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The basic insight of the literature concerning the Median Voter Theorem and its applications, dating back to Black (1948), is that the policies implemented by di¤erent parties once in o¢ce should approach the median voter's preferred policy if they run in a single-dimensional and democratic electoral space. This strong prediction has been challenged in recent years using arguments related to the observation that usually the political spaces concern much more than one single dimension and that, once we consider such a space, the Median Voter Theorem cannot be applied. Our idea is that one can challenge the median voter predictions even if we keep considering just one single dimension. Infect also in electoral competitions characterized by a very important issue seen by voters as "salient" is almost impossible to observe in reality the convergence predicted by the Black's theorem. In the present model we introduce a simple assumption over the process of opinions' formation of the voters and we show as in equilibrium strategic considerations lead the parties to choose polarized platforms.

The basic insight of the literature concerning the Median Voter Theorem and its applications, dating back to Black (1948), is that the policies implemented by di¤erent parties once in o¢ce should approach the median voter's preferred policy if they run in a single-dimensional and democratic electoral space. This strong prediction has been challenged in recent years using arguments related to the observation that usually the political spaces concern much more than one single dimension and that, once we consider such a space, the Median Voter Theorem cannot be applied. Our idea is that one can challenge the median voter predictions even if we keep considering just one single dimension. Infect also in electoral competitions characterized by a very important issue seen by voters as "salient" is almost impossible to observe in reality the convergence predicted by the Black's theorem. In the present model we introduce a simple assumption over the process of opinions' formation of the voters and we show as in equilibrium strategic considerations lead the parties to choose polarized platforms.

The New Great Game is a geopolitical competition between regional stakeholders over energy resources in Central Asia. The author seeks to use the expected utility voting model based on Black's median voter theorem for forecasting the New Great Game in Central Asia. To judge the external validity of the voting model, the author uses data from the Correlates of War project data set, to formulate three distinct models based only on the numbers in 1992 and 1993. Capabilities and alliance data were used to develop balance of power positions and compare the outcome of 100 simulations to the actual outcome in 2000 based on Correlates of War project data. This allows us to judge whether the emergence of Russia's weak advantage as well as the continuation of the competition in the New Great Game as of 2000 could have been predicted based on what was known in 1992 and 1993. By using only one year's data to forecast the New Great Game, we are able to eliminate historical and researcher bias and judge the applicability of the model in global policy and strategic analysis. ; 2009-12-01 ; Ph.D. ; Health and Public Affairs, Other ; Doctorate ; This record was generated from author submitted information.