Suchergebnisse

Les auteurs démontrent que la critique du caractère artificiel de l'approche expéri‐mentale en sociologie est fondée sur une fausse compréhension des buts de ce type de recherche. A la lumière des objectifs de la recherche expérimentale, l'article examine sous tous ses angles l'objection de ≪ l'artificialité≫. L'avancé fondamental repose sur le fait que le laboratoire est un cadre d'observation parmi plusieurs autres ou la theorie abstraite peut etre mise à l'epreuve empiriquement. Les avantages et désavantages que ce cadre comporte sont reliés à l'objectif de l'en‐quete. On discute les consequences qui découlent de cette prise de position.The criticism that sociological laboratory experiments are artificial, we argue, is based upon a misunderstanding of the purposes of this type of research. This paper is an examination of the "artificiality objection," in terms of the goals of experimental research. The basic point is that the laboratory is one setting among many in which abstract theory may be tested empirically, and that the advantages and disadvantages of the setting are dependent upon the goal of research. Some consequences of this position are discussed.

A series of recent debates in experimental economics have associated demand effects with the artificiality of the experimental setting and have linked it to the problem of external validity. In this paper, we argue that these associations can be misleading, partly because of the ambiguity with which "artificiality" has been defined, but also because demand effects and external validity are related in complex ways. We argue that artificiality (understood as unfamiliarity of the experimental environment) may be directly as well as inversely correlated with demand effects. We also distinguish between the demand effects of experimentation and the reactions that they may trigger and that might endanger experimental validity. We conclude that economists should pay more attention to the way in which subjects construe the experimental task and learn to exploit subjects' reactivity to expectations in their experiments.

Both Chinese and Western philosophers have argued for the ethical importance of manners. Their approaches are sometimes criticized on the grounds that manners are artificial. I compare Xunzi's and Kant's responses to this claim, and discuss the relevance of both positions for the development of a theory of manners. I show that there is no single artificiality claim, but rather four different claims: the claim that polite behavior lacks spontaneity, the claim that it is insincere, the claim that it goes against human nature, and the claim that it is arbitrary. While Kant is mainly concerned with the insincerity claim, Xunzi focusses on the claim that manners are arbitrary rules. Because of their different understandings of the function of manners both authors only provide a partial answer to the artificiality claim. To arrive at a full account of manners both perspectives must be combined.

A series of recent debates in experimental economics have associated demand effects with the artificiality of the experimental setting and have linked it to the problem of external validity. In this paper, we argue that these associations can be misleading, partly because of the ambiguity with which "artificiality" has been defined, but also because demand effects and external validity are related in complex ways. We argue that artificiality (understood as unfamiliarity of the experimental environment) may be directly as well as inversely correlated with demand effects. We also distinguish between the demand effects of experimentation and the reactions that they may trigger and that might endanger experimental validity. We conclude that economists should pay more attention to the way in which subjects construe the experimental task and learn to exploit subjects' reactivity to expectations in their experiments

[F]ocusing on the supposed consequences of Iraq's artificial foundations diverts our attention from the real issues—cumulative or immediate—that continue to destabilize the country.

Despite advocating for the necessity of absolutism, Hobbes is adamant that authority can only properly be derived from an act of human artifice and consent. But if the institution of sovereignty is subject to genuine choice, how can it be necessarily absolutist? I argue that one way of resolving this apparent dilemma is to focus on how Hobbes constructs and defends his own claim to authority in the Introduction to Leviathan. By encouraging his readers to read themselves and others, rather than rely on books, Hobbes ironically calls into question his own authority at the outset of his own book. But rather than subverting his claim to authority, it only strengthens it. After examining how this seemingly paradoxical tactic works, I demonstrate how an analogous claim applies to Hobbes's account of politics.

This book makes visible the hidden relations between things and individuals through a discussion of creative processes and cultural practices. It engages with fascinating Italian life and culture are filled with objects that cross, accompany, facilitate or disrupt experience, desires, and dreams. Yet in spite of their ubiquity, theoretical engagement in the Italian context is still underdeveloped. Paolo Bartoloni investigates four typologies-the fictional, migrant, multicultural/transnational, and the artificial-to hypothesize that the ability to treat things as partners of emotional and creative expression creates a sense of identity predicated on inclusivity, openness, care, and attention

This open access edited volume explores the past, present, and future of artificiality and sustainability in entrepreneurship – the unforeseen consequences and ways to advance to a sustainable future. In particular, it connects artificiality, sustainability and entrepreneurship, intertwining artificial with the specific phenomenon of those novel digital technologies that provoke continuous and significant change in our lives and business. Unlike digital entrepreneurship research, which focuses on digital technology development and management, this book covers processes and mechanisms of sustainable adaptability of entrepreneurs, the business logic of start-ups, and the collaborative behaviours under the mass digital transformation, including the prevalence of artificial intelligence. Some of the questions that this book answers are as follows: How has entrepreneurship reacted to such challenges previously? What lessons have been learned and need to be carried forward? How can entrepreneurship and the artefacts of entrepreneurship respond to current challenges? What should be the mindset of the entrepreneur to assure sustainable adaptation? How to embrace and embed the new business logic?

Abstract
The film Bicentennial Man (1999) pictured in a nutshell a robot who/that became human via his personality by plunging into the realities of freedom and death. The aim of this paper is to reflect on the notion of personality in the case of what this paper coins as a 'robot-incarnate' with the name Andrew, the first man who lived for two hundred years from his inception as an artificial machine. The method of exposition proceeds from (1) utilizing a philosophical reflection on the film concerning the determinacy of Andrew as a person and (2) then anchoring his case as a subject for the understanding of machine ethics. Regarding the first, the paper focuses on the questions of personality, death, and freedom. Regarding the second, the paper exposes the discussions of machine ethics and the issue of moral agency. Deducing from the already existing literature on the matter, the paper concludes that machine ethics must stand as the principle that serves as law and limitation to any scientific machine advancement showing promising potentials.