlerinden biri olarak herhangi bir askeri bloğa uyumsuzluk bir taahhüdüdür. Süriye krizinde, Endonezya, Süriye ve büyük güçler ile çok taraflı ve iki taraflı askeri paktların her türlü müdahalesini engellemiştir. Bunun yerine, barışçıl bir birlikteliğe güvenmek üzere ilişkileri güçlendirmeyi tercih edilmiştir. Dolayısıyla Endonezya'nın Bağlantısız Hareketi kurulmasında kritik ve yardımcı bir rolleri vardır. Bu yüzden uyumsuzluğun temel ruhunu yerine getirmek için kendini konumlandırmaktadır. İkincisi, lider algılarıdır. Endonezya'nın tutumu, ne Esad rejimi ne de muhalefetlerle karşı karşıya kalırken, Süriye'nin iç siyasetine müdahale etmemektedir. Başka bir deyişle, Endonezya'nın resmi duruşu tarafsızdır. Bu duruş, dünya barış ve güvenliği altındaki rejimin neden olduğu sömürgecilik ve ihlal biçimlerine karşı savaşmak anlamına gelmektedir. Endonezya hükümeti'nin tarafsız duruşu tarafsız bir siyaset olarak yorumlamamaktadır, krize dikkat etmemek değildir. Fakat, politikasını ulusal çıkarları doğrultusunda yürütmek anlamına gelmektedir. Üçüncüsü, Süriye'deki Endonezya vatandaşlarının korunmasının önceliğine bir bağlılık oluşturmasıdır. Bu hedefe ulaşmak için Endonezya hükümeti Şam, Halep ve Lazkiye'de diplomatik temsilcileri açmaya devam etmiştir. Bu temsilciler Endonezya'ya gönderilmeden önce onları korumak, savunmak ve güvenceye almak için temel görevlere sahiptir. Süriye'deki kimin hükümetleri olursa olsun, stratejik çıkarları doğrultusunda işbirliği yapmaya devam edecektir. xiv Daha sonra, uluslararası düzeyde etkili olan faktörler, ilk olarak IŞİD ve Endonezya'nın yabancı savaşçıları boyutudur. Endonezya'yı IŞİD'e bağlı ve ilham veren terör saldırılarıyla da IŞİD tarafından hedef alınmıştır. Ayrıca, Endonezya kökenli yabancı savaşçıların menşei ülkelerine dönmesiyle ilgili olası terör saldırılarından dolayı IŞİD bir tehdit olarak tanımlanmıştır. Olası terör saldırıları yürüten, iç ve dış dini çatışmaları teşvik eden, yerel militan grubun kapasitesinin eksikliğini yerine getiren, yeni kadroları işe almak genç kadroları hedefleyen yerel aşırı grupların uyku hücrelerinin yeniden canlanmasını kapsamakta Endonezya'daki IŞİD'in destekçileri ve temsilcilerinin varlığının potansiyel tehditleridir. İkincisi, Endonezya'nın İKT çerçevesinde rolüdür. Buna rağmen, Endonezya dünyanın çoğunlukta Müslüman nüfuslu ülkesi ve İKT'de aktif bir aktörüdür. Fakat, Endonezya'nın Süriye krizinde önemli bir rolü yoktur. Bölgesel jeopolitik terim olarak küçük bir aktör ve bölgesel karmaşık siyaset üzerine deneyim eksikliği gibi nedenlerden dolayı sınırlı rol oynamıştır. Süriye hükümetiyle sınırlı ikili ilişkilerin yönetiminde kalmaya devam ettiğini belirlemektedir. Özetle, Süriye krizi durumunda pasif bir dış politika yürütme eğilimindedir. Sonuç olarak, Türkiye Süriye krizine yönelik insani ve politik odaklı yaklaşımı benimsemiş ve tercih etmiştir. Fakat, ulusal güvenliğini tehlikeye sokan birçok uluslararası gelişmenin ardından, Türk dış politikası güvenlik odaklı bir yaklaşım tercih etmiştir. Dış politikanın formüle edilmesinde yumuşak ve sert güçleri birleştirmektedir. Öte yandan, Endonezya hükümeti'nin Süriye'deki insani krizle başa çıkmada insani yardım yaklaşımını ortaya koyarken, bu krizi diplomasi yolunu en uygun hale getirmiştir. Endonezyalı liderlerin duruşu askeri bir yaklaşımı engellemektir. Endonezya dış politikası'nın temel ilkesi olan bağımsız ve aktif ilkeleri olarak değerlendirildiğinde, Endonezya bağımsızdır ancak aktif değildir. Dolayısıyla bu temel ilkeler, diğer devletlerin iç sorunlarına müdahale etmemek ve bunlara müdahalede bulunmamaktan ziyade askeri bir ittifaka girmediğini belirlemektedir. Bunun yerine, diğer ülkelerle ikili ilişkilerini aktif olarak teşvik etmelidir. Ayrıca, Endonezya'nın bağımsız ve aktif statükoyu bir dış politikasını pragmatik bir şekilde göstermektedir. Bu durumda, özellikle Orta Doğu bölgesinin çatışma çözümüne katılma konusunda daha geniş küresel rol oynama isteği ve yeteneği arasında bir uçurum olduğunu fark edilmektedir. Süriye krizi durumunda Endonezya hükümeti ve Müslüman grup karşıt olarak durmaktadır. Endonezya hükümeti ılımlı duruşa yönelme ve Süriye'nin iç sorunu üzerine müdahale etmeme politikası'nın statüsünü korumaktadır. Endonezya'nın diplomatik xv temsilcisini açmaya ve Süriye'de ikili ilişkiler geliştirmeye devam ederken, çoğu ülke Şam'da diplomatik bürosunu kapatmaya devam etmesinin birkaç nedeni vardır. İlk olarak, Süriye ve Endonezya arasındaki tarihi ilişkiler olmasıdır. Süriye, Endonezya'nın bağımsızlığını tanıyan ilk ülkelerdir. İkincisi, Endonezya Süriye'nin iç meselesine özellikle Süriye'nin toprak egemenliğine dahil olma Süriye rejimi tarafından algılanmaktan kaçınmasıdır. Üçüncüsü, Bağlantısız Hareketi'nin üyesi olarak Süriye'ye saygı göstermesidir. Bağlantısız Hareketi'nin üye devletler arasında bir anlaşma olarak müdahaleci olmayan bir politikasını benimsemektedir. Endonezya, Bağlantısız Hareketi'nin önemli bir ilkesi olarak diğer devlet topraklarının egemenliğine saygı duyması gereken "Dasasila Bandung" ile Bandung Konferansı'nda doğup yaşandığını düşünmektedir. Başka bir deyişle, Endonezya'nın Süriye krizi durumunda normatif bir uluslararası rolü oynamaya denilebilmektedir. Özetle, Endonezyainın siyasi gücü Türkiye'nin sahip olabileceği gibi diğer uluslararası ve bölgesel aktörlere kıyasla çatışma çözümünü doğrudan etkilememektedir. ; Türkiye Bursları
How institutions shape the American presidencyThis incisive undergraduate textbook emphasizes the institutional sources of presidential power and executive governance, enabling students to think more clearly and systematically about the American presidency at a time when media coverage of the White House is awash in anecdotes and personalities. William Howell offers unparalleled perspective on the world's most powerful office, from its original design in the Constitution to its historical growth over time; its elections and transitions to governance; its interactions with Congress, the courts, and the federal bureaucracy; and its persistent efforts to shape public policy. Comprehensive in scope and rooted in the latest scholarship, The American Presidency is the perfect guide for studying the presidency at a time of acute partisan polarization and popular anxiety about the health and well-being of the republic.Focuses on the institutional structures that presidents must navigate, the incentives and opportunities that drive them, and the constraints they routinely confrontShows how legislators, judges, bureaucrats, the media, and the broader public shape the contours and limits of presidential powerEncourages students to view the institutional presidency as not just an object of study, but as a way of thinking about executive politicsHighlights the lasting effects of important historical moments on the institutional presidencyEnables students to grapple with enduring themes of power, rules, norms, and organization that undergird democracy
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News about offensive Israeli military operations has shifted, for the moment, from the Gaza Strip to the West Bank. A series of Israeli raids and attacks against Jenin and other West Bank cities began last week and is continuing. Although the carnage in Gaza during the past 11 months is larger and still deserves the most attention, the new operations in the West Bank are a further escalation of what already was, during this same period, accelerated violence against Palestinian residents of the West Bank. Since last October, at least 622 of those residents, including at least 142 children, have been killed, most by the Israeli military and the others by Jewish settlers. Fifteen Israelis died there during the same period.The West Bank operations are a direct extension of what Israel has done so far in Gaza. Israeli foreign minister Yisrael Katz says that Israel "must deal with the threat just as we deal with the terrorist infrastructure in Gaza, including the temporary evacuation of Palestinian residents and whatever steps are required. This is a war for everything and we must win it."The immediate ill effect of the newest Israeli operations — civilians suffering — also is the same as in Gaza though so far on a smaller scale. The suffering is not limited to the directly inflicted deaths and injuries. Many residents have been forcibly ejected from their homes. Medical care is impeded by a blockade of hospitals. Streets are bulldozed and other infrastructure needed for daily living is being destroyed.Official Israeli statements, as is customary with Israeli statements, talk of "terrorists" as the targets, the elimination of whom is ostensibly the purpose of the military operations. But again, as in Gaza, most of the victims — directly when they become casualties, and indirectly from all the other consequences of the destruction and dislocation — are innocent civilians.Undoubtedly there exist in the West Bank armed militants, deserving of the label "terrorist," who wish to cause Israel harm. The Israeli military already has killed some of those militants and probably will kill some more. The presence of such individuals in the West Bank is unsurprising, given what in general leads people to turn to such violent ways and what specifically are the conditions to which Israel subjects residents of the West Bank. Over the long term — now more than half a century — the relevant condition is the oppression of those residents under Israeli military occupation of their homeland.Added to this during the past year are the horrors that Israeli military operations have inflicted on their Palestinian brethren in the Gaza Strip. The outrage over those horrors underlies an increase in support of Hamas among West Bankers, although the prevailing sentiment is not love for Hamas but rather opposition to what Israel is doing to fellow Palestinians. The tragedy in Gaza undoubtedly provides additional motivations for the militants the Israeli army is hunting today.On top of all that is now the intensified violence that Israel is adding to its occupation of the West Bank itself. Whatever armed resistance arises there is not dependent on Hamas or any other group but instead on the anger that naturally occurs in response to this deadly form of military occupation. The resistance will continue as a ready supply of recruits to the cause of resistance replaces any militants the Israeli forces are able to kill.In short, what is happening in the West Bank today is another chapter in the long, tragic story of Israeli leaders choosing to live forever by the sword, bringing unending conflict to Israel itself and unending suffering to the Palestinian nation.The West Bank offensive provides further cause — although nearly a year of carnage in the Gaza Strip was already more than sufficient cause — for observers in the United States and elsewhere not only to recognize but to speak frankly about exactly why Israel is following such a destructive course.Israeli military operations — in both Gaza and the West Bank, not to mention elsewhere — long ago went far beyond anything that can be explained, much less justified, by reference to the inhumane attack that Hamas conducted against Israel last October. A connection between that attack and current military operations in the West Bank was that an earlier transfer of military resources from southern Israel to the West Bank is part of what possibly made Israel vulnerable to what Hamas did. The episode was one of the many demonstrations of how Israel's clinging to the occupied territories does not enhance Israeli security but instead diminishes it.That fact seems lost in the rhetoric of U.S. politicians of both parties who repeatedly swear their commitment to Israeli security and to the right of Israelis to defend themselves. Also not found in the rhetoric is any explanation of why other people should not enjoy and exercise that right as much as Israelis should. Given what has befallen Palestinians especially during the past year, their right to defend themselves appears more in need of sympathy and support than just about any other people in the world.The fundamental cause of this whole tragic story is the Israeli decision not to live peacefully alongside a state for the Palestinians — as was called for in the 1947 United Nations General Assembly partition plan that is the closest thing to a birth certificate for Israel — and instead to retain Palestinian-inhabited land that Israel has conquered through force of arms. There should be no doubt about this anymore, notwithstanding past "peace process" rhetoric that has obscured this Israeli objective in the past. The move to the right in Israeli politics has overwhelmed internal questioning of the objective. The Israeli government and legislature have declared, formally and forcefully, their opposition to creation of a Palestinian state.The West Bank figures into the objective even more than the Gaza Strip does. Although some Israeli religious nationalists are talking about returning Jewish settlements to Gaza, it is the West Bank — what Israel calls Judea and Samaria — and all of Jerusalem that play the largest role in fulfilling their objective.Accompanying this objective is a bigoted view of Palestinian Arabs that is most apparent among the most extreme rightists in Israeli politics, including those in the Israeli government, but has taken root more widely in Israeli society. The malign attitude is sometimes reflected in the words of Israeli leaders, such as defense minister Yoav Gallant, in announcing a total blockade and siege of the Gaza Strip, which has affected everyone living there, saying that Israel was going against "human animals." More explicit bigotry can be heard from other opinion leaders, such as a former chief rabbi of Israel, Ovadia Yosef, who once compared non-Jews to donkeys and preached, "Goyim [non-Jews] were born only to serve us. Without that, they have no place in the world — only to serve the people of Israel."The attitude is also reflected in deeds, especially Israeli military tactics that show little or no regard for Palestinian life and employ rules of engagement that bear no resemblance to international humanitarian law and the laws of war regarding protection of civilians. If an operation has a decent chance of killing even one suspected Hamas militant, then killing a score of civilians in the process evidently is considered acceptable by Israeli commanders.Too often, Israeli policy decisions show regard for Palestinian lives only when there may be an implication for Israeli lives. That is the situation today in Gaza, where Israeli agreement on a "humanitarian pause" for polio inoculations is motivated largely by a concern about, in the words of the prime minister's office, "the spread of disease in the region," with the possibility of infecting Israelis.Put the land-retaining objective and the bigoted attitudes together, and this translates into the broader objective of destroying the Palestinian nation. Although a plausible case has been made that what the Palestinians are being subjected to is nothing less than genocide, one does not need to employ that term, burdened as it is with legal implications and comparisons with even more horrendous exterminations of the past. Ethnic cleansing is a less loaded term but still descriptive of what is happening to the Palestinians.Exactly how Israeli leaders intend to complete this objective is probably not entirely thought through, and is more a matter of visceral antagonism than of careful planning. Deaths of individual Palestinians, as is happening wholesale in the Gaza Strip, is one way. A combination of intimidation and sufficient destruction of housing and infrastructure to make areas unlivable may compel others to leave and join the four million Palestinian refugees already living in other Middle Eastern countries. And an Israeli hope may be that those who remain will — like animals that have been broken, tamed, and penned — docilely submit to their subordinate status.Many will not submit. There will continue to be resistance, including violent resistance, and perhaps enough of an uprising in the West Bank to be called a third intifada. But as former United Nations Special Rapporteur Richard Falk observes, even more worrisome is the prospect of another nakba or catastrophe, in which Palestinians face the choice of extermination in place or fleeing to other countries.U.S. policy, and the expressions of leaders of both political parties, do not recognize the above realities. Certainly the United States should support Israeli security and the right of Israel to defend itself, although without the occupation there really would not be much to worry about on that score, given Israel's status as the most militarily advanced state in the region and national wealth sufficient to pay for maintaining that status itself. Exporting defensive systems such as air defense weapons would be consistent with the declared objective, but not the export of ordnance that Israeli is using offensively with great death and destruction as the result.Moreover, U.S. policy needs to reflect how much of what Israel is doing undermines rather than advances Israel's own security. Retaining occupied land is a burden, not a boost, to the Israeli military. The deadly tactics on display in Gaza and now accelerating in the West Bank motivate more deadly resistance to Israel than they quell.The United States has no positive interest in most of the Israeli behavior that U.S. material and diplomatic support has abetted. The United States has no positive interest in Israel holding on to the West Bank, or in the ethnic cleansing of Palestinians. The relevant U.S. interests are all negative, in terms of the offense to human values, the instability that entails the risk of wider war, and more direct harms to the United States itself.Those harms include the prospect of additional anti-U.S. terrorism motivated by anger over policies regarding Israel, and the impeding of U.S. diplomacy with foreign governments that are offended as much as their publics are by those U.S. policies.
Brussels Ii Conference On 'supporting The Future Of Syria And The Region': Co-chairs Declaration ; Council of the EU PRESS EN PRESS RELEASE 219/18 25/04/2018 Brussels II Conference on 'Supporting the future of Syria and the region': co-chairs declaration 1. The Second Brussels Conference on "Supporting the Future of Syria and the Region" took place on 24-25 April 2018. It was hosted by the European Union and co-chaired by the United Nations. 2. One year after Brussels I, and following the previous three pledging conferences in Kuwait as well as the London Conference in 2016, the Conference renewed and strengthened the political, humanitarian and financial commitment of the international community to support the Syrian people, the neighbouring countries, and the communities most affected by the conflict. Brussels II brought together 86 delegations including 57 States, 10 representatives of regional organisations and International Financial Institutions (IFIs) as well as 19 UN agencies. More than 250 Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) were also associated throughout the preparations and the two days of the Conference. 3. The former co-chairs of Brussels I: Germany, Kuwait, Norway, Qatar and the United Kingdom (UK) brought substantial input to the preparations and the proceedings of the Conference. Jordan and Lebanon were closely associated, in a spirit of partnership and in full acknowledgement of their tremendous efforts since the beginning of the Syrian conflict. Turkey also provided important contributions, both as the country hosting the largest number of Syrian refugees and as a key regional actor. 4. Civil society and NGOs were very closely and substantially associated to Brussels II and its preparations, including through extensive consultations with NGOs implementing humanitarian and resilience programmes in the region. The first day of the Conference was devoted to a high-level dialogue with representatives from 164 NGOs, including 15 from Syria and 72 from the three main refugee-hosting countries. 5. In addition, Syrian Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) from across Syria and neighbouring countries discussed their role in the future of Syria in a closed-door side event undertaken by the EU and the Office for the Special Envoy for Syria. The CSOs' views were further presented during the ministerial plenary on 25 April. The international community, and the EU in particular, will continue to work with Syrian civil society as essential stakeholders towards reaching a peaceful solution to the conflict and in its legitimate aspirations to contribute to the country's future. 6. Syria's artistic community was also given prominence through a string of cultural events, including a Syrian art space, "Tourab", that ran for ten days in central Brussels around the dates of the Conference. These events were meant as a tribute to the remarkable individual efforts of the Syrians since the start of the conflict. 7. The Conference reaffirmed that only an inclusive, comprehensive and genuine political solution in accordance with UNSCR 2254 and the Geneva Communiqué, that meets the legitimate aspirations of the Syrian people for dignity and freedom will ensure a sustainable end to the Syrian conflict, prevent regional escalation and a return of ISIL/Da'esh, and guarantee a peaceful and prosperous future for Syria and the region. It reiterated the international community's commitment to Syria's sovereignty, independence, unity and territorial integrity, and safety and security for all citizens. Participants stressed the importance of women's engagement in the political process, including through their adequate representation within the delegations of parties to the conflict. 8. The humanitarian and resilience needs of people inside Syria and in the region remain enormous. Current UN appeals are severely underfunded. In 2018, the UN-coordinated appeal for Syria requests to cover assistance and protection needs inside Syria amounts to US$ 3.51 billion. In addition, through the Regional Refugee and Resilience Plan (3RP), an appeal of US$ 5.6 billion, inclusive of US$ 1.2 billion already committed, is required to support refugee and host community humanitarian and resilience related assistance in Turkey, Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq and Egypt. 9. The Conference acknowledged the continuing generosity of neighbouring host countries and their communities in providing refuge to millions of displaced people. Participants pledged, for both Syria and the region, $ 4.4 billion (€ 3.5 billion) for 2018, as well as multi-year pledges of $ 3.4 billion (€ 2.7 billion) for 2019-2020. In addition, some international financial institutions and donors announced around $ 21.2 billion (€17.2 billion) in loans, of which elements are on concessional terms. The Conference noted that pledges made at Brussels I in 2017 had been largely fulfilled, and in some cases exceeded. Co-chairs and main donors agreed to widen the resource base and ensure greater predictability, coherence and effectiveness of the aid. The attached fundraising annex sets out the pledges made at this Conference. Political 10. The Conference expressed its strong support for the work of the UN Special Envoy for Syria in his mandate to facilitate the political process, with a view to a lasting political settlement based on the Geneva Communiqué and the full implementation of relevant UNSC Resolutions, including UNSCR 2254 (2015). It welcomed the twelve "Living Intra-Syrian essential principles" developed as commonalities in the Geneva process, offering a perspective of a vision of a future Syria that can be shared by all. It also welcomed the parameters on the constitutional and electoral baskets and the importance of a safe, calm and neutral environment, as outlined by the UN Special Envoy for Syria in his Security Council Briefing on 19 December 2017. Participants gave their full support to the Special Envoy's efforts to facilitate, in consultation with all concerned, the implementation of the Sochi Final Statement (as circulated to the Security Council on 14 February 2018) for the establishment of a Constitutional Committee for Syria in Geneva, under UN auspices and in accordance with UNSCR 2254 (2015). 11. The Conference reiterated the importance of preventing and combating terrorism in Syria in accordance with relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions. They took note of considerable progress in military operations to combat ISIL/Da'esh since the last Brussels Conference, while underscoring the continuing need to combat terrorism in accordance with international law. Efforts to combat terrorism do not supersede other obligations under international law 12. The co-chairs expressed their strong condemnation of the use of chemical weapons by any party to the conflict and under any circumstances. Their use is abhorrent and a clear violation of international law. It is very important that any alleged use be followed by an impartial, independent and effective investigation. Ensuring accountability for the use of chemical weapons is our responsibility, not least to the victims of such attacks. Co-chairs called upon all participants to use their influence to prevent any further use of chemical weapons. Humanitarian 13. Violence and human suffering have increased in Syria, with military escalation by parties to the conflict further increasing to an alarming extent in 2018. The civilian population has continued to endure the bulk of the suffering caused by the conflict, including severe, constant and blatant violations of International Humanitarian Law (IHL) and human rights law, in particular: deliberate and indiscriminate attacks on civilians and civilian infrastructure, reported and ongoing use of chemical weapons, forced displacement, arbitrary detention, enforced disappearances, and torture, including sexual exploitation and abuse and gender-based violence. More than 12 million people have now been displaced, including more than 5.6 million refugees hosted in neighbouring countries and 6.6 million displaced inside Syria. Nearly 13.1 million people, almost half of whom are children, urgently need humanitarian assistance and protection inside the country. 14. The co-chairs, together with all participants, reiterated their appreciation for Kuwait's and Sweden's efforts in drafting UNSC Resolution 2401 (2018) and called for its immediate and full implementation, as well as all other relevant resolutions on Syria. They urged all parties to the conflict to strictly adhere to their obligations under IHL. Attacks against civilians, humanitarian workers as well as any civilian infrastructure, particularly health facilities and schools, violate the most basic human rights, may amount to war crimes under international law, and must stop without delay. They also requested that humanitarian mine action programming be accelerated as a matter of urgency. 15. The Conference reconfirmed the importance of delivering needs-based humanitarian assistance to all civilians, in line with humanitarian principles of humanity, neutrality, impartiality and independence. Participants stressed the critical link between protection and access. They called for unconditional, unimpeded and sustained humanitarian access through the most direct routes, including to the 2.3 million people still living in besieged and hard-to-reach areas across Syria through all aid modalities: cross-line, cross-border and regular programme, in line with UNSC Resolution 2393 (2017). 16. Particular concerns were noted over the escalation of fighting and dramatic humanitarian situation still faced by civilians in many parts of Syria. The Conference stressed the need to ensure that any evacuation of civilians must be safe, informed, temporary, voluntary in nature and a solution of last resort including the destination of their choice, the right to return and the choice to stay, as per IHL. All efforts should be made to ensure the unconditional medical evacuation of those in need of urgent medical treatment. Denials of medical supplies and of access to healthcare are violations of international law and should be stopped at once. The systematic removal of life-saving medical items from humanitarian convoys is unacceptable and needs to be addressed once and for all. 17. Participants agreed that present conditions are not conducive for voluntary repatriation in safety and dignity. Significant risks remain for civilians across the country as the situation remains characterised by continued fighting and displacement, with 2.6 million people displaced in 2017 alone. Conditions for returns, as defined by the UNHCR and according to international refugee law standards, are not yet fulfilled. Any organised return should be voluntary and in safety and dignity. Regional/development 18. The international community acknowledged and commended the huge efforts made by the neighbouring countries and their citizens, in particular Jordan, Lebanon and Turkey, as well as Iraq and Egypt, in hosting millions of refugees from Syria. Participants recognised the deepening vulnerability of Syrian refugees, Palestinian refugees from Syria and host communities, which should be addressed through sustained humanitarian and resilience support. 19. Participants committed to remaining fully engaged, in a spirit of partnership, in supporting neighbouring countries to address the challenges they face. Substantial progress has been made by governments, donors and the UN in implementing the commitments undertaken in London in 2016 and in Brussels in 2017, including through the EU Compacts with Jordan and Lebanon. However, more should be done to ensure the continued and effective protection of refugees against risks of forced evictions and returns and improvement of their legal residency status. 20. While the countries of the region continue to face enormous humanitarian challenges, the Conference agreed that increased focus is required to support reform and longer-term development in a sustainable manner. It remains critical to support health and education, economic development, job creation and integration into labour markets, for both host communities and refugees, especially vulnerable groups such as women and youth. The Conference underlined the essential need to reach all children and young people, who will one day have a key role in the recovery and rebuilding of the region, with quality education and skills training. It expressed support for targeted resilience programming and an increase in allocations to women and girls. Extremely vulnerable refugees and host communities will continue to require support through cash assistance and enhanced social protection mechanisms. Resettlement was recognised as an essential protection tool for refugees with heightened protection risks and its importance was highlighted, together with other legal pathways, in offering safe and dignified access to safety beyond the immediate region. 21. The Conference welcomed the Lebanese Government's Vision for Stabilisation, Growth and Employment including the Capital Investment Programme together with its commitment to establish a timetable for reforms that were presented in Paris on 6 April 2018, whose implementation and follow-up with the support of the international community is critical. The Conference also welcomed the Rome II ministerial meeting in support of Lebanon's armed and internal security forces that was held on 15 March 2018. 22. The Conference equally welcomed the fiscal and structural reforms that are being implemented by the Jordanian Government in a difficult economic environment, with a view to ensuring fiscal sustainability and improving the investment climate in line with the "Jordan 2025" vision document and with the Economic Growth Plan for 2018-22. The Conference also welcomed the UK's intention to host an international Conference with Jordan in London later this year to showcase Jordan's economic reform plans, its aspiration to build/enable a thriving private sector, and mobilise support from international investors and donors. 23. The Conference commended the Turkish Government for its generous and large-scale efforts in hosting millions of Syrian refugees and integrating them into national services, including health, education, employment and other municipal and social services. Joint frameworks have been established with the international community under programmes such as the EU Facility for Refugees in Turkey and the UN Regional Refugee and Resilience Plan 2017-2018. Addressing the protracted refugee situation will require continued co-operation along those lines. 24. Participants committed to supporting further investments to foster inclusive economic growth and social development in Lebanon and Jordan, including through concessional financing, blending of grants with loans and the use of the EU External Investment Plan in cooperation with the support of European Financial Institutions and the private sector. They commended the efforts made by host countries to open access to education, water and sanitation and health services and encouraged further progress. Investment in infrastructure and in human capital is necessary to improve the quality of services and will continue to be supported. Participants also noted the importance of vocational training for refugees and host communities, closely aligned with private sector labour needs. Protection measures, in particular the provision of legal residency, should be reinforced. 25. Inside Syria, support to inclusive and accountable service delivery and to livelihood opportunities for the affected populations, particularly women and youth, should continue while ensuring that it does not condone, or indirectly entrench, social and demographic engineering as a result of forced displacement and intentional creation of obstacles to return. Work will address needs related to safe and equal access to civil documentation, housing and property rights to ensure that the rights of Syrians are protected and that those displaced are provided the basic conditions to be able to return to their homes in a dignified, safe and voluntary way when conditions allow. It is also important to support Syrian civil society, social cohesion/dialogue and seek to promote accountability and transitional justice. Funding decisions shall be conflict-sensitive and shall in no way benefit or assist parties who have allegedly committed war crimes or crimes against humanity. The UN reiterated that its Parameters and Principles for UN assistance in Syria will guide UN assistance beyond emergency life-saving aid in Syria. Future steps 26. The EU and the UN committed to tracking the commitments made during the Conference and reporting regularly on their delivery, including through reviews at key international events during the year. 27. Donor countries present at the Conference reiterated that reconstruction and international support for its implementation will only be possible once a credible political solution, consistent with UNSCR 2254 and the Geneva Communiqué, is firmly underway. A successful reconstruction process also requires minimal conditions for stability and inclusiveness, a democratic and inclusive government, an agreed development strategy, reliable and legitimate interlocutors as well as guarantees in terms of funding accountability. None of these conditions are fulfilled in Syria. In the meantime, participants agreed to regularly review post-agreement plans, including those produced by the UN-led post-agreement planning process initiated by the 2016 London Conference on Syria. 28. Participants also called upon all parties to release all persons who are arbitrarily detained, in line with UNSC Resolutions 2254 (2015) and 2268 (2016). Access to all detention facilities should be granted to independent monitors and information provided on cases of forced disappearances. Ongoing work on the release of detainees and abductees by all parties is valuable and can help build confidence between them. Participants expressed support to the UN proposal for a Standing Secretariat under UN auspices, recently proposed to support the working group formed by the Astana guarantors. 29. Finally, participants recalled that transitional justice and accountability are required for sustainable peace and an inherent part in any meaningful process of reconciliation. War crimes and violations of international humanitarian law and human rights abuses need to be investigated. Any entities and individuals guilty of such violations, including the use of chemical weapons, must be held accountable. The co-chairs commended the role of the Commission of Inquiry and welcomed progress in the work of the International Independent and Impartial Mechanism (IIIM) and called for continuous efforts to ensure the necessary means for its functioning. They called for the situation in Syria to be referred to the ICC. Annex - Fundraising - Supporting the future of Syria and the region Annex - Situation inside Syria Annex - Jordan partnership paper Annex - Lebanon partnership paper Annex - Turkey partnership paper Press office - General Secretariat of the Council Rue de la Loi 175 - B-1048 BRUSSELS - Tel.: +32 (0)2 281 6319 press.office@consilium.europa.eu - www.consilium.europa.eu/press