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Theory suggests that relations between authorities affect implementation. This article studies the link between central and local government agencies in the Swedish labour market sector. The analysis is based on new quantitative data. The results indicate that central and local government agencies have very different priorities, but they nonetheless cooperate to a considerable extent. However, cooperation and 'good' implementation only coincide under certain conditions. If the collaborative endeavours are explicitly designed to lead to implementation of a specific and demanding task, cooperation is positively related to implementation performance. Agencies that collaborate to a considerable extent at a general level do not, however, perform better than others. Thus, I argue that theories should be developed and tested to indicate when cooperation between public authorities will promote implementation, instead of assuming that cooperation, in general, is a 'good thing'.

In recent decades, many countries have experienced decentralization and neoliberal processes. The literature usually refers to decentralization as an outcome of growing neoliberalism, but are these two processes analytically connected? This study answers the question by examining the relationship between central and local government in Israel in the context of housing policy. It focuses on a housing policy called Heskem Gag ("umbrella agreement"), an agreement between the government and local authorities to rapidly increase the supply of housing units. Whereas Heskem Gag might seem an act of decentralization, in-depth analysis paints a mixed picture: although some terms of the agreement promote fiscal and administrative autonomy, others curb it and have a strong centralizing effect. The study discusses the possibility of a hybrid model of neoliberal centralism, and its problematic ramifications for the interests of local residents, especially the disadvantaged. Although the findings are based on the Israeli case, they are relevant to many countries with a neoliberal economy that have undergone decentralization in recent decades, especially at times of national crises.

In Britain since the 1930s social assistance recipients have in certain circumstances been able to claim 'exceptional expenses' in addition to their weekly benefit income. From the 1940s these were administered by its central government. However, in April 2013 the then incarnation of such payments (the discretionary Social Fund) was partly replaced by locally administered Local Welfare Assistance. Drawing upon material held in files at Britain's National Archives and central government documents framing the development of Local Welfare Assistance, this paper examines how concerns raised in the 1980s meant it was not possible to then transfer responsibility for 'exceptional expenses' from central to local government. The paper explores those concerns and how in contemporary Britain they are no longer deemed to be problematic because of the Coalition government's emphasis upon localism and because of changing local government views on the possibility of delivering a mainstream social assistance function.

Seeks to explain patterns of central government control & local government discretion across nations as well as across policy areas. The argument is that central-local policy is the result of the interaction of three types of actors: expenditure advocates, expenditure guardians, & topocrats. The argument is based on two assumptions: (1) The actors are assumed to pursue self-interests -- respectively, sectoral policy goals, macroeconomic control, & local autonomy. (2) The actors' abilities to pursue their self-interests are assumed to be constrained & facilitated by the structure of intergovernmental policy networks. The theoretical propositions are put to a first test in a comparative analysis of three policy areas (economic policy, health policy, & child care policy) in Sweden, Norway, & Denmark. 4 Tables, 4 Figures, 73 References. Adapted from the source document.

This paper seeks to explain patterns of central government control and local government discretion across nations as well as across policy areas. The argument is that central-local policy is the result of the interaction of three types of actors: 'Expenditure advocates', 'expenditure guardians', and 'topocrats'. The argument is based on two assumptions. First, the actors are assumed to pursue self-interests – respectively, sectoral policy goals, macroeconomic control, and local autonomy. Second, the actors' abilities to pursue their self-interests are assumed to be constrained and facilitated by the structure of intergovernmental policy networks. The theoretical propositions are put to a first test in a comparative analysis of three policy areas (economic policy, health policy, and child care policy) in the three Scandinavian countries of Sweden, Norway and Denmark.

This paper has two main purposes: first, it measures the level and degree of decentralisation in contemporary Korea, and, second, it explains why decentralisation is slow or stagnant. To measure the level of decentralisation in Korea, this paper uses Page & Goldsmith's triple measures of function, discretion, and access, which were developed to examine the extent of centralisation and decentralisation in any given polity. The results suggest that Korea is both legally and politically centralised. In Korea, a centralised party system has combined with other factors to drive centralisation, overcoming the decentralising forces that focus mainly on local elected and appointed officials. Centralising forces include the bureaucratic elitism of national officials, cultural disdain for local governments, and local people's feeble affective attachment to local identities and communities.

Restructuring of central and local government relations has occurred in a number of countries during the 1980s, and has been a striking phenomenon even in such different countries as Poland, Sweden and the US. In the first part of the article a resource framework is presented, designed to make basic comparisons of these relations between different countries. Five sets of resources are identified: constitutional‐legal, regulatory, financial, political and professional resources. It is argued that local‐government disposal of such resources provides a potential for local discretion. The applicability of the framework is illustrated by reference to a study of Poland, Sweden and the US, focusing on the restructuring of central and local government relations in these countries during the 1980s. The conclusion is that decentralization has occurred in all three cases, especially in terms of regulatory and other non‐financial resources. However, in Sweden and the US this trend has been counterbalanced by centralization of financial control. In Poland the post‐communist revolution has paved the way for a restoration of the pre‐war local self‐government system. Democratic elections at the local level are seen as crucial to break down the old, centralized party‐state system, and to reintroduce a dual local government system. In all three cases economic pressure, related to the individual countries' positions in the world capitalist system, seems to have been the main driving force beind the decentralization processes. However, the forms, magnitude and effects of decentralization must be seen in relation to the specific political economies and histories of the three countries. Thus, to understand the causes, mechanisms and effects of central–local government restructuring in depth one has to relate the resource approach to a broader theoretical framework.

How to explain the distortion of public–private partnerships (PPPs) is underexplored. Drawing on principal–agent theory, this article proposes an institutional incentive-driven framework. Based on a case study of PPPs in China, this article finds that central–local government relationships play a crucial role in shaping PPP performance. Goal incongruence and information asymmetry lead to two types of distortion. First, PPPs become a political task for local governments to respond to higher-level governments' needs. Second, PPPs serve as financing tools to create political achievements. These opportunistic behaviors violate the goals of the central government's PPP policy and increase government debt risks.