Arrow's theorem and theory choice
In: Synthese: an international journal for epistemology, methodology and philosophy of science, Band 191, Heft 8, S. 1847-1856
ISSN: 1573-0964
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In: Synthese: an international journal for epistemology, methodology and philosophy of science, Band 191, Heft 8, S. 1847-1856
ISSN: 1573-0964
In: Economica, Band 38, Heft 152, S. 413
In: Behavioral science, Band 32, Heft 4, S. 267-273
In: British journal of political science, Band 46, Heft 1, S. 1-9
ISSN: 1469-2112
Arrow's Impossibility Theorem and Sen's Minimal Liberalism example impose 'impossibility' roadblocks on progress. A reinterpretation explained in this article exposes what causes these negative conclusions, which permits the development of positive resolutions that retain the spirit of Arrow's and Sen's assumptions. What precipitates difficulties is surprisingly common, and it affects most disciplines. This insight identifies how to analyze other puzzles such as conflicting laws or controversies over voting rules. An unexpected bonus is that this social science issue defines a research agenda to address the 'dark matter' mystery confronting astronomers.
In: British journal of political science, Band 46, Heft 1, S. 1
ISSN: 0007-1234
In: Public choice, Band 42, Heft 3, S. 235-246
ISSN: 1573-7101
In: Public choice, Band 42, Heft 3, S. 235
ISSN: 0048-5829
In: Public choice, Band 179, Heft 1-2, S. 113-124
ISSN: 1573-7101
In: Mathematical social sciences, Band 3, Heft 1, S. 79-89
In: The Economic Journal, Band 91, Heft 361, S. 262
In: 47 Stan. L. Rev. 295 (1994-1995)
SSRN
In: Mathematical social sciences, Band 16, Heft 1, S. 41-48
SSRN
Working paper
In: Public Choice
Riker (Liberalism against populism, Waveland, New York, 1982) famously argued that Arrow's impossibility theorem undermined the logical foundations of "populism", the view that in a democracy, laws and policies ought to express "the will of the people". In response, his critics have questioned the use of Arrow's theorem on the grounds that not all configurations of preferences are likely to occur in practice; the critics allege, in particular, that majority preference cycles, whose possibility the theorem exploits, rarely happen. In this essay, I argue that the critics' rejoinder to Riker misses the mark even if its factual claim about preferences is correct: Arrow's theorem and related results threaten the populist's principle of democratic legitimacy even if majority preference cycles never occur. In this particular context, the assumption of an unrestricted domain is justified irrespective of the preferences citizens are likely to have.
In: Journal of risk and uncertainty, Band 47, Heft 2, S. 147-163
ISSN: 1573-0476