Suchergebnisse

A key factor in the transition to university is the enculturation of new students into both the discipline they are studying and effective study practices. Most significantly, students, whatever their chosen discipline, must learn to become autonomous learners. Too often this process is either left to chance or seen as a natural attribute of the higher education learning system rather than a particular skill that must be learnt and can be taught. In this article we discuss one particular approach to designing 'structured autonomy' into a first year core media studies module. We argue that the notion of autonomy needs to be considered as a central component of learning, teaching and assessment strategies and, moreover, that an integrated approach towards these factors has the additional benefit of contributing towards a more holistic first year experience for students.

As it is currently understood, the notion of autonomy, both as
something that belongs to human beings and human nature, as such,
and also as the source or basis of morality (that is, duty), is
bound up inextricably with the philosophy of Kant. The term
"autonomy" itself derives from classical Greek, where
(at least in surviving texts) it was applied primarily or even
exclusively in a political context, to civic communities possessing
independent legislative and self-governing authority. The term was
taken up again in Renaissance and early modern times with similar
political applications, but was applied also in ecclesiastical disputes
about the independence of reformed churches from the former authority in
religious matters of the church of the Roman popes. Kant's innovation
consisted in conceiving of (finite) individual rational persons, as such,
as lawgivers or legislators to themselves, and to all rational beings (or
rather to all that are not perfect and holy wills), for their individual
modes of behavior. For Kant, rational beings possess a power of
legislating for themselves individually, according to which they each
set their own personal ends and subject that selection, and their pursuit
of the ends in question, to a universal principle, which is expressed in
Kant's categorical imperative. The categorical imperative
requires that one set one's own ends only within a framework that
would warrant acceptance by all other such beings.

The datafication of society comes with a recalibration of power structures. European states can no longer depend on territorial control to govern (cyber)space, powerful corporations own essential cloud infrastructure, state actors denying the importance of democracy and human rights have crucial roles in supply chains, and users are left without choice when using digital services. This article proposes data autonomy as a value-based framework, in response to this ongoing powershift undermining the European Union's strategic autonomy. In contrast to debates around digital sovereignty and international data flows in data protection law, data autonomy aspires to establish a framework that puts human dignity at its core. Essentially, data autonomy is based on informational self-determination, yet expands it in three dimensions: First, informational selfdetermination remains limited to the citizen-state relationship. The scope of data autonomy expands to private actors, in cases where those are particularly powerful. Secondly, data autonomy expands beyond individual rights and duties, including organizational autonomy as an enabler for individual autonomy. Thirdly, data autonomy addresses harmful inferences resulting from the use of systems based on machine learning or artificial intelligence. Therefore, it is not limited to risks stemming from statically labelled data (e.g., data stored in databases).
Strategic Autonomy, Human Dignity, Digital Sovereignty, Governance, Datafication, Data Ownership, Data Governance, Data Protection, Privacy, Informational Self-Determination

These epigraphs present us with part of the problem that is to be
discussed in this essay. For Spinoza (1632–1677) there is no
metaphysical freedom, except for God/Substance/Nature. The
behavior of individual things, or modes, is completely a
function of causes that bring about the behavior. This might suggest
that there can be no autonomy in any meaningful sense either,
thus aborting at the outset any talk of autonomy in Spinoza. To add to
this problem, "autonomy" is somewhat anachronistic when
applied to Spinoza. The philosophical theory surrounding the concept
of autonomy seems to have developed later, perhaps mostly from Kant
(1724–1804), which is not to say that it did not have parallels
earlier. Kantian metaphysics is certainly different from Spinozistic
metaphysics in allowing for freedom, if nothing else. But even if we
ignore the metaphysics, the structure of a Kantian ethics is different
from a Spinozistic one in its focus on duty and imperatives. One finds
little of that in Spinoza. Consequently, on both metaphysical and
historical grounds, it seems somewhat problematic to speak of Kantian
autonomy in Spinoza.

Alienation, as that concept is handed down in the Marxist tradition, consists in part of lack of autonomy. Some feminists have urged greater autonomy for women, while others have attacked the ideal of autonomy. One can see that both views have much in their favor from a careful reading of Virginia Woolf's To the Lighthouse (New York 1927). The resulting dilemma is resolved by (1) uncovering the concept of persons underlying traditional notions of autonomy -- the concept of persons as separate from one another; & (2) reframing the concept of persons as "being-in-relation." This yields more acceptable concepts of autonomy & of alienation. AA