Suchergebnisse

Includes bibliographies. ; [v. 1] Statutes and related materials selected and annotated by Hans Aufricht. Pref. by Per Jacobsson. -- v. 2. Europe; statutes and related materials selected and annotated by Hans Aufricht with the assistance of Jane B. Evensen. Pref. by Pierre-Paul Schweitzer. ; Mode of access: Internet. ; conv lwr.

An examination of the post-recession responsibilities of central banks, this book proposes adaptations to the central banking model that preserve the advantages in terms of inflation control brought by their independence, while taking into account the long-term consequences of the Great Recession.

The paper develops a communication game that is applied to the question of central bank policy and independence. The game is about the preferred degree of conservatism of monetary policy and the game setting consists of a principal (politics), an agent (central bank) and an observer (financial market participants). The extent of the welfare losses depends on the degree of knowledge, the endogenized signaling of financial market participants and the probability whether the degree of conservatism in monetary policy is adequate to nature. Consequently, a mechanism to minimize welfare losses of the principal has to be implemented. It is shown how the introduction of an institutional control mechanism with a countervailing goal function will improve the utilities for the principal.

Culture and the economy -- Stability cultures and independent central banking -- The German Stabilitätskultur -- A stability culture for europe -- Stability culture and the financial crisis in America

This book explores financial stability issues in the context of East Asia. In the East Asian region financial stability has been a major concern ever since the Asian crisis of 1997/98, which still looms large in the collective memory of the affected countries. The global crisis, which had its starting point in 2007, only served to exacerbate this concern. Safeguarding financial stability is therefore a major goal of any country in the region. Diverging cultural, political and economic backgrounds may however pose different stability challenges and necessary cooperation may be complicated by this diversity. Against this backdrop the contributions of this book by leading academics from the fields of economics and law as well as by practitioners from central banks shed light on various financial stability issues. The volume explores the legal environment of central banks as lenders of last resort and analyzes challenges to financial stability such as shadow banking and the choice of exchange rate regimes. Case studies from China, Japan and Indonesia are contrasted with experiences from Europe.

Central banking has a long and colourful history from which important lessons can be drawn. This text reviews the policy objectives and financial operations of 25 central banks established before 1800 to show that many of today's central banking controversies date as far back as this time.

This book reflects on the innovations that central banks have introduced since the 2008 collapse of Lehman Brothers to improve their modes of intervention, regulation and resolution of financial markets and financial institutions. Authors from both academia and policy circles explore these innovations through four approaches: "Bank Capital Regulation" examines the Basel III agreement; "Bank Resolution" focuses on effective regimes for regulating and resolving ailing banks; "Central Banking with Collateral-Based Finance" develops thought on the challenges that market-based finance pose for the conduct of central banking; and "Where Next for Central Banking" examines the trajectory of central banking and its new, central role in sustaining capitalism.

We analyze the effect of central bank transparency on cross-border bank activities. Based on a panel gravity model for cross-border bank claims for 21 home and 47 destination countries from 1998 to 2010, we find strong empirical evidence that a rise in central bank transparency in the destination country, on average, increases cross-border claims. Using interaction models, we find that the positive effect of central bank transparency on cross-border claims is only significant if the central bank is politically independent. Central bank transparency and credibility are thus considered complements by banks investing abroad.

Since the global financial crisis the unprecedented role independent central banks have come to play in our societies has been increasingly disputed. This, in turn, has drawn greater attention to the link between their legitimacy, public support and their independence. Over the past thirty years, academics and central bankers have tried to systematically pin down the sources of central bank independence. One of them, however, culture, has continuously eluded their grip. By engaging in an ethnography of the social text of German, European and US monetary affairs, this book introduces a new analytical framework that will enable practitioners and academics, particularly within sociology, economics, political economy, and political science, to gain a clear understanding of the role of culture in central banking. Also, it will show why for an independent central bank meeting its own monetary goals may not be enough to secure public support for itself and its currency..