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High figures of political support are a necessary ingredient of consolidated democracy. Although the low standards of both satisfaction with democracy and trust in parliament in CEE countries are well known, one cannot say much about the factors underlying the fluctuation of these two indicators. The paper examines the effect of parliamentary fragmentation, polarization and ruling coalition size on satisfaction with democracy and trust in parliament. Statistical analysis, encompassing 10 CEE countries from 1991 to 2011, is used to measure the impact of political factors, while the effect of economic growth and unemployment rate is also evaluated. The most important statistical techniques used in the research are correlation analysis, linear regression, and a single-factor analysis of variance. Atwo-case comparative analysis is also carried out, with the aim of elaborating one of the findings of statistical analysis. The strongest finding suggests that there is a negative relation between unemployment rate and satisfaction with democracy. Furthermore, satisfaction with a political regime is undermined by a small number of parliamentary parties and large ruling coalitions. Trust in parliament tends to be lower when ideological differences among parliamentary parties are sizable, as well as at the times of economic recession or marginal growth. The fact that satisfaction with democracy and trust in parliament depend on different factors indicates the ability of CEE citizens to distinguish between different political phenomena. This conclusion contradicts the prevalent belief that the political sophistication in CEE countries is low. Generally, there are more winners of democratic competition when a large ruling coalition is formed. However, statistical analysis has shown that large ruling coalitions are usually followed by low satisfaction with democracy. This should be taken as a sign that, in the case of CEE countries, distinction between losers and winners of democratic competition is irrelevant, because citizens tend to turn away from their chosen parties very quickly. Instead, when asked to evaluate the functioning of democracy, they concentrate on the negative consequences of large ruling coalitions. Acomparative analysis of political realities in the Czech Republic and Bulgaria has shown that a large ruling coalition diminishes the political role of parliament, provides a strong ground for the implementation of a strict and unpopular economic policy and leads to the lack of viable political alternatives in the ranks of parliamentary opposition. The complex of these political phenomena contributes to the low satisfaction with democracy.

High figures of political support are a necessary ingredient of consolidated democracy. Although the low standards of both satisfaction with democracy and trust in parliament in CEE countries are well known, one cannot say much about the factors underlying the fluctuation of these two indicators. The paper examines the effect of parliamentary fragmentation, polarization and ruling coalition size on satisfaction with democracy and trust in parliament. Statistical analysis, encompassing 10 CEE countries from 1991 to 2011, is used to measure the impact of political factors, while the effect of economic growth and unemployment rate is also evaluated. The most important statistical techniques used in the research are correlation analysis, linear regression, and a single-factor analysis of variance. Atwo-case comparative analysis is also carried out, with the aim of elaborating one of the findings of statistical analysis. The strongest finding suggests that there is a negative relation between unemployment rate and satisfaction with democracy. Furthermore, satisfaction with a political regime is undermined by a small number of parliamentary parties and large ruling coalitions. Trust in parliament tends to be lower when ideological differences among parliamentary parties are sizable, as well as at the times of economic recession or marginal growth. The fact that satisfaction with democracy and trust in parliament depend on different factors indicates the ability of CEE citizens to distinguish between different political phenomena. This conclusion contradicts the prevalent belief that the political sophistication in CEE countries is low. Generally, there are more winners of democratic competition when a large ruling coalition is formed. However, statistical analysis has shown that large ruling coalitions are usually followed by low satisfaction with democracy. This should be taken as a sign that, in the case of CEE countries, distinction between losers and winners of democratic competition is irrelevant, because citizens tend to turn away from their chosen parties very quickly. Instead, when asked to evaluate the functioning of democracy, they concentrate on the negative consequences of large ruling coalitions. Acomparative analysis of political realities in the Czech Republic and Bulgaria has shown that a large ruling coalition diminishes the political role of parliament, provides a strong ground for the implementation of a strict and unpopular economic policy and leads to the lack of viable political alternatives in the ranks of parliamentary opposition. The complex of these political phenomena contributes to the low satisfaction with democracy.

High figures of political support are a necessary ingredient of consolidated democracy. Although the low standards of both satisfaction with democracy and trust in parliament in CEE countries are well known, one cannot say much about the factors underlying the fluctuation of these two indicators. The paper examines the effect of parliamentary fragmentation, polarization and ruling coalition size on satisfaction with democracy and trust in parliament. Statistical analysis, encompassing 10 CEE countries from 1991 to 2011, is used to measure the impact of political factors, while the effect of economic growth and unemployment rate is also evaluated. The most important statistical techniques used in the research are correlation analysis, linear regression, and a single-factor analysis of variance. Atwo-case comparative analysis is also carried out, with the aim of elaborating one of the findings of statistical analysis. The strongest finding suggests that there is a negative relation between unemployment rate and satisfaction with democracy. Furthermore, satisfaction with a political regime is undermined by a small number of parliamentary parties and large ruling coalitions. Trust in parliament tends to be lower when ideological differences among parliamentary parties are sizable, as well as at the times of economic recession or marginal growth. The fact that satisfaction with democracy and trust in parliament depend on different factors indicates the ability of CEE citizens to distinguish between different political phenomena. This conclusion contradicts the prevalent belief that the political sophistication in CEE countries is low. Generally, there are more winners of democratic competition when a large ruling coalition is formed. However, statistical analysis has shown that large ruling coalitions are usually followed by low satisfaction with democracy. This should be taken as a sign that, in the case of CEE countries, distinction between losers and winners of democratic competition is irrelevant, because citizens tend to turn away from their chosen parties very quickly. Instead, when asked to evaluate the functioning of democracy, they concentrate on the negative consequences of large ruling coalitions. Acomparative analysis of political realities in the Czech Republic and Bulgaria has shown that a large ruling coalition diminishes the political role of parliament, provides a strong ground for the implementation of a strict and unpopular economic policy and leads to the lack of viable political alternatives in the ranks of parliamentary opposition. The complex of these political phenomena contributes to the low satisfaction with democracy.

High figures of political support are a necessary ingredient of consolidated democracy. Although the low standards of both satisfaction with democracy and trust in parliament in CEE countries are well known, one cannot say much about the factors underlying the fluctuation of these two indicators. The paper examines the effect of parliamentary fragmentation, polarization and ruling coalition size on satisfaction with democracy and trust in parliament. Statistical analysis, encompassing 10 CEE countries from 1991 to 2011, is used to measure the impact of political factors, while the effect of economic growth and unemployment rate is also evaluated. The most important statistical techniques used in the research are correlation analysis, linear regression, and a single-factor analysis of variance. Atwo-case comparative analysis is also carried out, with the aim of elaborating one of the findings of statistical analysis. The strongest finding suggests that there is a negative relation between unemployment rate and satisfaction with democracy. Furthermore, satisfaction with a political regime is undermined by a small number of parliamentary parties and large ruling coalitions. Trust in parliament tends to be lower when ideological differences among parliamentary parties are sizable, as well as at the times of economic recession or marginal growth. The fact that satisfaction with democracy and trust in parliament depend on different factors indicates the ability of CEE citizens to distinguish between different political phenomena. This conclusion contradicts the prevalent belief that the political sophistication in CEE countries is low. Generally, there are more winners of democratic competition when a large ruling coalition is formed. However, statistical analysis has shown that large ruling coalitions are usually followed by low satisfaction with democracy. This should be taken as a sign that, in the case of CEE countries, distinction between losers and winners of democratic competition is irrelevant, because citizens tend to turn away from their chosen parties very quickly. Instead, when asked to evaluate the functioning of democracy, they concentrate on the negative consequences of large ruling coalitions. Acomparative analysis of political realities in the Czech Republic and Bulgaria has shown that a large ruling coalition diminishes the political role of parliament, provides a strong ground for the implementation of a strict and unpopular economic policy and leads to the lack of viable political alternatives in the ranks of parliamentary opposition. The complex of these political phenomena contributes to the low satisfaction with democracy.

This article is based on the analysis of a brief but very important period (from 19 June 1920 till 2 February 1922) of Lithuanian political history from the perspective of political science and history. The article provides the insights on the governmental dynamics of independent Lithuania during the first parliamentary and the fourth governmental coalition of the christian democrats party and peasant populists led by Kazys Grinius. Those two parliamentary parties were united by the common idea of independent state of Lithuania, besides they had similar social and economic programmes. On the other hand, those two political powers collided over different worldviews, understanding of democracy, human rights and civic liberty. From the beginning there were indications that coalition will not be long-lasting, nevertheless it worked more than 19 months it was employable and effective. Despite that, quantitative imbalance of the party members within the parliament, differences of political weight within the government, and deep contradictions on the place of church and religion within the state, produced the permanent clashes among the members of coalition. The aim of this article is to analyse the formation of peasant populists tactics and the process of its implementation. The analysis of primary sources revealed, that members of peasant populist from the very beginning of their work within the fourth government, till the autumn of 1921, fluctuated among two perspectives: remaining the member of coalition or withdrawing to the opposition. Long-term discussions within the peasant populists on political tactics while working in the parliament divided this political power into 2 competing radical and temperate sides. The permanent fluctuations among the coalition and opposition there reflected neither in seimas nor in the media.[.].

This article is based on the analysis of a brief but very important period (from 19 June 1920 till 2 February 1922) of Lithuanian political history from the perspective of political science and history. The article provides the insights on the governmental dynamics of independent Lithuania during the first parliamentary and the fourth governmental coalition of the christian democrats party and peasant populists led by Kazys Grinius. Those two parliamentary parties were united by the common idea of independent state of Lithuania, besides they had similar social and economic programmes. On the other hand, those two political powers collided over different worldviews, understanding of democracy, human rights and civic liberty. From the beginning there were indications that coalition will not be long-lasting, nevertheless it worked more than 19 months it was employable and effective. Despite that, quantitative imbalance of the party members within the parliament, differences of political weight within the government, and deep contradictions on the place of church and religion within the state, produced the permanent clashes among the members of coalition. The aim of this article is to analyse the formation of peasant populists tactics and the process of its implementation. The analysis of primary sources revealed, that members of peasant populist from the very beginning of their work within the fourth government, till the autumn of 1921, fluctuated among two perspectives: remaining the member of coalition or withdrawing to the opposition. Long-term discussions within the peasant populists on political tactics while working in the parliament divided this political power into 2 competing radical and temperate sides. The permanent fluctuations among the coalition and opposition there reflected neither in seimas nor in the media.[.].

This article is based on the analysis of a brief but very important period (from 19 June 1920 till 2 February 1922) of Lithuanian political history from the perspective of political science and history. The article provides the insights on the governmental dynamics of independent Lithuania during the first parliamentary and the fourth governmental coalition of the christian democrats party and peasant populists led by Kazys Grinius. Those two parliamentary parties were united by the common idea of independent state of Lithuania, besides they had similar social and economic programmes. On the other hand, those two political powers collided over different worldviews, understanding of democracy, human rights and civic liberty. From the beginning there were indications that coalition will not be long-lasting, nevertheless it worked more than 19 months it was employable and effective. Despite that, quantitative imbalance of the party members within the parliament, differences of political weight within the government, and deep contradictions on the place of church and religion within the state, produced the permanent clashes among the members of coalition. The aim of this article is to analyse the formation of peasant populists tactics and the process of its implementation. The analysis of primary sources revealed, that members of peasant populist from the very beginning of their work within the fourth government, till the autumn of 1921, fluctuated among two perspectives: remaining the member of coalition or withdrawing to the opposition. Long-term discussions within the peasant populists on political tactics while working in the parliament divided this political power into 2 competing radical and temperate sides. The permanent fluctuations among the coalition and opposition there reflected neither in seimas nor in the media.[.].

In the 1970s, the process of European integration induced discussions about the deficit of democracy in the European Union (EU). The decrease of national parliaments' powers and the increase of the autonomy of executive branches are named as one of the aspects of this problem. As this problem has been realised, national parliaments began to create different mechanisms for scrutinizing the activity of national governments at the level of EU institutions. Gradually, the European Affairs Committees (EAC) were founded in all EU member states. However, despite the role given to these innovations, the academic society, political analysts and politicians have doubts as to the effectiveness of these scrutiny mechanisms. When analyzing the issue of the parliamentary scrutiny of the EU affairs, very often the parliament is perceived as an undivided, integral object. However, the parliament is composed of different political parties that can have very different or similar attitudes and may form coalitions or become an oppositional power. When a government is composed of more than one political party, the informational asymmetry is increasing. Therefore, the need for the parliamentary scrutiny increases, too. Not only oppositional parties, but also the parties that have formed a coalition become the actors that scrutinize the government. These parties feel the need to scrutinize ministers and their subordinates who represent their coalitional partners in the government. This need increases even more when there is a high level of preference divergence within a coalition of political parties. The main issue of this study was to elucidate whether the level of preference divergence within a coalition determines the intensity of parliamentary scrutiny of the EU affairs. The Lithuanian case study is analysed. Results of the research show that, depending on the parties' position in the economic and ideological left–right scale, the level of preference divergence in the 2006–2008 coalition was higher that in the 2008–2012 coalition. However, in the 2008–2012 coalition there was a higher disagreement in the area of socio-cultural issues (in the area of human rights and liberties). Both coalitions had very similar attitudes towards the process of the European integration. Almost all parties could be named as euro-optimistic parties. A nalysis of the protocols of EAC meetings showed that in the period 18.11.2008–30.04.2012 there was implemented a more intensive parliamentary scrutiny than in the period 06.07.2006–17.11.2008. Thus, despite the lower level of preference divergence in the 2008–2012 coalition, during the period of its governing the instruments of parliamentary scrutiny were used more often than in 2006–2006. A more detailed analysis allows to conclude that a more intensive scrutiny in the second period was determined by a more active participation of the Seimas member V. Valkiūnas (who has a very skeptical attitude towards the EU) in the meetings of the EAC and the more intensive role of opposition in the activities of this committee. The number of cases when coalition partners could not reach a consensus during the EAC sessions was very small both in 06.07.2006–17.11.2008 and in 18.11.2008–30.04.2012. The cases when this consensus was not reached were related to spiritual, very ideologised issues and to the issues that were very important to interest groups. Moreover, in Lithuania, the EAC is not perceived as an area or the instrument to control coalitional partners despite the differences in the positions of the coalitional parties.

In the 1970s, the process of European integration induced discussions about the deficit of democracy in the European Union (EU). The decrease of national parliaments' powers and the increase of the autonomy of executive branches are named as one of the aspects of this problem. As this problem has been realised, national parliaments began to create different mechanisms for scrutinizing the activity of national governments at the level of EU institutions. Gradually, the European Affairs Committees (EAC) were founded in all EU member states. However, despite the role given to these innovations, the academic society, political analysts and politicians have doubts as to the effectiveness of these scrutiny mechanisms. When analyzing the issue of the parliamentary scrutiny of the EU affairs, very often the parliament is perceived as an undivided, integral object. However, the parliament is composed of different political parties that can have very different or similar attitudes and may form coalitions or become an oppositional power. When a government is composed of more than one political party, the informational asymmetry is increasing. Therefore, the need for the parliamentary scrutiny increases, too. Not only oppositional parties, but also the parties that have formed a coalition become the actors that scrutinize the government. These parties feel the need to scrutinize ministers and their subordinates who represent their coalitional partners in the government. This need increases even more when there is a high level of preference divergence within a coalition of political parties. The main issue of this study was to elucidate whether the level of preference divergence within a coalition determines the intensity of parliamentary scrutiny of the EU affairs. The Lithuanian case study is analysed. Results of the research show that, depending on the parties' position in the economic and ideological left–right scale, the level of preference divergence in the 2006–2008 coalition was higher that in the 2008–2012 coalition. However, in the 2008–2012 coalition there was a higher disagreement in the area of socio-cultural issues (in the area of human rights and liberties). Both coalitions had very similar attitudes towards the process of the European integration. Almost all parties could be named as euro-optimistic parties. A nalysis of the protocols of EAC meetings showed that in the period 18.11.2008–30.04.2012 there was implemented a more intensive parliamentary scrutiny than in the period 06.07.2006–17.11.2008. Thus, despite the lower level of preference divergence in the 2008–2012 coalition, during the period of its governing the instruments of parliamentary scrutiny were used more often than in 2006–2006. A more detailed analysis allows to conclude that a more intensive scrutiny in the second period was determined by a more active participation of the Seimas member V. Valkiūnas (who has a very skeptical attitude towards the EU) in the meetings of the EAC and the more intensive role of opposition in the activities of this committee. The number of cases when coalition partners could not reach a consensus during the EAC sessions was very small both in 06.07.2006–17.11.2008 and in 18.11.2008–30.04.2012. The cases when this consensus was not reached were related to spiritual, very ideologised issues and to the issues that were very important to interest groups. Moreover, in Lithuania, the EAC is not perceived as an area or the instrument to control coalitional partners despite the differences in the positions of the coalitional parties.

In the 1970s, the process of European integration induced discussions about the deficit of democracy in the European Union (EU). The decrease of national parliaments' powers and the increase of the autonomy of executive branches are named as one of the aspects of this problem. As this problem has been realised, national parliaments began to create different mechanisms for scrutinizing the activity of national governments at the level of EU institutions. Gradually, the European Affairs Committees (EAC) were founded in all EU member states. However, despite the role given to these innovations, the academic society, political analysts and politicians have doubts as to the effectiveness of these scrutiny mechanisms. When analyzing the issue of the parliamentary scrutiny of the EU affairs, very often the parliament is perceived as an undivided, integral object. However, the parliament is composed of different political parties that can have very different or similar attitudes and may form coalitions or become an oppositional power. When a government is composed of more than one political party, the informational asymmetry is increasing. Therefore, the need for the parliamentary scrutiny increases, too. Not only oppositional parties, but also the parties that have formed a coalition become the actors that scrutinize the government. These parties feel the need to scrutinize ministers and their subordinates who represent their coalitional partners in the government. This need increases even more when there is a high level of preference divergence within a coalition of political parties. The main issue of this study was to elucidate whether the level of preference divergence within a coalition determines the intensity of parliamentary scrutiny of the EU affairs. The Lithuanian case study is analysed. Results of the research show that, depending on the parties' position in the economic and ideological left–right scale, the level of preference divergence in the 2006–2008 coalition was higher that in the 2008–2012 coalition. However, in the 2008–2012 coalition there was a higher disagreement in the area of socio-cultural issues (in the area of human rights and liberties). Both coalitions had very similar attitudes towards the process of the European integration. Almost all parties could be named as euro-optimistic parties. A nalysis of the protocols of EAC meetings showed that in the period 18.11.2008–30.04.2012 there was implemented a more intensive parliamentary scrutiny than in the period 06.07.2006–17.11.2008. Thus, despite the lower level of preference divergence in the 2008–2012 coalition, during the period of its governing the instruments of parliamentary scrutiny were used more often than in 2006–2006. A more detailed analysis allows to conclude that a more intensive scrutiny in the second period was determined by a more active participation of the Seimas member V. Valkiūnas (who has a very skeptical attitude towards the EU) in the meetings of the EAC and the more intensive role of opposition in the activities of this committee. The number of cases when coalition partners could not reach a consensus during the EAC sessions was very small both in 06.07.2006–17.11.2008 and in 18.11.2008–30.04.2012. The cases when this consensus was not reached were related to spiritual, very ideologised issues and to the issues that were very important to interest groups. Moreover, in Lithuania, the EAC is not perceived as an area or the instrument to control coalitional partners despite the differences in the positions of the coalitional parties.

In the 1970s, the process of European integration induced discussions about the deficit of democracy in the European Union (EU). The decrease of national parliaments' powers and the increase of the autonomy of executive branches are named as one of the aspects of this problem. As this problem has been realised, national parliaments began to create different mechanisms for scrutinizing the activity of national governments at the level of EU institutions. Gradually, the European Affairs Committees (EAC) were founded in all EU member states. However, despite the role given to these innovations, the academic society, political analysts and politicians have doubts as to the effectiveness of these scrutiny mechanisms. When analyzing the issue of the parliamentary scrutiny of the EU affairs, very often the parliament is perceived as an undivided, integral object. However, the parliament is composed of different political parties that can have very different or similar attitudes and may form coalitions or become an oppositional power. When a government is composed of more than one political party, the informational asymmetry is increasing. Therefore, the need for the parliamentary scrutiny increases, too. Not only oppositional parties, but also the parties that have formed a coalition become the actors that scrutinize the government. These parties feel the need to scrutinize ministers and their subordinates who represent their coalitional partners in the government. This need increases even more when there is a high level of preference divergence within a coalition of political parties. The main issue of this study was to elucidate whether the level of preference divergence within a coalition determines the intensity of parliamentary scrutiny of the EU affairs. The Lithuanian case study is analysed. Results of the research show that, depending on the parties' position in the economic and ideological left–right scale, the level of preference divergence in the 2006–2008 coalition was higher that in the 2008–2012 coalition. However, in the 2008–2012 coalition there was a higher disagreement in the area of socio-cultural issues (in the area of human rights and liberties). Both coalitions had very similar attitudes towards the process of the European integration. Almost all parties could be named as euro-optimistic parties. A nalysis of the protocols of EAC meetings showed that in the period 18.11.2008–30.04.2012 there was implemented a more intensive parliamentary scrutiny than in the period 06.07.2006–17.11.2008. Thus, despite the lower level of preference divergence in the 2008–2012 coalition, during the period of its governing the instruments of parliamentary scrutiny were used more often than in 2006–2006. A more detailed analysis allows to conclude that a more intensive scrutiny in the second period was determined by a more active participation of the Seimas member V. Valkiūnas (who has a very skeptical attitude towards the EU) in the meetings of the EAC and the more intensive role of opposition in the activities of this committee. The number of cases when coalition partners could not reach a consensus during the EAC sessions was very small both in 06.07.2006–17.11.2008 and in 18.11.2008–30.04.2012. The cases when this consensus was not reached were related to spiritual, very ideologised issues and to the issues that were very important to interest groups. Moreover, in Lithuania, the EAC is not perceived as an area or the instrument to control coalitional partners despite the differences in the positions of the coalitional parties.

Despite the shutdown of the Chernobyl nuclear power plant (1986) it still influences the social and political reality. Chernobyl appears in this research as the result of work of interpretation of the aftermaths of Chernobyl disaster by different actors: state bodies, political parties, NGO and scientific institutions. This research touches upon different discourses, story-lines through witch the consequences of the accident on Chernobyl plant are managed in Belarus from 1986 to 2008. Applying such sociological concepts as risk (Beck 2000; Borraz 2008), construction of scientific facts (Callon 1979; Latour 1989, 2004), biopower (Foucault 1996) and the methodology of the discourse-coalitions (Hajer 1995) in this dissertation the constructivist analysis of the politics of Chernobyl is represented. The main hypothesis of this research is to identify the discourse-coalitions within the Chernobyl policy, the actors and story-lines they utter. This research analyses also how the risks created by Chernobyl accident are treated and how biopolitics rhetoric is articulated in the discourse-coalitions and reveals their role in the nuclear policy.

Despite the shutdown of the Chernobyl nuclear power plant (1986) it still influences the social and political reality. Chernobyl appears in this research as the result of work of interpretation of the aftermaths of Chernobyl disaster by different actors: state bodies, political parties, NGO and scientific institutions. This research touches upon different discourses, story-lines through witch the consequences of the accident on Chernobyl plant are managed in Belarus from 1986 to 2008. Applying such sociological concepts as risk (Beck 2000; Borraz 2008), construction of scientific facts (Callon 1979; Latour 1989, 2004), biopower (Foucault 1996) and the methodology of the discourse-coalitions (Hajer 1995) in this dissertation the constructivist analysis of the politics of Chernobyl is represented. The main hypothesis of this research is to identify the discourse-coalitions within the Chernobyl policy, the actors and story-lines they utter. This research analyses also how the risks created by Chernobyl accident are treated and how biopolitics rhetoric is articulated in the discourse-coalitions and reveals their role in the nuclear policy.

Despite the shutdown of the Chernobyl nuclear power plant (1986) it still influences the social and political reality. Chernobyl appears in this research as the result of work of interpretation of the aftermaths of Chernobyl disaster by different actors: state bodies, political parties, NGO and scientific institutions. This research touches upon different discourses, story-lines through witch the consequences of the accident on Chernobyl plant are managed in Belarus from 1986 to 2008. Applying such sociological concepts as risk (Beck 2000; Borraz 2008), construction of scientific facts (Callon 1979; Latour 1989, 2004), biopower (Foucault 1996) and the methodology of the discourse-coalitions (Hajer 1995) in this dissertation the constructivist analysis of the politics of Chernobyl is represented. The main hypothesis of this research is to identify the discourse-coalitions within the Chernobyl policy, the actors and story-lines they utter. This research analyses also how the risks created by Chernobyl accident are treated and how biopolitics rhetoric is articulated in the discourse-coalitions and reveals their role in the nuclear policy.

Despite the shutdown of the Chernobyl nuclear power plant (1986) it still influences the social and political reality. Chernobyl appears in this research as the result of work of interpretation of the aftermaths of Chernobyl disaster by different actors: state bodies, political parties, NGO and scientific institutions. This research touches upon different discourses, story-lines through witch the consequences of the accident on Chernobyl plant are managed in Belarus from 1986 to 2008. Applying such sociological concepts as risk (Beck 2000; Borraz 2008), construction of scientific facts (Callon 1979; Latour 1989, 2004), biopower (Foucault 1996) and the methodology of the discourse-coalitions (Hajer 1995) in this dissertation the constructivist analysis of the politics of Chernobyl is represented. The main hypothesis of this research is to identify the discourse-coalitions within the Chernobyl policy, the actors and story-lines they utter. This research analyses also how the risks created by Chernobyl accident are treated and how biopolitics rhetoric is articulated in the discourse-coalitions and reveals their role in the nuclear policy.