After the sharp conflicts between the government & the medical unions in 1964, concerning health insurance reform involving an `agreement system' for medical fees & repayments by the health insurance funds--a form of bargaining economy has developed in Belgian health care, with sick funds & medical unions as the major parties. This 'Pax Medica' appears to be threatened by a series of financially motivated government measures aimed at reducing the medical associations' professional autonomy & dominance. The historical context, the parties involved, & the development of this conflict are discussed. A striking analogy with the 1964 conflict is pointed out, particularly regarding union strategy. The present state of affairs does not suggest a threat to the 'Pax Medica,' but rather a stabilization of the established power relationship between government, sick funds, & medical unions, which will respect the rules of democratic compromise. Such a conflictual situation helps in making various aspects of the overall situation more perceptible. The scene is dominated by two groups of organizations: medical unions & the sick funds. They function on the background of _a market economy that is accepted by both. Hence, fundamental social changes in the area of medicine are unlikely. Modified HA.
In: Acta politica: AP ; international journal of political science ; official journal of the Dutch Political Science Association (Nederlandse Kring voor Wetenschap der Politiek), Band 22, Heft 4, S. 385-407
A theoretical analysis of the problem of conflict between states or alliances, founded on the Nash theory of bargaining & cooperative games (Nash, J. F., "The Bargaining Problem," Econometrica, 1950, 18, 155-162). Assumptions that must be met to make the use of this theory possible are elucidated. Given these assumptions, precise meanings can be given to such concepts as "dominance" & "strategic equilibrium." Such game-theoretical understanding provides an alternative to warfare as a means of gaining knowledge of relative military strength, thus making unnecessary the Clausewitzian process of repeated warfare. A two-step process -- a stage of strategic rivalry, & a cooperative phase -- leads to attainment of an ideal final agreement for both sides. An application to the global East/West matrix from 1970 to 1987 is presented, & means of applying game-theoretical methods realistically to international relations are proposed. 7 Tables, 3 Figures. Modified HA