Suchergebnisse

In a series of studies I analyze the past and present of Chinese higher education. The topic may be justified by the fact that up to now no comprehensive study has been published in Hungary about the long way China went along from the darkest years of communism to nowadays' education. In this second paper I summarize the four main phenomena of the reforms after the Mao-era: decentralization, marketization, privatization and internationalization. In the frame of decentralization, the external and internal governance of the universities changed resulting in a power shift from the central level to regional and institutional level. Marketization brought about significant change in the funding of higher education: instead of the state private actors pay for education. Privatization let private actors in the higher education arena, while internationalization means opening up China for foreign institutions and students and letting Chinese students to study abroad. I build my analysis on international literature and statistical data.

In recent decades, the United States has increasingly used the means of economic warfare in its geopolitical struggles. Among these instruments – in addition to the financial markets – it most often launches geoeconomic attacks in the oil market against its geopolitical adversaries. The United States can cause significant economic damage both for oil exporter (eg. Iran, Venezuela) and oil importer (eg. Cuba, North Korea) countries by restricting their access to oil markets.This paper analyzes the economic warfare in the oil market between the United States and Iran, Russia, and North Korea. Through these examples this paper demonstrates how the United States organizes and executes geoeconomic attacks in the oil market and how it handles country-specific problems. The United States has the means to organize broad international coalition alongside the oil market sanctions – even in the lack of UN Security Council resolutions.United Nations has decided on a number of economic sanctions against Iran because of its nuclear program. These sanctions reduced the supply in the world oil market and resulted in about 10-20% price increase, while Iran – despite of the sanctions – found the way to sell significant amount of oil, mainly to China and India.Russia is a member of the UN Security Council, so no UN sanctions can be imposed on it, nevertheless the United States and its allies launched a geoeconomics assault against Russia after the annexation of the Crimea. Russia was prepared for these economic sanctions and could effectively reduce the negative effects on its oil export, which could even increase after the western sanctions. North Korea is under UN sanctions since 2006 because of its nuclear program. The sanctions refer to oil and oil products as well, but has no significant effect on world oil market and oil price, because North Korea is a relatively small country with low oil consumption.North Korea is suffering a huge economic burden due to severe restrictions and its only way to circumvent the embargo – according to American accusations – is to smuggle some oil from China and Russia. ; In recent decades, the United States has increasingly used the means of economic warfare in its geopolitical struggles. Among these instruments – in addition to the financial markets – it most often launches geoeconomic attacks in the oil market against its geopolitical adversaries. The United States can cause significant economic damage both for oil exporter (eg. Iran, Venezuela) and oil importer (eg. Cuba, North Korea) countries by restricting their access to oil markets.This paper analyzes the economic warfare in the oil market between the United States and Iran, Russia, and North Korea. Through these examples this paper demonstrates how the United States organizes and executes geoeconomic attacks in the oil market and how it handles country-specific problems. The United States has the means to organize broad international coalition alongside the oil market sanctions – even in the lack of UN Security Council resolutions.United Nations has decided on a number of economic sanctions against Iran because of its nuclear program. These sanctions reduced the supply in the world oil market and resulted in about 10-20% price increase, while Iran – despite of the sanctions – found the way to sell significant amount of oil, mainly to China and India.Russia is a member of the UN Security Council, so no UN sanctions can be imposed on it, nevertheless the United States and its allies launched a geoeconomics assault against Russia after the annexation of the Crimea. Russia was prepared for these economic sanctions and could effectively reduce the negative effects on its oil export, which could even increase after the western sanctions. North Korea is under UN sanctions since 2006 because of its nuclear program. The sanctions refer to oil and oil products as well, but has no significant effect on world oil market and oil price, because North Korea is a relatively small country with low oil consumption.North Korea is suffering a huge economic burden due to severe restrictions and its only way to circumvent the embargo – according to American accusations – is to smuggle some oil from China and Russia.

A 20. század második felének bipoláris hatalma struktúráját (Amerikai Egyesült Államok versus Szovjetunió) követően a 21.században a két hagyományos nagyhatalom mellett egy újabb globális geopolitikai és geoökonómiai nagyhatalom is megjelent Kína gazdasági és katonai előtörésével. Az Amerikai Egyesült Államok vezető szerepe ugyanakkor (egyelőre) megkérdőjelezhetetlen, de Kína gazdaságilag tíz éven belül beérheti, Oroszország ásványkincs vagyona (földgáz, kőolaj) pedig függőségét jelent számos gazdasági hatalom számára. A három globális geopolitikai hatalom egymás közötti, bilaterális gazdasági és kereskedelmi kapcsolatai az elmúlt évtizedben nagyon heterogén módon alakultak: az amerikai-orosz relációban lineárisan csökkenő, az amerikai-kínai relációban jelentősen növekvő, majd a kereskedelmi háborúnak köszönhetően (talán átmenetileg) megtorpanó és csökkenő, az orosz-kínai relációban pedig folyamatosan növekvő trend figyelhető meg az elmúlt évtizedben. Az Oroszország által életre hívott gazdasági és kereskedelmi kezdeményezés a Szovjetunió felbomlását követő integrációs törekvések folytatása, az Eurázsiai Gazdasági Unió az elmúlt öt évben sikereket tud felmutatni, azonban már rövid távon is jelentős kihívásokkal néz szembe és kérdéses a további fejlődése. Előre tekintve új globális kockázati tényezők jelentek meg, melyek közül a legaktuálisabb és legnagyobb hatású a koronavírus járvány világszintű megjelenése és elterjedése. A globális szereplők egészségügyi és gazdasági járvány adott válasz lépései mind sebességet, mind mélységet tekintve heterogén képet mutatnak. Kérdés, hogy a jelenleg még mélyülő globális gazdasági válság a nemzetállamok szerepét fogja-e felerősíteni vagy új szövetségek jönnek létre a világban. Izgalmas, fordulatokkal teli évek következnek a globális geopolitikai színtéren, ahol a status quo megváltozása várható, új hatalmi központok jöhetnek létre, régi szövetségi rendszerek szűnhetnek meg illetve újak alakulhatnak ki, melyek a jelenlegi tripoláris világrendet alapjaiban változtathatják meg. Following the structure of bipolar power in the second half of the 20th century (United States versus the Soviet Union), in the 21st century, in addition to the two traditional superpowers, another global geopolitical and geoeconomic superpower emerged with the economic and military outbreak of China. At the same time, the leadership of the United States of America (for the time being) is unquestionable, but China can reach the nominal GDP of the US within ten years and still many economic powers depend on Russia's mineral wealth (natural gas, oil). Bilateral economic and trade relations between the three global geopolitical powers have evolved in a very heterogeneous manner over the last decade: linearly declining in the US-Russian relationship, significantly increasing in the US-China relationship, and then (possibly temporarily) due to the trade war stagnant and declining, and the Russian-Chinese relationship has been steadily increasing over the last decade. The economic and trade initiative launched by Russia is a continuation of the integration efforts following the dissolution of the Soviet Union, and the Eurasian Economic Union has been successful over the last five years, but it faces significant challenges in the short term and its further development is questionable. Looking ahead, new global risk factors have emerged, the most relevant and influential of which is the global emergence and spread of the coronavirus epidemic. The response of global actors to the health and economic epidemic shows a heterogeneous picture in terms of both speed and depth. The question is whether the global economic crisis, which is currently deepening, will strengthen the role of nation-states or create new alliances in the world. Exciting, turbulent years will follow on the global geopolitical scene, where the status quo is expected to change, new centers of power may emerge, old federal systems may disband, and new ones may be formed that can fundamentally change the current tripolar world order.

Considering the recent series of events and intensified diplomatic and economic relations, many experts envisage a new Cold War between the two superpowers of the twenty-first century. Although the Chinese-American relationship over the last half-century has experienced some great moments, it has mostly been characterised by less amicable or even hostile attitudes, as well as economically volatile competition. The pragmatic realist approach and diplomatic appeasement of the 1970s and 1980s served mutual interests for the two countries against their common foe, the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, concerning their political values and visions, the democratic US and the Marxist-Maoist People's Republic of China have proven to be two irreconcilable political and social experiments, worlds apart from each other's spheres and paradigms. Within the context of the drastically altered global political milieu of the new millennium, the two great powers have manoeuvred themselves into heated confrontational positions over the last decade, not even excluding the possibility of a severe clash of interests in the future.

The worldââ'¬â"¢s largest rabbit meat producer (460.000 tons in 2004) and exporter (6.397 tons) is China but their import is negligible. Italy is Europeansââ'¬â"¢s leading producer (second of the world: 222.000 tons). Italyââ'¬â"¢s rabbit meat import was the largest worldwide between 1990 and 1994 but in 2004 it was at the 4th position (2.320 tons). With its decreasing import the export is increasing and it reached 6.231 tons in 2003. Spain is at the second position in the European production (100.610 tons in 2004). With the increasing production it is among the top five countries in export (4.629 tons in 2004) but its import is small (441 tons in 2004). The largest importer country is Germany (7.589; 4.958 and 4.487 tons in 2002, 2003 and 2004, respectively). Its production was between 33.000 and 34.000 tons (between 1990 and 2004) but the export was small. The Netherlands is among the five countries that are exporting the largest amount of rabbit meat. They owned the first position (8.940 tons in 1998; 11.187 tons in 2001) then the second position (3.574 tons in 2004) after China. Hungary is at the 10th position in rabbit production (7.500 tons in 2004) and the country is among the leading exporters having the second-third place of the world (5.391 tons in 2004) but the country has no import at all. ; A világon Kína állítja elő a legtöbb nyúlhúst (2004-ben 460.000 tonna), ők exportálják a legnagyobb mennyiséget (6.397 tonna), de importjuk jelentéktelen. Európa első, a világ második legnagyobb termelője Olaszország (222.000 tonna 2004-ben). 1990 és 1994 között még ők importálták a legtöbb nyúlhúst, de 2004-ben már csak a 4. helyen álltak (2.320 tonna). Az import csökkenésével egyidejűleg nő az exportjuk, ami 2003-ban 6.231 tonnát ért el. Spanyolország Európában a második legnagyobb termelő (2004-ben 100.610 tonna). A termelésük növekedésével már a legtöbbet exportáló öt ország között vannak (2004-ben 4.629 tonna), de importjuk alacsony (2004-ben 441 tonna). A világon Németország importálja a legtöbb nyúlhúst (2002, 2003 és 2004-ben 7.589, 4.958 és 4.487 tonna). Termelésük 1990-től 33.000 és 34.000 tonna közötti, de kis mennyiséget exportálnak (2002, 2003 és 2004-ben 365, 305 és 173 tonna). Hollandia az öt legtöbb nyulat exportáló ország között található: 1998 (8.490 tonna) és 2001 (16.125 tonna) között az első helyen álltak, 2004-ben a másodikok (3.574 tonna). Ugyanakkor nagy mennyiségű nyúlhúst exportálnak, 2004-ben (8.716 tonna) és 2001- ben (11.187 tonna) Kína után a második helyet foglalták el. Magyarország termelésben a világon a 10. helyen áll (2004-ben 7.500 tonna), egyúttal a fő exportáló országok között a 2. és 3. helyet foglaljuk el (2004-ben 5.391 tonna), de egyáltalán nem importálunk nyulat.

During the Cold War, the Philippines was an indispensable US ally, and this was still basically the case at the turn of the 21st century. However, the inauguration of President Rodrigo Duterte in June 2016 heralded great changes for the international position of the Philippines: a shift towards China and Russia occurred, followed by the emergence of a more balanced foreign policy. The partnership with the US has changed, too: during the Obama administration, the relationship between the two countries became cooler, although the foundations of the alliance were never contested. In the wake of Donald Trump's assumption of office in January 2017, the alliance seems to have become as strong as before, and economic as well as security-military cooperation has continued. The author's aim is to analyze the Philippines' position in the US-led world order from 1945 to the present, as well as the foundations of the United States–Philippines special relationship. After that the main components of Duterte's "independent" foreign policy and the fundamental changes in the Philippines' foreign relations are presented. The analysis focuses on the causes of the conflict at the end of Barack Obama's presidency, followed by the improving partnership during the Trump era and the main geopolitical challenges the alliance has had to face. According to its conclusion the US–Philippines security cooperation will remain strong under Presidents Duterte and Trump due to strategic considerations, which indicate the military alliance is in the interests of both nations.