Arrow's Theorem
In: Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics
"Arrow's Theorem" published on by Oxford University Press.
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In: Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics
"Arrow's Theorem" published on by Oxford University Press.
In: Synthese: an international journal for epistemology, methodology and philosophy of science, Band 191, Heft 8, S. 1847-1856
ISSN: 1573-0964
In: British journal of political science, Band 46, Heft 1, S. 1-9
ISSN: 1469-2112
Arrow's Impossibility Theorem and Sen's Minimal Liberalism example impose 'impossibility' roadblocks on progress. A reinterpretation explained in this article exposes what causes these negative conclusions, which permits the development of positive resolutions that retain the spirit of Arrow's and Sen's assumptions. What precipitates difficulties is surprisingly common, and it affects most disciplines. This insight identifies how to analyze other puzzles such as conflicting laws or controversies over voting rules. An unexpected bonus is that this social science issue defines a research agenda to address the 'dark matter' mystery confronting astronomers.
In: British journal of political science, Band 46, Heft 1, S. 1
ISSN: 0007-1234
In: Public choice, Band 179, Heft 1-2, S. 113-124
ISSN: 1573-7101
SSRN
Working paper
In: Public Choice
Riker (Liberalism against populism, Waveland, New York, 1982) famously argued that Arrow's impossibility theorem undermined the logical foundations of "populism", the view that in a democracy, laws and policies ought to express "the will of the people". In response, his critics have questioned the use of Arrow's theorem on the grounds that not all configurations of preferences are likely to occur in practice; the critics allege, in particular, that majority preference cycles, whose possibility the theorem exploits, rarely happen. In this essay, I argue that the critics' rejoinder to Riker misses the mark even if its factual claim about preferences is correct: Arrow's theorem and related results threaten the populist's principle of democratic legitimacy even if majority preference cycles never occur. In this particular context, the assumption of an unrestricted domain is justified irrespective of the preferences citizens are likely to have.
In: Journal of risk and uncertainty, Band 47, Heft 2, S. 147-163
ISSN: 1573-0476
In: Public choice, Band 179, Heft 1-2, S. 97-111
ISSN: 1573-7101
In: The B.E. journal of theoretical economics, Band 21, Heft 1, S. 347-354
ISSN: 1935-1704
Abstract
Arrow (1950) famously showed the impossibility of aggregating individual preference orders into a social preference order (together with basic desiderata). This paper shows that it is possible to aggregate individual choice functions, that satisfy almost any condition weaker than WARP, into a social choice function that satisfy the same condition (and also Arrow's desiderata).
In: Mathematical social sciences, Band 94, S. 58-64
In: Kenneth J. Arrow Lecture Series
Kenneth Arrow's pathbreaking ?impossibility theorem" was a watershed in the history of welfare economics, voting theory, and collective choice, demonstrating that there is no voting rule that satisfies the four desirable axioms of decisiveness, consensus, nondictatorship, and independence. In this book, Amartya Sen and Eric Maskin explore the implications of Arrow's theorem. Sen considers its ongoing utility, exploring the theorem's value and limitations in relation to recent research on social reasoning, while Maskin discusses how to design a voting rule that gets us closer to the ideal?given
These are the sheets of a presentation on June 8 2018, at the conference of Dutch and Flemish political science. These sheets give an overview, and see "Voting Theory for Democracy" (VTFD) for precision. Arrow's theorem is that four axioms would be reasonable and morally required each by themselves, but together they result into a contradiction. The deduction stands but the interpretation can be rejected. Arrow confuses voting and deciding. The axiom of "pairwise decision making" can be rejected - and Arrow's label "independence of irrelevant alternatives" is distractive. A method that many would find interesting is Borda Fixed Point. ; This is an update of the sheets of my presentation on March 16 2001 for the Social Choice group in Tilburg, The Politicologenetmaal 2018 has this link: https://politicologenetmaal.eu See Voting Theory for Democracy at https://zenodo.org/record/291985
BASE
In: Public choice, Band 179, Heft 1-2, S. 125-131
ISSN: 1573-7101
SSRN