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Preface -- Acknowledgements -- List of Figures -- List of Tables -- Fuzzy Social Choice -- 1.1 The Purpose and Plan of the Book -- 1.2 General Concepts -- 1.2.1 Sets -- 1.2.2 Subsets -- 1.2.3 Relations -- 1.2.4 Fuzzy Intersection and Union -- 1.2.5 Residuum -- References -- Classical Social Choice Theorems -- 2.1 Arrows Theorem -- 2.2 Discussion -- 2.3 Gibbard-Sattherthwaite Theorem -- 2.4 The Median Voter Theorem -- 2.5 The Maximal Set -- References -- Rationality of Fuzzy Preferences -- 3.1 The Structure of Fuzzy Preference Relations -- 3.2 Consistency of Fuzzy Preferences and the Fuzzy Maximal Set -- 3.3 Empirical Application I: Deriving an FWPR from a Fuzzy Preference Function -- References -- Arrow and the Aggregation of Fuzzy Preferences -- 4.1 Fuzzifying Arrow's Conditions -- 4.1.1 Transitivity -- 4.1.2 Weak Paretianism -- 4.1.3 Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives -- 4.1.4 Dictatorship -- 4.2 Making and Breaking Arrow's Theorem -- 4.3 Empirical Application II: The Spatial Model and Fuzzy Aggregation -- References -- Characteristics of Strategy-Proof Fuzzy Social Choice -- 5.1 Fuzzy Choice and Manipulation -- 5.2 Fuzzy Social Choice: Definitions and Concepts -- 5.2.1 Fuzzifying ASB II -- 5.2.2 Relaxing the Conditions of Abdelaziz et. al. -- 5.3 Findings -- 5.4 Implications for the Spatial Model -- 5.5 Conclusions -- References -- Fuzzy Black's Median Voter Theorem -- 6.1 The Structure of Fuzzy Rules and Strict Preference -- 6.2 Basic Definitions and Concepts -- 6.3 New and Old Fuzzy Voting Rules -- 6.4 Single-Peaked Preferences and the Maximal Set -- 6.5 Extending Black's Median Voter Theorem -- 6.6 An Application -- 6.7 Conclusions and Spatial Models -- References -- Representing Thick Indifference in Spatial Models -- 7.1 Stability and Thick Indifference in Individual Preferences

Contents -- 1 Non-monotonic Voting Methods: An Overview -- Abstract -- 1.1 Introduction -- 1.2 Types of Monotonicity Failure -- 1.3 The Plan of the Book -- References -- 2 Descriptions of the Voting Methods to Be Analyzed -- Abstract -- 2.1 Introduction -- 2.2 Five Voting Methods Susceptible to Types of Monotonicity Failure Under Both Fixed and Variable Electorates -- 2.2.1 Plurality with Runoff (P-R) -- 2.2.2 Alternative Vote (AV -- aka Instant Runoff Voting -- Ranked Choice Voting) -- 2.2.3 The Coombs Method (Cf. Coombs 1964, pp. 397-399 -- Straffin 1980 -- Coombs et al. 1984) -- 2.2.4 The Dodgson Method (Cf. Black 1958, pp. 222-234 -- McLean and Urken 1995, pp. 288-297) -- 2.2.5 The Nanson Method (Cf. Nanson 1883 -- McLean and Urken 1995, Chap. 14) -- 2.3 Eight Voting Methods Susceptible to Types of Monotonicity Failure Under Variable Electorates -- 2.3.1 Successive Elimination (Cf. Farquharson 1969) -- 2.3.2 Bucklin's Method (Cf. Hoag and Hallett 1926, pp. 485-491 -- Tideman 2006, p. 203) -- 2.3.3 Majority Judgment (Cf. Balinski and Laraki 2007a, b, 2010) -- 2.3.4 Copeland's Method (Copeland 1951) -- 2.3.5 Black's Method (Black 1958, p. 66) -- 2.3.6 Kemeny's Method (Kemeny 1959 -- Kemeny and Snell 1960 -- Young and Levenglick 1978 -- Young 1988, 1995) -- 2.3.7 Schwartz's Method (Schwartz 1972, 1986) -- 2.3.8 Young's Method (Young 1977) -- 2.4 Five Main Procedures that Are not Susceptible to Any Monotonicity Failure -- 2.4.1 Plurality (or First Past the Post) Voting Procedure -- 2.4.2 Approval Voting (Brams and Fishburn 1978, 1983) -- 2.4.3 Borda's Count (Cf. de Borda 1784 -- Black 1958 -- McLean and Urken 1995, pp. 83-89) -- 2.4.4 Range Voting (Smith 2000) -- 2.4.5 The Minmax Procedure -- References -- 3 Some Theoretical Results on Monotonicity-Related Properties of Voting Rules -- Abstract -- 3.1 Smith's (1973) Theorem

Essays -- Public Choice and Constitutional Political Economy -- Public Choice: An Introduction -- Are Vote and Popularity Functions Economically Correct? -- Constitutional Political Economy -- Corruption -- Dictatorship -- Environmental Politics -- Experimental Public Choice -- Gordon Tullock at Four Score Years: An Evaluation -- Interest Group Behavior and Influence -- International Trade Policy: Departure from Free Trade -- James M. Buchanan -- Milton Friedman, 1912: Harbinger of the Public Choice Revolution -- Monetary Policy and Central Bank Behavior -- The Political Economy of Taxation: Positive and Normative Analysis When Collective Choice Matters -- Public Choice from the Perspective of Economics -- Public Choice from the Perspective of the History of Thought -- Public Choice Theory from the Perspective of Law -- Public Choice from the Perspective of Philosophy -- Public Choice from the Perspective of Sociology -- Public Finance -- Regulation and Antitrust -- Scholarly Legacy of Mancur Olson -- Shadow Economy -- Social Choice, Contracts and Logrolling -- Spatial Theory -- Trade Liberalization and Globalization -- William H. Riker -- Concepts -- Academia -- Al-Qaeda -- Alternative Voting Methods -- Altruism -- The Anatomy of Political Representation -- Approval Voting -- Arbitration and Bargaining -- Arrow's Impossibility Theorem -- An 'Austrian' Perspective on Public Choice -- Autocracy -- Autocratic Succession -- Bicameralism -- Blackmail -- Black's Single-Peakedness Condition -- Budgetary Processes -- Budget Deficits -- Bureaucratic Discretion -- Campaign Contributions and Campaign Finance -- Campaign Finance 1 -- Campaign Finance 2 -- Central Banks -- Chicago Political Economy -- The Clayton Act -- Coalitions and Power Indices -- Coalitions and Social Choice -- Coase Theorem and Political Markets -- Coercion -- Collective Action Under the Articles of Confederation -- Committee Assignments -- Committee Jurisdictions and PAC Contributions -- Committees in Legislatures -- Commons and Anticommons -- Constitution -- Constitutional Frameworks and Economic Progress -- The Constitution of the European Union -- Constitutional Political Economy -- The Contemporary Political Economy Approach to Bureaucracy -- Contractarianism -- Corruption 1 -- Corruption 2 -- Cost and Choice -- The Cost Disease of the Personal Services -- Customary Law -- The Demand-Revealing Process -- Deregulation of Postal Service -- Dictators and Social Contracts -- Direct Democracy -- Discrimination -- Dynamic Inconsistency -- Economic Freedom and its Measurement -- Economic Freedom and Political Freedom -- Economic Regulation -- The Economic Theory of Clubs -- Economists Versus the Public on Economic Policy -- Education and the State -- Efficiency of Democracy -- Efficiency of Democracy? -- The Efficiency of the Common Law Hypothesis -- Elected Versus Appointed Regulators -- Election Models -- Electoral College -- Electoral Competition in Mixed Systems of Representation -- The Elusive Median Voter -- Emerging from the Hobbesian Jungle -- Endogenous Morality -- Enron -- Environmental Politics and Economic Development -- The Euro -- European Political Integration -- Evolution of Institutions -- The Evolution of Law -- Experimental Economics and Public Choice -- Experimental Public Choice -- Expressive Voting and Redistribution -- Fair Division -- Fame and Politics -- Federal Reserve System -- Forecasting Presidential Elections in the United States -- Game Theory -- Game Theory in Public Choice -- Generality and the Efficiency of Government Decision Making -- Group Roles in Evolution and Cognition -- Growth of Local Government in the United States -- The Growth of Public Expenditure -- The Growth of the Relative Size of Government -- Heresthetics and the Evolution of the Us Constitution -- Homo Economicus -- Human Evolution and Political Behavior -- Ideology -- The Importance of the Middle in Spatial Politics -- Initiative and Referendum -- Institutions of Trade Protection -- Interest Groups 1 -- Interest Groups 2 -- International Game of Power -- International Organization -- Internet Voting -- Is Russia a Market Economy? -- Is Voting Rational? -- The Italian Public Finance Contribution to Public Choice -- The Judiciary -- The Law and Economics Movement -- Legal Precedents and Judicial Discretion -- Legal Rules and Standards -- Legislative Politics -- Legislators -- Leviathan Models of Government -- Logic of Collective Action -- The Logic of Liberty -- Logrolling 1 -- Logrolling 2 -- Meddlesome Preferences and Rent Extraction: The Tobacco Shakedown -- The Median in Politics -- The Median Voter Model -- Medieval Church -- Mercantilism -- Monetary Politics -- The New Deal -- Nonprofit Organizations -- The Origins of Social Choice Theory -- The Paradox of Rebellion -- Parchment Versus Guns -- Political and Cultural Nationalism -- Political Business Cycles -- Political Economics and Public Choice -- The Political Economy of FEMA Disaster Payments -- The Political Economy of Italian Electoral Reform -- Political Transaction-Cost Manipulation -- Pressure Groups and Uninformed Voters -- Principal-Agent Relationships in the Theory of Bureaucracy -- Prohibition -- Public Choice and Socialism -- Public Choice and the Chicago School of Antitrust -- Public Choice in Italy -- Public Enterprise -- Public Finance and the Median Voter Model -- Public Finance in Democratic Process -- Public Goods -- Public Schools -- Public Utility Regulation -- Rational Choice Approaches to Economic and Political History -- Rational Ignorance -- Rational Irrationality -- Reciprocity -- Redistributive Politics 1 -- Redistributive Politics 2 -- Regulating Government -- Regulatory Takings -- Rent Dissipation -- Rent Extraction -- Rent Seeking -- Rent Seeking and Political Institutions -- Rent-Seeking Games -- Rent Seeking in Development -- The Rule of Law -- Rules Versus Standards -- Self-Interest -- Selfish Gene -- September 11, 2001 -- Single-Peaked Preferences and Median Voter Theorems -- The Social Cost of Rent Seeking -- Sortition -- Standard Oil and Microsoft: Antitrust Lessons -- State-Sponsored Murder as a Rent-Seeking Activity -- Structure-Induced Equilibrium -- Supply of Public Goods -- The Supreme Court -- Takings and Public Choice: The Persuasion of Price -- Term Limits 1 -- Term Limits 2 -- Terrorism -- The Theory and Measurement of Economic Freedom -- Totalitarianism -- Trade Protectionism -- Transitional Economies -- Transitions from Autocracy to Democracy -- Triangulation -- Underground Government: The Off-Budget Public Sector -- The Value of Voting Rights -- Votes for Women -- Voting Equipment, Minorities and the Poor -- Voting in U.S. Presidential Elections -- Voting Paradoxes in List Systems of Proportional Representation -- The War on Drugs -- Welfare Economics and Public Choice -- Welfare Economics and the Theory of the State -- Why Government Succeeds.