Suchergebnisse

One of few can enjoy the pleasures of living in a time of transition to democracy and have the opportunity to comment on the development and raise critical questions about the future of the Central and Eastern Europe. Editors Kaldor and Vejvoda pose several such questions right at the beginning of their book: Do political systems within CEEC represent a particular variant of democracy that is specific to this part of the world? Is it possible to talk about a post-communist model sui generis that is influenced by the legacy of communism and at the same time by both the weaknesses and strengths of western democracy? Can we talk about an emergent concept of European Democratic Space [term introduced by editors] as a way of consolidating democracy in Central and Eastern European Countries and of reinvigorating democracy in Western Europe? ; One of few can enjoy the pleasures of living in a time of transition to democracy and have the opportunity to comment on the development and raise critical questions about the future of the Central and Eastern Europe. Editors Kaldor and Vejvoda pose several such questions right at the beginning of their book: Do political systems within CEEC represent a particular variant of democracy that is specific to this part of the world? Is it possible to talk about a post-communist model sui generis that is influenced by the legacy of communism and at the same time by both the weaknesses and strengths of western democracy? Can we talk about an emergent concept of European Democratic Space [term introduced by editors] as a way of consolidating democracy in Central and Eastern European Countries and of reinvigorating democracy in Western Europe?

In the translated lecture the author tries and answers the question on what ground are we entitled to ascribe "centrality" to Central Europe. He points out that, in contemporary usage, the term "Europe" stands for three different, not overlapping phenomena: geographical, political, and cultural.

Socialism was born out of the belief in the bright future of mankind. Thus, the utopian vision of classless society occupied the minds of the early communist avant-garde. Yet, such hopes did not survive the initial revolutionary enthusiasm. As the social organization of the 'real socialism' turned out to be a rigid bureaucratic system, the visions of the 'bright future' were replaced by the 'picture of the golden age', namely the image of the revolution itself. Accordingly, rituals commemorating the 'founding fathers of socialism' substituted the ritualized commitments to building the 'ideal society of equals'. The ideological content of socialism vanished. Past memories occupied the present. With the breakdown of communism the present could for a moment release itself from the iron grip of the past. The "envelope of the unhistorical" seemed to be open for the deeds of new reformers. Yet, the present could not escape too far. It was almost immediately caught again either by the past or by the future. In the first case, post-communist nationalisms (Brubaker 1996) monopolized the political field; in the second case, the "scientists of the not yet" (Stark and Bruszt 1998: 1-11) disseminated their neoliberal visions of free-market economy. As a result, the present was defined either in terms of national myths going far back to history or by visions to be realized by imitation of the Western model of capitalism. The focus of this paper is the different paths taken by different countries in the region after the collapse of socialism. The paper distinguishes between the 'nationalizing alternative' as one basic direction, and the 'catching up option' as another one. The paper further argues that this dichotomy itself forms around two clusters of several potential stances which could have been taken in the process of transformations. The goal of the paper is to propose a general framework, with the help of which the interactions 'behind' the political decisions taken by political elites in the post-socialist countries ...

There are currently held tough discussions among economists and policy makers on the most appropriate form of taxation that would be fair, simple, enough incentive to wage work and entrepreneurship and withal also providing sufficient revenue for the state to fund the services provided to citizens. In this debate two opposing views on the basic form of this system stand against each other, namely, whether it should tax the income in a progressive manner, as is the case with tax systems applied today in most countries, or in a proportional manner, which has been introduced in a limited extent in several countries, especially in Central and Eastern Europe. This article provides a brief description of the basic characteristics of both these approaches and summarizes the main arguments presented by their proponents and opponents. The next section describes the different variants of a proportional system, also known as a flat tax system, some of which currently exist only in the yet unrealized proposals, and in the end, then compare their pros and cons. Adapted from the source document.

The article presents economic voting theory and its application to the study of electoral behaviour in four Central European countries. The theoretical part describes the reward-punishment model of economic voting and its predictions for electoral behaviour in countries with coalition governance and in internationally open economies during the global economic crisis. The analytical part investigates the existence and features of economic voting (as a P-function) in the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia. Hypotheses about the existence of economic voting in these countries, the higher economic accountability of more responsible coalition partners, and the lower level of economic voting under the perceived influence of the EU on the domestic economy are tested using OLS and binary logistic analysis of European Election Study data (2004 and 2009). As the results show, economic voting was only detected in Hungary (2004 and 2009) and Slovakia (2004). The analysis indicates that, in general, almost all Prime ministers' parties bear a greater degree of economic accountability; meanwhile, perceptions of EU economic responsibility had no influence on the popularity of government parties in 2009. ; The article presents economic voting theory and its application to the study of electoral behaviour in four Central European countries. The theoretical part describes the reward-punishment model of economic voting and its predictions for electoral behaviour in countries with coalition governance and in internationally open economies during the global economic crisis. The analytical part investigates the existence and features of economic voting (as a P-function) in the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia. Hypotheses about the existence of economic voting in these countries, the higher economic accountability of more responsible coalition partners, and the lower level of economic voting under the perceived influence of the EU on the domestic economy are tested using OLS and binary logistic analysis of European ...

The following paper focuses on the theoretical concept of the catch-all party developed by Kirchheimer and examines possibilities of its application in analyses of the political parties in the new Central-East European democracies. The paper is the case study of the Civic Democratic Party (ODS). Through detailed analyses of the two core elements of the original catch-all party concept – intra-party organisation and character of the ideological appeal – article questions the scientific adequacy of frequent labelling of ODS as catch-all party. The argument points out that neither intra-organisational processes, nor ideological shifts of ODS provide a clear picture of the catch-all party. The case of ODS seems to be much more complex. Moreover, the paper points out that frequent usage of the catch-all label in the case of ODS is misleading also from a methodological point of view. Critique reveals that these works loose original concept too much. They ignore that theoretical concepts of all party types were designed for relatively long periods of time and should not be used as contingent categories describing a year or two in the party life. Paper is concluded with the proposition that analyses of political parties in Central-East Europe need complex revision of existing theoretical party types or development of the new ones based on detailed and precise case studies of individual parties in the region.