Post-cold war concept of security is based on realistic postulates and emphasises a concept of state, forces,power and national interests. Military and political concept of security was dominant while the relations between the superpowers was based on the so called bipolar balance of power. Identity of states was realised by membership in military, political and economic organisations. The strategy of returning to the era of nuclear weapons reaches its full flowering. The crucial point of security after the end of Cold war consists of searching for giving answers to the threats coming from the outside and abilities of states to maintain their independent integrity against changed relations among the powers, which potentially may become enemies. Under such circumstances powers should not be ignored in any interpretation of any aspect of security, for realistic theories of international relations are still of great influence in the field of security. They will be modified in different conditions and will act in the sense of enlarged concept of security - instead of dominant concepts of political and military security typical for the Cold War era, economic, social and environmental factors will appear. Basic weakness of the realistic theories of security is in the lack of recognising the importance of cooperation between main factors in international community. This failure will be replaced neo realistic and liberal and institutional theories of security which emphasises the concept of cooperation in the first place. Concepts of power, forces and integral processes will be observed within the context of changes in the international relations.
In the last twenty years the world has undergone serious changes, unfortunately not in positive direction. The collapse of the bipolar system and the establishment of one bloc hegemony - NATO headed by the USA, has not only failed to establish more stable and secure international relations, but, on the contrary, it has corresponded with the greatest insecurity and uncertainty of the mankind ever since World War II till the present day. After the 'counter-balance' disappeared, there has been open political, economic, even direct military, interference by the Alliance states in the sovereignty of many countries. Consequently, the world's conflicting potential has largely increased. Apart from the threats present from earlier, the contemporary world is faced with a series of new, formerly unknown or marginal, ones. The most notable among them are: uncontrolled escalation of armed conflicts; international terrorism; proliferation of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction; expansion of drugs trafficking; illegal cross-border migrations; human trafficking and trafficking in human organs; piracy; criminalization of different areas of living; etc. The economic and financial crises have additionally warned the world of the limitedness of natural resources and, in the most serious form, posed the issue of the fight for preservation, or conquest of areas rich in raw minerals. Apart from the current courses of action in the fight for control over the natural resources, both new methods of action and new areas of contest are emerging (Arctic, Antarctic .; above and under the Earth's surface; on the sea, and under the sea bottom), over which the interests of great powers will be increasingly conflicting. Michael Klare, the author of well-known books 'Blood and Oil' and 'Resource Wars', convincingly evokes a growing hunger for resources by the picturesque title of his latest book 'Race for What's Left: Global Scramble for the World's Last Resources'. For success in this new competition in strength and skills, new strategic concepts are required. Some have already been created and preliminarily tested; others are being prepared for implementation and corrected 'on the go' based on the performance of already proved solutions; still others are being hurriedly shaped. Understandably, along with this, what actual and potential rivals do related to this, or what their activities suggest, is watched closely.
Predmet istraživanja u ovom radu je izgradnja identiteta NATO, koji danas sebe određuje kao političko-vojnu organizaciju i već šest i po decenija, ponekad i presudno, utiče na međunarodne odnose i bezbednosne procese u svetu. Cilj rada je da se na osnovu teorijske i praktične deskripcije i analize procesa konstituisanja identiteta NATO, uočavanjem različitih dometa pojedinih teorija međunarodnih odnosa i studija bezbednosti u opisivanju, objašnjenju i prognoziranju društvenih pojava i uloge Alijanse u njihovom oblikovanju, pokaže dostignuti nivo izgradnje činilaca identiteta NATO. Da bi se odgovorilo ovom zadatku, u prvom poglavlju izlažu se osnovni koncepti identiteta i bezbednosti kao ključnih kategorija, koje se posmatraju u dinamičnom uzajamnom odnosu, smisao dobijaju društvenom konstrukcijom i proizvodnjom značenja, socijalno su uslovljene i promenljive zavisno od konteksta. U drugom poglavlju izlažu se stavovi tri uticajne teorije međunarodnih odnosa: realizma, liberalizma i socijalnog konstruktivizma, o karakteru, ulozi i budućnosti NATO. U trećem i četvrtom poglavlju, teorijski uvidi iz prva dva poglavlja primenjuju se u studiji slučaja izgradnje identiteta NATO posle Hladnog rata, a težište analize je na promenama karaktera bezbednosnih pretnji i odgovorima NATO koji se opredeljuje za širenje i vojno delovanje izvan svoje teritorije. Peto poglavlje posvećeno je analizi činilaca identiteta NATO: političkog jedinstva, vojnih sposobnosti, razvijene institucionalne infrastrukture i nove bezbednosne kulture. Zbirnim delovanjem grade NATO, koji u novom multipolarnom nadmetanju za raspodelu moći i kontrolu resursa i teritorija, predvođen najjačom silom – SAD, nastoji da spreči opadanje, sačuva i unapredi dostignutu moć i uticaj. ; This paper studies building the identity of NATO, which now defines itself as a politico-military organization and, for the past six and a half decades, has had, sometimes decisive, influence over the international relations and security processes in the world. The aim of this paper is to show the achieved level of building the NATO identity factors, on the basis of theoretical and practical description and analysis of the process of NATO identity constitution, noticing different range of certain theories of international relations and security studies in describing, explaining and forecasting of social phenomena and the role of the Alliance in their design. In order to accomplish this task, the first chapter addresses the basic concepts of identity and security as key categories, which are viewed in a dynamic correlation, receiving its meaning through social construction and production of meanings, are socially conditioned and variable depending on the context. The second chapter presents the views of three prominent theories of international relations: realism, liberalism and social constructivism, the character, the role and future of NATO. In the third and the fourth chapter, the theoretical insights from the first two chapters are applied in the case study of building NATO identity after the Cold War, and the focus of the analysis is on changing the character of security threats and responses of NATO which opts for the expansion and military action outside its territory. The fifth chapter is devoted to the analysis of NATO identity factors: political unity, military capabilities, developed institutional infrastructure and new security culture; their aggregate action builds NATO, which, in the new multipolar competition for the distribution of power and control of resources and territories, led by the strongest power – the United States, seeks to prevent degradation, preserve and improve the achieved power and influence.
Hladni rat je predstavljao rat ideologija bez presedana u istoriji. Nijedan drugi rat, ni pre ni posle ovog višedecenijskog hladnog sukoba između Sjedinjenih Američkih Država i Saveza Sovjetskih Socijalističkih Republika, nije bio rat koji se vodio u tolikoj meri u sferi meke moći kao Hladni rat. Odsustvo neposrednog oružanog sukoba između Sjedinjenih Američkih Država i Sovjetskog Saveza učinilo je da se Hladni rat odvija kao takmičenje u sferi ekonomije, tehnologije i nauke, kao trka u nuklearnom i konvencionalnom naoružanju i kao svemirsko nadmetanje. Pored takmičenja u sferi tvrde moći, Sjedinjene Američke Države i Sovjetski Savez vodili su intenzivnu bitku u oblasti meke moći. Ovo je bio sukob između američke liberalno-demokratske ideologije i sovjetske marksističke ideologije. Svaka od ove dve zemlje težila je tome da ubedi građane one druge zemlje da je njen društveni i ekonomski sistem idealan i da je bolji i pravedniji od sistema njenog glavnog suparnika. Uzrok propasti Sovjetskog Saveza i komunizma u istočnoj Evropi nikada sa sgurnošću neće moći da bude određen. Okolnosti koje su dovele do raspada Sovjetskog Saveza, pada Berlinskog zida 1989. godine i urušavanja komunizma u Evropi ne mogu se svesti na skup vojnih, političkih, ekonomskih i društvenih činilaca koji su, nezavisno jedni od drugih, doveli do tektonskih promena u međunarodnim odnosima. Svi ovi činioci zajedno, isprepletani u kompleksnu mrežu poluga, učinili su da se Sovjetski Savez uruši i da Sjedinjenim Američkim Državama prepusti ulogu pobednika u Hladnom ratu. Pritom, Amerika nije bila samo vojni i ekonomski pobednik. Amerika je iz Hladnog rata izašla kao moralni i ideološki pobednik. Hladni rat predstavlja temu izuzetno velikog broja radova, ali mali broj tih radova se bavi analizom američko-sovjetskog sukoba u sferi meke moći. Stoga je cilj ovog istraživanja i rada rasvetljavanje, objašnjene i tumačenje poluga meke moći koje su Sjedinjene Američke Države institucionalizovale, pokrenule i upotrebile u ideološkoj borbi protiv Sovjetskog Saveza u vreme Hladnog rata. Međutim, Sjedinjene Američke Države nisu od svog nastanka u drugoj polovini 18. veka do Hladnog rata osmišljeno primenjivale svoju meku moć. Do Hladnog rata upotreba poluga meke moći bila praksa kojom su se Sjedinjene Američke Države bavile isključivo u vreme učešća u oružanim sukobima. Tek sa Hladnim ratom u Americi se javlja potreba za namenskom i osmišljenom upotrebom poluga meke moći. Odmah nakon Drugog svetskog rata Sovjetski Savez je počeo da vrši uticaj na druge zemlje šireći marksističku ideologiju i komunističke ideje. Osim širenja marksističke ideologije Sovjetski Savez je vodio i dobro osmišljenu kampanju protiv Sjedinjenih Američkih Država i američkog načina života. Američka administracija je kao odgovor na sovjetsku spoljnu politiku u periodu od 1946. do 1950. godine stvorila politiku obuzdavanja Sovjetskog Saveza i sovjetskog uticaja u svetu svim sredstvima. Ovo je podrazumevalo kako upotrebu poluga tvrde moći tako i primenu poluga meke moći. U to vreme u američkom društvu postojao je konsenzus o upotrebi političkih, vojnih i ekonomskih oruđa u borbi protiv Sovjetskog Saveza, ali je upotreba poluga meke moći bila predmet duge javne rasprave. Jedna od izuzetno važnih poluga meke moći su državni programi informisanja, odnosno ono što se u Sjedinjenim Američkim Državama smatra propagandom, a propaganda se od nastanka Sjedinjenih Američkih Država do danas smatra nečasnom delatnošću autokratskih režima. Sjedinjene Američke Države su u periodu neposredno nakon Drugog svetskog rata sprovele zakonske, institucionalne i strukturalne promene koje su omogućile trajno ustanovljavanje poluga meke moći zarad širenja američkih vrednosti, ideja i kulture i zarad ideološke borbe protiv Sovjetskog Saveza i sovjetske marksističke ideologije. Zakoni doneti u to vreme su na snazi i danas i pružaju okvir za mnogobrojne programe i aktivnosti na polju primene poluga meke moći po celom svetu. ; The Cold War was a war without precedent in the history. No war before this prolonged cold conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union was waged that much in the realm of soft power as the Cold War. In the absence of an immediate armed conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union, the Cold War was conducted as a competition in the areas of economy, technology and science, nuclear and conventional weapons, as well as the space race. Besides the competition in the realm of hard power, the United States and the Soviet Union pursued an intensive battle in the realm of soft power. This was a conflict between the American ideology of a liberal democracy and the Soviet Marxist ideology. Each of the two attempted to persuade the citizens of the other country that its social and economic practice was an ideal one, better and more just than the other one. The source of the collapse of the Soviet Union and communism in Eastern Europe will never be fully determined. The circumstances that brought about the break-up of the Soviet Union, the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, and the fall down of communism in Europe cannot be summarized as an aggregation of military, political, economic and social factors that independently from each other led to the colossal changes in the world order. All of these factors, entangled together in a complex net, caused the implosion of the Soviet Union which left the United States as the winner in the Cold War. Yet, the United States was not only a military and economic victor, it resurfaced as a moral and ideological champion, as well. The Cold Was has been a theme of numerous papers but only a handful of these papers tackled the American-Soviet conflict in the realm of soft power. Thus, the objective of this research and dissertation is to shed the light, explain and construe the instruments of soft power that the United States institutionalized, put into motion and deployed in the ideological battle against Soviet Union in the Cold War. However, since its birth in the 18th century until the Cold War, the United States had not wielded its soft power strategically. Up to the Cold War, the soft power instruments were used exclusively during the times when the United States was involved in an armed conflict. Only in the Cold War, the need for intentional and thoughtful use of soft power instruments emerged. Soon after the end of the Second World War, the Soviet Union got set off to exert its influence by diffusing its Marxist ideology and communist values. In addition to spreading its ideology, the Soviet Union led a well-planned campaign against the United States and the American way of life. From 1946 to 1950, in response to the Soviet policy towards the United States, the American administration coined the policy of containment of the Soviet Union and the Soviet influence in the world. The policy of containment included both the use of the instruments of hard power and of soft power. At that time, there was a consensus in the American society on the use of political, military and economic means in fighting the Soviet Union, while the use of soft power instruments was a subject of a prolonged public discourse. Government information programs, perceived as propaganda in the United States, have always been a very important soft power instrument, and propaganda has been considered by Americans to be a dishonest activity of autocratic governments. In the period right after the Second World War, the United States implemented legislative, institutional and structural changes that allowed for permanent establishment of the soft power instruments. These foreign policy instruments made it possible for the United States government to diffuse American values, ideas and culture and to wage an ideological war against the Soviet Union and its Marxist principles. The acts adopted at that time are in place nowadays, and provide a legal framework for numerous programs and activities in the realm of soft power.
У раду се размaтра утицај политичких промена на културно-уметнички живот Пољске и Југославије средином прошлог века. Након периода соцреализма, као водећег уметничког правца, у обе земље је отпочета тежња ка деетатизацији културе, што је у сфери организације музичког живота резултирало оснивањем интернационалних фестивала савремене музике. Будући да је пољски фестивал Варшавска јесен (1956), утемељен пет година раније, он је постао узор југословенском Музичком бијеналу Загреб (1961), што имплицира потенцијалне аналогије између стратегија и циљева ових манифестација. Оба фестивала замишљена су као места на којима би се сусрели композитори са обе стране Гвоздене завесе. Наиме, организатори су тежили инкорпорирању домаћих композитора у актуелне западноевропске музичке токове, не би ли створили повољније услове за културну либерализацију Пољске и Југославије. Стога, иако перципирани као отклон од соцреализма, те као вид деполитизације музике, ови фестивали су, сасвим парадоксално, наставили да служе новопрокламованим политичким идејама, усмереним ка презентацији Пољске и Југославије као либерално-демократских средина. ; This paper examines the influence of political changes on the cultural life in Poland and Yugoslavia from the 1950s to the early 1960s. After a period of socialist realism (as the main art orientation), the tendency toward liberalization of culture started in both countries. In the domain of organizing musical life, such tendencies reflected in establishing of international festivals of contemporary music. The Warsaw Autumn (1956) and the Zagreb Music Biennale (1961) were places where composers from both sides of the Iron Curtain have presented their works. Analogies between these festivals are evident, given the fact that the Polish festival was founded five years earlier and served as a model for establishment of the Zagreb Music Biennale. First of all, the Warsaw Autumn and the Zagreb Music Biennale have shown similar problems in regard to the music repertoire. In addition, the similarities between these festivals are recognized based on the main objectives of both festivals organizers which implied aspiration for incorporation of Polish and Yugoslav music culture into the contemporary tendencies of Western Europe. It was a crucial strategy of the Warsaw Autumn, as well as of the Zagreb Music Biennale, whose purposes were about contributing to the liberalization of both Polish and Yugoslav culture. Therefore, this study has found that these festivals, although perceived as a departure from political ideologization of music, continued to promote modified political aims referring to presentation of Poland and Yugoslavia as liberal countries.
The maintenance of peace and stability in the post-cold-war world in the circumstances of cooperation and partnership requires an appropriate approach and manner of resolving the crises triggered off by the collapse of communist federations. Imperial policies and regimes must be eliminated while the process of the geopolitical consolidation and the creation of independent and sovereign states in Central and Eastern Europe (and in Euro-Asia on the whole), built around the democratic and market principles, must be wrapped up. The new political leaders (mostly leftist) in the countries that for over fifty years (and now through the Kosovo crisis) have been developing the trans-Atlantic alliance within the military-political framework of NATO (based on the same values, principles, and goals), are now developing appropriate strategies for the post-cold-war hotspots (based on the accumulated experiences). (SOI : S. 89) + The author analyses the process of democratisation of international relations and the future configuration of international order following the end of the era of bipolar confrontation and the establishment of cooperation in the world which has witnessed the change in the key actors' roles regarding their approach to the resolution of the post-cold-war crises which jeopardise the world's peace and stability. First, the author provides a short outline of the genesis of the evolution of the US foreign policy, from the end of World War II to the beginning of the cold war and the formation of NATO. He points out that today's agenda of the international order, its structures, interventionism, and use of force in achieving political objectives, were already shaped at that time. The suggestions put forward constituted the framework and the foundation for the world politics until the late 80s; the cumulative effect of these responses on today's attempts at solving post- cold-war crises enables us to evaluate the roles and behaviour of individual actors in the resolution of the Kosovo crisis
After the cold war, when the Eastern block collapsed, considerable changes were made in the world security architecture. Althought it seemed like a beginning of more certain and secure era, cold war ending didn't fulfill expectations neither the main actors in the cold war conflict, nor the expectations of the rest of the world. Besides, collapse of one block, didn't stop growth dynamic of new power centers. Tendencies for power are not new and unfamiliar to human. When bypolar system collapsed, other subjects started fighting for the positions. PRC role with her enormous people potential, growing economy and strengthened military is evident. Soviet Union, accordingly Russian Federation, believed that there was no more need for strenghtening the other block, especially when the opposite doesn't exist. But, former partners included the opposite side, and that made more tensions between Russia and United States. Rest of the world didn't get better chance to create own future. On the contrary, especially for the peripheral and semiperipheral countries, new threats appeared that destabilized individual and collective security. Efforts to make human community rational, were always idealism and those efforts were considered utopian, but under the given circumstances, for the international stability, the most accseptable model is model of global triangle - China, Russia, USA. Reason why this three countries is ther specific potention: USA is powerful technological, military and political center, RF is worlds warehouse' and China is the worlds manufacture. In the globalism domination over nationalism era that model could be the optimal 'braking and balance' system in the international relations- political ideal that all liberal schools wanted to acchievestarting Lock, Montesquieu, Rousseau till today.
The authors of this paper offer an overview and analysis of the rise and fall of the liberal international order that emerged after the end of the Cold War and along with the rising power of the United States. The foreign policy agenda of the post-Cold War sole superpower was guided by the idea of creating a global order based on the ideology of liberalism, which incorporates theories of liberal peace, democratic peace and neoliberal institutionalism. The establishment of a liberal order has been accompanied by numerous political, social, economic and security crises. The current era is characterized by the rise of the relative power of global actors, primarily China and Russia, as the main challengers to the world domination of the United States, geopolitical revisionism and ideological struggle around the world. The authors of this paper use the dialectic of political mechanics as a method that relies on the teachings of Friedrich Hegel on the dialectic of history and Carl Schmitt on the phenomenon of the political. The authors advocate the view that the political field "permanently pulsates", which, in everything that is social and political, necessarily creates action and reaction.
After the end of the Cold War, civil defense was transformed into civil protection. This part of the state structure moved from the armed forces to the civilian sector. There are two reasons. First, direct threat of nuclear war was eliminated and the other reason were climate changes caused by natural disasters on a large scale. Today's civilan protection is organized in order to protect life and property in the event of a disaster caused by nature or man. End of the Cold War influenced the transformation of the social system in Poland. This was also reflected in the field of civil protection in this country. In Poland many sectors of civil society are now directly or indirectly involved in the system of civil protection. This was largely contributed by the decentralization of the state system, which allowed greater involvement of different actors in the system of civil protection. Decentralization has enabled a more efficient division of responsibility in case of emergencies. Regardless of the differences in size of territory and population, Poland has gone through similar challenges in transformation of the state and civil protection system like other new states of the European Union. This is especially important if we look other states of the former Warsaw Pact. Beside aforementioned transformation, Poland needed to eliminate communist legacy in many areas of society. This was precondition for stabilization and modernization of the state system. After that, Poland could put more effort in the reform of other areas of political, economic and social organization, which included area of civil protection.
The author looks into the concept of the "smal1 nation" and whether it is high time for its scientific or linguistic revision. If "small nations" are a qualitative category, why define them quantitatively as "small"? Small nations gained independence in two waves: between the German-French war (1870-1871) and the end of World War One, and after the close of the "cold war" in 1990. However, not all small nations gained independence (e.g. Basques, Catalonians, Bretons, etc.). They pose a major challenge for Western Europe. The example of Croatia and its relationship with Serbs serves to illustrate the vacillations in the European ideology and attitudes towards small nations. The pressures exerted on the Croatian state regarding the political attitude of the Croatian people towards small nations did not stem from the logic of globalist economism or neoliberal political doctrine but were the.consequence of the war which the mother country Serbia of the Serbs in Croatia waged with the aim of annexing the territories on which they were a majority population. (SOI : PM: S. 98)
Doktorska disertacija Jugoslovenska politika prema zemljama narodne demokratije u susedstvu 1953 – 1958. godine zasnovana je na jugoslovenskim arhivskim izvorima iz Arhiva Srbije i Crne Gore, Diplomatskog arhiva Ministarstva spoljnih poslova Republike Srbije i Vojnog arhiva kao i na relevantnoj domaćoj i stranoj literaturi. Disertacija se bavi jugoslovenskom politikom prema Albaniji, Bugarskoj, Rumuniji i Mađarskoj u periodu normalizacije odnosa Jugoslavije sa ovim zemljama posle Staljinove smrti tj. posle petogodišnjeg perioda tokom koga su njihovi odnosi bili u gotovo potpunom prekidu. Ona predstavlja pokušaj da se sagleda odnos Jugoslavije prema neposrednom susedstvu u uslovima hladnog rata i sadejstva jugoslovenskih interesa sa jedne i spoljnih faktora poput uloge Sovjetskog Saveza u procesu normalizacije odnosa Jugoslavije sa pomenutim zemljama ili uloge vodećih zapadnih zemalja i njihovih interesa u Jugoslaviji i susednim zemljama "narodne demokratije" sa druge strane. U nekoliko faza kroz koje su od marta 1953. do aprila 1958. godine prošli odnosi Jugoslavije sa Albanijom, Bugarskom, Rumunijom i Mađarskom (od Staljinove smrti do potpisivanja Beogradske deklaracije, od potpisivanja Beogradske deklaracije do XX kongresa KPSS-a, od XX kongresa KPSS-a do izbijanja događaja u Mađarskoj 1956. godine i od događaja u Mađarskoj do kritike novog Programa SKJ) jugoslovenska politika se menjala u skladu sa okolnostima zadržavajući kao konstante izražen interes za normalizaciju odnosa i insistiranje na tome da sve susedne zemlje "narodne demokratije" javno osude svoju raniju politiku prema Jugoslaviji i rehabilituju sve koji su na montiranim sudskim procesima osuđeni zbog špijunske delatnost u korist Jugoslavije. Osnovni cilj rada na ovoj dioktorskoj disertaciji je bio da pruži nova znanja o ovoj temi, nove poglede na jugoslovensku spoljnu politiku i ponudi novi ugao gledanja na odnose Jugoslavije sa SSSR-om i Varšavskim paktom u celini. U vezi sa tim definisan je i drugi cilj ovog rada koji se odnosi na rekonstrukciju jugoslovenske politike prema ovim zemljama i na pokušaj da se uoče specifičnosti, metode i ciljevi te politike koji su se razlikovali u odnosu na jugoslovensku politiku prema ostalim istočnoevropskim zemljama. Treći cilj na temu jugoslovenske politike prema susednim zemljama "narodne demokratije" od 1953. do 1958. godine bio je i sistematizacija postojećih znanja o ovoj temi i njihova evaluacija s obzirom na veći stepen dostupnosti izvora nego što je to bio slučaj pre više decenija kada su nastali najznačajniji radovi koji su se delimično bavili pojedinim segmentima ove teme. Četvrti cilj istraživanja bio je utvrđivanje hronološki jasno određenih faza kroz koje su prolazili odnosi Jugoslavije sa Mađarskom, Rumunijom, Bugarskom i Albanijom u posmatranom periodu i identifikacija faktora koji su na to uticali. U trenutku Staljinove smrti, susedne zemlje "narodne demokratije" bile su daleko od centra pažnje jugoslovenske spoljne politike jer je , između ostalog, i njihov značaj za nju u uslovima prekida međudržavnih odnosa bio mali. Međutim, promene koje su ubrzo posle Staljinove smrti usledile u Sovjetskom Savezu omogućile su početak normalizacije odnosa Jugoslavije i "prve zemlje socijalizma" što je za sobom povuklo i mogućnost da Jugoslavija normalizuje svoje odnose i sa susednim zemljama "narodne demokratije". Kada su u pitanju bile te zemlje, primarni jugoslovenski interes nije se nalazio u sferi politike i ekonomije kao u slučaju Sovjetskog Saveza već u sferi praktičnih međudržavnih pitanja koja su teško opterećivala Jugoslaviju. Na prvom mestu to je bio interes da se što pre otkloni vojna pretnja na granicama i stanje na zajedničkoj "liniji razgraničenja" koje je u godinama posle 1948. iziskivalo velika materijalna i kadrovska ulaganja. Osim toga, Jugoslavija je jasan interes imala i po pitanju poboljšanja položaja pripadnika jugoslovenskih manjina u susednim zemljama "narodne demokratije" kao i po pitanju normalizacije saobraćaja. Razlog što Jugoslavija nije pokazivala izražen interes za političku i ekonomsku saradnju sa ovim zemljama ležao je u činjenici da je ona u međuvremenu, u vreme godina sukoba, uspela da pronađe alternativu kako u sferi spoljne politike tako i u sferi ekonomije i na taj način obesmisli blokadu kojoj je bila izložena sa Istoka. Međutim, cena iznalaženja te alternative bila je visoka i pretila je da ugrozi monopol vlasti Saveza komunista Jugoslavije što je za Tita i njegovo najbliže okruženje bilo neprihvatljivo. Iz tog razloga, mogućnost da se nađe zajednički jezik sa Moskvom predstavljao je za Tita priliku da uspostavi ravnotežu kada je u pitanju bio jugoslovenski položaj prema suprotstavljenim blokovima u zaoštrenoj hladnoratovskoj atmosferi. Odnos Jugoslavije prema SSSR-u, i obrnuto, može se smatrati jednim od najznačajnijih faktora koji su uticali na oblikovanje jugoslovenske politike prema susednim zemljama "narodne demokratije" sa jedne i na kreiranje politike koje su sve istočnoevropske zemlje vodile prema Jugoslaviji sa druge strane. Drugi značajan faktor koji je uticao na jugoslovensku politiku prema zemljama "narodne demokratije" u susedstvu od 1953. do 1958. godine bio je u tesnoj vezi sa jugoslovensko-sovjetskim odnosima a ticao se prevashodno ideologije i s tim u vezi destaljinizacije. Kreirajući u godinama sukoba sa Informbiroom sopstveni model "samoupravnog" socijalizma, Jugoslavija tokom procesa normalizacije odnosa nije pristajala na "jedinstvo lagera" i povratak u njega što je bio glavni kamen spoticanja u njenim odnosima kakao sa SSSR-om tako i sa drugim istočnoevropskim zemljama pa i susednim kao što su bile Albanija, Bugarska, Mađarska i Rumunija. S tim u vezi je i destaljinizacija, odnosno njen napredak i dubina u susednim "zemljama" narodne demokratije kao i njihova spremnost da se distanciraju od staljinističke ideologije, predstavljala jedan od glavnih faktora koji su uticali na oblikovanje jugoslovenske politike prema tim zemljama. Najzad, važan činilac koji je uticao na jugoslovensku spoljnu politiku uopšte pa i na njenu politiku prema delu ili celini Istočnog bloka bili su i njeni odnosi sa Zapadom, koji su iz pragmatičnih razloga tokom godina sukoba sa Informbiroom bili poboljšani do te mere da su Jugoslaviju, iako nevoljno, doveli na rub uključenja u zapadni vojni savez. Zapad je bio taj kome se nije dopadalo jugoslovensko približavanje SSSR-u i istočnoevropskim zemljama i u periodu normalizacije njihovih odnosa svaki korak koji je vodio približavanju dveju do tada suprotstavljenih strana izazivao je na Zapadu sumnje u iskrenost Jugoslavije i zebnju kada je u pitanju bila budućnost odnosa Zapada i Jugoslavije. Kao rezultat sadejstva nekoliko najvažnijih spoljnih faktora i jugoslovenskih interesa u neposrednom susedstvu iz okvira socijalističkog "lagera" nastajala je jugoslovenska politika prema Istoku uopšte pa i prema Albaniji, Bugarskoj, Rumuniji i Mađarskoj ponaosob, onakva kakva je bila. U periodu od 1953. do 1958. godine ta politika je bila aktivna i pozitivna ali ne i bez ograda. Tih godina, Jugoslavija je bez sumnje pokazivala interes da normalizuje svoje odnose sa susedima sa kojima je osim granice delila i ideologiju ali najčešće nije želela da ona bude ta koja će dati inicijativu za konkretne korake u tom procesu. Smatrajući da su međusobni odnosi narušeni ne njenom već krivicom suseda, ona je strogo poštovala načelo (koje je inače zastupala i kada je u pitanju bila njena politika prema SSSR-u) da prvi korak treba da učini onaj koji je odgovoran za prekid normalnih dobrosusedskih odnosa. Imajući u vidu sve interese, želje i aspiracije koje je Jugoslavija imala kada je u pitanju bio prostor neposredno uz njene granice kao i faktore koji su neminovno uticali na njenu politiku, može se reći da je Jugoslavija prema zemljama "narodne demokratije" u susedstvu u periodu normalizacije međusobnih odnosa od 1953. do 1958. godine vodila politiku mogućeg. Ta politika, međutim, iako osmišljena na isti način, nije uvek bila ista prema svakoj pojedinačnoj zemlji u susedstvu iz prostog razloga što u njima nije nailazila na istovetne uslove i mogućnosti. Tamo gde su mogućnosti bile veće, Jugoslavija je postizala više. Međutim, kako je vreme odmicalo i kako je Jugoslavija bivala sve uspešnija u pronalaženju svog sopstvenog "trećeg puta", čini se da joj je sve manje i manje bilo stalo do sadržajnije saradnje sa većinom suseda od kojih je (budući da su sve bile deo Istočnog bloka), u skladu sa svojom novom spoljnopolitičkom strategijom koja je ekvidistancu prema blokovima predviđala kao imperativ, trebalo da napravi određeni otklon. ; The Ph.D. thesis Yugoslav Policy Towards the Neighboring Countries of People's Democracy 1953-1958 is based on Yugoslav archival sources from the Archives of Yugoslavia, the Diplomatic Archives of the Foreign Ministry of the Republic of Serbia and the Military Archives, as well as on the relevant domestic and foreign literature. The thesis deals with Yugoslav policy towards Albania, Bulgaria, Romania and Hungary during the period of normalization of relations between these countries and Yugoslavia after Stalin's death, i.e. after a five years' period of almost complete interruption in bilateral relations. It is an attempt at a study of the interplay of Yugoslavia's relations with immediate neighborhood during the Cold War and Yugoslav interests on the one hand, and interests of foreign factors, such as the Soviet Union and the leading Western nations in Yugoslavia and in the neighboring countries within the framework of the normalization of Yugoslavia's relations with the above mentioned countries. During the several phases the Yugoslav relations with Albania, Bulgaria, Romania and Hungary went through between March 1953 and April 1958 (from Stalin's death until the signing of the Belgrade Declaration, from then to the 20th congress of the CP of the USSSR, from then until the beginning of the events in Hungary in 1956 and from then until the critique of the new Program of the CP of Yugoslavia), the Yugoslav policy changed in accordance with the situation, preserving the interest in normalizing relations and insisting that all neighboring countries of "people's democracy" should condemn their former policy towards Yugoslavia and rehabilitate all those who had been sentenced as Yugoslav spies at show trials. The main goal of this Ph.D. thesis was to provide new knowledge of the topic, new views on Yugoslav foreign policy and to propose a new vantage point on the Yugoslav relations with the Soviet Union, and on relations with the Warsaw Pact as a whole. Connected with this was another goal of the thesis that concrens the reconstruction of Yugoslav policy toward these countries and the attempt to pinpoint the characteristics, methods and goals of that policy that were different from those of Yugoslav policy toward other east European countries. The third goal of the topic of Yugoslav policy toward the neighboring countries of "people's democracy" between 1953 and 1958 was also to systematize the existing knowledge on the subject in view of better accessability of sources as compared with the situation of several decades ago when the most important works touching upon some aspects of this topic were written. The fourth goal of the research was to determin chronologically clearly defined phases that the Yugoslav relations with Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria and Albania had gone through during the researched period and to identify the factors that influenced the process. At the time of Stalin's death the countries of "people's democracy" were far from the focus of the Yugoslav foreign policy, because, among other things, their importance was small due to the severed inter-state relations. However, the changes that set in the Soviet Union soon after Stalin's death made the beginning of normalization of relations with the "first country of socialism" possible. This entailed the possibility that Yugoslavia also normalizes its relations with neighboring countries of "people's democracy". When these countries were in question, Yugoslavia's primary interest didn't lie in political or economic spheres as in the case of the Soviet Union, but rather in the sphere of practical inter-state matters weighting heavily on Yugoslavia. Supreme was the interest to do away as soon as possible with the military threat on the borders and to change the situation on the "line of demarcation" that had required much material and human resources in the years after 1948. Furthermore, Yugoslavia had a clear interest in improving the situation of members of Yugoslav minorities in the neighboring countries of "people's democracy", as well as in normalization of trafic. The reason why Yugoslavia showed no great interest in political or economic cooperation with these countries lay in the fact that she had in the meantime, during the years of conflict, found alternative solutions in the spheres of foreign policy and economy, reducing thus to insignifficance the blocade imposed on her from the East. However, the price of that alternative solution was high and it threatened to endanger the power monopoly of the Union of the Communists of Yugoslavia, which was unacceptable for Tito and his innermost circle of collaborators. For that reason, the possibility of finding common grounds with Moscow was for Tito an oportunity to balance Yugoslavia's position between the two competing blocs in a worsened Cold War atmosphere. Yugoslavia's relation to the USSSR and vice versa, can be seen as one of the most important factors influencing Yugoslav policy toward the neighboring countries of "people's democracy" on the one hand, and on the other, one that was decisively shaping their policy towards Yugoslavia. Another important factor influencing Yugoslav policy toward the countries of "people's democracy" in the vicinity between 1953 and 1958 was closely connected with the Yugoslav-Soviet relations and it concerned primarily ideology and, in that context, destalinization. Having created her own model of "self-managing" socialism during the years of conflict with the Cominform, during the process of normalization Yugoslavia didn't accept the unity of the Eastern Bloc and the matter of her return to it was one of the main stumbling blocks both in her relations with the USSR and with the neighbors such as Albania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania. In that context, destalinisation, i.e. its progress and depth in the neighboring countries of "people's democracy" and their willingnes to distance themselves from the Stalinist ideology was one of the major factors influencing Yugoslavia's policy toward those countries. Finally, the important factor influencing Yugoslav foreign policy in general, including part of the Eastern Block or it as a whole, were Yugoslavia's relations with the West that had been so improved during the years of conflict with the Cominform, that they led Yugoslavia, although unwillingly, to the brink of joining the western military alliance. The West was unhappy with Yugoslav rapprochement with the USSR and eastern European countries and every step that brought closer the two once confonted parties during the process of normalization of their relations, caused the West to doubt Yugoslavia's sincerety and cause fears for the future relations between the West and Yugoslavia. As a result of interplay of several major foreign political factors and Yugoslav interests in the imediate socialist block neighborhood, the Yugoslav policy toward the East in general and toward Albania, Bulgaria, Romania and Hungary individually, emerged in the given form. Between 1953 and 1958 that policy was active and positive, but not without restrains. During those years Yugoslavia clearly showed interest in normalizing her relations with the neighboring countries with whom she shared not only borders, but ideology too, but in most cases she was not willing to be the one to initiate concrete steps in that process. Deeming that it had not been her fault but that of her neighbors that the bilateral relations had been spoiled, she observed strictly the principle (that she also championed in her relations with the USSR) that the side that had been responsible for the interruption of normal good neighborly relations should also make the first move. Having in mind all the interests, wishes and aspirations that Yugoslavia had concerning the space imediatly bordering on her territory as well as the factors necessarily infuencing her policy, it can be said that Yugoslavia led the policy of what was possible toward the neighboring countries of "people's democracy" during tthe period of normalization of bilateral relations 1953-1958. However, that policy wasn't always the same toward all these neighboring countries, for simple reason that it didn't meet with the same conditions and possibilities in them. Where possibilities were greater, Yugoslavia acheived more. However, as the time went by and as Yugoslavia became increasingly more successful in finding her own "third way", it seems she was increasingly less interested in substantial cooperation with most of the neighbors from whom (since they were all members of the Eastern Block) certain distance should be kept – in keeping with the new foreign political strategy that foresaw equidistance towards both blocs as a must.
The author claims that all major efforts concerning European security have always been linked with the end of a war. Thus the end of the cold war has been marked with the expansion of NATO and an attempt to create a new security. By analysing the political scope of the expansion, the military and strategic framework, the Russian reactions, and the economic significance, the author comes to the conclusion that the expansion is not conducive to the establishment of an integral system of European security. The purpose of this development by Clinton's team was primarily to outline the new European borders (the key aspect of Clinton's foreign policy) and, in the future, to create the conditions for further expansion and admittance of new members. Only in the remote future, through constant expansion and links with other European organisations, NATO could turn into the central system of European security. (SOI : PM: S. 97)
In the introduction, the author analyses Clinton's approach to Europe and the European NATO allies, particularly his wish to develop the partnership and to expand the Alliance. The new post-cold-war relations in Europe contributed to the stronger American-European ties - the foundation of atlantism. This new model of relations is discussed in relation to the emerging challenges that pose the key questions: the creation of a new joint strategy, the problems of NATO's "out of area" interventions and the creation of such European relations that will not provoke uncalled-for Russian reactions. Seen within such a framework, NATO is going to remain the chief proponent of military-political actions of the developed world in which US is to play the leading role. (SOI : S. 102)
After World War Two there have been opposing views of the role and the importance of the state in international affairs. Some think that the importan the state is slowly decreasing, since the increasing interdependence of the wo has an enormous influence on internal and foreign policies of a state. On the hand, some point out that the state has not lost any of its importance and tha the contrary, this importance will only be enhanced since the world community has not as yet come up with a model by which to replace sovereign state entities. States generate the structure which has a significant influence on individual group security. This particularly applies to the post-cold-war period since th problems and the threats of the present-day world - economic collapse, politic oppression, poverty, ethnical conflicts, nature degradation, terrorism, crime diseases - directly affect many other elements of security. It is these very problems that turn our attention to the state as the most important institution of the day world which still has at its disposal the resources for reducing or eliminating these threats. (SOI : PM: S. 43)