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The circumstances of the author's discovery of the median voter theorem and the steps which led from there to his Theory of Committees and Elections are set out. His theory is presented in the form of the `statistical thesis' that the best choice procedure selects the option which `on average' is highest on the committee members' schedules. As there is more than one concept of average, so there is more than one acceptable committee procedure. The author's way of proceeding is compared and contrasted with Arrow's.

This paradox of voting in Arrow's theorem has hardly any application to voting in the real world. Arrow, in introducing his theorem, says specifically that it does not apply in those cases in which individuals do not vote according to their elementary preferences, but accept payment of some sort to vote against them. Since log-rolling is usual in most democratic legislatures, the theorem does not apply.

THE PARADOX OF VOTING PRESENTED IN ARROW'S THEOREM HAS HARDLY ANY APPLICATION TO VOTING IN THE REAL WORLD. IN INTRODUCING HIS THEOREM, ARROW SAYS SPECIFICALLY THAT IT DOES NOT APPLY IN THOSE CASES IN WHICH INDIVIDUALS DO NOT VOTE ACCORDING TO THEIR ELEMENTARY PREFERENCES BUT ACCEPT PAYMENT OF SOME SORT TO VOTE AGAINST THEIR TRUE INCLINATIONS. SINCE LOG-ROLLING IS COMMON IN MOST DEMOCRATIC LEGISLATURES, THE THEOREM DOES NOT APPLY.

Abstract. In this note we study different methods of aggregation of preferences met on the occasion of elections. Through a simple geometrical representation, we analyse several of their properties, in particular those linked to Arrow's theorem for ordinal rankings; we pursue this discussion in the case of cardinal rankings, the qualities of which convince us of the usefulness of experiencing their introduction in real ballots.

IN THIS NOTE THE AUTHORS STUDY DIFFERENT METHODS OF AGGREGATION OF PREFERENCES MET ON THE OCCASION OF ELECTIONS. THROUGH A SIMPLE GEOMETRICAL REPRESENTATION, THEY ANALYSE SEVERAL OF THEIR PROPERTIES, IN PARTICULAR THOSE LINKED TO ARROW'S THEOREM FOR ORDINAL RANKINGS; THEY PURSUE THIS DISCUSSION IN THE CASE OF CARDINAL RANKINGS, THE QUALITIES OF WHICH CONVINCE US OF THE USEFULNESS OF EXPERIENCING THEIR INTRODUCTION IN REAL BALLOTS.

The concept of the General Will has been criticized as being either tyrannical or empirically unattainable. From a social choice perspective, Riker (1982) and others have merged the substance of both perspectives. The new argument maintains that Arrow's Theorem and similar impossibility results imply that the General Will is both dangerous and "intellectually absurd." While not denying the relevance of the collective choice literature, it is argued that such apocalyptic conclusions are premature.

This paper analyzes the implications of social choice theory for the study of world politics. A view of the world system as a social choice mechanism leads to the observation that the outcomes of world politics are determined neither by structure nor by preferences alone, but rather by their interaction. Structural change occurs only when the actors cannot achieve their preferences through the current system. Three particular social choice mechanisms are analyzed to determine which conditions of Arrow's theorem they violate. The argument is illustrated by examining two salient theoretical works, Waltz's Theory of International Politics and Gilpin's War and Change in World Politics. The critique of Waltz illustrates that structure alone cannot determine outcome; the critique of Gilpin examines how structural change occurs in world politics and underlines the importance of preferences in such changes.

Arrow's Impossibility Theorem is concerned with the problem of finding a collective choice rule which selects one or more alternatives from every non emplty subset of the universal set of alternatives.

Intro -- Social Choice Theory -- Copyright -- Table of Contents -- Guide to Chapter Dependencies -- To the Student -- Acknowledgements -- Chapter 0. What is Social Choice Theory? -- Chapter 1. Simple Majority Voting -- Chapter 2. The Voting Paradox -- Chapter 3. Single-Peakedness -- Chapter 4. Chaos -- Chapter 5. Other Voting Extensions -- Chapter 6. Social Choice Rules -- Chapter 7. Arrow's Impossibility Theorem -- Chapter 8. Power -- Chapter 9. Rights -- Chapter 10. Strategy-Proofness -- Chapter 11. Counterthreats -- Chapter 12. Approval Voting -- Chapter 13. Mistakes -- Mathematical Appendix -- Answers and Hints to Selected Exercises -- Subject Index.

I / Philosophy and Logic -- On Some Limits and Resources of Common-Sense Psychology -- Probability and Proportions -- Why Substitutional Quantification Does Not Express Existence -- II / Methodology of Social Sciences -- Ideology and Science -- Some Imperfections in the Scientific Communication System and a Possible Remedy -- Value-Free vs. Value-Conscious Social Sciences -- III / Economics and Social Issues -- Public Bads and Socio-Moral Reasoning: The Case of the New Social Movements in Germany -- The Impact of Computers on Job Opportunities: An Analysis of Employment Trends, 1972–1982 -- Insurance without Utility Theory -- IV / Game and Decision Theory -- Three Theorems on the Theory of Cardinal Utility and Random Choice -- Chairman Paradoxes under Approval Voting -- Some Recent Developments in Game Theory -- Foundations of Preference -- What Does Arrow's Impossibility Theorem Tell Us? -- Choice Processes, Computability and Complexity: Computable Choice Functions -- Curriculum Vitae Werner Leinfellner -- Werner Leinfellner:Selected Bibliograph -- Index of Names -- Index of Subjects.

Cover -- Title -- Copyright -- Dedication -- contents -- preface -- chapter one: An overview -- 1.1. The basic categories: Actors, behavior, institutions, and equilibrium -- 1.2. The purpose of microeconomic theory -- 1.3. Scope, detail, emphasis, and complexity -- 1.4. A précis of the plot -- part I: Individual and social choice -- chapter two: The theory of consumer choice and demand -- Prologue to part I -- 2.1. Preferences and choices -- 2.2. Marshallian demand without derivatives -- 2.3. Marshallian demand with derivatives -- 2.4. Aggregate demand -- 2.5. Bibliographic notes -- 2.6. Problems -- chapter three: Choice under uncertainty -- 3.1. Von Neumann-Morgenstern expected utility -- 3.2. On utility for money -- 3.3. Applications to market demand -- 3.4. States of nature and subjective probability -- 3.5. Problems with these models -- 3.6. Normative applications of the theory -- 3.7. Bibliographic notes -- 3.8. Problems -- chapter four: Dynamic choice -- 4.1. Optimal dynamic strategies -- 4.2. Menus and meals -- 4.3. Bibliographic notes and discussion -- 4.4. Problems -- chapter five: Social choice and efficiency -- 5.1. The problem -- 5.2. Pareto efficiency and optimality: Definitions -- 5.3. Benevolent social dictators and social welfare functionals -- 5.4. Characterizing efficient social outcomes -- 5.5. Social choice rules and Arrow's possibility theorem -- 5.6. Bibliographic notes -- 5.7. Problems -- part II: The price mechanism -- chapter six: Pure exchange and general equilibrium -- Prologue to part II -- 6.1. Pure exchange and price equilibrium -- 6.2. Why (not) believe in Walrasian equilibrium? -- 6.3. The efficiency of a general equilibrium -- 6.4. Existence and the number of equilibria -- 6.5. Time, uncertainty, and general equilibrium -- 6.6. Bibliographic notes -- 6.7. Problems -- chapter seven: The neoclassical firm.