City Hall Leadership
In: Proceedings of the Academy of Political Science, Band 29, Heft 4, S. 33
In: Proceedings of the Academy of Political Science, Band 29, Heft 4, S. 33
In: The annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Band 353, S. 52-63
ISSN: 0002-7162
Municipal leadership in Kansas City centers on the nonpartisan principle & the council-manager plan. Unlike many other cities with nonpartisan requirements, Kansas City has produced a nonpartisan system that has proved workable over a 20-yr period. But continuance depends on the viability of the Citizens Assoc, a nonpartisan - or bipartisan - group which has dominated Kansas City pot from its inception in 1941 to the present time, with a 4-yr break from 1959-1963. The Assoc has experienced some difficulty in keeping its leadership vital & in maintaining a sufficiently broad base to permit participation by the diverse elements of the community. The leadership responsibility of the Assoc, resumed in 1963, is of major importance in maintaining a stable source of power. Also, relations between the mayor & the manager are crucial, as experiences in the immediate past have shown. Under present arrangements, official & private groups are co-operating in achieving public objectives. A new sophistication is now being demanded of those to whom the manager is accountable. AA.
In: The annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Band 353, Heft 1, S. 52-63
ISSN: 1552-3349
Municipal leadership in Kansas City centers on the nonpartisan principle and the council-manager plan. Un like many other cities with nonpartisan requirements, Kansas City has produced a nonpartisan system that has proved workable over a twenty-year period. But continuance depends on the viability of the Citizens Association, a nonpartisan—or bipartisan—group which has dominated Kansas City politics from its inception in 1941 to the present time, with a four-year break from 1959 to 1963. The Association has experienced some difficulty in keeping its leadership vital and in maintaining a sufficiently broad base to permit participation by the diverse elements of the community. The leadership responsibility of the Association, resumed in 1963, is of major importance in maintaining a stable source of power. Also, relations between the mayor and the manager are crucial, as experiences in the immediate past have shown. Under present arrangements, official and private groups are co-operating in achieving public objectives. A new sophistication is now being demanded of those to whom the manager is accountable.
In: The current digest of the Soviet press: publ. each week by The Joint Committee on Slavic Studies, Band 22, S. 17-18
ISSN: 0011-3425
In: Policy & politics, Band 2, Heft 2, S. 113-133
ISSN: 1470-8442
In recent years the idea of decentralisation has attained a controversial status among those concerned with the future of our cities. To its advocates, decentralisation is seen as a tool by which citizens can forge a sense of community and make their cities liveable; to others, it is a ruse which detracts from real problems, or worse, threatens the cosmopolitanism of our great cities. The debate continues across continents and by now the arguments for and against decentralisation seem to have outrun the empirical findings on the many forms it can take. This paper explores the forms and ramifications of decentralisation as it relates to the exercise of leadership in seven decentralised areas of two cities; New York and London.
Of the seven decentralised areas or sub-systems used for this study four were in New York City and three in London. The New York operations, called 'neighbourhood districts', include identifiable areas in various parts of the city. These are Crown Heights and Bushwickin Brooklyn, Wakefield Edenwald in the Bronx, and Washington Heights in Manhattan. The New York projects were begun in 1972, at the discretion of the Mayor, and represent the core of an experiment in administrative decentralisation.
In: Public management: PM, Band 36, S. 50-53
ISSN: 0033-3611
In: Public management: PM, Band 44, S. 242-246
ISSN: 0033-3611
In: Oxford historical monographs
In: National civic review: publ. by the National Municipal League, Band 53, S. 360-364
ISSN: 0027-9013
In: The annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Band 353, S. 1-121
ISSN: 0002-7162
Contents are grouped under the headings: Bossism: the past and the transition; Interest groups and municipal leadership; Leadership, managers, and "metro"; The municipal leader and the state; Low political visibility, stability, and uncertainty.
In: The annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Band 350, S. 95-106
ISSN: 0002-7162
Though other issues exist, the basic problems in city Sch's arise from a conflict of interests between haves & have-nots. Race appears as a subdimension of the larger problem. The major contours of this engagement are seen at the federal level where the power exists to make governing decisions about Sch financing & in state gov where conservative & anticity interests dominate. It is seen in a dimmer but far more explosive form in the city itself where have-nots, mainly Negroes, are pressing demands for Sch equity. Class lines are somewhat redrawn within liberal city gov's & Sch systems. Negro demands give the illusion that the issue is strictly racial though, in fact, the educ 'al & pol'al interests of other have-not & liberal leadership groups run parallel & converge more often than they diverge. AA.
In: The annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Band 352, Heft 1, S. 95-106
ISSN: 1552-3349
Though other issues exist, the basic issues and problems in city schools arise from a conflict of interests be tween haves and have-nots. Race appears as a subdimension of the larger problem. The major contours of this engagement are seen at the federal level where the power exists to make governing decisions about school financing and in state govern ment where conservative and usually anticity interests domi nate. It is seen in a dimmer but far more explosive form in the city itself where have-nots, mainly Negroes, are pressing demands for school equity. Class lines are somewhat redrawn within liberal city governments and school systems. Negro demands give the illusion that the issue is strictly racial al though, in fact, the educational and political interests of other have-not and liberal leadership groups run parallel and converge more often than they diverge.
In: The annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Band 353, S. 95-106
ISSN: 0002-7162
9 Bosses, & their tollowers & apologists, perennially inquire noNN alternative sources for leadership may be developed in lieu of a boss. A boss is the principal but not the sole leader of a pol'al clique or faction at the top of a monolithic power structure in a community with a monopolistic pol'al style. Alternatives to a boss are a clique or faction, a popularly elected mayor, a city manager, or a pol'al party. Some Fla communities exhibit a monopolistic pol'al style; others, a competitive style. Town with a monopolistic style show a narrow set of econ interests; the entrance of competing econ interests leads to competitive pot. Ruling cliques are of varying kinds & can exist in either amonopolistic or competitive situation. A popularly elected mayor also can function as the leader in either situation. A manager is a source of policy leadership, but several factors condition his leadership. The elected mayor often inhibits the manager. The manager's scope may also be greatly restricted in a monopolistic setting, for he usually has no pol'al base of his own in such a situation. He will often have more scope when competition is the style. A few managers succeed by forming their own bases, ie, that composed of city employees. Party participation is a concomitant of competitive pot in a few Fla cities, but the rise of the Republicans may lead to some local monopolies. Alternative sources of leadership are enhanced by competition. AA.
In: American political science review, Band 66, Heft 2, S. 511-524
ISSN: 1537-5943
Observers of city politics have often stated that political leadership—usually mayoral leadership—is a crucial ingredient in a city's ability to deal with its problems. And studies of successful leaders in urban systems have led to the formulation of a model of the "political entrepreneur" who is adept at accumulating political resources and pyramiding them to gain increased influence. Based on four years of observation of politics in Oakland, California, this study suggests that successful mayoral leadership and resource-pyramiding may be limited by governmental structure, the personality of the mayor, and the nature of the political system.In Oakland, fragmented institutional authority and the council-manager form of government have created obstacles for elected officials. A privately oriented, "nonpolitical" mayor has avoided publicity and has tended to underutilize, rather than pyramid, his resources. Finally, in an amorphous political system characterized by a lack of group and party activity, a mayor is denied both information and support. By examining the ways in which the performance of Oakland's mayor diverges from a model of political leadership, we can identify some of the factors that support or limit such leadership.