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"Om Brexit?" eller "Om inte Brexit?" : Konsekvenser för transatlantisk säkerhet
In: http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:fhs:diva-6500
The starting point for this analysis is that there is no 'business as usual' when considering the consequences of the Brexit referendum: there is either the question 'if Brexit?' or the question 'if-not Brexit?' because there is no turning around or comfortable retreat to established positions. Starting with an analysis of the British debate this 'policy-brief paper' looks at the consequences of the Brexit referendum for transatlantic security relations and in particular the consequences for Sweden. The most important arguments are, in brief: (1) That the value conflict inherent in the British debate, essentially between Eurosceptic nationalism and pro-EU integrationism, is mirrored in several European nations and remains a challenge to the EU; (2) that while Britain remains a European power regardless of the outcome of the referendum, the British geo-political outlook is differs from that of other European nations and will have to be taken into account when considering transatlantic security relations; (3) that NATO is likely to be even more important if Britain leaves the EU but that a strengthening of NATO's European pillar is likely regardless of the outcome of the referendum, among other things because of US demands on European nations to improve their military capacity; (4) that Sweden in the case of Brexit is likely to lose influence over the development of European security cooperation in general but might nevertheless be able to gain in influence mainly as a result of Sweden's geo-strategic position. ; Rapport inom ramen för "Transatlantisk säkerhet" som ingår i Forskning för regeringens behov (FORBE)
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Kärnvapen i en alltmer multipolär värld : forskningsöversikt och jämförande analys av amerikansk, brittisk, fransk och rysk doktrin
In: http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:fhs:diva-8212
The first part of this report provides an overview of the history of nuclear weapons doctrine, as it evolved in parallel to the practice of warfare and war planning in the mid-1940s and subsequently as an integral element of the cold war. A distinction is made between the early development of nuclear weapons doctrine, when United States held a dominant position in the field, and the near-parity situation that ensued in the late 1960s and onwards. The second part of the report consists of an analysis of American, British, French and Russian nuclear weapons doctrine between 1991 and 2018, illustrating how a period of low tension was gradually replaced with a reinvigoration of mutual suspicion after the year 2000. A third part briefly examines recent contributions to the American scholarly debate about the utility of nuclear weapons for strategic thought in a world moving toward polycentrism, as it revisits earlier theoretical insights and challenges conventional wisdoms. The fourth and final part elicits lessons for Sweden in particular. Overall, the report demonstrates that nuclear weapons consistently have represented an integral element of managing security risks in the Western hemisphere but that domestic political and defense industry considerations play in as well. It also suggests that doctrinal adjustments mirror the major concerns of policymakers in this regard and that nuclear powers are well aware of special obligations and privileges ascribed to them by countries that lack this category of weapons. A world in which the United States wields the greatest share of this power (unipolarity) will nonetheless be quite different from one in which two countries possess roughly the same capacity (bipolarity), and yet fundamentally different from one in which three or more countries compete to gain, or sustain, an edge toward others (multipolarity). To the extent that the world is moving toward greater security competition including the dimension of nuclear power, it will inevitably be more difficult for individual states to remain on the sidelines, unless they are ready to compromise their political autonomy. In terms of options for aligning Sweden with a broader security arrangement in the near future, there are only three feasible alternatives that may offset the risk of nuclear coercion: responding within the framework of the EU, forge closer ties to NATO, or build a bilateral relationship to the United States. Each such option comes with its own set of assets and liabilities, as does remaining a passive bystander. ; Transaltantisk och europeisk säkerhet , FORBE
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Sovjetunionen och svenska vänsällskap 1945-1958 : sällskapen Sverige-Sovjetunionen som medel i sovjetisk strategi
The purpose of this dissertation is to describe and analyze how the Soviet Union attempted to win the sympathies of the Swedish population during the period 1945-1958 through the All-Union Society for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries (VOKS) and the Sweden-Soviet Union Societies. The dissertation includes the central Soviet decision-making apparatus' general formulation of strategy and what means were to be used to win the sympathies of populations in other countries. Concerning VOKS's work targeting Sweden, this dissertation examines the general strategies and means used in practice. This dissertation links these activities with realism which serves as an analytical framework. Realism focuses states seeking their security in the international system. Security is considered achievable through strategies for using different means of force, in this case, diplomacy and its sub-instruments in the form of soft power and public diplomacy. Immediately after World War II, VOKS was seen by the Soviets as a tool for countering American and British propaganda. VOKS's reorganization in the early 1950s led to more country-specific activities. Increasingly in the 1950s VOKS sought out partners from outside organizations associated with national communist parties. This strategy aimed to optimally convey the message and to popularize the Soviet Union. This also led to a decline in VOKS's importance. VOKS during the period 1945-1958 can be viewed as a collaborative project between the state and the party. The Soviet Union, through VOKS, used the Sweden-USSR Society to popularize the country among the Swedish public. VOKS took increasingly greater control over the societies' activities, which were reviewed and approved by the Soviet Embassy in Stockholm and VOKS in Moscow. To develop these societies, VOKS increased its efforts to influence the Communist Party of Sweden (SKP) to take part in the societies' activities. At the suggestion of VOKS in Moscow, the local Sweden-USSR societies formed a national organization in the autumn of 1950 called the Sweden-Soviet Union Federation. After 1953, VOKS's interest intensified in implementing and developing cultural collaborations with other actors in addition to the societies. Near the end of VOKS's existence, representatives from the Soviet Embassy and VOKS tried to establish an intergovernmental cultural agreement with Sweden. However, no such agreement was ever signed. The Soviet Union continued to channel most of its public diplomacy toward Sweden through the societies.
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