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Survey data of volunteers on boards and commissions in 60 small cities across six states are used in this study to test a logit model of recruitment behavior in order to understand the relative significance of individual and contextual factors affecting recruitment. Three-quarters of board members report being asked to serve by someone else; the remainder report that they sought service on their own. The results of the model demonstrate that selective incentives, capacity to serve, and contextual variables are predictive of self-recruitment and that small-town leaders cannot ignore the context in which recruitment occurs. The article concludes with some practical considerations for small-town leaders who are interested in designing or modifying their procedures for identifying potential board members. Adapted from the source document.

In the corporate setting, government investigators increasingly ask corporations to waive the attorney-client privilege as part of the "cooperation" necessary to receive incentives. In practice, however, these cooperation incentives have led to what has become known as a "culture of waiver," where waiver of the privilege in the face of investigation has become virtually essential. One way courts have sought to diminish the negative externalities of waiver is through the doctrine of selective waiver. Selective waiver allows the corporation to waive the attorney-client privilege, but only to the government agency during the course of the investigation, while still retaining the right to assert the privilege against third parties. Thus far, the debate over selective waiver has focused on whether selective waiver should be judicially recognized and how to solve the unsettled nature of the law in the courts. Both the culture of waiver and the uncertainty regarding the selective waiver doctrine's validity have created tension between a corporate executive's personal interests and fiduciary duties. As currently implemented, the selective waiver doctrine may promote a perverse incentive for corporate managers to waive the corporation's attorney-client privilege in order to be deemed "cooperative" individually and thereby decrease their own personal criminal liability while potentially subjecting the company to extensive third-party liability.

New Zealand has gone further than most European countries in the use of child-based tax credits that emphasise work as the way out of poverty, especially for lone parents. From a background of neglect, as outlined in St John's 'New Zealand's Financial Assistance for Poor Children: Are Work Incentives the Answer?' published in the European Journal of Social Security (2006), family financial assistance was substantially boosted between 2005 and 2007 when the Working for Families package was introduced. The In Work Tax Credit (IWTC) is a major part of Working for Families. It is a dual-purpose tool, aiming to both improve labour market participation of lone parents and to reduce child poverty. Holding to the two objectives has however been problematic, and the IWTC has proved to be a costly experiment. It has also raised human rights concerns; necessitated other complex adjustments in the tax system; and proved to be poorly designed in times of recession with unintended consequences for children. Official evaluations have not established that the small work incentive effects justify the selective achievement of the child poverty objective. European countries may find the New Zealand experience interesting as they also grapple with the seemingly intractable problems of child poverty and look to paid work as the solution.

The theory of collective action has long since moved beyond the "free-rider problem" as originally stated by Olson (1965). It is now recognized that large-scale participation is possible even without selective incentives, but this has raised new questions. I discuss two types of contributions from the past few years. Some of the recent literature has remained close to the canonical game-theoretic framework, clarifying many analytical issues and proving important results in participation games that had remained elusive. We now know that the "turnout paradox" had been grossly overstated. Another set of contributions has expanded the original framework, incorporating results from psychology and social sciences with the aim of obtaining more realistic models with better empirical performance. Adapted from the source document.

How can individuals with contrasting interests in a declining industry, at odds with the country's identity, and facing an illiberal and sceptical government, band together to promote collective goals? This article addresses this question by examining Singapore's Kranji Countryside Association, one of Singapore's few civil society organisations to focus on community organising. To Association members, the material and time costs of organising were high, the odds of success were low and the material rewards of success were modest. The article evaluates two views that purport to explain collective action: the rational choice approach that focuses on selective incentives and the social-psychological approach that emphasises non-excludable collective incentives and collective identity. It is concluded that while selective incentives were necessary for attracting several non-active members to fill out the ranks of the organisation, the rational choice approach cannot explain the group's initial establishment or why some members have been especially active. For this, social-psychological factors were vital to both building and sustaining the organisation. The results illuminate collective action in Singapore's illiberal context and enhance our understanding of the state's dilemmas in managing civil society.

Financial repression policies (lowering real interest rates, selective credits and other restrictions on financial markets, products and institutions) have been widely discussed in the economic literature during the last four decades. A key question is 'why governments would opt for financial repression policies in the first place'? As an answer, governments' desire to obtain rents from the financial system or to manage public debt servicing have been suggested as the typical underlying incentives. It has been argued in 1970s and 1980s that especially in developing economies, financial repression would have negative consequences on economic growth and financial development, although more recently financial repression policies are back as governments in the developed economies aim at obtaining low-cost funds from the financial markets in the aftermath of the global financial crises. In this article, a simple two-sector model is set up in order to show that governments may institute financial repression policies to internalise production and investment externalities. It is shown that such a government policy is welfare improving and abolishment of selective credits may cause welfare loss. The model also provides a case where financial policy is designed according to the priorities of industrial policy. © 2017 The Author(s).

E-Governance in India has steadily evolved from computerization of Government Departments to initiatives that encapsulate the finer points of Governance, such as citizen centricity, service orientation and transparency. Due cognizance has been taken of the notion that to speed up e-Governance implementation across the various arms of Government at National, State, and Local levels, a programme approach needs to be adopted, guided by common vision and strategy. NeGP which was launched in 18 may 2006 takes a holistic view of e-Governance initiatives across the country, integrating them into a collective vision, a shared cause. However, E-Government initiatives in developing countries are constrained by lack of financial resources, low level of skills and capacity within governments, and the absence of incentive structures for rewarding performance. PPPs in e-government have help overcome many of these constraints, while at the same time increasing opportunities for the private sector and economic sustainability of e-Government projects. The Present Paper proposes to study the successful 'PPP in e-Government' projects, implemented in India, to highlight the best practices and key learning obtained from each project.

A dynamic model of selective harvesting in multi-species, multi-age tropical forests is developed. Forests are predicted to exhibit different optimal harvesting profiles depending on the nature of their joint cost functions and own or cross-species stock effects. The model is applied to the controversy about incentives produced by various taxes. The impacts of specific taxes are shown to depend on the composition of the forest stocks, growth rates, and joint cost effects. Therefore, specific taxes may create different incentives and impacts in Indonesia than in Brazil or Malaysia, for example, suggesting that no single uniform forest tax policy will be appropriate for all countries or all forests.

An increasing literature encourages the use of selective immigration policies as a tool to promote incentives to education. It is argued that, since not everybody is allowed to migrate, under these policies a poor country may well turn out with more human capital than in autarchy. The implicit assumption is that migrations are permanent. However, this assumption has recently been dropped: a large literature studies the optimal migration duration in an intertemporal framework. In our work we study how selective immigration policies affect the human capital accumulation and the migration duration. Unlike most of the existing literature, the probability of entering abroad is endogenous and our analisys is not limited to two periods: there is no reason to consider a single migration spell, and our infinite-horizon model includes an aggregate shock as a source of constrained migration. Contrary to the "brain gain with a brain drain" reasoning, we show that selective policies may be harmful for human capital accumulation. As a consequence, their effectiveness is questionable, and they may produce a "brain loss" rather than a brain gain. Besides, borders closure backfires on migration duration especially for unskilled workers. ; Une littérature croissante encourage l'utilisation des politiques d'immigration sélective comme outil pour favoriser les incitations à l'éducation. L'idée de base est que, puisque l'entrée à l'étranger n'est pas permise à tout le monde, un pays pauvre peut enfin retenir plus de capital humain que dans l'autarcie. L'hypothèse implicite est que les migrations sont permanentes. Cependant, cette hypothèse a été récemment abandonnée : une grande partie de la littérature étudie la durée optimale de migration dans un cadre intertemporel. Dans notre article nous étudions comment les politiques d'immigration sélective affectent l'accumulation de capital humain et la durée de la migration. A la différence de la littérature existante, la probabilité d'entrer à l'étranger est endogène et notre analyse ...

An increasing literature encourages the use of selective immigration policies as a tool to promote incentives to education. It is argued that, since not everybody is allowed to migrate, under these policies a poor country may well turn out with more human capital than in autarchy. The implicit assumption is that migrations are permanent. However, this assumption has recently been dropped: a large literature studies the optimal migration duration in an intertemporal framework. In our work we study how selective immigration policies affect the human capital accumulation and the migration duration. Unlike most of the existing literature, the probability of entering abroad is endogenous and our analisys is not limited to two periods: there is no reason to consider a single migration spell, and our infinite-horizon model includes an aggregate shock as a source of constrained migration. Contrary to the "brain gain with a brain drain" reasoning, we show that selective policies may be harmful for human capital accumulation. As a consequence, their effectiveness is questionable, and they may produce a "brain loss" rather than a brain gain. Besides, borders closure backfires on migration duration especially for unskilled workers. ; Une littérature croissante encourage l'utilisation des politiques d'immigration sélective comme outil pour favoriser les incitations à l'éducation. L'idée de base est que, puisque l'entrée à l'étranger n'est pas permise à tout le monde, un pays pauvre peut enfin retenir plus de capital humain que dans l'autarcie. L'hypothèse implicite est que les migrations sont permanentes. Cependant, cette hypothèse a été récemment abandonnée : une grande partie de la littérature étudie la durée optimale de migration dans un cadre intertemporel. Dans notre article nous étudions comment les politiques d'immigration sélective affectent l'accumulation de capital humain et la durée de la migration. A la différence de la littérature existante, la probabilité d'entrer à l'étranger est endogène et notre analyse ...

AbstractThe use of selective benefits, directed to those considered most in need, has a high 'poverty reduction efficiency'. But selectivity inevitably produces non‐linearities in the budget constraints facing individuals, which may have incentive effects. The design of a tax and transfer scheme requires these two aspects to be carefully balanced. This article considers the issues in the context of means‐testing within the Australian and UK State pension schemes. In the Australian case, the main question concerns the incentive to save, while in the UK scheme the 'earnings rule' presents a strong disincentive to work beyond pension age.

Research has long shown that organizations shape members' identities. However, the possibility that these identities might also be desired and that members might benefit from this process has only recently been explored. In a qualitative study of a French aeronautic plant, I demonstrate how an implicitly negotiated leniency between management and workers around the use of company materials and tools, on company time, to produce artifacts for personal use, enhances workers' identities. This leniency applies to a select subset of workers and enhances their desired occupational identity. This practice produces an engaging form of control that relies on management's selective allocation of identity incentives. These findings document a previously overlooked type of control—one reliant on desired identities that engage rather than constrain. Desired identities, specifically previously enacted ones, constitute potent incentives for inducing efforts or actions.

The Confederate States of America floated two small bond issues in Europe during the American Civil War; cotton bonds that traded primarily in England and junk bonds in Amsterdam. The Confederacy serviced the cotton bonds for the duration of the war and defaulted on the junk bond issue. Evidently the South believed that the cotton bonds provided a financial incentive for England to intervene or give military support. This policy of selective default suggests that reputation spillovers across markets may be smaller than indicated in theoretical models of debt repayment (Cole and Kehoe, 1994).