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"Rational Choice Theory in Political Decision Making" published on by Oxford University Press.

In this paper problems of social choice in general, and political choice in particular, are considered in light of uncertainty. The space of social alternatives in this formulation includes not only pure social states, but lotteries or probability distributions over those states as well. In the context of candidate strategy selection in a spatial model of political choice, candidate strategy sets are represented by pure strategies—points in the space of alternatives—and ambiguous strategies—lotteries over those points. Questions about optimal strategy choice and the equilibrium properties of these choices are then entertained. Duncan Black's theorem about the dominance of the median preference is generalized, and further contingencies in which the theorem is false are specified. The substantive foci of these results are: (1) the conditions in which seekers of political office will rationally choose to appear equivocal in their policy intentions; and (2) the role of institutional structure in defining equilibrium.

The basic insight of the literature concerning the Median Voter Theorem and its applications, dating back to Black (1948), is that the policies implemented by di¤erent parties once in o¢ce should approach the median voter's preferred policy if they run in a single-dimensional and democratic electoral space. This strong prediction has been challenged in recent years using arguments related to the observation that usually the political spaces concern much more than one single dimension and that, once we consider such a space, the Median Voter Theorem cannot be applied. Our idea is that one can challenge the median voter predictions even if we keep considering just one single dimension. Infect also in electoral competitions characterized by a very important issue seen by voters as "salient" is almost impossible to observe in reality the convergence predicted by the Black's theorem. In the present model we introduce a simple assumption over the process of opinions' formation of the voters and we show as in equilibrium strategic considerations lead the parties to choose polarized platforms.

The basic insight of the literature concerning the Median Voter Theorem and its applications, dating back to Black (1948), is that the policies implemented by di¤erent parties once in o¢ce should approach the median voter's preferred policy if they run in a single-dimensional and democratic electoral space. This strong prediction has been challenged in recent years using arguments related to the observation that usually the political spaces concern much more than one single dimension and that, once we consider such a space, the Median Voter Theorem cannot be applied. Our idea is that one can challenge the median voter predictions even if we keep considering just one single dimension. Infect also in electoral competitions characterized by a very important issue seen by voters as "salient" is almost impossible to observe in reality the convergence predicted by the Black's theorem. In the present model we introduce a simple assumption over the process of opinions' formation of the voters and we show as in equilibrium strategic considerations lead the parties to choose polarized platforms.

Preface -- Acknowledgements -- List of Figures -- List of Tables -- Fuzzy Social Choice -- 1.1 The Purpose and Plan of the Book -- 1.2 General Concepts -- 1.2.1 Sets -- 1.2.2 Subsets -- 1.2.3 Relations -- 1.2.4 Fuzzy Intersection and Union -- 1.2.5 Residuum -- References -- Classical Social Choice Theorems -- 2.1 Arrows Theorem -- 2.2 Discussion -- 2.3 Gibbard-Sattherthwaite Theorem -- 2.4 The Median Voter Theorem -- 2.5 The Maximal Set -- References -- Rationality of Fuzzy Preferences -- 3.1 The Structure of Fuzzy Preference Relations -- 3.2 Consistency of Fuzzy Preferences and the Fuzzy Maximal Set -- 3.3 Empirical Application I: Deriving an FWPR from a Fuzzy Preference Function -- References -- Arrow and the Aggregation of Fuzzy Preferences -- 4.1 Fuzzifying Arrow's Conditions -- 4.1.1 Transitivity -- 4.1.2 Weak Paretianism -- 4.1.3 Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives -- 4.1.4 Dictatorship -- 4.2 Making and Breaking Arrow's Theorem -- 4.3 Empirical Application II: The Spatial Model and Fuzzy Aggregation -- References -- Characteristics of Strategy-Proof Fuzzy Social Choice -- 5.1 Fuzzy Choice and Manipulation -- 5.2 Fuzzy Social Choice: Definitions and Concepts -- 5.2.1 Fuzzifying ASB II -- 5.2.2 Relaxing the Conditions of Abdelaziz et. al. -- 5.3 Findings -- 5.4 Implications for the Spatial Model -- 5.5 Conclusions -- References -- Fuzzy Black's Median Voter Theorem -- 6.1 The Structure of Fuzzy Rules and Strict Preference -- 6.2 Basic Definitions and Concepts -- 6.3 New and Old Fuzzy Voting Rules -- 6.4 Single-Peaked Preferences and the Maximal Set -- 6.5 Extending Black's Median Voter Theorem -- 6.6 An Application -- 6.7 Conclusions and Spatial Models -- References -- Representing Thick Indifference in Spatial Models -- 7.1 Stability and Thick Indifference in Individual Preferences

AbstractDuncan Black, like Adam Smith before him, was trained at, and taught at, the University of Glasgow. Like Smith, Black followed the Enlightenment in appreciating the importance of theory and of its empirical applications. Black sought to apply the ideas of a schedule of preferences and a conception of equilibrium, to politics, as Smith had done in economics. Black believed that his median voter theorem could generalize to a theory of politics, much as Smith's contributions did for market economics. Black did not complete that generalization, but William Riker did offer a theory of institutional politics, designed to complete Black's project.

The New Great Game is a geopolitical competition between regional stakeholders over energy resources in Central Asia. The author seeks to use the expected utility voting model based on Black's median voter theorem for forecasting the New Great Game in Central Asia. To judge the external validity of the voting model, the author uses data from the Correlates of War project data set, to formulate three distinct models based only on the numbers in 1992 and 1993. Capabilities and alliance data were used to develop balance of power positions and compare the outcome of 100 simulations to the actual outcome in 2000 based on Correlates of War project data. This allows us to judge whether the emergence of Russia's weak advantage as well as the continuation of the competition in the New Great Game as of 2000 could have been predicted based on what was known in 1992 and 1993. By using only one year's data to forecast the New Great Game, we are able to eliminate historical and researcher bias and judge the applicability of the model in global policy and strategic analysis. ; 2009-12-01 ; Ph.D. ; Health and Public Affairs, Other ; Doctorate ; This record was generated from author submitted information.

Political science remains an emergent discipline; but research within it has congealed around a set of well-defined programs that has engaged an international community of scholars. Here I will identify three of these programs in order to show the continued intellectual vibrancy of the discipline. First, in normative theory, political scientists are working out the implications of John Rawls' A Theory of Justice in a program that has reinvigorated liberalism to make it speak to core political issues of our time. Second, in a program once embedded bureaucratically in "American Politics," political scientists are working out the implications of Duncan Black's median voter theorem in an expanded set of democratic countries with different institutional details to address the core political issues of representation and accountability. Third, relying on extensive cross-sectional time-series data previously unavailable, on computer programs not imaginable a generation ago, and on theoretical developments in econometrics, political scientists are fulfilling a dream of the founders of the behavioral revolution (Stein Rokkan, S. M. Lipset, and Karl Deutsch) by addressing systematically the sources of democracy and political order. To be sure, there are other political science research programs, for example, in international relations, in comparative political economy, and in political psychology, that could well have been elucidated in this essay. My goal here, in addressing Professor Sartori's jeremiad, is not to show the scope of the field, but rather its quality, its internationalism, and its real-world relevance. This is best done with a few select examples.

Contents -- 1 Non-monotonic Voting Methods: An Overview -- Abstract -- 1.1 Introduction -- 1.2 Types of Monotonicity Failure -- 1.3 The Plan of the Book -- References -- 2 Descriptions of the Voting Methods to Be Analyzed -- Abstract -- 2.1 Introduction -- 2.2 Five Voting Methods Susceptible to Types of Monotonicity Failure Under Both Fixed and Variable Electorates -- 2.2.1 Plurality with Runoff (P-R) -- 2.2.2 Alternative Vote (AV -- aka Instant Runoff Voting -- Ranked Choice Voting) -- 2.2.3 The Coombs Method (Cf. Coombs 1964, pp. 397-399 -- Straffin 1980 -- Coombs et al. 1984) -- 2.2.4 The Dodgson Method (Cf. Black 1958, pp. 222-234 -- McLean and Urken 1995, pp. 288-297) -- 2.2.5 The Nanson Method (Cf. Nanson 1883 -- McLean and Urken 1995, Chap. 14) -- 2.3 Eight Voting Methods Susceptible to Types of Monotonicity Failure Under Variable Electorates -- 2.3.1 Successive Elimination (Cf. Farquharson 1969) -- 2.3.2 Bucklin's Method (Cf. Hoag and Hallett 1926, pp. 485-491 -- Tideman 2006, p. 203) -- 2.3.3 Majority Judgment (Cf. Balinski and Laraki 2007a, b, 2010) -- 2.3.4 Copeland's Method (Copeland 1951) -- 2.3.5 Black's Method (Black 1958, p. 66) -- 2.3.6 Kemeny's Method (Kemeny 1959 -- Kemeny and Snell 1960 -- Young and Levenglick 1978 -- Young 1988, 1995) -- 2.3.7 Schwartz's Method (Schwartz 1972, 1986) -- 2.3.8 Young's Method (Young 1977) -- 2.4 Five Main Procedures that Are not Susceptible to Any Monotonicity Failure -- 2.4.1 Plurality (or First Past the Post) Voting Procedure -- 2.4.2 Approval Voting (Brams and Fishburn 1978, 1983) -- 2.4.3 Borda's Count (Cf. de Borda 1784 -- Black 1958 -- McLean and Urken 1995, pp. 83-89) -- 2.4.4 Range Voting (Smith 2000) -- 2.4.5 The Minmax Procedure -- References -- 3 Some Theoretical Results on Monotonicity-Related Properties of Voting Rules -- Abstract -- 3.1 Smith's (1973) Theorem

Essays -- Public Choice and Constitutional Political Economy -- Public Choice: An Introduction -- Are Vote and Popularity Functions Economically Correct? -- Constitutional Political Economy -- Corruption -- Dictatorship -- Environmental Politics -- Experimental Public Choice -- Gordon Tullock at Four Score Years: An Evaluation -- Interest Group Behavior and Influence -- International Trade Policy: Departure from Free Trade -- James M. Buchanan -- Milton Friedman, 1912: Harbinger of the Public Choice Revolution -- Monetary Policy and Central Bank Behavior -- The Political Economy of Taxation: Positive and Normative Analysis When Collective Choice Matters -- Public Choice from the Perspective of Economics -- Public Choice from the Perspective of the History of Thought -- Public Choice Theory from the Perspective of Law -- Public Choice from the Perspective of Philosophy -- Public Choice from the Perspective of Sociology -- Public Finance -- Regulation and Antitrust -- Scholarly Legacy of Mancur Olson -- Shadow Economy -- Social Choice, Contracts and Logrolling -- Spatial Theory -- Trade Liberalization and Globalization -- William H. Riker -- Concepts -- Academia -- Al-Qaeda -- Alternative Voting Methods -- Altruism -- The Anatomy of Political Representation -- Approval Voting -- Arbitration and Bargaining -- Arrow's Impossibility Theorem -- An 'Austrian' Perspective on Public Choice -- Autocracy -- Autocratic Succession -- Bicameralism -- Blackmail -- Black's Single-Peakedness Condition -- Budgetary Processes -- Budget Deficits -- Bureaucratic Discretion -- Campaign Contributions and Campaign Finance -- Campaign Finance 1 -- Campaign Finance 2 -- Central Banks -- Chicago Political Economy -- The Clayton Act -- Coalitions and Power Indices -- Coalitions and Social Choice -- Coase Theorem and Political Markets -- Coercion -- Collective Action Under the Articles of Confederation -- Committee Assignments -- Committee Jurisdictions and PAC Contributions -- Committees in Legislatures -- Commons and Anticommons -- Constitution -- Constitutional Frameworks and Economic Progress -- The Constitution of the European Union -- Constitutional Political Economy -- The Contemporary Political Economy Approach to Bureaucracy -- Contractarianism -- Corruption 1 -- Corruption 2 -- Cost and Choice -- The Cost Disease of the Personal Services -- Customary Law -- The Demand-Revealing Process -- Deregulation of Postal Service -- Dictators and Social Contracts -- Direct Democracy -- Discrimination -- Dynamic Inconsistency -- Economic Freedom and its Measurement -- Economic Freedom and Political Freedom -- Economic Regulation -- The Economic Theory of Clubs -- Economists Versus the Public on Economic Policy -- Education and the State -- Efficiency of Democracy -- Efficiency of Democracy? -- The Efficiency of the Common Law Hypothesis -- Elected Versus Appointed Regulators -- Election Models -- Electoral College -- Electoral Competition in Mixed Systems of Representation -- The Elusive Median Voter -- Emerging from the Hobbesian Jungle -- Endogenous Morality -- Enron -- Environmental Politics and Economic Development -- The Euro -- European Political Integration -- Evolution of Institutions -- The Evolution of Law -- Experimental Economics and Public Choice -- Experimental Public Choice -- Expressive Voting and Redistribution -- Fair Division -- Fame and Politics -- Federal Reserve System -- Forecasting Presidential Elections in the United States -- Game Theory -- Game Theory in Public Choice -- Generality and the Efficiency of Government Decision Making -- Group Roles in Evolution and Cognition -- Growth of Local Government in the United States -- The Growth of Public Expenditure -- The Growth of the Relative Size of Government -- Heresthetics and the Evolution of the Us Constitution -- Homo Economicus -- Human Evolution and Political Behavior -- Ideology -- The Importance of the Middle in Spatial Politics -- Initiative and Referendum -- Institutions of Trade Protection -- Interest Groups 1 -- Interest Groups 2 -- International Game of Power -- International Organization -- Internet Voting -- Is Russia a Market Economy? -- Is Voting Rational? -- The Italian Public Finance Contribution to Public Choice -- The Judiciary -- The Law and Economics Movement -- Legal Precedents and Judicial Discretion -- Legal Rules and Standards -- Legislative Politics -- Legislators -- Leviathan Models of Government -- Logic of Collective Action -- The Logic of Liberty -- Logrolling 1 -- Logrolling 2 -- Meddlesome Preferences and Rent Extraction: The Tobacco Shakedown -- The Median in Politics -- The Median Voter Model -- Medieval Church -- Mercantilism -- Monetary Politics -- The New Deal -- Nonprofit Organizations -- The Origins of Social Choice Theory -- The Paradox of Rebellion -- Parchment Versus Guns -- Political and Cultural Nationalism -- Political Business Cycles -- Political Economics and Public Choice -- The Political Economy of FEMA Disaster Payments -- The Political Economy of Italian Electoral Reform -- Political Transaction-Cost Manipulation -- Pressure Groups and Uninformed Voters -- Principal-Agent Relationships in the Theory of Bureaucracy -- Prohibition -- Public Choice and Socialism -- Public Choice and the Chicago School of Antitrust -- Public Choice in Italy -- Public Enterprise -- Public Finance and the Median Voter Model -- Public Finance in Democratic Process -- Public Goods -- Public Schools -- Public Utility Regulation -- Rational Choice Approaches to Economic and Political History -- Rational Ignorance -- Rational Irrationality -- Reciprocity -- Redistributive Politics 1 -- Redistributive Politics 2 -- Regulating Government -- Regulatory Takings -- Rent Dissipation -- Rent Extraction -- Rent Seeking -- Rent Seeking and Political Institutions -- Rent-Seeking Games -- Rent Seeking in Development -- The Rule of Law -- Rules Versus Standards -- Self-Interest -- Selfish Gene -- September 11, 2001 -- Single-Peaked Preferences and Median Voter Theorems -- The Social Cost of Rent Seeking -- Sortition -- Standard Oil and Microsoft: Antitrust Lessons -- State-Sponsored Murder as a Rent-Seeking Activity -- Structure-Induced Equilibrium -- Supply of Public Goods -- The Supreme Court -- Takings and Public Choice: The Persuasion of Price -- Term Limits 1 -- Term Limits 2 -- Terrorism -- The Theory and Measurement of Economic Freedom -- Totalitarianism -- Trade Protectionism -- Transitional Economies -- Transitions from Autocracy to Democracy -- Triangulation -- Underground Government: The Off-Budget Public Sector -- The Value of Voting Rights -- Votes for Women -- Voting Equipment, Minorities and the Poor -- Voting in U.S. Presidential Elections -- Voting Paradoxes in List Systems of Proportional Representation -- The War on Drugs -- Welfare Economics and Public Choice -- Welfare Economics and the Theory of the State -- Why Government Succeeds.