Suchergebnisse

Existing models for the formation of governmental coalitions do not score high in predictability for Belgium. A more complex model, covering 3 fields, 7 vectors, & 1 strong actor among a limited number of decisionmakers, fits much better. A prerequisite for a coalition is a majority within the elitist parties in Parliament. Favoring coalition formation are: the decision-making capabilities of the cabinet; elite consensus on the basic values prominent in Belgian society; similarities of program among the political parties; & their capacity to manipulate issues. Hampering coalition formation are: the development of partisan options; the polarization of issues; & internal dissensions within the political parties. This model stresses the combined action of strong structures & actors, which is paramount in Belgian society. 2 Figures. Modified HA

Main political events of 1999 in Flanders (Belgium) are discussed. Following a description of the formalities, notably budget control issues, leading up to the June 13 elections, the results of the elections & the formation of the new Flemish parliament are described. Although the Christian democratic party CVP emerged as the largest party, it forfeited its governing rights; instead, a socialist/environmentalist coalition consisting of VLD, SP, Agalev, & VU-ID was formed. The development of budgetary agreements is summarized, & main elements of discussions & agreements in the following policy fields are addressed: economy & labor, infrastructure, environment, welfare, education, media, & state reformation. Since the Flemish parliament, established in 1995, is a relatively new institution, organizational & structural aspects of its departments are highlighted & explained, & the developmental processes of each department & office are emphasized. S. Paul

Political parties normally compete in elections individually. Yet, sometimes they join forces and form pre-electoral alliances. This rather unusual strategy contains both costs and benefits. In this article we try to identify those costs and benefits by opening up the black box of internal party decision making in considering pre-electoral alliance formation. We start by assuming that parties of different electoral sizes could have different motives to face the voter as one electoral list. Through in-depth interviews at the local level in Flanders, we have studied pre-electoral alliance formation for the municipal elections in 2006. We find that the arguments of large parties mainly focus on becoming the leading formation and thus claiming the initiative in coalition formation. Small parties have more varied motives for forming or failing to form a pre-electoral alliance. Adapted from the source document.

Since the 'argumentative turn' in policy analysis scholars have increasingly focused on discourse as an explanatory factor for the analysis policy processes. This has resulted in a proliferation of rich and deep qualitative discourse-analytical studies on a vast range of policy controversies. However, these studies have two important shortcomings: firstly, they offer limited possibilities for comparative research, because they lack an objectified and standardized measuring instrument. Secondly, according to some critics, these studies do not live up to scientific standards. This article presents a method based on a combination of content analysis and social network analysis which can be complementary to qualitative approaches, in order to answer to these shortcomings. It is exemplified by a limited case study on two debates within the policy domain of transport-mobility in Flanders. The article concludes with a discussion of a number of possible applications of the method within the broader discipline of political science. Adapted from the source document.

Communication between political elites & the general public is suffering from information overload. The best way to remedy the problem is to improve political language. Ideology is the most 'rational' political language available: it carries information about elite decision making at a relatively modest cost. Three questions are considered: (1) Do the decisionmakers have an ideology? (2) If 'yes,' is it instrumental in the decision-making process? (3) If 'yes,' why does this ideological factor rarely reach the public? The last two questions are considered from a formal viewpoint. It is shown that ideology can be important in the private decision-making forum & disappear when the elites address the public. The private forum is dominated by the need for policy output & by the necessity for coalition formation. The adaptation of ideology to this situation depends on its articulation degree & on the coalition-formation type. Generally, the salience aspect of ideology is less likely to suffer than its position aspect. The public forum is dominated by the needs for recruiting support & legitimizing proposals. Ideology is generally too costly a device to be used for these purposes. HA.

The last local elections in Wallonia were marked by the introduction of a new legislation concerning the way mayors are appointed. Before 2006, mayors were appointed by the regional government. Since the last elections, a new decree institutes that is automatically appointed mayor the candidate having most preferential votes from the list having most seats. In this article, we explore how the new legislation has affected the way voters behave in 2006 & also how it has affected parties when it comes to coalition agreements. What appears is that the new legislation has a fairly limited impact. Voters did not cast more preferential votes in 2006 than in 2000. The logics of coalitions have not been changed significantly. Finally, the only notable -- even if not spectacular -- impact of the new Walloon decree is that the elections have been much more focused on the candidates that were leading their list, the ones that were presented by their party as their candidate to become mayor. These candidates have more often been appointed mayors in 2006 than in 2000 & the proportion of preferential votes that they have received is higher in 2006. In that sense, even if the degree of change must not be exaggerated, Walloon local elections are slightly turning into a horse race between candidates leading their list. Tables. Adapted from the source document.

Dutch socioeconomic concertation has experienced some transformative changes in its modus operandi in recent years, which has given the 'Polder Model' a new lease on life for the time being. Building on an older tradition of sharing political space with civil society organizations, the recent liberal-social democratic government coalition, with Mark Rutte at the helm (2012-2017), has been able to enact a surprisingly successful structural reform agenda in the aftermath of the global financial crisis. Governing in times of significant economic, social and political uncertainty, it is no mean feat that the Rutte II administration – de facto a minority government – is the first Dutch coalition to complete its term since the administration under Wim Kok (1994-1998). After the foundational Social Accord (the so-called Mondriaan Akkoord) in April 2013, a series of reform agreements were reached in the policy areas of education, housing, healthcare, industrial and energy policy. For each of these more meso-level accords, a variety of civil society organizations participated that were beyond the traditional social partners of business and labor. Over time these seemingly ad hoc, open and non-hierarchical agreements materialized in a trajectory of cumulatively transformative policy change. The political tactic of the Rutte II government stands out in comparison with the halcyon Dutch miracle era of the Polder Model in the 1980s and 1990. We explain the new modes of Dutch socioeconomic policy concertation and its political tactic as a kind of rallying around existing institutional arrangements to bring the contested political and social center together behind a major adjustment strategy, including retrenchment, compensatory social meas­ures and investments, when reform output and outcomes are fundamentally uncertain. Whether the new Polder Model will prove robust remains an open question. Recently, new multiple party covenants were negotiated in the textile and banking industry. Meanwhile a number of issues concerning regional labor market regulation and work-life balance reconciliation have yet to be resolved.