Suchergebnisse

Central-local relations have been of particular interest since the Labour government came to power in 1997. Both academics & practitioners have pointed to tensions within the Labour government's reform agenda -- between a "top-down" & "bottom-up" approach; between a drive for national standards & the encouragement of local learning & innovation; & between strengthening executive leadership & enhancing public participation. It is argued that while Labour's modernization strategy has clear elements of a top-down approach (legislation, inspectorates, white papers, etc) there is also a significant bottom-up dimension (a variety of zones, experiments, & pilots, albeit with different degrees of freedom). This article utilizes a multi-level governance framework of analysis & argues that, while much of the research using such frameworks has hitherto focused on the EU, recent developments in governance at neighborhood, local authority, subregional & regional levels facilitate its application within a nation state. The central thesis is that, while there is extensive interaction between actors at subnational level, this should not be seen as a proxy for policy influence. The local political arena is characterized less by multilevel governance than by multi-level dialogue. Subnational actors participate but they are rarely major players in shaping policy outcomes: the plurality that characterizes subcentral governance does not reflect a pluralist power structure. 2 Tables, 54 References. Adapted from the source document.

As prefectoral systems are generally regarded to be systems that underpin and serve as the basis for centralization, this article examines how they have developed and how they work, and why they are still considered necessary in decentralized Scandinavia. The article finds that the prefect's authority towards the municipalities varies in Scandinavia. The Norwegian and Swedish prefectures hold rather powerful roles, while the Danish ones do not. The article suggests that this may have something to do with the need for an institution that brings about cohesion and coordination. Prefectoral systems are basically pragmatic solutions to the problem of enforcing national standards and common values across regions and municipalities, but their role may vary with institutional conditions created by local government reforms. The article further suggests that the authority of the prefecture varies with the character of central-local relations, and that it is vulnerable to changes in dominant political goals and values. en. References. Adapted from the source document.

Central-local relations have been of particular interest since the Labour government came to power in 1997. Both academics and practitioners have pointed to tensions within the Labour government's reform agenda—between a 'top-down' and 'bottom-up' approach; between a drive for national standards and the encouragement of local learning and innovation; and between strengthening executive leadership and enhancing public participation. It is argued that while Labour's modernisation strategy has clear elements of a top-down approach (legislation, inspectorates, white papers, etc) there is also a significant bottom-up dimension (a variety of zones, experiments and pilots, albeit with different degrees of freedom). This article utilises a multi-level governance framework of analysis and argues that, while much of the research using such frameworks has hitherto focused on the EU, recent developments in governance at neighbourhood, local authority, sub-regional and regional levels facilitate its application within a nation state. The central thesis is that, while there is extensive interaction between actors at sub-national level, this should not be seen as a proxy for policy influence. The local political arena is characterised less by multi-level governance than by multi-level dialogue. Sub-national actors participate but they are rarely major players in shaping policy outcomes: the plurality which characterises sub-central governance does not reflect a pluralist power structure.

Focuses on municipalities. Argues that recent decentralization serves to increase central state control over local government expenditure.

Concludes that given the amount of discretion that local government is allowed, and its firm integration into the 'Swedish model' of state welfare provision, current reforms can have only marginal effects. (SJK)

Divergent conclusions have been drawn from research about whether or not local government in Sweden has become more independent of central government during the post-war expansion of the Swedish welfare state. By using a multi-dimensional resource perspective it is argued that local government could be viewed as potentially strong with regard to constitutional–legal, political, financial and professional resources. However, during the 1980s as several decentralist and deregulative programs were being implemented, central government strengthened its financial control over local government. An increasing interdependency between local government agencies and private institutions could also be observed. Thus, the current relations between central and local government in Sweden can be summarised in the formula: centralising (financial) power — decentralising responsibility.

In April 1980 a group of urban historians and political scientists met at the University of York under the auspices of the Social Science Research Council to pool what they knew about the changing relations between central and local government and to identify areas for future research. The initiative had come from the political scientists whose interest in the subject had been stimulated by recent government policy. Those who attended from among the historians had to confess that this was not a subject that had recently been much discussed among them. When I was invited by the editor of thisYearbookto contribute an article on a neglected aspect of urban history, it seemed a good opportunity to draw the attention of the urban history group to the subject. What follows is an amended version of the paper that had originally been written for the SSRC seminar.

Sustainable and inclusive growth in emerging Asian economies requires continued high levels of public sector investment in areas such as infrastructure, education, health, and social services. These responsibilities, especially with regard to infrastructure investment, need to be devolved increasingly to the regional government level. However, growth of sources of revenue and financing for local governments has not necessarily kept pace, forcing them, in some cases, to increase borrowing or cut spending below needed levels. This paper reviews alternative models of the relationship between central and local governments, and provides an overview and assessment of different financing mechanisms for local governments, including tax revenues, central government transfers, bank loans, and bond issuance, with a focus on the context of emerging Asian economies. The paper also reviews financing mechanisms for local governments and mechanisms for maintaining fiscal stability and sustainability at both the central and local government levels. Based upon the evidence on the decentralization process in Asia, it proposes some policy implications for improving central-local government relations and fiscal sustainability.

Local authority involvement in economic matters has become widespread since the early 1970s. Recent developments in the pattern of local economic activity have been the increasing use of section 137 of the Local Government Act 1972 to fund local programmes, the spread of local authority involvement from the Assisted Areas to the more prosperous regions, and the increasing interest shown by the smaller shire districts, often in rural areas. The portfolio of possible interventions has also changed, bringing a new diversity to the practice of local economic development. Whereas central government has in the past eschewed the temptation to exercise close controls over these activities, the new diversity of local economic initiatives presents it with new dilemmas. It can no longer be assumed that such initiatives will be supportive of central government's spatial or sectoral policies. This vacuum in central-local relations is unlikely to remain, and renewed pressures to grant specific economic development powers to local authorities can be expected. If these claims are accepted, central government will be drawn inexorably into local economic affairs by the need to develop the capacity of local authorities to intervene effectively in pursuit of economic and employment goals.

The constitutional, legal, & financial changes in the relations between central & local government in GB over the past decade have steadily & increasingly eroded the political autonomy of local government, & considerably strengthened the grip of the center. The 1972 reform of local government, the Consultative Council on Local Government Finance, the introduction of policy planning systems, the use of legal powers on council house sales & rents, the use of ministerial veto, & most especially the financial legislation of 1981 & 1982 have reduced the rights & powers of local government, thereby altering fundamental constitutional patterns. 3 Tables. HA.