Côte d'Ivoire: Opposition Party Congress
In: Africa research bulletin. Political, social and cultural series, Band 60, Heft 12
ISSN: 1467-825X
In: Africa research bulletin. Political, social and cultural series, Band 60, Heft 12
ISSN: 1467-825X
In: World development: the multi-disciplinary international journal devoted to the study and promotion of world development, Band 176, S. 106512
In: Civil wars, S. 1-31
ISSN: 1743-968X
In: Global discourse: an interdisciplinary journal of current affairs and applied contemporary thought, Band 14, Heft 1, S. 79-95
ISSN: 2043-7897
Theories of international recognition posit that states' identities are formed through dialogical relations with other states. However, they often overlook the ways in which weaker states' struggles, constrained within the languages of the powerful, produce misrecognition and inhibit identity formation. This is the experience of many post-colonial francophone African states whose search for international recognition has been inhibited by their special relationship with France, their former coloniser. This article shows how such struggles for recognition can fail. It draws on two examples of francophone African countries, showing how their search for recognition sprung from the misrecognition of colonial experiences. Each has made explicit attempts to attract richer forms of state recognition through purposive acts but has continued to do so within post-colonial conditions. Using citizens' understandings of these struggles, the article explores what drove them, how they manifested and how they unravelled. It draws on Frantz Fanon's account of misrecognition, making a novel interpretation based on his concept of 'speaking proper French', or how experiences of 'identity alienation' can only produce further misrecognition.
In: Africa today, Band 70, Heft 3, S. 3-23
ISSN: 1527-1978
Abstract: This article looks at fatherhood and fathering as performative practices. Based on ethnographic fieldwork among middle-class fathers in urban Côte d'Ivoire, it explores intimate fathering as both an exceptional practice and a reinterpretation of hegemonic masculinities. Intimate fathering offers an alternative way of living for Ivorian men, who use it to renegotiate and reevaluate gender roles and relations between nuclear and extended families and to craft imaginaries of father-child relationships that differ greatly from their own experiences as children. I address here two blind spots in the study of contemporary parenting in Africa: paternal performances of care, often neglected in the literature in favor of mothering, and the dominant discourse of African fatherhood in crisis, highlighting a more nuanced view of engaged fatherhood.
In: Politique africaine, Band 171-172, Heft 3, S. 217-239
Dans le département de Bangolo (Côte d'Ivoire), les conflits fonciers ont pris depuis au moins trois décennies un caractère politique incontestable. Ils voient s'opposer une jeune population autochtone n'ayant que peu accès à la terre aux travailleurs migrants du Nord (ivoiriens et burkinabè) ayant massivement participé au développement des cultures de rente. Après des années de cessions foncières plus ou moins contraintes, au profit des allogènes, durant les dernières années de la guerre civile (2009-2012), les propriétaires autochtones revendiquent la transformation des rapports socio-fonciers vers le « boussan à vie ». Tant sa formalisation que sa mise en place relèvent d'un cadre extralégal laissé à l'initiative des notables et des jeunes autochtones sous l'impulsion de la réforme foncière du 13 octobre 2019.
In: Politique africaine, Band 171-172, Heft 3, S. 195-215
En Côte d'Ivoire, la lutte contre l'immigration irrégulière s'est imposée, depuis le milieu des années 2010, comme un nouvel objet d'intervention du développement. Touchant à la fois des migrants de retour et des potentiels migrants, cette lutte se déploie principalement par le biais de campagnes de sensibilisation mises en œuvre par des structures associatives. Cet article se propose d'interroger les figures sociales à l'origine de ces campagnes et leur positionnement sur le marché du développement. À la fois entrepreneurs et leaders associatifs, il s'agit de comprendre leurs logiques d'engagement pour, de participation à ou de contestation de l'ordre social du développement.
In: Routledge Studies of the Extractive Industries and Sustainable Development Series
Intro -- Cover -- Half Title -- Series Page -- Title Page -- Copyright Page -- Table of Contents -- List of illustrations -- Notes on contributors -- Acknowledgments -- 1 An introduction to mining, mobility, and social change -- Section I The Andes -- 2 Ch'ixi mobilities: Small-scale mining and Indigenous autonomy in the Bolivian tin belt -- 3 Mining, infrastructure, and mobility in the Andes -- 4 Navigating gendered landscapes of mineral extraction: Spatial mobility, women's autonomy, and mining development in the Peruvian Andes -- Section II Central and West Africa -- 5 Chasing gold: Technology, people, and matter on the move in Eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo -- 6 Making mining localities: Trajectories and stories of mining and mobility in Zambia -- 7 The governance of ASGM in Guinea and Côte d'Ivoire: (Im)mobility, territory, and technological change -- Section III Melanesia -- 8 Mining-induced in-migration in Papua New Guinea -- 9 Mining fronts, labor mobilities, and the construction of locality in Thio, New Caledonia -- 10 Beyond the enclave: Workforce mobility and livelihoods in a New Caledonia mining region -- Section IV Conclusion -- 11 Mining and mobility: Key insights, governance implications, and future research -- Index.
In: International relations: the journal of the David Davies Memorial Institute of International Studies
ISSN: 1741-2862
Since the Great Recession in 2008, the academic debate has been flooded with literature that predicts the sunset of the liberal world order including the practice of humanitarian intervention as initiated at the United Nations (UN) in the early 1990s and regulated by the adoption of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) in 2005. In contrast, this article argues that the practice of humanitarian intervention continues to operate under post-hegemonic and multipolar conditions, but in new ways. Based on a theorization of fundamental institutional change and exploratory case studies of the international reactions to the humanitarian crises in Libya, Côte d'Ivoire, Syria and Mali, and supportive evidence from Gambia and DR Congo, we show that contemporary humanitarian intervention is closely related to a normalization of the fundamental institution of great power management and a regionalization of international society. In this post-hegemonic world order, humanitarian intervention is shaped, facilitated or hampered by various practices of great power management including concert, soft balancing and hard balancing. The return of great-power competition means an inconsistent and sometimes counterproductive resort to humanitarian intervention far from the ideals of the R2P, but the growing importance of regional ownership affects the great powers, keeps this potential response to mass atrocity crimes on the table and adds to its legitimacy.
In: Routledge Studies on African and Black Diaspora
This book investigates the diverse and dynamic forms of migration within Africa. Centring themes of agency, resource flows, and transnational networks, the book examines the enduring appeal of the Global South as a place of origin, transit, and destination. Popular media, government pronouncements, and much of the global research discourse continue to be oriented towards migration from the Global South to the Global North, despite the fact that the vast majority of migration is South-South. This book moves beyond these mischaracterisations and instead distinctly focuses on the agency of African migrants and the creative strategies they employ while planning their routes within and across the African continent. Case studies explore the flow of resources such as people, money, skills, and knowledge throughout the continent, while also casting a light on the lived experiences of migrants as they negotiate their sometimes precarious and vulnerable positions. Underpinned by intensive empirical studies, this book challenges prevailing narratives and provides a new way of thinking about South-South Migration. Composed by a majority of scholars from the Global South, the book will be crucial reading for researchers, students, and policy makers with a focus on South-South Migration, Migration and Inequalities, Migration and Development, and Refugee and Humanitarian Studies.
"The book explores how wartime processes affects post-war state-building efforts when rebels win a civil war and come into power. Post-war governance is a continuation of war: although violence has ceased, the victor must consolidate its control over the state through a process of internal conquest. This means carefully making choices about resource allocation towards development and security. Where does the victor choose to spend, and why? And what are the implications for ultimately consolidating power and preventing conflict recurrence? The book examines wartime rebel-civilian ties under rebel governance and explains how these ties-along with rebel governing institutions-shape the rebel victors' post-war various resource allocation strategies to establish control at the sub-national level. In turn, successfully balancing resource dedicated toward development and security helps the victor to consolidate power. The book relies on mixed-methods evidence from Zimbabwe and Liberia, combining interviews, focus groups, and archival data with fine-grained census, administrative, survey, and conflict datasets to provide an in-depth examination of subnational variation in wartime rebel behavior and post-war governing strategies. A comparison of Zimbabwe and Liberia alongside four additional civil wars in Burundi, Rwanda, Côte d'Ivoire, and Angola further demonstrates the importance of wartime civilian tie-formation for post-war control. The argument's central insights point to war and peace as part of a long state-building process, and suggest that the international community should pay attention to sub-national political constraints that new governments face. Findings offer implications for recent rebel victories and, more broadly, for understanding the termination, trajectories, and political legacies of such conflicts around the world"--
World Affairs Online
In: Africa's Global Engagement: Perspectives from Emerging Countries
Section I: Philosophical, Theoretical & Historical Overview Of The Responsibility To Protect -- Chapter I: Introduction -- Chapter II: Responsibility-to-Protect and a Tri-dimensional Methodology: Exploring the Epistemic-Morality of an Interventionist -- Chapter III: From Peacekeeping to the Responsibility to Protect: Unpacking the Genealogy and History of the RtoP Doctrine in the International Humanitarian System -- Section II: Theory & Practice Of The Responsibility To Protect In Africa -- Chapter IV: A Critical Reflection of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's Responsibility to Protect Intervention in Libya -- Chapter V: Horizontal Inequality - Armed Violence and the Responsibility to Protect in Africa: The Cote d'Ivoire Experience -- Chapter VI: Insurgency, Responsibility to Protect at the Expense of Local Protection in the Civilian Joint Task Force in the North-Eastern Region of Nigeria -- Chapter VII: The Sahel Region and the Dilemma of Civilian Protection: A Challenge to the Responsibility to Protect -- Chapter VIII: The Anglophone – Cameroon Conflict and the Responsibility to Protect -- Chapter IX: The Responsibility to Protect and International Community Response to the Boko Haram Insurgency in Nigeria -- Chapter X: From Regionalization of Peacekeeping to the Responsibility to Protect in Africa: The Gambia Experience -- Chapter XI: The US Foreign Policy and the Responsibility to Protect in Africa -- Section III: Emerging & contending issues from the pratice of the responsibility to protect in africa -- Chapter XII: The African Union, Responsibility to Protect and the Mantra of African Solutions to African Problems -- Chapter XIII: Implementing the RtoP: Coordinating Approaches Between the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) and the International Criminal Court (ICC) -- Chapter XIV: Peace Enforcement In The Face of International Military Intervention -- Chapter XV: The Media, Armed Conflict, and the Responsibility to Protect -- Chapter XVI: Exploring the Legal Discourse on the Practice of the Responsibility to Protect in Africa -- Chapter XVII: Responsibility to Protect and the Avoidance of the Responsibility: Ending Atrocity Crimes in Northern Nigeria -- Chapter XVIII: Environmental Challenges, Climate Change and the Responsibility to Protect (RtoP) In Africa -- Section IV: Institutionalization, consolidation & prospects of the responsibility to protect in africa -- Chapter XIX: From the Sustainable Development Goal 16 to the African Union's Silencing the Guns Agenda: Why is it so Difficult to Achieve Sustainable Peace and Stability in Africa? -- Chapter XX: Can the Responsibility to Protect Doctrine Act as a Deterrent against Mass Atrocity and Human Rights Infringement in Africa? -- Chapter XXI: The Responsibility to Protect (RtoP): Norm Institutionalization, Issues, and Challenges -- Chapter XXII: Responsibility to Protect: From Contestation to Internationalization.
Blog: Responsible Statecraft
The U.S. government is compromising democratic values for the sake of maintaining an expensive and ineffective drone base in the West African country of Niger — all while exploring new drone bases in three nearby coastal countries: Cote d'Ivoire, Ghana, and Benin.The rationale for both the existing base and the aspirational ones is to constrain jihadist insurgencies. The problem is, there's no publicly available evidence that the base in Niger has done any good. In fact, regional trends — in terms of political violence, but also in terms of overall political instability — suggest that expeditionary counterterrorism does more harm than good.The U.S. military's Air Base 201 is situated outside Agadez, northern Niger, and was built in the late 2010s at a cost of some $110 million or more (and upwards of $30 million per year to operate and maintain). Operations began at the site in 2019, involving "intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance" (ISR) drone flights. The New York Times calls it "vital" but it has yet to demonstrate its worth to the public.During the 2010s, Niger was considered the most reliable Sahelian country in the eyes of Washington, Paris, Berlin, and others. Ruled by an elected civilian, Mahamadou Issoufou (in office 2011-2021), Niger had seemed to be entering a new chapter, leaving behind the coups and rebellions that still plagued neighboring Mali. As crises grew in virtually all of Niger's neighbors — especially in Libya, Mali, Nigeria, and soon Burkina Faso as well — Niger appeared to be more a victim of spillover violence than of its own homegrown insurgencies.By 2019, however, it should already have been clear that Niger was brittle — and that France's assertive counterterrorism operations in Mali were yielding only fleeting gains. In Niger, the 2016 election had been lopsided at best and farcical at worst, with Issoufou's main opponent, Hama Amadou, spending much of the campaign in detention on shaky charges connected to human trafficking. Niger was also beginning to produce its own militants — and its own spate of human rights abuses by the military. In Mali, France had killed many top jihadist leaders, but violence was only growing. If American airpower was meant to support the tracking of top targets, and if removing those targets did not fundamentally disrupt the insurgencies, then what good was all that surveillance capacity?Starting in 2020, coup after coup struck the countries of central Sahel. In Mali and soon after in Burkina Faso, coup-makers both channeled and stoked anti-French sentiment, eventually expelling French troops and other Western-backed security missions, such as the United Nations peacekeeping mission in Mali. French counterterrorism ran aground not just at the level of strategy, but also politically. The French failed to maintain the goodwill of populations who cared little if Abdelmalek Droukdel or Adnan Abu Walid al-Sahrawi had been killed when that did nothing against the grassroots fighters, bandits, and ethnic militias that made ordinary people's lives hellish. Surveillance capacity, moreover, is even less effective when it comes to sorting out who is who at the level of ordinary fighters — just ask the French, who horrified Malians by striking a wedding party at the town of Bounti in January 2019, believing the targets were terrorists.Niger's government has been the most recent to fall to a coup, in July 2023. The combination of the coup and the U.S. military's assets triggered an awkward dance in Washington, as the administration sought — and continues to seek — an impossible balance. On the one hand, there is the imperative to uphold the plain meaning of legal restrictions on U.S. assistance to junta-run countries (a determination the U.S. finally reached in Niger's case in October). On the other hand, the administration seems to feel compelled to engage the junta with an eye to protecting the drone base. Administration officials have hinted to the junta that if it puts forward even a minimally credible transition plan, the administration will explore ways to restore military cooperation.The sunk costs of the Niger base appear to be one of the primary arguments in its favor, as well as the argument that the base is vital for counterterrorism success. Yet throwing good money after bad makes little sense, and the argument about counterterrorism is impossible to falsify, given classification practices — and even if all the data were out in the open, backers of unlimited counterterrorism budgets often make the equally unfalsifiable claim that things would be worse without those expenditures. Meanwhile, there is a circularity involved in the logic of the U.S. military presence in Niger as well. As the New York Times puts it, "The American military is still flying unarmed drone surveillance missions to protect its troops posted in Niamey and Agadez" — in other words, the drone base becomes its own justification.Meanwhile, the U.S. government appears to be simultaneously considering the possibility of maintaining the Niger base and the possibility of shifting resources elsewhere; namely, to Cote d'Ivoire, Ghana, and Benin. The Wall Street Journal reports on "preliminary talks" about opening bases in those countries. The logic, in the Journal's own words, is as follows: "Drones would allow U.S. forces to conduct aerial surveillance of militant movements along the coast and provide over-the-shoulder tactical advice to local troops during combat operations."This logic should sound awfully familiar, as it was the same thinking that has now failed in Niger and beyond. None of the core problems have been solved: whether tracking and killing top leaders translates into wider gains; whether it is possible to distinguish insurgents from non-combatants at the level of rank-and-file fighters; and what the wider theory of change and success is.Nor has the fundamental political problem been solved or, it seems, even acknowledged: the reference to "over-the-shoulder tactical advice" is very telling. What might seem like a simple military matter is in fact a political one: again and again in the Sahel, it became evident that soldiers often dislike having someone else peering over their shoulder and telling them what to do. All that assistance and advice can also have unintended consequences, as occurred in Niger. It's not that establishing drone bases in coastal West African countries will inexorably lead to coups — but securitizing the relationship and militarizing those countries' response to insurgency will only hurt. Cote d'Ivoire has won some acclaim for its response to a nascent insurgency, for example, but more for its social programs than for its combat operations.And, finally, for U.S. forces, the temptation to do more than peer over the shoulder and whisper into the ear is always there. Best of all would be to wind down the base in Niger, avoid making the same mistakes elsewhere in the region, and keep the Sahel's juntas at arm's length.
1. South-South Migration, Inequality and Development: An Introduction -- PART I Conceptualising South-South Migration -- 2. The Enduring Impacts of Slavery: An Historical Perspective on South-South Migration -- 3. Recentering the South in Studies of Migration. 4. Writing the Camp -- 5. Migration Research, Coloniality and Epistemic Injustice -- 6. Rethinking Power and Reciprocity in the "Field" -- 7. What does it mean to move? Humanising Cultural Work in South-South Migration -- PART II Unpacking "the South" in South-South Migration -- 8. Trends in South-South Migration -- 9. The Dynamics of South-South Migration in Africa -- 10. Migration as a Collective Project in the Global South: a Case Study of Hadiya Migration to South Africa -- 11. Migration and Inequality in the Burkina Faso- Côte d'Ivoire Corridor -- 12. Unequal Origins to Unequal Destinations: Trends and Characteristics of Migrants' Social and Economic Inclusion in South America -- 13. The Making of Migration Trails in the Americas: Ethnographic Network Tracing of Haitians on the Move -- 14. Migrant Labour and Inequalities in the Nepal-Malaysia Corridor (and Beyond) -- 15. Inter-regional Migration in the Global South: Chinese Migrants in Ghana -- 16. Inter-regional Migration in the Global South: African Migration to Latin America -- PART III Inequalities and South-South Migration -- 17. Poverty, Income Inequalities and Migration in the Global South -- 18. Gendered Migration in the Global South: An Intersectional Perspective on Inequality -- 19. Haitian Migration and Structural Racism in Brazil -- 20. Climate Change and Human Mobility in the Global South -- 21. Why, When and How? The Role of Inequality in Migration Decision-making -- 22. Overcoming and Reproducing Inequalities: Mediated Migration in the "Global South" -- 23. The Design and Use of Digital Technologies in the Context of South-South Migration -- 24. Migrant Resource Flows and Development in the Global South -- 25. South-South Migration and Children's Education: Expanded Challenges and Increased Opportunities -- 26. Mapping the Linkages between Food Security, Inequality, Migration and Development in the Global South -- PART IV Responses to South-South Migration - 27. The Governance of South-South migration: Same or Different? - 28. Policies towards Migration in Africa -- 29. Migration Governance in South America: Change and Continuity in Times of "Crisis" -- 30. Perú and Migration from Venezuela: From Early Adjustment to Policy Misalignment -- 31. The "ASEAN Way" in Migration Governance -- 32. Unfair and Unjust: Temporary Labour Migration Programmes in and from Asia and the Pacific as Barriers to Migrant Justice -- 33. Migrant Political Mobilisation and Solidarity Building in the Global South.
Blog: Responsible Statecraft
Prospects for democratic gains in West Africa have taken two major hits so far in 2024. First, on January 28, the military-ruled Sahelian countries Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger announced their withdrawal from the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), a regional economic and diplomatic bloc. Second, on February 3, Senegal's term-limited President Macky Sall unilaterally postponed the country's presidential elections, scheduled for February 25; a pliant legislature voted two days later to place the new election date on December 15.The U.S., which has looked to ECOWAS as the key front-line diplomatic actor in responding to West Africa's crises, has cause for concern as well as reasons for reflection — especially about how its aversion to seriously criticizing civilian incumbents has helped lead to this juncture.The crises in Senegal and within ECOWAS are interrelated in several ways. ECOWAS has been vocal but severely inconsistent in attempting to uphold democratic norms in the region. ECOWAS intervened militarily to oust longtime Gambian President Yahaya Jammeh after he conceded his country's 2016 elections but then tried to reverse that decision; the intervention represented the high-water mark of ECOWAS's enforcement power in recent years. Before and after, however, ECOWAS reacted tepidly to relatively blatant power grabs and executive overreach by West African leaders, setting the stage for coups and other forms of upheaval.Civilian presidents' overreach included several instances in which legal systems targeted prominent opposition figures at moments that were highly politically convenient for incumbents; for example, in Niger under President Mahamadou Issoufou and in Senegal under Sall. ECOWAS had little criticism to make of those maneuvers, or of dubious third term bids by leaders in Guinea and Cote d'Ivoire, or of a deeply flawed legislative election in Mali, all of which took place in 2020.Post-election discontent contributed directly to coups in Mali (2020) and Guinea (2021), suggesting that ECOWAS's (and Western powers') reluctance to criticize civilian incumbents can actually feed, rather than tamp down, political instability. ECOWAS's tolerance of civilian overreach also weakened its credibility when negotiating with coup-makers in Mali, Guinea, Burkina Faso, and Niger, and that same tolerance has also likely been one factor emboldening Sall in his recent decision to postpone Senegal's elections. ECOWAS has also lost face through its unsuccessful sanctions regime against Mali in 2022, which failed to bring that country's junta to heel, and through some members' threats to invade Niger after the 2023 coup (and subsequent and ongoing detention of president Mohamed Bazoum and his family) there. Those threats were both reckless to make and embarrassing to abandon.The Sahelian juntas' decision to leave ECOWAS has raised numerous questions about the bloc's future, as well as the future of other West African regional organizations, such as the West African Monetary Union (a group of Francophone countries with a common currency); so far, Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso have not left the latter organization. Nonetheless, the three Sahelian states' departures takes a substantial swath of territory out of ECOWAS's zone, although the economic impact could be felt more in the Sahel than in the rest of West Africa, given that the former relies upon the latter (for ports and migrant workers' remittances, among other things) more than West Africa relies upon the Sahel. Pulling out of ECOWAS also lets the juntas delay transitions to civilian rule even longer, and saps ECOWAS's influence over its remaining member states.The disruptions to Senegal's electoral calendar, meanwhile, threaten to set that country back significantly. Senegal's democracy has been imperfect, to say the least: the country experienced de facto (and, for a time, de jure) single-party rule for its first 40 years, and, following the unprecedented opposition victory by Abdoulaye Wade in 2000, it took a massive popular mobilization to ensure that Wade ultimately conceded the 2012 election when his own time was up.Sall's tenure has been marked, as noted above, by a series of aggressive court cases against whoever the president's key rival happened to be at a given moment, with three prominent figures at various times banned from contesting elections. Nevertheless, Senegal's democracy is no sham, and the country enjoys several rare distinctions in the region, notably the lack of a successful military coup — and until 2024, no presidential election had been postponed there.Sall had already, with apparent reluctance, pledged not to seek a third term, and the 2024 election was expected to be (and perhaps still will be) a coronation of his hand-picked successor, Prime Minister Amadou Ba. Yet the postponement raises fears that Sall may have other maneuvers planned. It also establishes the precedent of putting the president above institutional rules.The United States government issued a fairly firm statement raising concerns about the postponement, the security forces' harsh treatment of opposition politicians, and the government's clampdown on internet access. The statement could have gone further by naming Sall, rather than referring amorphously to "the Government of Senegal." Presumably American officials are also working behind the scenes to pressure Sall to hold the election and not let the date slip any further than December 15. And hopefully officials are threatening actual consequences if that doesn't happen.This moment should also invite reflection, however, on how events reached this point. The full diplomatic record is not available to the public, of course, but if American officials did not earlier make pointed criticisms regarding the legal system's treatment of Sall's opponents, then they missed a key opportunity to prevent the scenario that is unfolding now. From what this outside observer can tell, American officials have typically contented themselves with a superficial stability in various West African countries, and have elevated some countries (Senegal and Niger, in recent years, and even more recently, Cote d'Ivoire) to "darling" status — with a correspondingly gentle approach to leaders there.As the Sahel dives into an even darker political period, with juntas arresting dissidents and independent voices right and left, and as Senegal teeters, American officials should be even quicker to offer constructive criticism to their remaining friends in the region — lest things deteriorate further.