Suchergebnisse

"Negotiation in the Law Enforcement Context" published on by Oxford University Press.

An experimental study was performed investigating the influence of handrail height on the ability of stairway users to generate stabilizing forces and moments, with the aim of improving stairway safety by developing better handrail design standards. The experiments involved measurement of the maximum forces and moments that subjects were able to exert on a handrail while they stood stationary in an upright position. Two age groups were tested: young (20 to 45 years) and elderly (59 years and over), with a total of 35 subjects. All subjects showed a strong linear dependence on handrail height in generating stabilizing forces and moments. Ability to generate forward/backward forces and forward/backward moments increased linearly with increasing handrail height. Ability to generate upward force decreased linearly with increasing handrail height. Based on the results, an optimal design range for handrail height was estimated.

Confidence in and responses to an unreliable test alarm were studied in the presence of nearby unspecified alarms. The test alarm's reliability rate was represented as averaging "true" only 50% or 60% of the time. Confidence or response rates ranged proportionately from 23% to 97% with the number of active alarms within 5, 6, 7, or 9 annunciator arrays. Adjacent alarms resulted in confidence estimates that were higher (by about 10%) than those with the same number of active alarms spaced up to 3 positions away. Simultaneously activated alarms resulted in a more than 20% increase in "true" responses compared with the same number of alarms offset in time by up to 32 s, regardless of which came first. Active alarms "known" to be functionally related to, or independent of, the test alarm substantially raised or lowered responding but did not completely overcome prior effects. These findings indicate that presumptions that operators' responses are not influenced by nearby alarms, regardless of their function, may be unwarranted. Applications of this research include suggestions to improve responding and training recommendations.

This paper analyzes how bounded rationality affects monetary and fiscal policy via an empirically relevant enrichment of the New Keynesian model. It models agents' partial myopia toward distant atypical events using a new microfounded "cognitive discounting" parameter. Compared to the rational model, (i) there is no forward guidance puzzle; (ii) the Taylor principle changes: with passive monetary policy but enough myopia equilibria are determinate and economies stable; (iii) the zero lower bound is much less costly; (iv) price-level targeting is not optimal; (v) fiscal stimulus is effective; (vi) the model is " neo-Fisherian" in the long run, Keynesian in the short run. (JEL E12, E31, E43, E52, E62, E70)

This dissertation examines game theory models in the context of persuasion and competition wherein decision-makers are not completely rational by considering two complementary threads of research. The first thread of research pertains to offensive and preemptively defensive behavioral models. Research in this thread makes three notable contributions. First, an offensive modeling framework is created to identify how an entity optimally influences a populace to take a desired course of action. Second, a defensive modeling framework is defined wherein a regulating entity takes action to bound the behavior of multiple adversaries simultaneously attempting to persuade a group of decision-makers. Third, an offensive influence modeling framework under conditions of ambiguity is developed in accordance with historical information limitations, and we demonstrate how it can be used to select a robust course of action on a specific, data-driven use case. The second thread of research pertains to behavioral and behaviorally robust approaches to deterrence. Research in this thread makes two notable contributions. First, we demonstrate the alternative insights behavioral game theory generates for the analysis of classic deterrence games, and explicate the rich analysis generated from its combined use with standard equilibrium models. Second, we define behaviorally robust models for an agent to use in a normal form game under varying forms of uncertainty in order to inform deterrence policy decisions.