De samenwerking van de Europese centrale banken
In: Internationale spectator, Band 42, Heft 2, S. 80-86
ISSN: 0020-9317
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In: Internationale spectator, Band 42, Heft 2, S. 80-86
ISSN: 0020-9317
World Affairs Online
In: http://hdl.handle.net/1942/15602
In deze masterproef trachten we te onderzoeken in welke mate het dalende vertrouwen van de Europese burgers de adequaatheid van het beleid van de Europese Centrale Bank kan beïnvloeden. Tijdens de zoektocht naar een antwoord op deze vraag wordt om te beginnen het begrip vertrouwen als geloofwaardigheid gedefinieerd en de blijvende heterogeniteit binnen de Europese (Monetaire) Unie onderzocht. Vervolgens wordt nagegaan welke relatie er bestaat tussen het nationaal inkomen, de inflatie en het niveau van werkloosheid, en het vertrouwensniveau. Na deze analyse presenteren we een nieuw trillemma uit de literatuur en leggen we het verband met het concept van de vijfvoudige unie (monetair, fiscaal, politiek, competitief en bankenunie). Ook het monetaire ECB beleid wordt hierbij onder de loep genomen. Als algemene conclusie kan worden gesteld dat de ECB met een vertrouwenscrisis kampt en dat zij haar onafhankelijkheid dient te herbevestigen en het vertrouwen opnieuw op te bouwen.
BASE
In: Nijmegen studies in development and cultural change 2
In: Social Europe series 3
In: Res publica: politiek-wetenschappelijk tijdschrift van de Lage Landen ; driemaandelijks tijdschrift, Band 56, Heft 2, S. 231-251
ISSN: 0486-4700
In Europe and especially in the euro existed between mid 2007 to late 2009 preserve vote on how the institutions of a sometimes fragile EU and the single currency managed to the global financial crisis defy. The crisis hit over from the United States, where the dangers of applied liberal and deregulated model of financial markets and inadequate governance were insufficiently recognized. European banks, but a few, behaved more than their American peers. Also banking supervision was generally effective, especially in countries like Italy, Spain and the small Cyprus. Through an innovative and fast answer to the European Central Bank had a leading role in tackling the crisis: the European legal framework for emergency loans was modified and cross-border coordination was performed. Crucial factor was that, in countries such as Belgium, Greece and Italy after, most EU and eurozone countries thanks to the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) and the Treaty of Maastricht had their debt under control. The result was that most European countries have not been hit as hard by the recession and the United States. The Anglo-American capitalism performed moderately, while the European system had shown its resilience (for the first time). Adapted from the source document.
In: Overbeek , H W 2019 , ' De schuldencrisis in de Eurozone : Oorzaken, aanpak en implicaties ' , Beleid en Maatschappij , vol. 46 , no. 1 , pp. 134-154 . https://doi.org/10.5553/BenM/138900692019046001010
Ten years ago, now, the Eurozone began to shake on its foundations. This article traces the genesis of the crisis and the present state of affairs. As to the causes of the global financial crisis in 2008, I argue that contrary to common understanding, the financial crisis had its deeper causes in a decades old tendency towards crisis in the real economy, produced by the continuous overaccumulation of capital which can only return profits by undertaking speculative short-term investments (a phenomenon known as 'financialisation'). I then trace how the global financial crisis morphed into a crisis of public deficits and debt in 2010-2011, particularly in the Eurozone. Three factors are shown to be responsible: financialization, design faults in the European monetary union, and the neo-mercantilist strategy of especially Germany and the Netherlands. The paper next looks at the five main traits of the policy responses in the Eurozone: bailing out governments and banks through creating emergency funds; imposition of austerity and budget discipline for member state governments; attempting to create and complete a Eurozone banking union; subsequently the European Central Bank engaged on an unprecedented scale in 'quantitative easing'; and finally, institutional reform in an attempt to repair the most pressing design faults of the EMU. The paper concludes that the underlying structural factors leading up to the crisis have only been addressed incompletely: the overaccumulation of capital continues, the completion of the banking union is in an impasse, quantitative easing has mostly just intensified financialization by pushing up asset prizes, and institutional reform has taken the form of a fundamentally undemocratic attempt at monetary and political union by stealth. The broader legitimacy of the European project has been substantially undermined, and Europe is not in a better position than eight years ago in case of a new global crisis.
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In: OMV 21
In: Cahiers AEDBF/EVBFR-Belgium 15