Strategic arms negotiations
In: Nato's sixteen nations: independent review of economic, political and military power, Band 29, Heft 8, S. 26-33
ISSN: 0169-1821
1940 Ergebnisse
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In: Nato's sixteen nations: independent review of economic, political and military power, Band 29, Heft 8, S. 26-33
ISSN: 0169-1821
World Affairs Online
In: Current history: a journal of contemporary world affairs, Band 88, Heft 541, S. 369-372
ISSN: 1944-785X
In: Current history: a journal of contemporary world affairs, Band 88, Heft 541, S. 369-372,398-399
ISSN: 0011-3530
World Affairs Online
In: Arms control: the journal of arms control and disarmament, Band 12, Heft 1, S. 82
ISSN: 0144-0381
In: Arms Control, Band 12, Heft 1, S. 82-93
In: New York University journal of international law & politics, Band 16, Heft 4, S. 655
ISSN: 0028-7873
In: Foreign affairs: an American quarterly review, Band 61, Heft 5, S. 1157
ISSN: 2327-7793
In: Foreign affairs, Band 61, Heft 5, S. 1157-1182
ISSN: 0015-7120
World Affairs Online
In: International interactions: empirical and theoretical research in international relations, Band 41, Heft 5, S. 832-856
ISSN: 0305-0629
Why do some states agree to suspend their weapons programs in exchange for compensation while others fail to come to terms? I argue that the changing credibility of preventive war is an important determinant of arms construction. If preventive war is never an option, states can reach mutually preferable settlements. However, if preventive war is not credible today but will be credible in the future, a commitment problem results: the state considering investment faces a "window of opportunity" and must build the arms or it will not receive concessions later on. Thus, agreements fail under these conditions. I then apply the theoretical findings to the Soviet Union's decision to build nuclear weapons in 1949. War exhaustion made preventive war not credible for the United States immediately following World War II, but lingering concerns about future preventive action induced Moscow to proliferate. (International Interactions (London)/ FUB)
World Affairs Online
In: International interactions: empirical and theoretical research in international relations, Band 41, Heft 5, S. 832-856
ISSN: 1547-7444
In: Bulletin of peace proposals: to motivate research, to inspire future oriented thinking, to promote activities for peace, Band 16, Heft 2, S. 87-97
ISSN: 2516-9181
In: Bulletin of peace proposals: to motivate research, to inspire future oriented thinking, to promote activities for peace, Band 16, Heft 2, S. 87-97
ISSN: 0007-5035
World Affairs Online
In: Contemporary economic policy: a journal of Western Economic Association International, Band 4, Heft 4, S. 22-37
ISSN: 1465-7287
It is widely assumed that weak economic performance in the Soviet Union provides motivation for Soviet leaders to pursue arms negotiations in good faith. This paper argues that the reality is quite the opposite. For both political and economic considerations, the weak economy of the Soviet Union generates incentives for the Soviets to use arms control negotiations to achieve military advantages rather than to limit arms.
In: International negotiation: a journal of theory and practice, Band 22, Heft 1, S. 162-180
ISSN: 1571-8069
Theorists debate whether symmetry or asymmetry of the power balance can help bring about bargaining success. Arbitration is difficult because the 'Symmetry Theory' accepts Structuralist theoretical conventions, while the 'Asymmetry Theory' rejects such conventions. This article employs a 'Nuclear Weapons Addendum' to strengthen the Asymmetry Theory by allowing it to explain bargaining results in symmetric and asymmetric cases without dismissing Structuralist assumptions. We analyze comparative case studies of the Cuban Missile Crisis and the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty to argue that this modified Asymmetry Theory provides a more convincing narrative that should be considered in Structuralist discussions of international negotiation.
In: Arms control: the journal of arms control and disarmament, Band 7, Heft 2, S. 133-155
ISSN: 0144-0381
IF YOU CONSIDER WHY WE HAVE AN ARMS RACE AND WHY NEGOTIATIONS OVER ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT FAIL, YOU CAN TRACE THE TROUBLE TO ONE PRECEPT OF STRATEGY THAT IS COMMONLY ACCEPTED WITHOUT QUESTION: THAT THE WAY TO KEEP THE PEACE IS TO MAINTAIN A MILITARY BALANCE VIS-A-VIS YOUR POTENTIAL OPPONENT. THERE FOLLOWS FROM IT THE BELIEF THAT THE WAY TO IMPROVE STABILITY AND TO CHECK THE ARMS RACE IS TO SEEK BALANCED CONSTRAINTS ON ARMS BY NEGOTIATION. THIS PAPER EXAMINES THESE BELIEFS, WHAT IS WRONG WITH THEM AND WHAT SHOULD BE PUT IN THEIR PLACE. THE CONCLUSION REACHED IS THAT IF THE POLITICAL AIM IS THE PRESERVATION OF PEACE, THE APPROPRIATE STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE SHOULD BE, NOT BALANCE, BUT 'SUFFICIENCY' IN NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND 'DEFENSIVE SUPERIORITY' IN NON-NUCLEAR FORCES, TWO CONCEPTS THAT ARE DEVELOPED IN THE ANALYSIS. THE WAY TO ACHIEVE THESE AIMS AND EASE THE ARMS RACE IS BY INDEPENDENT CHANGES IN STRATEGY. CONSULTATION AND DEBATE WITH YOUR OPPONENT TO PERSUADE HIM THAT HE TOO SHOULD CHANGE STRATEGY MAY HELP TO IMPROVE SECURITY AND EASE THE LEVEL OF ARMS. NEGOTIATION OF CONDITIONAL CHANGES CAN BE COUNTER-PRODUCTIVE AND IS APPROPRIATE ONLY IN SPECIAL CIRCUMSTANCES. A BASIC PRINCIPLE ARRIVED AT IS THIS: IF THERE IS A CHANGE IN THE LEVEL OR CHARACTER OF YOUR FORCES THAT WOULD HELP YOU ATTAIN NUCLEAR SUFFICIENCY OR NON-NUCLEAR DEFENSIVE SUPERIORITY, REGARDLESS OF WHETHER YOUR OPPONENT MADE A SIMILAR MOVE, THERE ARE NO GROUNDS FOR SEEKING RECIPROCITY THROUGH NEGOTIATION. IT WILL PY: 1986