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One of few can enjoy the pleasures of living in a time of transition to democracy and have the opportunity to comment on the development and raise critical questions about the future of the Central and Eastern Europe. Editors Kaldor and Vejvoda pose several such questions right at the beginning of their book: Do political systems within CEEC represent a particular variant of democracy that is specific to this part of the world? Is it possible to talk about a post-communist model sui generis that is influenced by the legacy of communism and at the same time by both the weaknesses and strengths of western democracy? Can we talk about an emergent concept of European Democratic Space [term introduced by editors] as a way of consolidating democracy in Central and Eastern European Countries and of reinvigorating democracy in Western Europe? ; One of few can enjoy the pleasures of living in a time of transition to democracy and have the opportunity to comment on the development and raise critical questions about the future of the Central and Eastern Europe. Editors Kaldor and Vejvoda pose several such questions right at the beginning of their book: Do political systems within CEEC represent a particular variant of democracy that is specific to this part of the world? Is it possible to talk about a post-communist model sui generis that is influenced by the legacy of communism and at the same time by both the weaknesses and strengths of western democracy? Can we talk about an emergent concept of European Democratic Space [term introduced by editors] as a way of consolidating democracy in Central and Eastern European Countries and of reinvigorating democracy in Western Europe?

The first question that we ask ourselves in our article is whether the accounting of the central bank is supposed to respect the principles of internationally accepted standards (especially the International Financial Reporting Standards). We are looking for the basic differences in understanding of terms such as (il)liquidity & (in)solvency on the level of central & commercial banking. We analyze the economic reasons for origination of the long foreign exchange position of the CNB which, under the circumstances of trend appreciation of the exchange rate of the Czech crown, is leading to a cumulative loss. We are discussing whether the current level of foreign exchange reserves of the CNB is excessive or adequate. Special attention is paid to the monetary & financial impact of the loss of the central bank. We are pointing out that losing the central bank means profit for market subjects at the same time. It is not just a "fictitious" accounting problem & it can have its factual impact on the national economy. At the end we are summarizing & assessing the individual opinions regarding the loss of the CNB. Adapted from the source document.

The article presents economic voting theory and its application to the study of electoral behaviour in four Central European countries. The theoretical part describes the reward-punishment model of economic voting and its predictions for electoral behaviour in countries with coalition governance and in internationally open economies during the global economic crisis. The analytical part investigates the existence and features of economic voting (as a P-function) in the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia. Hypotheses about the existence of economic voting in these countries, the higher economic accountability of more responsible coalition partners, and the lower level of economic voting under the perceived influence of the EU on the domestic economy are tested using OLS and binary logistic analysis of European Election Study data (2004 and 2009). As the results show, economic voting was only detected in Hungary (2004 and 2009) and Slovakia (2004). The analysis indicates that, in general, almost all Prime ministers' parties bear a greater degree of economic accountability; meanwhile, perceptions of EU economic responsibility had no influence on the popularity of government parties in 2009. ; The article presents economic voting theory and its application to the study of electoral behaviour in four Central European countries. The theoretical part describes the reward-punishment model of economic voting and its predictions for electoral behaviour in countries with coalition governance and in internationally open economies during the global economic crisis. The analytical part investigates the existence and features of economic voting (as a P-function) in the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia. Hypotheses about the existence of economic voting in these countries, the higher economic accountability of more responsible coalition partners, and the lower level of economic voting under the perceived influence of the EU on the domestic economy are tested using OLS and binary logistic analysis of European ...

The relatively long term period of stability before the present crises called even "Great Moderation" or "Golden Age of Central Banking" indicated that the inflation targeting was a success story. As of 2008 a lot has changed and the debate over "Leaning against the wind or Clean afterwards?" is being revisited among central bankers and academicians. At the same time the question "Does money matter in monetary policy" is on the table again. This paper focuses on the discussion of these issues; moreover, some new challenges that emerged in previous three years are discussed. The crisis has highlighted an urgent need to incorporate banks and financial frictions into monetary policy modelling framework -- therefore some new findings on this field of research are outlined. An important lesson from the crises is that price stability is not a sufficient precondition for financial stability, therefore an operational framework for financial stability is being searched -- this is subject of the final part of this paper. Adapted from the source document.

An assumption that a central bank can influence the real interest rates is the object of our interest. In the paper we form and solve a model which corresponds to Romer's (2000) assumptions. Our model is IS-LM augmented by a conception of price-adjusting after monetary intervention and inflation expectations. A monetary policy rule is derived from the model. Moreover, it offers a demonstration of economic behaviour by different economic assumptions of different economic schools, similar to one in the book of Heijdra (2002). Adapted from the source document.

Significant international attention has been directed to the most pressing problem of the financial crisis of 2008/2009 -- global liquidity shortages. The use of adequate foreign exchange reserves during the crisis helped alleviate pressures. However, this was only partially effective in a number of important cases. Some countries also needed to rely on external official financing. The aim of this article is to compare and analyse the main sources of official global liquidity -- foreign exchange reserves, bilateral swap lines of central banks, regional financial arrangements arid IMF resources. To reach effective outcomes in relation to the accumulation of FX reserves and a strengthening of the global financial safety nets, effective international coordination will be necessary. Adapted from the source document.

The post-Keynesian approach to the nature of money brings some other conclusion to the monetary policy, independence of a central bank, & function of commercial banks. The source money is created by demand of businessmen especially. Loans create deposits, deposits create reserves. Central bank plays two roles: lender of last resort & inflation supervisor. Crediting by commercial banks & their credit policy in post-Keynesian economics is considered as credit rationing. If the role of central bank -- lender of last resort -- is not connected with changes of regulation, which reduce new practice of financial markets to avoid regulation, the influence of central bank to fight with inflation declines. Post-Keynesian economics is not directed against competence & independence of central bank. On the contrary, it welcomes the more direct influence of central bank on commercial banks & other financial institutions, however, with use of alternative limiting facilities. 2 Graphs, 15 References. Adapted from the source document.

The authors of the paper discuss reasons as well as current stage of the regulation of the financial (mostly banking) sector. They are not in favor of strict rejection of the regulation, but they are not in favor of strong regulation of the financial sector either. The article is based on the economic theory that there are objective economic reasons as well as specific financial features which cannot recommend and provide clear, simple, and unilateral solution about what level of regulation is appropriate in the financial market. The authors offer some economic ideas that can be useful for preparing and evaluating new regulation of the banking sector. The paper also defines theoretical assumptions of an ideal financial system. Based on those assumptions, the authors formulate and describe problems of real working financial (banking) system, and these problems create necessary condition, but not sufficient condition for imposing regulation. Finally, the paper describes and discusses impacts of concrete new banking regulatory proposals (increasing capital requirements, creating conservation and countercyclical capital buffers, calculating leverage ratio and liquidity ratio, and imposing bank levy). Adapted from the source document.

Central banks of major advanced economies have already started their sixth year of the greatest ever experiment in monetary policy at place. First, special measures were taken to prevent collapse of financial intermediation. At the same time main policy rates were cut down to historical lows hitting the zero lower bound quite soon after the onset of the financial crisis. After that central banks realised various unconventional measures in order to support their weak economies. While exceptional instruments aimed at restoring financial markets seem to have been inevitable to avert a collapse of a much greater magnitude in the short run, some other measures have remained disputable. Not only had these measures limited effectiveness in restoring stronger and sustainable economic growth, but concerns have also been raised recently about their unintended consequences. These side-effects concern not only domestic economies but international spillovers on many vulnerable less advanced and/or developing economies have been evident. Moreover, potential risks of the unprecedented measures may start to act fully in a longer horizon. Quantitative easing has led to enormous increases in balance sheets of the Fed, the BoE and ECB; however structural differences on the asset side have been evident. Main challenge for major central banks thus seems to be the right timing and structure of inevitable exit strategies in the near future so that a smooth exit with minimal side effects could be guaranteed. Adapted from the source document.