Suchergebnisse

The Cour de cassation (Court of Cassation) was particularly 'versatile' (P. Jourdain, 'Loss of approval: return to an objective conception of accidents at work' RTD Civ., 2010, p. 559) in its assessment of the content of the loss of approval. However, its case law tends to stabilise, as evidenced by the judgment in Comment.A woman undergoes laser eye intervention; she contracted a nosocomial disease as a result of the operation and loses some of her visual faculties. Re. ; La Cour de cassation s'est montrée particulièrement « versatile » (P. Jourdain, « Préjudice d'agrément : retour à une conception objective en matière d'accident du travail » RTD Civ., 2010, p. 559) dans son appréciation du contenu du préjudice d'agrément. Sa jurisprudence tend toutefois à se stabiliser, comme en témoigne l'arrêt commenté.Une femme subit une intervention oculaire au laser ; elle contracte une maladie nosocomiale suite à l'opération et perd une partie de ses facultés visuelles. Ré …

Whether considered as a status, a set of activities or from a political philosophy point of view, citizenship has been largely explored by political science and legal studies. Such research are meanwhile mainly normative or theoretical and empirical approaches are much more rare, especially in the French context. This HDR explores and discuss an original anthropological approach in the field of citizenship studies; an approach characterised by a will to analyse the social and political "manufacture" of citizenship and to "destabilise" its theories by a critical analysis. ; La citoyenneté, qu'elle soit abordée comme statut, ensemble d'activités ou en philosophie politique, a déjà fait l'objet de nombreux travaux, notamment en science politique ou en droit. Ces approches laissent cependant la part belle aux approches théoriques et normatives, les travaux empiriques restant beaucoup plus rares, notamment en France. Il s'agit ici est de proposer une approche anthropologique originale dans le champ des études de la citoyenneté. Ce qui la caractérise sans doute le mieux est la volonté de s'intéresser à la " fabrique " sociale et politique de la citoyenneté, et d'en " déstabiliser " les théories par un regard critique.

Les travaux de Judith Butler qui analysent les pratiques discursives de légitimation de la violence étatique, nous servent ici à comprendre comment le gouvernement mexicain organise les représentations publiques de la mort dans l'actuelle guerre contre la drogue. À partir de l'idée selon laquelle les cadres de la guerre constituent inégalement les vies à même d'être pleurées ou non, nous analysons dans cet article la manière dont certains massacres récents ont été présentés par le gouvernement et les médias mexicains. Nous cherchons à souligner l'utilisation publique et médiatique de deux catégories ( narco et sicario ), qui servent à justifier et à normaliser la violence de la guerre. Par ailleurs, cet article complète les travaux de Butler sur les cadres de la guerre en montrant qu'au Mexique, ils ne visent guère à occulter la mort des personnes qui s'extraient de ces catégories, mais qu'ils exhibent au contraire publiquement ces vies perdues en tant qu'elles représenteraient des sacrifices nécessaires. Après avoir montré les connexions qui résident entre cette distribution inégale du deuil, l'affirmation de la souveraineté étatique, et l'utilisation politique des cadavres, cet article finit par proposer d'utiliser la mélancolie comme un moyen affectif permettant de concurrencer le cadre sacrificiel proposé par l'État.

The force of exceptions, special statuses and simplified procedures, the law and the relationship at work undergo a real upheaval. A development obscured by the words 'flexibi-lity', 'autonomy'. ; International audience ; The force of exceptions, special statuses and simplified procedures, the law and the relationship at work undergo a real upheaval. A development obscured by the words 'flexibi-lity', 'autonomy'. ; A force d'exceptions, de statuts particuliers, de procédures simplifiées, le droit et le rapport au travail connaissent un vrai bouleversement. Une évolution occultée par les mots « flexibi-lité », « autonomie ».

The Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002 (TRIA) established a public-private program to cover commercial enterprises against foreign terrorism on US soil. It was a temporary measure to increase the availability of risk coverage for terrorist acts by requiring insurers to provide coverage. Initially established to sunset on December 31, 2005, a two-year extension has been voted by Congress and signed by the President in December. This paper provides an extensive series of empirical analyses of loss sharing under this program in 2005, and a prospective analysis for 2006. Using data collected on the top 451 insurers operating in the United States, we examine the impact of TRIA on loss sharing between the key stakeholders: victims, insurers and their policyholders, and the taxpayers. By simulating the explosion of a 5-ton truck bomb in major cities in the United States, we conclude that taxpayers are likely not to pay anything for losses below $15 billion. For a $25 billion loss, insurers and policyholders would handle between 80 and 100 percent of the loss depending on the property take up rate. Only for terrorist attacks where insured losses were $100 billion would taxpayers have to pay 50 percent of the claims. Recent modifications of TRIA will transfer an even larger part of the risk to the private sector. We also show that if TRIA were made permanent in its current form some very large insurers could strategize by collecting large amount of premiums for terrorism insurance but only would be financially responsible for a small portion of the claims. Commercial policyholders from all insurers (whether or not covered against terrorism) and the federal government would absorb the residual insured losses, raising equity issues. The paper also reviews a set of possible long-term alternatives or complementary options to the current design of TRIA that could be important features of a more permanent program. We conclude that more than four years after 9/11, the question as to who should pay for the economic ...

The Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002 (TRIA) established a public-private program to cover commercial enterprises against foreign terrorism on US soil. It was a temporary measure to increase the availability of risk coverage for terrorist acts by requiring insurers to provide coverage. Initially established to sunset on December 31, 2005, a two-year extension has been voted by Congress and signed by the President in December. This paper provides an extensive series of empirical analyses of loss sharing under this program in 2005, and a prospective analysis for 2006. Using data collected on the top 451 insurers operating in the United States, we examine the impact of TRIA on loss sharing between the key stakeholders: victims, insurers and their policyholders, and the taxpayers. By simulating the explosion of a 5-ton truck bomb in major cities in the United States, we conclude that taxpayers are likely not to pay anything for losses below $15 billion. For a $25 billion loss, insurers and policyholders would handle between 80 and 100 percent of the loss depending on the property take up rate. Only for terrorist attacks where insured losses were $100 billion would taxpayers have to pay 50 percent of the claims. Recent modifications of TRIA will transfer an even larger part of the risk to the private sector. We also show that if TRIA were made permanent in its current form some very large insurers could strategize by collecting large amount of premiums for terrorism insurance but only would be financially responsible for a small portion of the claims. Commercial policyholders from all insurers (whether or not covered against terrorism) and the federal government would absorb the residual insured losses, raising equity issues. The paper also reviews a set of possible long-term alternatives or complementary options to the current design of TRIA that could be important features of a more permanent program. We conclude that more than four years after 9/11, the question as to who should pay for the economic consequences of a terrorist attack on the US has not yet received the attention it deserves. The new Congress or the White House should consider establishing a national commission on terrorism risk coverage before permanent legislation is enacted.