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Article 34 of the European Convention on Human Rights prescribes that individual applications must be directed against one of the Convention States. Consequently, private actors involved in proceedings against other private actors before domestic courts must complain about State (in)action in their application to the European Court of Human Rights. In other words, originally 'horizontal' conflicts must be 'verticalised' in order to be admissible. Although such verticalised cases make up a large portion of the Court's case law, the particular nature of these cases, as well as procedural issues that may arise in them, has not received much attention. To fill this gap, this book offers a detailed examination of verticalised cases coming before the Court. The characteristics of and the Court's approach to verticalised cases are explored by means of an in-depth analysis of four types of verticalised cases (cases related to one's surroundings; cases involving a conflict between the right to reputation and private life and the right to freedom of expression; family life cases; and employer-employee cases). On the basis of this analysis, it is argued that the Court's current approach to verticalised cases poses problems for private actors, Convention States and the Court itself. In presenting recommendations for the resolution of these problems, the book concludes with a proposal for a new approach to verticalised cases, consisting of a redesigned third-party intervention procedure.

Cover -- Half-title -- Title page -- Imprints page -- Dedication -- Contents -- Table of International Cases -- Table of International Instruments -- Introduction -- 1 Parenthood Aspirations and Justiciable Rights -- 1.1 Reproductive Technologies, Bioethics and the Rise of New Human Rights Claims -- 1.2 Reproductive Freedom between Negative and Positive Obligations -- 1.2.1 Classic Negative Obligations in Relation to Natural Procreative Capacity -- 1.2.2 Medically Assisted Procreation: Interferences or Lacunae? -- 2 A Right to a Genetically Related Child? -- 2.1 The Right to Medically Assisted Procreation and to Control over One's Genetic Material -- 2.1.1 Respect for the Decision to Become a Parent and Make Use of ART -- 2.1.2 Gamete Providers' Right to Use Their Embryos for Reproductive Purposes -- 2.1.3 The Right to Decide the Fate of Embryos No Longer Intended for a Pregnancy -- 2.2 Gamete Donation: Reconciling Genetic Parenthood and Free Choice of Partner -- 2.3 Posthumous Parenthood: Deferred Procreation and Respect for Privacy beyond Death -- 2.3.1 Posthumous Conception and Reproductive Testaments -- 2.3.2 Use of a Deceased Child's Cryopreserved Gametes to Become a Grandparent -- 2.4 Recognition of Legal Ties Following Overseas Surrogacy Arrangements: Respect for Biological Parentage -- 2.5 Concluding Remarks -- 3 A Right to the Recognition of Intentional Parenthood? -- 3.1 Parenthood Claims in Third-Party Reproduction -- 3.2 Protecting Intention-Based (Non-biological) Parenthood in Donor Cases -- 3.2.1 Issues Raised by Gamete Donation -- 3.2.2 Issues Raised by Embryo Donation -- 3.3 Non-biological Commissioning Parents in Surrogacy Arrangements -- 3.3.1 The Non-biological Parent Married to the Biological Parent: Parasitic Rights -- 3.3.2 Intentional Parenthood Where Neither Commissioning Parent Is Genetically Related to the Child.

"The primary purpose of this book is to demonstrate the scope that already exists for using international human rights law in English courts, regardless of its status as 'incorporated' or 'unincorporated'. Murray Hunt addresses directly what are commonly supposed to be the theoretical obstacles to using human rights law in English courts and aims to raise awareness of the extent to which these have now fallen away in light of recent developments in English judicial practice. The book was first published in hardback in March 1997"--Bloomsbury Publishing

International Human Rights Courts (IHRCts), such as the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), have come under increasing criticism as being incompatible with domestic judicial and legislative mechanisms for upholding rights. These domestic instruments are said to possess greater democratic legitimacy than international instruments do or could do. Within the UK this critique has led some prominent judges and politicians to propose withdrawing from the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). Legal cosmopolitans respond by denying the validity of this democratic critique. By contrast this article argues that such criticisms are defensible from a political constitutionalist perspective but that International Human Rights Conventions (IHRCs) can nevertheless be understood in ways that meet them. To do so, IHRC must be conceived as legislated for and controlled by an international association of democratic states, which authorizes IHRCts and holds them accountable, limiting them to 'weak review'. The resulting model of IHRC is that of a 'two level' political constitution. The ECHR is shown to largely accord with this model, which is argued to be both more plausible and desirable than a legal cosmopolitan model that sidelines democracy and advocates 'strong' review.

Abstract
This paper integrates the scholarship on compliance with international human rights courts to reflect upon how the literature approaches delays and compliance cycles. Building on this review, we propose a new analytical approach that helps distinguish between reparations prone to immediate or protracted implementation. We introduce two metrics to facilitate the interpretation of delays: the yearly probability of compliance and the expected time to compliance. We also show, using machine-learning tools, how scholars can reconstruct life cycles of compliance. The article illustrates the utility of this approach with an analysis of all cases decided by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACtHR) between 1989 and 2019. This analytical framework provides critical insights for courts and activists seeking to promote interventions at key moments when compliance is most likely. Moreover, the study underscores important lessons for the Inter-American Human Rights System. Current concerns about a compliance "crisis" at the IACtHR partly reflect a failure to distinguish between reparation types and the Court's preference for reparations requiring protracted implementation. By modeling compliance life cycles, our study opens a promising research avenue that can facilitate effectual and timely policy intervention.

Abstract
This article offers the first comprehensive mapping of the place of international human rights law (IHRL) in Israeli case law. It explores how Israeli courts use IHRL, based on quantitative and qualitative content analysis of all decisions, in all courts, referring to IHRL between 1990 and 2019. It reveals that Israeli courts mobilize IHRL predominantly with respect to children's rights and due process, seldom invoking IHRL in relation to ethnic and gender equality. It further shows that a significant portion of references to IHRL serve to justify state action. We discuss possible explanations for these patterns of use of IHRL and argue that, overall, these findings illustrate the paradox of IHRL being amenable to uses that are both emancipatory and protective of power.

This article examines treaty interpretation based on consensus, or the idea that legal or political practice that is not directly related to a treaty can be used in interpreting it, or at least in granting more discretion to States Parties. The practice of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, contrasted with the well-settled practice of the European Court of Human Rights, reveals that consensus interpretation plays an important role in entrenching the legitimacy of international human rights courts. The Inter-American Court's practice seems to rely on consensus when it supports a progressive, teleological interpretation of human rights. The article argues that this selective engagement eliminates the legitimacy-building possibilities of the consensus method of interpretation, but that the Inter-American Court, in seeking legitimacy not from States Parties, but other stakeholders, does not seem particularly concerned with legitimacy costs (even if it probably should). ; Not peer reviewed