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Firearm trafficking as defined in the UN Protocol against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Their Parts and Components and Ammunition, refers to the unauthorized "…import, export, acquisition, sale, delivery, movement or transfer of firearms, their parts and components and ammunition…" across internal or state borders (UNGA 2001: 4). The term trafficking is also used to designate the intentional diversion of firearms from legal to illegal commerce, without involving the movement of items across physical borders. Illicit manufacture is closely tied to the act of firearm trafficking and it incorporates the "manufacture or assembly of firearms, firearm parts and components or ammunition" from illicitly produced parts (UNGA 2001: 3).

There are at least 875 million combined civilian, law enforcement and military firearms in the world (Small Arms Survey 2012). The value of the documented global authorized trade in firearms has been estimated at approximately US$1.58 billion in 2006, with unrecorded but licit transactions making up another US$100 million. The most commonly cited estimate for the size of the illicit market is 10–20 percent of the licit market, which would be about US$170 million to US$320 million per annum (Small Arms Survey 2012). While there are various types of arms that are trafficked, small arms and light weapons (SALW)1 trafficking has been instrumental in many of the world's conflicts since 1990, with 90 percent of all war casualties since World War II being attributed to small arms weaponry (Bassiouni 2010; Stohl 1999; Shah 2006).

The majority of SALW producers are located in the West. According to the Small Arms Survey, in 2010, the top exporters of SALW (those with annual exports of at least USD 100 million), according to available customs data, were (in descending order) the United States, Germany, Italy, Brazil, Switzerland, Israel, Austria, the Russian Federation, South Korea, and Sweden. In 2010 the top importers of SALW (those with annual imports of at least USD 100 million), according to available customs data, were (in descending order) the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, Germany, Australia, South Korea, France, and Thailand (Small Arms Survey 2013).2 When it comes to international trafficking of major weapons, the flow of arms to Africa, the Americas, and Asia and Oceania increased significantly between 2004–2013. European imports however decreased by 25 per cent between 2004–2013. The UK was the largest importer of major weapons in Europe, followed by Azerbaijan and Greece. Many European states are choosing second-hand weapons as cheaper alternatives. The level of arms transfers to the Middle East remained more or less unchanged (Wezemen & Wezemen 2014).3

SALW trafficking involves a host of actors ranging from the individual rogue seller and buyer to intermediaries, transnational networks, transport companies, states, and corporate organizations (Rothe and Collins 2011). Some trafficking operations appear to be more sophisticated and to involve organized crime groups, licensed dealers, and/or corrupt state officials, while others are a result of theft, for example. In the literature (see, Rothe and Collins 2011; Cragin and Hoffman 2003), four types of markets for small arms sales are mentioned; white, black, gray, and covert military transactions. The white market refers to the legal sale of weapons by governments or private manufacturers to other countries or governments. While the white market is considered a legal market, a large proportion of trafficked arms are said to originate from government weapons surplus that make their way into the illicit market (Greene 2000).

Black market deals are illegal by the covert nature of the transaction as well as through the illegal status of the buyer, seller, or transaction. Transactions can be hidden through the concealment of the weapons through mislabeling, forging of documents, and the laundering of the criminal proceeds. This also includes covert government (military) transfers of arms to another country, specifically to insurgent forces due to their lack of transparency (Mouzos 2002; Rothe and Collins 2011).

The gray market makes reference to those transactions that are not considered illegal, but do not fall within the category of white market dealings. For example, while there are direct violations of arms embargoes (black market deals), there are also sales of arms to a non-embargo country (B) with the knowledge that such arms will then be sold to the intended state (A) to bypass the embargo, through the use of proxy individual brokers or insurgency groups (see, Rothe and Collins 2011).

In the US most firearms appear to be trafficked via a corrupt licensed dealer (see Fig. 1). A similar situation is reported in Australia (Bricknell 2012). Licensed firearm dealers are well placed to divert firearms—they have access to large firearm collections, and their familiarity with legislation and processes around the importation, sale and distribution of firearms will have revealed where vulnerabilities exist and can be best exploited. Theft is also cited as an important source of illegal firearms in countries such as the US (Kleck and Wang 2009; Wright and Rossi 1994) and inferred in other jurisdictions such as England and Wales (Hales et al. 2006) and within the European Union (Spapens 2007).
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Fig. 1
Source of weapons and type of trafficking Source: UNODC Transnational Organized Crime Threat Assessment (2012) (Based on US Bureau of Justice Statistics 2002 & ATF 2000)



The trafficking of firearms is unlike many of the other forms of trafficking. Unlike drugs, cigarettes, or counterfeit pharmaceuticals, AK-47 will last indefinitely. As a result, a logical argument follows: arms trafficking is episodic, often from an established stockpile to a region descending into crisis (UNODC 2010). However, the "rationality" of the illicit firearms market is one of the topics further discussed in this special issue, since this market deals with a product that is significantly different from other illicit products or services offered by criminal networks. For example, it is essential to understand that the inherent nature of firearms and other weapons is their ability to take and/or protect human life. Their ability is to intimidate, threaten or defend the survival of "imagined communities" including, groups, gangs, and nation states. Arms do not only help rebel groups and governments to maintain control over territories, but they are also a very "useful tool" for expanding the influence of organized crime groups and for projecting "masculinity" (Davis et al. 2001; Arsovska and Kostakos 2008).

"I don't think that [the war] is a stalemate," Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelensky told NBC News' Meet the Press on Sunday."They thought they would checkmate us, but," he insisted, "this didn't happen." According to recent interviews, his military leadership disagrees. His political inner circle thinks his insistence is delusional.Zelensky is facing pressure both from within Ukraine and from without. Growing pressure from within is coming from both the political and military leadership; growing pressure from without is coming from Ukraine's key partners.The battle is largely being played out in the Western media. Most intimately, Zelensky has faced criticism from his political inner circle. TIME magazine reports that some of the president's advisors have become worried that his "belief in Ukraine's ultimate victory over Russia . . . "verg[es] on the messianic." One of Zelensky's "closest aides" said that Zelensky "deludes himself." The aide complained, "We're out of options. We're not winning. But try telling him that."Some Zelensky aides say his intransigence hampers Ukraine's ability to adapt to the changed reality on the battlefield and worry that negotiating a settlement with Russia remains "taboo."Domestic criticism is also coming from the top levels of the military. Zelensky is reportedly in conflict with his generals over the conduct of the counteroffensive and over his demands to defend Bakhmut and Avdiivka at any cost, which the military leadership sees as a strategic mistake that is already hurting Ukraine dearly in soldiers and equipment. A senior Ukrainian military officer said that orders from the president's office are, at times, disconnected from the battlefield reality and defended some front-line commanders who have begun second-guessing and refusing "orders from the top."Zelensky's struggle with his generals intensified on November 3 when Zelensky fired General Viktor Khorenko, the commander of Ukraine's special operations forces. The commander-in-chief of the Ukrainian army, General Valery Zaluzhny, did not request his dismissal. The New York Times reports that "It was unclear whether General Zaluzhny, the overall commander of Ukraine's forces, knew in advance of the planned dismissal" and that "[t]he firing appeared to undercut General Zaluzhny's authority."The firing took U.S. military officers, who "described a close and effective working relationship with" Khorenko, by surprise. Khorenko's special operations forces had had some success with long-range strikes and sabotage operations behind Russian lines. But the NYT reports that there had been tension over what the military had "perceived as politically guided decisions on strategy" that had been ineffective and costly.Zelensky's tensions with his generals reached a peak with Zaluzhny's November 1 interview with The Economist. He asserted that the war had reached a "stalemate." He conceded that "There will most likely be no deep and beautiful breakthrough."What's worse is that Zaluzhny implied that the stalemate would evolve into defeat for Ukraine. A stalemate entails a long war of attrition. In a companion essay published simultaneously by The Economist, he explained that a long war "as a rule, in most cases, is beneficial to one of the parties to the conflict. In our particular case, it is the russian [sic] federation, as it gives it the opportunity to reconstitute and build up its military power."Zaluzhny said that in a prolonged war, Ukraine will run out of the "required volume" of missiles and ammunition while Russia, despite sanctions, is increasing its production capabilities. And even if it didn't run out of weapons, he added, it will run out of men: a war of attrition "leads to the lack of Ukraine's ability to achieve superiority over the enemy in reserves by increasing their number." A close Zelensky aide told TIME that, even if the United States gave Ukraine all the weapons it needed, Kyiv doesn't "have the men to use them."Zelensky's office censured Zaluzhny, saying it "eases the work" of Russia and stirs "panic" among Ukraine's Western partners. The New York Times calls the censure "a striking public rebuke that signaled an emerging rift between the military and civilian leadership."In addition to the pressure coming from within Zelensky's inner political and military circle, diplomatic pressure is also coming from Zelensky's international partners. A November 3 NBC News article reported that "U.S. and European officials have begun quietly talking to the Ukrainian government about what possible peace negotiations with Russia might entail to end the war." The article went on to say, citing one current and one former senior U.S. official familiar with the discussions, that "the conversations have included very broad outlines of what Ukraine might need to give up to reach a deal."The quiet talks suggest agreement by the U.S. and its European allies with Zaluzhny that Ukraine may not achieve its goals on the battlefield, that the realization of their aspirations may continue to dim with prolonged battle, and that some concessions may need to be made.There is a remarkable convergence in the language used by the U.S. and European officials and the language used by Zaluzhny and Zelensky's aides. NBC reports that the conversations "began amid concerns among U.S. and European officials that the war has reached a stalemate." NBC reports that, like Zaluzhny, "[s]ome U.S. military officials have privately begun using the term 'stalemate' to describe the current battle in Ukraine."Like Zaluzhny and Zelensky's aides, "Biden administration officials also are worried that Ukraine is running out of forces." According to "people familiar with the matter," NBC reported, "President Joe Biden has been intensely focused on Ukraine's depleting military forces." "Manpower," one of those sources is quoted as saying, "is at the top of the administration's concerns right now." Echoing the "close Zelensky aide" quoted in TIME, the same source said, "The U.S. and its allies can provide Ukraine with weaponry, but if they don't have competent forces to use them it doesn't do a lot of good."These concerns, NBC reported, have led U.S. officials to concede privately that "Ukraine likely only has until the end of the year or shortly thereafter before more urgent discussions about peace negotiations should begin."That leaves only a couple of months. With the battlefield turning against Ukraine despite Zelensky's intransigent "belief in Ukraine's ultimate victory over Russia," the pressure targeted at Zelensky seems to be building, from both within and without,, to turn to the diplomatic front and face the beginning of the end of the war.

The position of Israel's Prime Minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, concerning the establishment of a Palestinian State has been, at a conceptual level, rather consistent. Since assuming the office of Prime Minister for the second time some months ago (he served as Prime Minister between 1996 and 1999), his stance on this matter has evolved in a coherent manner.To begin with, Netanyahu said that, in the context of a peace agreement with the Palestinian Authority, he would be in favour of the creation of an entity in which the Palestinians would enjoy the fullest possible degree of liberty and political authority commensurate with Israel's vital security interests.Following his first official meeting with US President Barack Obama, Netanyahu was asked by reporters whether he would agree to the establishment of a Palestinian state. He retorted by saying that it was not important how one defined a Palestinian entity that would emerge as a result of a peace accord so long as there was agreement on its contents.In his speech at Bar Ilan University in Israel, in which, for the first time, Netanyahu endorsed, in principle, the idea a Palestinian state, the Israeli Prime Minister did not argue his case in a top-bottom manner. Netanyahu did not say he was in favour of a two-state solution and went on to explain what he meant by that. He did not state, first and foremost, that he would accept a Palestinian state living side by side with Israel. Rather, he argued his case in a bottom-up way.He started by describing the kind of Palestinian entity that would be acceptable to Israel in the framework of a peace agreement. That entity would have to be, according to Netanyahu, fully demilitarized, with iron-clad international supervision. He made it clear, albeit in a rather implicit manner, that the frontiers would have to be supervised to prevent smuggling of prohibited weaponry, and the freedom of its airspace would have to be partially curtailed to avert any possible aerial attack of Israeli targets.Netanyahu then went on to say that, if the aforementioned conditions were met, he would agree to the establishment of a Palestinian state.In other words, the kind of Palestinian entity Netanyahu would accept was identical to the kind of entity he was ready to accept even prior to his Bar Ilan speech. Now, however, he went a step further, saying that he would agree that such an entity be a state. Netanyahu was prepared to endorse the idea of a Palestinian state as long as the main characteristics he thought essential for an autonomous entity were to be applied to such a state. Netanyahu agreed to the creation of a Palestinian state primarily due the pressures exerted by the Obama Administration. To be sure, other countries with which Israel had close relations, such as Germany, Britain, France and Italy made it clear to Israel, both in private and in public, that the endorsement of a Palestinian state, as an integral component of a peace agreement, was essential.However, the manner by which Netanyahu presented his consent to the creation of a Palestinian state was related to his domestic audience. The bottom-up approach adopted by him during his Bar Ilan speech could be understood as an attempt by Netanyahu to assuage his domestic constituency. By describing first the main characteristics of a Palestinian entity, by emphasizing the security elements essential to Israel to begin with, and then moving on to state that he would be ready to accept a Palestinian state, Netanyahu may have wished to convey the impression that the change entailed in his position was of a gradual, incremental nature, rather than a radical departure from his previous stance.Netanyahu did not wish to portray himself as the De Gaule of a Palestinian state. He had no intention for his Bar Ilan speech to become the Balfour Declaration for the Palestinian people.His speech was designed to fend off external pressures while maintaining the support of his domestic audience. He had to maintain a delicate equilibrium by adopting the idea of a Palestinian state while doing so in a manner that did not cause a political earthquake in Israel. His whole speech, to be sure, was aimed at eliciting the support of the international community while maintaining the backing of his domestic base.Although many on the right of the Israeli political spectrum objected to the speech and some in the international community were not fully satisfied with it, Netanyahu managed, so far, to remove this issue from the international agenda as a bone of contention without causing any ruptures within his domestic base.The bottom-up analytical approach of Netanyahu in presenting his endorsement of a Palestinian state stands in contrasts to the way the parties to the left of the Likud argue their case in favour of a Palestinian state.Kadima, Labour and Meretz, the three main Zionist political parties to the left of the Likud, advance their position on this matter in a top-bottom dialectical manner. They start by the headline, so to speak, by saying that they favour a two-state solution or the establishment of a Palestinian state next to Israel. They hardly move into specifics, at least not in public. Netanyahu, as we have seen, moved from the main features of a Palestinian entity to the headline, to the endorsement of a Palestinian state.Indeed, these parties argue their case in an instrumental vein as well. The creation of a Palestinian state, they contend, is an interest of Israel. Israel would not be making any favours by agreeing to such a state. It would be operating in its own self interest.Netanyahu's argument in this regard is not instrumental. He wishes to convey the impression that such a Palestinian state would entail some notable sacrifices. It is a concession done under duress, rather than a unilateral decision reached from purely self-interest.Notwithstanding all this, it should be stressed that none of the Zionist parties to the left of Netanyahu would accept a Palestinian state that would not be demilitarized, the frontiers of which would not be supervised and the aerial space of which would be fully under the control of a Palestinian state.In this regard, Netanyahu expresses explicitly what these parties say implicitly.In contrast to his first tenure as Prime Minister, Netanyahu has been adopting a consensual rather than a confrontational approach to policy-making. Indeed, he has even said so explicitly on more than one occasion. Both in shaping his domestic and his foreign policy Netanyahu has been endeavouring to be inclusive rather than exclusive. Following his Bar Ilan speech, he stated that he has embraced a policy towards the peace process which encompasses a large consensus within Israel.Netanyahu has been, so far, more of a problem solver than an opportunity creator. This has led him to adopt a somewhat defensive posture aimed at avoiding political and diplomatic convulsions. His main objective seems to be stability. Paradoxically, his adoption of the idea of a Palestinian state was undertaken as part of this same defensive posture. *Diplomacy Program. Tel Aviv University. Israel

At the height of the "unipolar moment" of the 1990s and 2000s, a popular school of thought argued that the U.S. could use its unchecked power to do good on the world stage. When peace proved elusive after the fall of the Soviet Union, the world saw exceptionally deadly warfare and attempted ethnic cleansing erupt in Karabakh, the Congo, Rwanda, and Yugoslavia. If there was one power that could do anything about this, it was the United States.The primary ideologue of this push for humanitarian interventionism would become Samantha Power. A journalist and author of the influential book A Problem from Hell: America in the Age of Genocide, Power argued that the U.S. and other liberal nation states should use military force to halt crimes against humanity in other countries. Nation-states have a responsibility to protect their citizens, and if they are found not be doing this, other states may then step in to do so should the situation continue to deteriorate. This principle was called "Responsibility to Protect," or "R2P," and it became so influential that it was adopted into the United Nations Charter in 2005.Two decades later, the concept has been shown to be both hypocritical and dangerous. As Israel bombs Gaza to dust, world elites have shown no interest in living up to their apparent responsibility to protect civilians. Contrast this with the response to Russia's war in Ukraine, in which commentators called for direct intervention to save innocent Ukrainians. And actual examples of R2P have led to disaster, as civilians in Libya can attest. Fortunately, there's a simple answer to this hellish problem: abandoning R2P once and for all.Who's protecting who?Power's line of argument masked the darker history of so-called humanitarian interventions. Both the Romans and Spanish, more than 1000 years apart, argued that their bloody conquests in Carthage and Central America would help the world by ending the practice of human sacrifice. In the 19th century, the colonial states of western Europe began to see their maritime expansion abroad not simply in terms of wealth and power acquisition but as an inevitable stage of human moral development. France and Britain in particular dove into Africa with the justification of putting an end to tribal wars and extirpating the slave trade. With economic and technological shifts, the same empires who had once expanded with shackles in hand now came, so they said, as liberators. Yet the result of this "liberation" was little more than violence and famine.Unfortunately, the lessons of this sordid history didn't stick. Barack Obama would end up recruiting Power for multiple roles in his administration. While Obama ran explicitly against the disastrous foreign policy of George W Bush in 2008, subsequent events related to the "Arab Spring" would see him continue if not expand these same policies, launching an overt regime change war in Libya (and a covert one in Syria) while intensifying U.S. operations in Yemen.It was in the Libya war that Power would see her dream fulfilled, when R2P was explicitly invoked to protect Libyan civilians in rebel-held areas from retaliation by the government of Muamar Gaddafi. This operation resulted in widespread state failure, a collapse of central authority, a massive refugee crisis, a resurgence of extremism in that country, and, most gallingly of all, the return of slave markets along the North African coast. It turned out that there are worse things out there than oppressive governments.R2P's reputation took a hit and receded from the discourse, at least until Russia's invasion of Ukraine gave it life once more. Some members of the press called for no-fly zones over the country, and politicians in NATO states debated if such ideas were feasible. Ultimately, they decided that it was not, given Russia's conventional capabilities, particularly in the field of anti-aircraft weaponry. There was also the inconvenient fact of Moscow having nuclear deterrence. Any attempts to create a safe area for Ukrainians using NATO military forces risked a level of escalation deemed unpalatable by most in the alliance. This clearly showed that R2P was only ever really meant to be used by great powers against smaller countries that could not defend themselves. It never had any utility against more robust foes. Interestingly, Moscow had picked up on the trick and justified its invasion of Ukraine using explicitly R2P-flavored rhetoric about protecting lives in the Donbass.The Gaza challengeThe current Gaza War is, by all the standards usually cited by humanitarian interventionists, a perfect case for invoking R2P. Rhetoric from some actors inside the Israeli state suggests that some form of population displacement is at least being considered. The incredible population density of the Gaza Strip means civilians bear the brunt of the violence. Lack of access to medicine and food exacerbates all of these problems.Samantha Power is the current head of USAID in the Biden administration. One cannot help but wonder what she thinks of the war currently unfolding in Gaza while she coordinates food shipments through Egypt's Sinai that are often held up at border checkpoints. For one so adamant that the U.S. must intervene whenever war disproportionately hits a civilian populace, she has been strangely silent.Meanwhile, Yemen's Houthis explicitly cite their own version of R2P to justify their attacks on shipping in the Red Sea. This shows the true future of R2P, if it is to have any — one of selective applications by great powers that muddy the waters around their wars in an attempt to gain media approval from within their alliance networks. As the world's balance of power inevitably moves into its more normal state of multipolarity, governments further undermine claims of ethical conduct in foreign policy, as states now have constant incentive to claim that their foes have a monopoly on human rights abuses. Inevitably, this will lead to all such claims being met with greater and greater skepticism by the global public, regardless of their factuality.Far from the centers of great power rivalries, the utility of R2P seems to be declining, as crises such as Myanmar and Sudan are assiduously ignored by the countries expected to be intervening, likely out of fear of being sucked into another Syria or Iraq and giving one's foes more opportunities to indirectly strike at stretched-thin tripwire forces.It is a trite observation to point out that great powers have different moral standards for their allies and their enemies, but R2P is a foreign policy doctrine entirely based on moralist claims. Not being able to live up to its own principles when a humanitarian crisis is unleashed by an allied country such as Israel is the last nail in the coffin for a thoroughly failed idea. We can only hope that a silver lining of this difficult moment in history is that we never have to hear about the Responsibility to Protect again.

The stark failure of Ukraine's 2023 counteroffensive, which Kyiv billed as the one-two punch that can knock Russia out of the war, has led proponents of maximalist war aims in Ukraine to revise their timetable for victory.The Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU), according to this emerging consensus, can fend off ongoing Russian attacks and replenish their capacity for renewed offensives in 2025 with sustained Western support. Key to these plans is a two-fold assessment of both sides' strike capabilities.This view argues that Ukraine, if supplied with enough "game-changing" medium and long-range missiles, can successfully degrade Russian logistics and command and control (C2) nodes and make large swathes of occupied territories — including Crimea — untenable for Russian forces. Such perspectives are complemented and often accompanied by the parallel observation that Russian forces are running critically low on key munitions and thus lack the ability to apply sustained long-term pressure on Ukrainian infrastructure.Both approaches, which invite Western policymakers to double down on Ukraine's maximalist war aims in hopes that something approximating a total victory can yet be secured with enough funding and persistence, are deeply flawed and risk putting Kyiv and its Western partners in an even more precarious military position over the coming year.The AFU received around 20 ground-launched ballistic M39 Block I Army Tactical Missile System, or ATACMS, missiles from the United States in late 2023. These older variant missiles, which boast a range of 170 kilometers, were reportedly used by the AFU to strike Russian-controlled airfields in southern and eastern Ukraine.In a November 2023 letter, a group of lawmakers called on the Biden administration to transfer more ATACMS, including advanced longer-range variants, to Ukraine with the aim of sustaining the AFU's "requirement for deep-strike capability." Former U.S. General Ben Hodges argued that the provision of ATACMS and other Western missiles, including German Taurus cruise missiles, would isolate Russian-occupied Crimea and make it untenable for Russian forces. "ATACMS with 300km range will make Crimea untenable as soon they arrive in Theater. No place for Russian Navy, Air Force, Logistics to hide in Crimea," Hodges wrote. "On ATACMS for Ukraine, don't settle for a job half done."As with other plans formulated around Ukraine's use of game-changing "wunderwaffen," the thinking on massed ATACMS strikes all too often presumes a static Russian adversary incapable of adapting to these weapons over time.Consider the 2022 introduction of U.S.-supplied HIMARS missiles to the battlefield, which enabled a spate of successful AFU strikes on high-value Russian assets in Ukraine. The AFU's HIMARS honeymoon phase gradually came to an end as the Russians learned to disperse their munitions depots more effectively, jam Western precision missiles, and employ more sophisticated air defense practices.Russian command has a grasp of which Western arms have yet to be supplied to Ukraine and, at this stage in the war, has had months if not years to simulate their effects and preemptively draw up countermeasures against them, diluting the element of technological surprise that gave HIMARS missiles a brief but real window of operational success in 2022. It is all but certain that the Russian military will continue honing their force dispersion methods and developing additional countermeasures to mitigate the future battlefield impacts of Western medium and long-range missiles.Russia could likewise respond to expanded Western missile deliveries with a wide array of asymmetric measures facilitating a dangerous escalation in the war's intensity. Moscow, which has so far opted to attrit Ukraine and its Western backers at a deliberate pace, can leverage its considerable and growing escalation control by bringing more of its strike capabilities to bear on Ukrainian infrastructure and stepping up offensive operations across the line of contact in the country's east and south.Western-provided missiles can be used to impose operational costs on Russian forces with strikes on high-value targets and infrastructure, but these attacks carry limited long-run strategic value. There is no indication that they can be conducted on a large enough scale so as to decisively defeat Russian forces in Ukraine, nor — as noted by the Quincy Institute's Anatol Lieven — can they make the Russian presence in Crimea untenable if they are not accompanied by successful large-scale ground offensives to drive the Russians out of southeastern Ukraine.There is nothing to suggest, especially in light of the costly failure of the 2023 counteroffensive, that the AFU will develop the offensive potential necessary for such advances in the foreseeable future. Ukrainian strikes with Western-supplied missiles have driven parts of the Russian Navy out of Crimea, further stymying Moscow's long-abandoned plans for amphibious landings in Odessa and Mykolaiv. But the loss and relocation of these ships, though unquestionably a material setback for Russia, is not and has never been a critical factor in the ability of Russian ground forces to sustain their occupation of southern Ukraine. No less wrongheaded is the accompanying notion that Russia faces critical missile shortages of its own. Russian forces, predicted Ukraine's military intelligence chief Kyrylo Budanov in an interview on December 31, 2022, have enough missiles left for two large-scale attacks. Top Estonian intelligence official Margo Grosberg said in January 2023 that Russia has the precision-guided munitions to continue attacking Ukraine for "the next three to four months, or until spring, and from a more pessimistic point of view, six to nine months." These and similar assessments by Ukrainian and Western officials, despite being continuously contradicted by events on the ground over the past two years, have lingered even in the recent discourse on Ukraine.Though it is impossible to accurately estimate Russia's stockpiles of various precision munitions at any given moment, there are clear indications that the Kremlin has mitigated Western export controls and successfully consolidated its defense-industrial base to at least sustain, if not continue to grow, Russian long-range strike capabilities in the short to medium term. Russia's steady output of precision munitions offers a stark contrast against the ongoing degradation of Ukraine's air defenses in the face of relentless Russian strikes over the winter, further undermining the fraught notion that time is on Ukraine's side.Neither of these two ideas — namely, that Ukraine can win if flooded with Western heavy weaponry and that Russia is on the verge of depleting its stocks — is new. Indeed, both concepts are part of the initial thinking that led some Western policymakers and observers to conclude over the course of 2022 that the AFU can vanquish Russia on the battlefield.But, after two years of brutal fighting in which Russia has gradually gained the upper hand, and the stakes are higher than ever and the costs of continued miscalculation, potentially catastrophic. It is long overdue for Kyiv's backers on both sides of the Atlantic to repair to a realistic theory of victory that accounts for, rather than obfuscates, the dire conditions faced by Ukraine and offers a sustainable framework for war termination on the best possible terms for Kyiv and the West.

Problem and Purpose The U.S. Army has changed radically in the 68 years since World War II ended, from uniforms to vehicles, from weaponry to organizational changes. While still the Army, its workforce has changed greatly in gender, ethnic, and age composition. John Bruce, Jr. saw many of these changes during his 69-year career as both soldier and executive. How this leader responded to the changes in the U.S. Army over nearly seven decades was the problem I explored. The purpose of the study was to describe how 94-year-old John Bruce, senior executive at the U.S. Army's Tank-automotive and Armaments Command Life Cycle Management Command (TACOM-LCMC), responded to change in the U.S. Army environment during his career. This exploration revealed how Mr. Bruce continued to function for the entire length of his career through his leadership, loyalty, and learning, and showed how these qualities influenced his work, his associates, and his extraordinary length of service. Research Method This was a single case study of one of the U.S. Army's longest-serving civilian leaders, Mr. John Bruce Jr. The methodology of this study design was five comprehensive interviews of peers of John Bruce, plus a similar interview of Mr. Bruce himself. The interviews were structured around questions designed to bring out the life, core beliefs, leadership style, and motivation of a man who served his nation for the length of time that would be considered the entire lifespan of another man. Interpreting John Bruce's evolving leadership vision, core beliefs, style, skills, adaptation to organizational and life changes, philosophy, and role within the organization, as well as his lifelong contributions and personal motivation through the revelations obtained in the interviews, were the particular challenges of this study. Findings Well into his 90s, John Bruce is a man of many talents, blessed with great health and a sharp mind. He came from a sound family background where he learned to love his family, his heritage, and his country. He was instilled with the principles of hard work, thrift, honesty, and integrity, all of which contributed to Mr. Bruce's long, productive career. He enlisted in the U.S. Army during World War II and afterwards, became a civilian employee of the Army, and was able to successfully respond to the Army's many changes by adapting to whatever the Army demanded of him. He made the transition from Accounting to Procurement, climbed the ladder of executive leadership, oversaw vast technological changes brought on by the computer and paperless contracting, and was a valued leader and role model to the changing workforce. He held deep loyalty to family, duty, the soldier, and his staff, and evolved with the Army as it became a 21st century organization. He oversaw the training and mentoring of his staff and kept himself motivated because of his strong desire to serve his country, and his drive for continual learning. He demanded the best of his workers as he demanded the same of himself, and proved throughout his career to be an exceptionally good steward of the public trust. Discussion The life of John Bruce Jr. aligns with several theories as frameworks to interpret his life. He progressed through the many levels of Maslow's Hierarchy of Needs: After attaining the basic needs of food and shelter (Level 1), he secured safety by fitting into society (Level 2). He found love and fulfillment in his family (Level 3). He achieved esteem and responsibility through his career (Level 4). His great success in his career helped him to achieve self-actualization (Level 5) as he put his personal leadership style on the day-to-day workings of TACOM-LCMC. John Bruce's life also aligns with elements of Erikson's Eight Stage Theory of Human Development. He developed trust in family and teachers early in life (Stage 1), developed autonomy as a young child (Stage 2), and took initiative in learning at school (Stage 3). Success in school provided competence (Stage 4), and as he gained independence (Stage 5), he chose advanced education in college. He took initiative by joining the Army, and developed an identity as a soldier in the Army, and, after his military service, as a civilian executive of the Army. He chose the intimacy in married life (Stage 6). He gained great success in his career as an executive and came to guide the careers of the next generation of leaders (Stage 7). He stayed life-affirming well into his 90s (Stage 8). John Bruce's career also aligns with the Herzberg Motivation-Hygiene Theory for job satisfaction, particularly through positive work experiences. He gained recognition as he advanced in his career, achieved many successes in program accomplishments, held a position of great responsibility, was promoted many times, attained an excellent salary, grew in competency along with his career promotions, and enjoyed his job, doing it well. John Bruce's development aligns with Kotter's 8-Step Process in Leading Change through his sense of urgency to accomplish the mission, developing a successful coalition of teammates and staff, developing a change vision that refined itself as he remained in his position, and communicating his vision to his staff and peers for buy-in. He brought about broad-based action in vehicle acquisition, achieved many short-term wins through incremental successes, never let up in his drive to succeed, and incorporated change into the culture. John Bruce's development aligns with Scharmer's U-Shaped Theory in that he achieved "presencing" through growth from a limiting institutional vision of leadership to a fuller connection with the world. Finally, John Bruce's career training was in line with accepted literature: He was a highly motivated learner who held a variety of assignments, acquired on-the-job training and a broad, big-picture perspective; cultivated an expanding skill set; and accepted a position and assignments that involved change and continuing education. His was a high-profile job with associated high job stress; and he willingly accepted the responsibility that came with it. Conclusions and Recommendations John Bruce Jr.'s long and exemplary career may never be repeated but we can take away a strong lesson from his life. A willingness to respond to the changes that life will inevitably bring and to work hard at the varied tasks that life throws our way, a great devotion to family, country, and fellow man, and a strong motivation to learn and to be successful, offers a blueprint for success. We can gain new leaders with the qualities of Mr. Bruce, just as he directed or mentored many in his leadership style, if we continue to create a sense of honor and loyalty towards family, country, and duty, while promoting selflessness. This needs to be promoted throughout the United States. We should permit leaders to gain the training and experience they need to discover for themselves that great leaders will need to respond to change many times along the path of their careers in order for them to remain motivated to serve. We should promote healthy living that will permit our best leaders to serve longer, and celebrate older workers for their positive contributions and their knowledge, wisdom, and experience. Finally, I recommend similar studies be undertaken on especially long-serving executives.

The Pentagon released its proposed budget for Fiscal Year 2025 this week. There were no major surprises, unless you're shocked by the fact we are continuing to over-invest in a strategy and a military force structure that is making the world less secure.If this budget goes through as requested, the Pentagon and related activities like work on nuclear warheads at the Department of Energy will come in at $894 billion. That's slightly less than the number being debated for this year, but far more than the levels achieved at other major turning points like the Korean and Vietnam wars or the peak of the Cold War. Meanwhile, Congress has shown little ability to provide adequate input or oversight of these huge figures. Over five months into the new fiscal year, it has yet to even pass a 2024 budget.What could possibly justify devoting these enormous sums to the Pentagon at a time of urgent national need to address other threats to our lives and livelihoods, from climate change to epidemics of disease to rampant inequality? The primary answer is the same one we have heard repeatedly in recent years: China, China, and China.But as I have noted in a recent paper for the Brown University Costs of War Project, by any measure the United States already spends two to three times as much on its military as China does, and outpaces it by far in basic military capabilities like nuclear weapons, naval firepower, and modern transport and combat aircraft. In the areas where there is room for doubt about the relative military power of the two rivals, from emerging technology to the likely outcome of a war over Taiwan, dialogue and diplomacy offer a far better chance of reaching a stable accommodation than spinning out scenarios for "winning" a war between two nuclear-armed powers, or by running a costly new arms race.Unfortunately, the rhetoric and resources underpinning the new Pentagon request are more consistent with arms racing than accommodation. The department remains firmly committed to its plan to build thousands of "autonomous, attritable systems" by August 2025, with the express purpose of developing the ability to overwhelm China in a conflict in Asia. In plain English, this means building swarms of drones and other high-tech systems controlled by artificial intelligence. And the plan is for these systems to be cheap and readily replaced if large numbers are destroyed in battle.The idea that the U.S. arms industry can produce large numbers of new systems quickly and affordably, and build replacements on short notice, runs contrary to the experience of recent decades. It's an exercise in wishful thinking that could result in the worst of both worlds — spurring China to increase its investments in next generation military technology even as it is unclear whether the United States can develop and integrate it successfully in any reasonable time frame.Far from increasing our security, once these new systems are developed and fielded they will almost certainly make the world a more dangerous place. This point is underscored in a new report from Public Citizen which notes that "[i]ntroducing AI into the Pentagon's everyday business, battlefield decision-making and weapons systems poses manifold risks."For example, although current Pentagon guidelines pledge to keep humans in the loop in decisions to engage in lethal force, once autonomous weapons are produced on a large scale the temptation to use them without human intervention will be great. This in turn will have a cascade of potential negative effects, from dehumanizing the targets of these systems, to making it easier to contemplate going to war, to risking mass slaughter caused by a malfunction in one of these complex systems.And as Michael Klare has written in an analysis for the Arms Control Association, the dangers of AI and other emerging military technologies are likely to "expand into the nuclear realm by running up the escalation ladder or by blurring the distinction between a conventional and nuclear attack."Klare also rings the alarm bell about the real risks of technical failures involving next generation technologies:"Non-military devices governed by AI, such as self-driving cars and facial-recognition systems, have been known to fail in dangerous and unpredictable ways; should similar failures occur among AI-empowered weaponry during wartime, the outcomes could include the unintended slaughter of civilians or the outbreak of nuclear war."These are all strong reasons to go slow and evaluate the consequences of applying AI to military operations, not engage in uncritical cheerleading that gives lip service to risk assessment while moving full speed ahead towards deployment of autonomous systems. To his credit, President Biden has pledged to promote talks with China on "risk and safety issues related to artificial intelligence." An analysis by Sydney Freedberg of Breaking Defense points out that "the Chinese have been showing signs they are receptive, particularly when it comes to renouncing AI command-and-control systems for nuclear weapons." More discussions of this sort are urgently needed before moving full speed ahead on AI-driven weapons.The urge to deploy AI and other emerging military technologies without adequate deliberation or scrutiny is just one of the troubling elements to come out of this week's Pentagon budget release. Staying the course on the Pentagon's plan to build a new generation of nuclear weapons and continuing to subsidize a policy of global military reach that has helped spark the disastrous wars in Iraq and Afghanistan are more likely to fuel future conflicts than prevent them. And despite President Biden's recent, tougher rhetoric in response to Israel's slaughter of tens of thousands of Palestinians in Gaza, the White House fact sheet issued in conjunction with the Pentagon budget release provides a whitewashed, wildly misleading description of the U.S. role in enabling Israel's brutal attacks:"After Hamas's horrific terrorist attacks against Israel, the President has led the United States to support Israel's right to defend its country and protect its people in a way that upholds international humanitarian law, while ensuring the Palestinian people have access to vital humanitarian aid and lifesaving assistance."It is impossible to square these claims with the actual situation in Gaza, and attempting to do so makes a mockery of the administration's repeated references to supporting a "rules-based international order."The bottom line is that the United States is spending far too much on the Pentagon, much of it in service of goals that are likely to cause far more harm than good. It's time to reverse course, but neither the White House nor a majority in Congress are likely to do so of their own accord.We must pay closer attention to the consequences of the massive military spending and widespread military activities being carried out in our name, and stand up for more realistic policies that can set the stage for a future free of unnecessary conflicts and dangerous arms racing. We can't afford to let the Pentagon and the policies it underwrites continue on autopilot, promoting military approaches to problems that don't have military solutions, all too often with disastrous results.

The world of Cold War-era espionage was famously described by former CIA counterintelligence chief James Jesus Angleton as a wilderness of mirrors, one of those rare coinages that so beautifully captures its subject matter as to require little by way of elaboration.
The wilderness of mirrors is itself a rather brilliant literary appropriation from T.S. Eliot's 1920 poem Gerontion, a hauntingly foreboding portrait of interwar abjection that gripped a generation of Europeans hurtling at breakneck speed toward another, even greater calamity lurking just around the corner.
Angleton plucked this phrase from its original, admittedly vastly different context to capture the grasping in the dark — or, as Eliot put it, braving life's many "cunning passages" and "contrived corridors" only to arrive at a distant echo of the truth — that is part and parcel of intelligence and counterintelligence work.
But these problems of perception are no less salient in the peripheral world of statecraft, where leaders must deter adversaries and uphold international commitments not, for the most part, by their actions but by the signals they transmit to their counterparts. The structure of the international system is held aloft by these signals and the vast array of policies, institutions, and arrangements underpinning them.
The basic currency behind signaling is credibility, backed by a commensurate capability to make good on the signal one is trying to send. For instance, the NATO alliance and its collective defense provision, Article 5, rest on America's assurance that it will come to the defense of its European partners if they are subject to aggression by another state. As I have written with my colleagues Anatol Lieven and George Beebe, all the available evidence suggests that the Russian leadership more or less sees this U.S. security assurance as credible and shapes its approach toward NATO's eastern flank accordingly.
Meanwhile, Russia's most formidable challenge — one that rivals and potentially outstrips the battlefield difficulties it is facing in Ukraine and, now, its border region of Kursk– has been finding ways to credibly deter the West from continuing to aid and supply Ukraine. Just under 30 months ago, the day the invasion commenced, Russian President Vladimir Putin warned that anyone who interferes will suffer "consequences like you have never seen."
Since then, the West has successfully coordinated a colossal, by some measures unprecedented security assistance operation for Ukraine, steadily deepening its involvement with new types of weaponry and by relaxing or altogether abandoning its previous injunctions curbing Ukraine's ability to strike within internationally recognized Russian territory.
Moscow enjoys a considerable degree of deterrence on the question of direct Western intervention in the war, if for no other reason than the eventuality of such a move spilling into a wider regional war one hair's breadth removed from a nuclear confrontation. But the same cannot be said of its ability to deter the West from doing all it can to aid Ukraine indirectly.
Putin's latest scheme to dissuade further Western involvement in the Ukraine war was to threaten to arm the West's adversaries in retaliation, supposedly under the belief that this policy would raise costs on Ukraine's Western partners such that they would either back down or at least refrain from further deepening their commitment to Kyiv.
Yet, three months later, Russia has yet to make good on this threat. As it turns out, this kind of punitive tit for tat was never quite fit for purpose, not least because Russia lacks the capacity to make good on it without running a red pen through other parts of its global portfolio of military, economic, and political interests.
Just as the Kremlin was reportedly getting ready to arm the Houthi rebels in Yemen against the United States, Washington coordinated a diplomatic push with Saudi Arabia to stay Moscow's hand. Russia and North Korea signed a defense pact in June, advertised by both sides with much pomp, but there is no evidence to date that the Russians are planning to send any major weapons shipments to North Korea. It's so far been the other way around, with the DPRK shipping millions of artillery shells to Russia.
Perhaps the North Koreans believe themselves to be benefiting in other ways, including the political leverage their relations with Russia give them over their prime benefactor and partner, China, but there has not been anything approximating a comparable exchange of weapons between Moscow and Pyongyang.
It's not difficult to see why: any large-scale effort to arm the DPRK could prove fatal to Russia's relations with South Korea, which have not completely tanked following the 2022 Ukraine invasion despite the ROK's tight-knit partnership with Washington and obvious susceptibility to U.S. interests. Beijing, too, would be left unsmiling by the destabilizing effects that large Russian arms infusions into North Korea could exercise throughout the region, and the China relationship is one Russia can ill afford to complicate.
Turning to the Middle East, Iran emerges as an obvious candidate for Russia's generosity — it is, after all, a U.S. adversary locked in a bitter struggle with one of America's closest allies, Israel. But here, too, the Kremlin finds itself navigating gingerly between Scylla and Charybdis.
Part of Russia's complex Middle East strategy following its intervention in the Syrian civil war has been to support a stable, partner-level relationship with Israel. Both Putin and his Israeli counterpart Bibi Netanyahu regard cordial ties between their two countries as a personal achievement, and they have been remarkably loath to jettison this relationship even as the Ukraine war and 2023 Gaza War have found them on different sides of the barricade.
Though Moscow has recurrently needled Israel over its conduct in Gaza, these kinds of rhetorical pinpricks are one thing; supplying Israel's avowed Iranian enemy with major weapons systems is quite another, and, so far, not a bridge Putin has been willing to cross.
Simply put, Russia is running out of Western enemies that can be armed without negatively impacting its own interests. Smaller potential players remain in Latin America and parts of Africa, but in these cases, the impact of such provisions is likely to be far too small to carry the punitive effect that is Russia's raison d'être for pursuing this arms transfer policy in the first place.
The conundrum Moscow finds itself in reveals a deeper facet of its war effort in Ukraine: Moscow's ability to maintain relationships with almost the entire non-Western world in spite of the West's persistent isolation campaign is both an asset and a liability. It buffers Russia from Western economic and diplomatic pressures that may otherwise have successfully crippled it in the war's opening stages. But these relationships also carry with them a set of barriers constraining Moscow from pursuing many forms of escalation and retaliation.
These limitations point to a wilderness of mirrors that has developed around the war in Ukraine — a set of expectations and norms that, though never codified and largely unspoken, nevertheless has a real disciplining effect on its participants. This logic should be studied more deeply and integrated as part of the U.S. policy toolkit for bringing the war to a close on maximally advantageous terms for the West and Ukraine.

There is little secret that proponents of total victory in Ukraine have trained their focus on ensuring that a $60 billion Ukraine military aid package, introduced by the Biden administration late last year, is passed by Congress. Its backers claim this aid is of vital, even existential importance, but what effects could this package actually have on the battlefronts in Ukraine and what is really at stake in the debate over Ukraine aid more broadly?
The funding, part of a larger $95 billion supplemental package for Ukraine, Israel and Taiwan, allocates $20 billion to replenish Department of Defense stockpiles after previous rounds of Ukraine aid, around $14 billion for Ukraine to purchase weapons from U.S. entities, $15 billion in support including intelligence services and military training, and $8 billion in direct budget support for the Ukrainian government. This sum, though prodigious in an absolute sense, pales in comparison to the $113 billion in Ukraine aid approved by Congress in 2022 during a time in the war when the balance of forces was much more favorable to the Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU) than it is now.
The AFU faces a cascade of critical challenges; prime among them are its growing shortage of troops and its dire munitions deficit in what, according to Ukrainian officials, has become an "artillery war." The aid package strives to alleviate Ukraine's mounting shell hunger, but money does not directly translate into readily-available munitions. It is not clear how many shells, and how quickly, the U.S. can send Ukraine even if the supplemental was approved today. Russia, according to estimates by RUSI from earlier this year, fires 10,000 artillery rounds per day. Consider, for a sense of scale, that European annual production by February 2023 totaled just 300,000 rounds — or roughly what Russia has spent every month in Ukraine. Russia — which is believed to have made around 2 million artillery shells in 2023 — outproduced its Western counterparts at a rate of seven to one, according to an Estonian intelligence assessment from last year.
Josep Borrell, Europe's top diplomat, noted that Europe cannot shoulder the burden of supporting Ukraine on its own, but there are signs that Washington could struggle to backfill some of Ukraine's core needs even with ample political will on both sides of the aisle. Indeed, there is no immediate fix for revamping the U.S. defense-industrial base to support the staggering scale of Ukrainian munitions expenditures. U.S. officials have announced plans for an incremental production ramp peaking at 100,000 shells per month, but this target will not be fully met until at least October 2025. Ukrainian Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba said Ukraine needs 2.5 million shells this year — or roughly 208,000 per month — to sustain its war effort, suggesting a shell usage rate that the West simply cannot underwrite in the short to medium term even with the supplemental funding bill.
Kyiv's severe materiel deficits are accompanied by equally serious manpower shortages, a problem that the West cannot alleviate short of direct military intervention in Ukraine. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy has struggled to craft a viable mobilization strategy amid spiking domestic divisions even as the number of foreign volunteers has declined from its peak of 20,000 in early 2022. These shortages are driven not only by Ukrainian casualties, which reportedly exceed the 31,000 total combat deaths claimed by Zelenskyy last month, but by depopulation trends so stark as to verge on demographic collapse. Kyiv must likewise grapple with the second-order effects of waging a prolonged and costly total war; a more expansive mobilization program would take even more people out of the labor force, further straining Ukraine's limping wartime economy.
Moscow is not a static actor in this unfolding drama. The Russians keenly perceive Ukraine's weaknesses and are racing to exploit them to the fullest extent, leveraging their vast manpower and firepower advantages to apply pressure all along the line of contact in Eastern-South Eastern Ukraine in the aftermath of Avdiivka's fall.
In short, the Ukrainian war effort is on life support. Its collapse is, for the first time since the Russian invasion commenced in 2022, now a distinct possibility. What can the $60 billion aid package achieve in light of these grim realities? It will undoubtedly help Ukraine impose costs on and slow the pace of Russian advances. Though it will not forestall the continued threat of a collapse, it will likely give the AFU a lease on life through the coming months. But, as Sen. J.D. Vance (R-Ohio) accurately observed, it "is not going to fundamentally change the reality on the battlefield."
Importantly, to acknowledge the limits of Western aid is not the same as suggesting that there is absolutely no value in continuing to support Ukraine. Indeed, a scenario in which the AFU collapses and Ukraine gets steamrolled by Russian forces would be dangerous for everyone involved and make it more difficult to reach a durable settlement. But it is equally true that any plan to support Ukraine must be coupled with a sober assessment of what can and cannot be achieved at this stage in the war.
Prospects of continued Western aid to Ukraine are an important, if not principal, source of leverage vis-a-vis Moscow in this war, but leverage tends to dissipate if left untapped. The problem is not aid as such but, rather, a continued insistence on maximalist war aims that are increasingly detached from this war's realities.
Proposals to sustain Ukraine's defense through 2024 in a bid to push Kyiv toward a new counteroffensive in 2025 are setting the AFU up for a re-enactment of the disastrous 2023 counteroffensive, if not worse. Plans involving NATO boots on the ground in Ukraine have wisely been ruled out by most Western leaders.
Advocates of maximalist war aims in Ukraine have been remarkably successful over the last two years in affecting their policies both on and off the battlefield. From HIMARS rocket launchers and SCALP cruise missiles to Patriot missile systems and Leopard 2A6 main battle tanks, Ukraine has been saturated with a vast and potent array of Western weaponry. The international sanctions regime on Russia is by far the largest in history and growing, with the EU now on its thirteenth package of restrictive measures while the U.S. Treasury Department constantly looks for opportunities to further tighten the screws on Moscow.
The $60 billion supplemental is the latest such measure, but the issue has never been a lack of action — it's the absence of a viable endgame in Ukraine. Speaker Mike Johnson has called on the Biden administration to articulate "a clear strategy in Ukraine, a path to resolving the conflict." Indeed, it is vitally important to re-center the Ukraine debate on achieving consensus around a realistic framework for war termination.

Recent elections in Central Europe swept out incumbents, but in opposite directions, with the nearby Ukraine war and its impact on citizens and the economies never far from the political surface.Poland's liberal opposition managed to defeat the stubborn hold on power of the conservative nationalist party that has ruled since 2015. With the exception of the far-right Konfederacja party, the victors and the vanquished in Poland both support Ukraine's war effort. However, the campaign period exposed some economic grievances related to supporting Ukraine's European Union membership bid.In Slovakia, former prime minister Robert Fico, whose SMER party combines social democratic welfare policies with conservative nationalism, defeated the pro-EU and pro-Ukraine incumbents by emphatically opposing further military aid for Ukraine. Poland: Return to the European fold?The victory of Poland's liberal opposition in the October 15 parliamentary elections was momentous for the European Union, since it could signal the end of the uneasy relations with Europe under Poland's conservative Law and Justice party (PiS).The prospective coalition will be composed of the Civic Platform led by former Prime Minister Donald Tusk, along with the centrist Third Way coalition and the New Left bloc. Together, these three parties won 54% of the vote in a record turnout. Tusk, who served as president of the EU Council from 2014 to 2019, is committed to unblocking over 30 billion euros withheld by the EU pending the reversal of measures taken by PiS seen as having curbed judicial independence.Although it has no obvious coalition partner, PiS got the largest share of votes of any single party at 35.6 percent, allowing their leader Jaroslaw Kaczynski to claim a victory of sorts. The Law and Justice party, having governed for eight years, will be formidable in opposition, in part because the PiS-aligned President Andrzej Duda's term ends only in 2025. Even if Duda bows to the election arithmetic and allows Tusk and partners to form a new government, PiS can rely on the presidential veto and court challenges to hobble Tusk's policy agenda.Law and Justice took a stubborn anti-German stance while in power and has sought to depict Tusk and other liberal opponents as agents of Germany. Moreover, Kaczynski has long accused Tusk of conspiring with Russia to cause the Polish presidential aircraft to crash as it attempted to land in the Russian city of Smolensk in 2010. For several years prior to this event, Tusk had, as Prime Minister, pursued a limited rapprochement with Russia, part of his attempt to bring Polish diplomacy more into alignment with that of France and Germany.A rare exception among nationalist-populist parties in Europe, PiS enthusiastically pushed for greater and more advanced weapons deliveries to Ukraine. However, during the election campaign this fall, PiS exploited Ukraine fatigue among Polish farmers calling for barring Ukrainian grain from the Polish market. In mid-September, in the midst of the electoral campaign, Duda likened Ukraine to a drowning man that risked taking others down with it.Polls indicate that many Poles resent the alleged economic impact of the roughly 1 million Ukrainian refugees resettled in the country. The Polish population seems to be torn between this resentment and the otherwise still solid support for Ukraine's war effort. There are also unresolved historical grievances held by some Poles against Ukrainians. Insightful polling last year concluded that Poles love Ukraine but not Ukrainians. PiS in opposition will likely seek to block Ukrainian EU accession, which can easily be depicted as disadvantageous to Polish economic interests and will respond to the frustrations exposed by the swing in public opinion.Slovakia's elections move country away from Ukraine supportSlovakia's elections of September 30 brought former Prime Minister Robert Fico's SMER (Direction) party back to power in coalition with two other parties. Fico and his coalition partners — the social democratic Voice Party and the hard-right nationalist Slovak National Party — campaigned openly on halting military support to Ukraine and on resisting any new sanctions on Russia. The pro-EU and pro-Ukraine Progressive Slovakia finished a distant second.Slovak public opinion shows a swelling Ukraine fatigue. Inflation, a weak economy and a general positive disposition among many Slovaks toward Russia are among the causes.At his first EU summit on October 27, Fico announced an end of any further military support from Slovakia to Ukraine and called for the EU to press for a negotiated settlement. He pledged to oppose any new sanctions against Russia that would adversely affect Slovakia's economy. In these positions, Fico and Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban were in close alignment. Since matters of foreign and security policy in the EU are decided unanimously, Hungary and Slovakia have some leverage over policy outcomes.How might the balance have shifted?The Polish election result may well reinforce Poland's already pronounced Atlanticist orientation. But Tusk's government may also align Poland more closely with the somewhat more nuanced and reserved position taken by Germany on supporting Ukraine. Germany has been cautious to avoid escalation of the conflict in Ukraine and has only reluctantly come on board with the US in the provision of longer-range and more advanced weaponry. Poland, under its conservative government, publicly derided German hesitations. This may change under Tusk.Chancellor Olaf Scholz and French president Macron have also championed intensified cooperation in defense-industrial modernization for Europe, a cause which Poland has not heretofore espoused. This could also change under Tusk's leadership. But Tusk's role will be under constant challenge, since PiS will hope to divide his coalition and bring forward new elections. The ongoing drag on the Polish economy will ensure that the question of balancing support for Ukraine with other objectives will not disappear from public discourse.Kaczynski's PiS was strongly in sympathy with Orban's Hungary in decrying the imposition of the European normative agenda on the scope of their powers. But the two parties never began to close the gap between their views on questions of war and peace. Relations between the two countries will now be far less cordial.Slovakia, on the other hand, is a small but unreserved ally for Hungary in resisting further military support for Ukraine. Fico has already fully committed Slovakia to opposing new military aid from the EU to Ukraine and any new sanctions against Russia. This will on balance reduce the marginalization of Hungary in the EU and in NATO.The net effect of these two elections leave the disposition of Europe as a whole toward support for Ukraine still very much in play. Poland returns to the top table of European decision-making but in doing so will be expected to accommodate to some extent the views of Germany and France. Slovakia under Fico will offer important cover to Orban's Hungary, which would otherwise be isolated.

With few exceptions, most soldiers do not wish for death on the battlefield.While some warrior cultures, like the Norse, revered dying in battle as an honourable end, and some jihadists today believe in heavenly rewards for martyrs, these are outliers. The reality is that the prospect of being shot or blown to pieces is terrifying, making recruitment a persistent challenge.A recent BBC article highlighted the increasing difficulty of recruiting new soldiers in Ukraine. After two-and-a-half years of war and more than 500,000 Russian and Ukrainian casualties, volunteers are scarce.Consequently, Ukraine introduced a law requiring all men aged 25 to 60 to register their details in an electronic database for potential conscription. Conscription officers actively seek those avoiding registration, driving many into hiding.In Odesa, the feared mobilization squads are known for pulling people off buses and from train stations, taking them directly to enlistment centres. These reluctant recruits understandably fear becoming another statistic in the front line "meat grinder" with Russia.Throughout history, rulers and politicians have faced the challenge of convincing ordinary citizens to enlist for war. How do leaders persuade their populace to take up arms and risk their lives? As societies have become better educated and informed, these tactics have evolved. Leaders often appeal to extreme nationalism, dehumanize the enemy, and create an atmosphere of existential threats, false flags, and outright lies.Consider Putin's "Denazification" of Ukraine, Israel's claims of decapitated babies, and America's claim of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs). Not to mention the excuse of needing to protect citizens through regime change, as seen in Libya. The truth usually emerges, but often long after the damage is done.Notable examples include the Pentagon Papers scandal in 1971, which revealed significant information about the Gulf of Tonkin incident, showing that the U.S. government had misrepresented the events that led to the escalation of the Vietnam War, and the unfounded WMD claims that led to the invasion of Iraq.Convincing the populace is one thing, but recruiting soldiers requires a deeper indoctrination. Training recruits to follow orders without question involves repetitive military drills. These drills condition recruits to respond to commands promptly and without hesitation. As a soldier, you're not expected to judge the morality of your actions; you execute orders precisely as given. If this indoctrination fails, there is always the threat of court-martial, imprisonment, or even facing a firing squad.That said, given the effort required to craft narratives, fear-mongering, lies, and indoctrination necessary to mobilize the populace for war, wouldn't it be simpler to eliminate the need for citizens' permission or soldiers altogether? Recent technological advances might offer warmongers a solution.Artificial Intelligence (AI) will revolutionize weaponry like no previous innovation in history. A recent report by the Quincy Institute, which I support, highlights Silicon Valley's entry into the weapons industry. It quotes former Google CEO Eric Schmidt, "Every once in a while, a new weapon, a new technology comes along that changes things. Einstein wrote a letter to Roosevelt in the 1930s saying that there is this new technology — nuclear weapons — that could change war, which it clearly did. I would argue that (AI-powered) autonomy and decentralized, distributed systems are that powerful."AI can achieve what humans cannot, parsing millions of inputs, identify patterns, and alerting commanders at unimaginable speeds. Military experts assert that the side that most effectively shortens the "kill chain" — the time between identifying and destroying a target — wins.AI may be the most revolutionary technology for conducting war, but it's not alone. Kamikaze drones, now used in the Ukraine war, will one day swarm battlefields. Additionally, many other sci-fi-esque technologies, like Direct Energy Weapons (DEW), including high-power microwaves, particle beam weapons, and lasers are being tested by the U.S., the U.K., Israel, and Russia.Mimicking "Terminators" is not far off either. Witness the advancements by companies like Boston Dynamics. Their humanlike robots can run, jump, and move much like humans. Equipping them with machine guns or flame-throwers and mass-producing a few hundred thousand of them is a scary thought. (Boston Dynamics reached out to the Star following publication to note that it does not support the weaponization of robots). The future of war will also encompass fifth-generation warfare, primarily conducted through nonkinetic military actions like social engineering, misinformation, and cyberattacks. When paired with AI and fully autonomous systems, these methods can be as damaging as kinetic warfare. Consider the movie "Leave the World Behind," which explores societal collapse when all communication networks are shut down by a cyberattack.Adding AI to any of these weapons creates autonomous systems capable of making decisions without human intervention, leaving the decision to kill to an algorithm. Given that we still don't fully understand how AI learns and arrives at conclusions, the risks of catastrophic malfunctions should not be underestimated.AI lacks a moral compass; it simply aims to complete its task. As author and AI expert Max Tegmark explains, "a machine does not need to be malevolent; it simply needs to be competent at achieving its goals to be a potential threat." If innocent humans are in the way of completing its task, tough luck.What are the implications of these advancements for decisions about wars? It's hard to predict, but one outcome might be that with less need to recruit soldiers, there's less need to "sell" the public on engaging in war. In the U.S., the "Military Industrial Complex" has already managed to bypass Congress (contravening the U.S. Constitution) when deciding to go to war, giving the president tremendous power.Relegating soldiers to museums alongside crossbows and muskets, would make declaring war much less controversial — no body bags on the evening news — and therefore easier to wage. The only "soldiers" needed will be the young kids sitting at computer consoles conducting destruction of lives and property like in video games. No more 18-year-olds dying somewhere in the mud. Only the innocent civilians caught in the crossfire of this new kind of warfare will pay the price.As the U.S. has engaged in decades of wars that have destroyed lives and economies without achieving their stated goals, and have significantly contributed to the nation's enormous debt, public attitudes — especially among Gen-Z — have become increasingly critical and less accepting of war.As rapper Cardi B mockingly said about recent draft legislation, "I just read an article saying that the House just passed a bill that they're going to automatically register men from 18 to 26 for war. All I want to say is to America, good luck with that. These new little n——— are TikTokkers, baby. These mother f——— ain't going to fight no war. You might as well just keep investing money and get guns. This is a new America, baby."The introduction of technologies that might make soldiers obsolete may give warmongers who manipulate the decision-making process at the highest levels an easier path to wage more senseless wars. That would be a tragedy.This article was republished with permission from the Toronto Star.

In the Art of War, Chinese military strategist Sun Tzu said, "if you know neither the enemy nor yourself, you will succumb in every battle." This nugget of wisdom is as perceptive today as it was over 2,000 years ago. And it does not bode well for America.We clearly don't know our adversaries. We've been caught flat-footed, repeatedly, in recent years, from Russia's invasion of Ukraine, the almost instantaneous collapse of the Afghanistan government that we'd spent two decades supporting, to the recent Hamas attacks destabilizing the Middle East.The biggest question mark of all is if and when China might transition from nibbling on the margins of Asia to taking a big bite in the form of Taiwan. Perhaps even more worrisome, and far less excusable, is the fact that we don't know ourselves. In a world growing less stable by the day, the disconnect between our policymakers in Washington and the American public is frightening. While prominent national security experts of both parties seem to be coalescing around maximalist approaches toward the conflicts in Ukraine and Gaza, and lobbying for a more confrontational stance toward China, the American public appears largely tuned out, instead focused on challenges closer to home, like paying bills, raising children, and navigating polarizing domestic politics. The disconnect between rhetoric and reality is breathtaking. On one hand Washington issues commitments to helping reclaim all Ukrainian territory, the "total destruction" of Hamas, and a robust defense of Taiwan. On the other hand the American public is either disengaged from (or divided on) these issues, our weapons stockpiles are shrinking, military recruitment numbers plunging, the deficit is ballooning, and the economy is uncertain.Meanwhile, the country continues to fracture along red and blue lines. Could we still unite in a time of war? It depends. If Russian paratroopers descended on Colorado like the 1984 cult classic Red Dawn, yes, I'm confident we'd come together and repel the existential threat of a foreign invasion. But am I convinced, in this toxic political climate, that farm boys from Kansas, warehouse workers from the Rust Belt, and college students from the Pac-12 would race to recruiting offices to help Taiwan repel a Chinese invasion? Or to deploy to the Middle East to dive into what looks like an intractable conflict with complicated roots dating back at least 75-years? Not really.It is also worth asking if America has the stomach for casualty numbers that would almost certainly dwarf the 7,057 U.S. servicemembers killed in action post-9/11 in a Great Power war. Russia continues to fight in Ukraine despite estimates of over 100,000 killed in just the past few years. We can't assume China wouldn't have a similar tolerance for heavy losses too.Despite these concerns, national security officials and foreign policy luminaries persist in advancing strategic postures that may require U.S. troops to deploy in greater numbers to three theaters (even if these deployments are under the guise of "deterrence") .
(While the principle of deterrence is sound in theory, the danger lies in assuming that appearing to be a superior force on paper will obviate the need to ever actually fight, overlooking the fact that credibility requires a willingness and capacity to do just that. Which brings us back to Sun Tzu. Can we answer the willingness and capacity question about ourselves with any degree of confidence? Have we ever taken it seriously?)Right now it seems like our strategy — to the extent we have one — is being developed in a vacuum, with little concern for minor details like who will fight, and with what degree of national commitment. This reflects, in part, a persistent tendency, to which we keep returning since the days of Robert McNamara's "Whiz Kids" of the Vietnam era, to view conflict as a technocratic exercise where victory and defeat are largely dependent on the amount, and quality, of sophisticated high-dollar weaponry. But as our experiences in Vietnam and Afghanistan should have taught us, collective will and resolve also matter. A lot. We must not overestimate (or fail to even consider) ours. Wars are still fought by people. And, to date, there has been no effort to secure the buy-in of the American public.We need to really ask: How many young Americans would volunteer to strap on a ruck, grab an M4, and go fight one of these distant wars if an adversary calls what they may see as a bluff? We must first accept that these would not be conflicts that could be handled by cobbling together the same people from a volunteer force and deploying them countless times over decades like we did during the "Global War on Terror." In fact, it is almost impossible to envision a scenario where our deterrent is credible, or where we could prevail in a world war, absent a draft.While a draft invokes images of Vietnam it may be time to revisit its upsides in the context of today's disconnect between citizen and military and citizen and government.At the most basic level, a draft would solve the personnel shortages we are struggling with. I'm aware that military leaders fear that a draft would hurt the professionalism of today's force. However, the lowering of recruiting requirements, as well offering big signing bonuses to impressionable high school students, is already diminishing standards. It would also serve as a powerful unifying force, bringing together young people of different races, belief systems, and geographic backgrounds in shared national service. This would help unify a generation that has experienced little but corrosive fragmentation for years. And since Americans would have skin in the game, a draft would also force politicians to abandon vapid, cliché-ridden rhetoric, and be forced to either convince Americans we need to be on wartime footing, or tone down their bellicose talk and develop creative and less militaristic strategies, starting with our approach to Ukraine, China, and now the Middle East.Finally, it would signal to the world that we are serious about a strong national defense. The perception would no longer be that we are a country in decline, anesthetized by popular culture and unwilling to sacrifice. Unfortunately, there seems to be no appetite for such a call to service on the part of the same leaders and pundits lobbying for a muscular, militarized foreign policy. It is remarkable to witness swaggering commitments to the potential use of force against Great Power adversaries on Capitol Hill but absolutely no willingness to discuss the national sacrifice that it would require. And so, if we conclude a draft won't happen, we'd be better off addressing the massive disconnect between Washington rhetoric and the extent of Americans' willingness to fight now, as opposed to after our leaders talk us into another, and possibly far more calamitous, war.

The development of Ukrainian defense industry technologies in response to Russian missile and drone attacks has led to the revival of Ukraine's defense technological and industrial base (DTIB) after decades of decline. It seems clear that Ukraine will have to rely on technology to withstand an aggressor with four times more draftable conscripts to call on. The United States would benefit economically and in the acquisition of advanced military technology by cooperating with Ukraine in joint defense industry ventures.The Boom in Armaments TechnologyIn 2023, the Ukrainian defense industry produced weapons and equipment worth $3 billion, adding 1.5 percent to the country's GDP growth. Over the past year, the largest state-owned industry holding, Ukrainian Defense Industry JSC, boosted its production by 92 percent, but it now lags behind local, privately owned defense enterprises, especially with respect to R&D. For example, nine out of ten long-range drone manufacturers are private players.Ukraine, with over 100 different drone models developed and customized locally for the military's needs by more than 200 Ukrainian manufacturers, greatly outperforms Russia in this arena. Ukraine's Sea Baby maritime drone, largely produced through private R&D, has already destroyed one-third of the Russian fleet in the Black Sea, forcing the remaining vessels out of Russia's naval base in Sevastopol. The need to increase weapons production has become increasingly urgent, however, as Putin boosts Russia's military production with additional budget allocations and mobilizes hundreds of thousands of new soldiers. These moves threaten not only Ukraine but also the EU and NATO—hence the United States.President Zelensky has proposed a target of one million drones produced annually by Ukraine, a figure barely feasible without considerably greater foreign capital investment in drone production. Sustaining the great number of arms variants and integrating these military technologies has become a challenge for the Ukrainian army. Proven success in such integration so far has made Ukraine the world center for the testing and practical application of modern weapons. Nonstop front-line data collection has aided Ukraine in becoming a global leader in technology development. The practical application of big data takes place in real time that otherwise would take years and tens of billions of dollars just to replicate the data sources needed for such R&D.Ukraine's weapon supply needs have also undergone changes. Whereas in early 2022, old Soviet-standard ammo, tanks, and artillery were employed to support Ukraine's defense, with a subsequent shift toward post-World War II stocks, today newly manufactured, modern NATO-standard weapons are arriving at the front.Can Localized Coproduction Be Achieved Quickly?Last year, cooperation in the defense sphere between Ukraine and the United States reached a new level. The White House announced it wanted Ukraine to be a partner in joint production and would provide the necessary technology transfers for military R&D and production.Sealing the deal, in December 2023 the United States and Ukraine signed a declaration on joint weapons manufacturing, including the production of hybrid air defense systems within the FrankenSAM program, which combines advanced Western technology and Soviet-era weapons stockpiles, with possible technology transfer for Ukraine. (An early test of the combined weapon system in January 2024 was successful.) A special tri-departmental interagency group, the Ukraine Deal Team, has begun operating. Its task is to work on potential deals and craft the U.S. response in respect to export requirements.Ukraine has a distinct presence in military technology and can quickly adapt to joint weapons production with American DTIB players, starting with licensed manufacturing and moving toward common R&D. Still, despite the deal looking favorable, some conflict risk mitigation protection is needed to stimulate such U.S. investment. Three ways of providing such protection are commonly discussed.1. Insurance of investments for defense industry enterprisesOne way to derisk cooperative DTIB investments is to provide investment insurance, but no existing programs covering DTIB military risk are available now. Conflict risk coverage needs to be created for U.S. DTIB investments. Such coverage could be formulated along the lines of the successful non-DTIB investment insurance developed several years ago by the U.S. International Development Finance Corporation, and the insurance programs developed by the World Bank's Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency. Both programs could be a model for the DTIB sector.2. New Lend-Lease DTIB equipment-targeted programThe U.S. Ukraine Democracy Defense Lend-Lease Act, passed on April 28, 2022, could have helped in this regard. Despite its advantages, however, it was not used by the U.S. administration in fiscal 2023 and was allowed to expire on September 30, 2023. The White House prefers other support programs for Ukraine, such as the Presidential Drawdown Authority (allowing the president to deliver services and equipment quickly from U.S. stocks), the IMF's Extended Fund Facility (which provides funds to support Ukraine economically), and the Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative, operating under the U.S. Department of Defense (which provides funds for training and equipment to build Ukraine's defense capacity).An alternative approach would be to revisit lend-lease arrangements to support commercial leasing of the equipment needed for weapons and ammunition production. This could be crucial to meeting the massive CAPEX needs (capital expenditures, used to acquire and maintain hard physical assets) for the joint ventures suggested above to ramp up production quickly in high volumes. The lend-lease mechanism proved successful during World War II. The difference now is that leasing can be provided on a paid basis for the private sector, avoiding the additional sovereign-country-risk liability burden for Ukraine.3. Diversified demand for long-term agreementsThe Ukrainian army's needs for modern weaponry and EU and NATO members' needs to replenish, modernize, and expand their own stockpiles will support such cross-border joint ventures with Ukrainian firms.Long-term off-take contracts both from Ukraine and allied states are also needed but will become practical only if military technology conflict insurance can be offered for investments. The intense local combat and probable future instability both in the region and globally means that demand for DTIB products will likely remain high for decades.Potential OutcomesDTIB is a long-term priority of the Ukrainian government. In the future, it should lead to the development of a more technologically competent workforce and experienced engineers. The country's high-tech military sector will develop quickly. It would also ensure that manufacturing in Ukraine through joint ventures would be cheaper, rewarding the United States well for its involvement. And the joint venture production would be a form of economic assistance that would reduce the need for direct U.S. support.All the ingredients are in place for U.S.-Ukraine coproduction now. Needed are some facilitators, such as DTIB conflict insurance, to get it rolling. Special legal protections and tax regimes for joint military technology projects would also encourage quick action. It's time to move forward on these projects.The opinions expressed in this article are those solely of the author and do not reflect the views of the Kennan Institute.

The development of Ukrainian defense industry technologies in response to Russian missile and drone attacks has led to the revival of Ukraine's defense technological and industrial base (DTIB) after decades of decline. It seems clear that Ukraine will have to rely on technology to withstand an aggressor with four times more draftable conscripts to call on. The United States would benefit economically and in the acquisition of advanced military technology by cooperating with Ukraine in joint defense industry ventures.The Boom in Armaments TechnologyIn 2023, the Ukrainian defense industry produced weapons and equipment worth $3 billion, adding 1.5 percent to the country's GDP growth. Over the past year, the largest state-owned industry holding, Ukrainian Defense Industry JSC, boosted its production by 92 percent, but it now lags behind local, privately owned defense enterprises, especially with respect to R&D. For example, nine out of ten long-range drone manufacturers are private players.Ukraine, with over 100 different drone models developed and customized locally for the military's needs by more than 200 Ukrainian manufacturers, greatly outperforms Russia in this arena. Ukraine's Sea Baby maritime drone, largely produced through private R&D, has already destroyed one-third of the Russian fleet in the Black Sea, forcing the remaining vessels out of Russia's naval base in Sevastopol. The need to increase weapons production has become increasingly urgent, however, as Putin boosts Russia's military production with additional budget allocations and mobilizes hundreds of thousands of new soldiers. These moves threaten not only Ukraine but also the EU and NATO—hence the United States.President Zelensky has proposed a target of one million drones produced annually by Ukraine, a figure barely feasible without considerably greater foreign capital investment in drone production. Sustaining the great number of arms variants and integrating these military technologies has become a challenge for the Ukrainian army. Proven success in such integration so far has made Ukraine the world center for the testing and practical application of modern weapons. Nonstop front-line data collection has aided Ukraine in becoming a global leader in technology development. The practical application of big data takes place in real time that otherwise would take years and tens of billions of dollars just to replicate the data sources needed for such R&D.Ukraine's weapon supply needs have also undergone changes. Whereas in early 2022, old Soviet-standard ammo, tanks, and artillery were employed to support Ukraine's defense, with a subsequent shift toward post-World War II stocks, today newly manufactured, modern NATO-standard weapons are arriving at the front.Can Localized Coproduction Be Achieved Quickly?Last year, cooperation in the defense sphere between Ukraine and the United States reached a new level. The White House announced it wanted Ukraine to be a partner in joint production and would provide the necessary technology transfers for military R&D and production.Sealing the deal, in December 2023 the United States and Ukraine signed a declaration on joint weapons manufacturing, including the production of hybrid air defense systems within the FrankenSAM program, which combines advanced Western technology and Soviet-era weapons stockpiles, with possible technology transfer for Ukraine. (An early test of the combined weapon system in January 2024 was successful.) A special tri-departmental interagency group, the Ukraine Deal Team, has begun operating. Its task is to work on potential deals and craft the U.S. response in respect to export requirements.Ukraine has a distinct presence in military technology and can quickly adapt to joint weapons production with American DTIB players, starting with licensed manufacturing and moving toward common R&D. Still, despite the deal looking favorable, some conflict risk mitigation protection is needed to stimulate such U.S. investment. Three ways of providing such protection are commonly discussed.1. Insurance of investments for defense industry enterprisesOne way to derisk cooperative DTIB investments is to provide investment insurance, but no existing programs covering DTIB military risk are available now. Conflict risk coverage needs to be created for U.S. DTIB investments. Such coverage could be formulated along the lines of the successful non-DTIB investment insurance developed several years ago by the U.S. International Development Finance Corporation, and the insurance programs developed by the World Bank's Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency. Both programs could be a model for the DTIB sector.2. New Lend-Lease DTIB equipment-targeted programThe U.S. Ukraine Democracy Defense Lend-Lease Act, passed on April 28, 2022, could have helped in this regard. Despite its advantages, however, it was not used by the U.S. administration in fiscal 2023 and was allowed to expire on September 30, 2023. The White House prefers other support programs for Ukraine, such as the Presidential Drawdown Authority (allowing the president to deliver services and equipment quickly from U.S. stocks), the IMF's Extended Fund Facility (which provides funds to support Ukraine economically), and the Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative, operating under the U.S. Department of Defense (which provides funds for training and equipment to build Ukraine's defense capacity).An alternative approach would be to revisit lend-lease arrangements to support commercial leasing of the equipment needed for weapons and ammunition production. This could be crucial to meeting the massive CAPEX needs (capital expenditures, used to acquire and maintain hard physical assets) for the joint ventures suggested above to ramp up production quickly in high volumes. The lend-lease mechanism proved successful during World War II. The difference now is that leasing can be provided on a paid basis for the private sector, avoiding the additional sovereign-country-risk liability burden for Ukraine.3. Diversified demand for long-term agreementsThe Ukrainian army's needs for modern weaponry and EU and NATO members' needs to replenish, modernize, and expand their own stockpiles will support such cross-border joint ventures with Ukrainian firms.Long-term off-take contracts both from Ukraine and allied states are also needed but will become practical only if military technology conflict insurance can be offered for investments. The intense local combat and probable future instability both in the region and globally means that demand for DTIB products will likely remain high for decades.Potential OutcomesDTIB is a long-term priority of the Ukrainian government. In the future, it should lead to the development of a more technologically competent workforce and experienced engineers. The country's high-tech military sector will develop quickly. It would also ensure that manufacturing in Ukraine through joint ventures would be cheaper, rewarding the United States well for its involvement. And the joint venture production would be a form of economic assistance that would reduce the need for direct U.S. support.All the ingredients are in place for U.S.-Ukraine coproduction now. Needed are some facilitators, such as DTIB conflict insurance, to get it rolling. Special legal protections and tax regimes for joint military technology projects would also encourage quick action. It's time to move forward on these projects.The opinions expressed in this article are those solely of the author and do not reflect the views of the Kennan Institute.

Since the start of U.S. involvement in the Russo-Ukrainian War, the Biden administration established a series of clear red lines intended to limit the war's escalation and avoid direct confrontation with Russia. However, at every juncture, President Biden has buckled in the face of outside pressure and crossed each of these lines. The last frontier he has yet to reach is putting U.S. service members on the ground in Ukraine, but unfortunately, we seem to be halfway there.Initially, the Biden administration was firm in its refusal to send certain military assistance to Ukraine. For instance, President Biden said early on in the war that the U.S. would not send American M1 Abrams tanks to Ukraine because they were too complex for Ukrainian troops to operate. But in January 2023, the Department of Defense announced it would be supplying the tanks to Ukraine after all.Following this shift, in May 2023, President Biden had another change of heart regarding F-16 fighter jets. For months, the president and senior U.S. officials opposed sending the aircraft to Ukraine, citing their sophistication and the need for pilots to have a strong command of English. Nevertheless, President Biden last year yielded to pressure from President Zelensky and European allies and authorized the transfer of dozens of warplanes from Western allies. The U.S. is currently training Ukrainian pilots.Similar reversals followed at every turn. Later, with the approval of cluster munitions, and then with long-range missiles, such as ATACMS. More recently, and even more alarming, the president's reversals have expanded to include significant policy red lines beyond weaponry. First, he permitted Ukraine to use U.S. weapons to strike targets in Russia's interior. This decision was a shocking escalatory move, which the president originally prohibited because it would get the U.S. more directly involved in the fight.Second, administration officials said the president is considering lifting the ban on U.S. military contractors in Ukraine. The importance of this decision should not be understated. Historically, this action is the opening move towards the eventual deployment of U.S. soldiers to a foreign conflict.There is no better example of this than our involvement in Vietnam. In the 1950s through the official beginning of the war, the initial American presence on the ground in Vietnam operated under the guise of civilian advisers. Their mission was to provide military aid and advice first to French colonial forces fighting the Viet Minh, then to the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) after the French left. While these U.S. personnel were not officially in a combat role, they were there to offer logistical and technical support, training, and intelligence assistance. This action eventually led to the deployment of U.S. service members. Our nation's involvement started in a limited, indirect capacity and then incrementally escalated over 20 years to include the deployment of combat forces in Vietnam. Is there any reason to believe that if he opts to put contractors inside Ukraine, President Biden won't at some point succumb to the pressure and barrel through the final red line by deploying U.S. service members to Ukraine? It would be a miscalculation to assume that Russia doesn't see this, and every other red-line crossing, as direct U.S. participation in the war. There is no more significant burden to bear in the White House than that of Commander-in-Chief. Yet, ours seems poised to blunder (perhaps willfully) into World War III. This seems especially true when paired with his administration's recent announcement of a 10-year bilateral security agreement with Ukraine.According to the White House, this agreement would deepen the security and defense cooperation between our two nations. Additionally, it aims to support Ukraine's economic recovery and accelerate its integration into the European Union and NATO. While this agreement also calls on the U.S. and Ukraine to work together to achieve a "just peace" — defined by the Biden administration as reestablishing Ukraine's "territorial integrity" — he has yet to provide Congress with a detailed strategy on how exactly he plans to accomplish this. It is no coincidence that such an agreement comes during an election year when President Biden's opponent has promised to negotiate a peace deal and conclude the war. Meanwhile, according to reports, NATO is expected to announce "a bridge to Ukraine's eventual membership in the NATO Alliance" at the NATO Summit in Washington, DC, this week. NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg is a core architect of the alliance's expansion. He expressed this exact sentiment out loud when recently visiting Kyiv: "Ukraine will become a member of NATO. The work we are undertaking now puts you on an irreversible path toward NATO membership, so that when the time is right, Ukraine can become a NATO member straightaway."In addition to this bilateral agreement with Ukraine, the Biden administration also decided to export consequential authority to NATO, whose defense ministers finalized a proposal in June to give the alliance greater control over security assistance to Ukraine's military. According to Ivo Daalder, a former American ambassador to NATO, "It's an effort at Trump-proofing" support for Ukraine. Because the mission is sponsored and controlled by NATO, it is designed to function even if former President Trump wins the election in the fall. A U.S. president ceding any leadership on a vital national security issue to a supranational organization should be a five-alarm fire in our mainstream media. Instead, it is met with raucous applause. These maneuvers taken by President Biden are meant to avoid accountability to the American public for escalations in the war, unconstitutionally circumvent Congress, and box in the next administration. Lastly, for a security guarantee to be worth the paper it's written on, a country must be willing to enforce the agreement with its military might. In this case, the signal seems clear: President Biden believes no cost is too great to achieve his desired outcome of reclaiming lost territory in Ukraine and integrating Ukraine into NATO. Does this include placing U.S. boots on the ground? The security guarantee does not prohibit such a measure. This is a dangerous agreement between Joe Biden and Volodymyr Zelensky. An actual agreement between nations is called a treaty. For that reason, I introduced the House companion to a resolution spearheaded by Senators Mike Lee and Rand Paul to clarify the hollow status of the administration's current agreement.If, for whatever reason, President Biden intends his agreement to bind future actions, then Congress must assert its authority and demand that the Senate ratify the Biden-Zelensky security scheme as a treaty. It's the only way to ensure President Biden doesn't stumble through his last red line.Congress holds the sole Constitutional authority to declare war, and America is not threatened by an imminent attack by Russia — yet. President Biden may be interested in escalating this war and giving up U.S. sovereignty to NATO, but the American people are not.