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This chapter surveys the sizable and growing literature on coalition formation. We refer to theories in which one or more groups of agents ("coalitions") deliberately get together to jointly determine their actions. The defining idea of a coalition, in this chapter, is that of a group which can coordinate agreements among its members, while it interacts noncooperatively with other non-member individuals and the outside world in general. It is hard to overstate the importance of coalition formation in economic, political and social analysis. Ray (2007) gives several examples in which such a framework comes to life: cartel formation, lobbies, customs unions, conflict, public goods provision, political party formation, and so on. Yet as one surveys the landscape of this area of research, the first feature that attracts attention is the fragmented nature of the literature. The theories that bear on our questions range from collusive behavior in repeated games, to models of bargaining, to cooperative game-theoretic notions of the core, or notions of coalition-proofness in noncooperative games. To unravel the many intricacies of this literature would take far more than a survey. To prevent our terms of inquiry from becoming unmanageably large, we impose a basic restriction.

In this chapter we outline the Danish and Scandinavian experiences with coalition governments and coalition governance. We do so by first briefly describing the historical path that has led to the political system we see working today in these countries. Then we tell about the political culture and institutional factors that lead to coalition governments. In the third section, we look at the nature of political agreements. We discuss the preconditions for coalition governments or coalition governance and its pros and cons. We focus on the trade-offs between including different interests into legislative coalitions and the possible lack of clarity of responsibility or of party identity that this inclusion entails. ; In this chapter we outline the Danish and Scandinavian experiences with coalition governments and coalition governance. We do so by first briefly describing the historical path that has led to the political system we see working today in these countries. Then we tell about the political culture and institutional factors that lead to coalition governments. In the third section, we look at the nature of political agreements. We discuss the preconditions for coalition governments or coalition governance and its pros and cons. We focus on the trade-offs between including different interests into legislative coalitions and the possible lack of clarity of responsibility or of party identity that this inclusion entails.

This paper examines recent theoretical developments of the theory of coalition stability. It focuses on the relationship between the incentives to defect from a coalition, the size of the resulting equilibrium coalition structure, and the different assumptions on membership rules, coalition behaviour, players' conjectures, etc. The paper considers several cases. Simultaneous vs. sequential moves, linear vs. circular order of moves, Nash vs. rational conjectures, open vs. exclusive membership, monotonic vs. non monotonic payoff functions, and orthogonal vs. non-orthogonal reaction functions. The profitable and stable coalition will be derived for each possible configuration of the rules of the game, the payoff functions and the membership rules. The results show that the size of the profitable and stable coalition highly depends on the chosen configuration and that the equilibrium outcome ranges from a small coalition with a few signatories to full cooperation. The paper explores under which conditions a large stable coalition is likely to emerge, and identifies the institutional setting that favours the emergence of such coalition.

The Shapley value for an n-person game is decomposed into a 2n × 2n value matrix giving the value of every coalition to every other coalition. The cell ϕIJ(v, N) in the symmetric matrix is positive, zero, or negative, dependent on whether row coalition I is beneficial, neutral, or unbeneficial to column coalition J. This enables viewing the values of coalitions from multiple perspectives. The n × 1 Shapley vector, replicated in the bottom row and right column of the 2n × 2n matrix, follows from summing the elements in all columns or all rows in the n × n player value matrix replicated in the upper left part of the 2n × 2n matrix. A proposition is developed, illustrated with an example, revealing desirable matrix properties, and applicable for weighted Shapley values. For example, the Shapley value of a coalition to another coalition equals the sum of the Shapley values of each player in the first coalition to each player in the second coalition. ; publishedVersion

Volltext // Exemplar mit der Signatur: München, Bayerische Staatsbibliothek -- Eur. 293 d-134

Following the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in August 1990, the UN Security Council issued a series of resolutions exerting increasing pressure on lraq. This process started with Resolution 660/ 90, condemning the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, and reached its highest point with Resolution 678/90, which authorized the use of force against Iraq after the deadline of 15 January 1991. These resolutions were the legal umbrella under which was built the largest international military coalition to be employed in combat since World War ll. Countries from Africa, Europe, East Asia, the Pacific, North America, South America, and South Asia joined forces with nations of the Middle East. 1 The ground forces were provided by twenty-five countries, the naval forces came front twenty-three, and the air forces from fourteen

WOS:000289715000006 (Nº de Acesso Web of Science) ; "Prémio Científico ISCTE-IUL 2012" ; In coalition government, the relationship between parties and ministers is one of double delegation: from the party to the minister and from the coalition of parties to the individual minister. On the basis of principal—agent theory, I argue that a coalition agreement is a tool used by coalition parties to reduce agency loss when delegating to ministers. In six governments in Belgium, Italy and The Netherlands, I show that: a majority of the pledges were transferred into cabinet decisions, a majority of cabinet decisions were effectively constrained by the coalition agreement and that one-third of cabinet decisions had been precisely defined beforehand in the document. Interestingly, the length of the coalition agreement, the entry of party leaders to government and the number of ministers participating in the negotiations do not seem to have had a significant influence on the above two measurements.

Coalitions for Change supports key policy reforms that will make a difference in the lives of Filipinos, especially the poor and marginalized. CfC is focused on the whole policy cycle - identifying obstacles and gaps, improving how policies are developed, implemented, and enforced, and monitoring the impacts policy changes create. CfC measures success by looking at the impact of policy reforms and how these lead to sustainable and scalable social or economic outcomes.

Coalitions are partnerships among distinct actors that coordinate action in pursuit of shared goals. But what distinguishes them from other kinds of partnerships? The term is widely used to describe joint ventures in a wide range of arenas, most notably in international geopolitics or political party competition and governance. The literature on coalitions is dominated by discussions of war and peace, election campaigns, and parliamentary dynamics. Just as in war or politics, successful collective action in civil society often depends on the formation and survival of coalitions – insofar as the whole is often greater than the sum of the parts.

Theoretical models of government formation in political science usually assume that the head of state is non-strategic. In this paper, we analyse the power of an agenda setter who chooses the order in which players are recognised to form coalitions in simple games. We characterise those sets of players which can be imposed in the equilibrium coalition and show that the only decisive structures where the agenda setter can impose the presence of any minimal winning coalition are apex games, where a large player forms a winning coalition with any of the small players.

The thesis is a contribution to Coalition Formation Theory. Coalition formation theory is the collection of disciplines and mathematical tools which deals with the analysis of coalition formation processes. A coalition formation process is a process by which agents get together to coordinate their actions in order to achieve shared goals. Coalition formation is an important and recurrent pattern in human behavior and many social phenomena can be studied in terms of coalition formation processes. Examples are: cartel formation, environmental agreements, political party formation, lobbying and the of a local public good. The thesis provide a new tool to analyse coalition formation processes and to predict the behaviour of the agents involved in the processes. From one side, our new tool connects and generalizes different existing tools; from another side it is able to provide predictions even when the other tools fails.

Lobbyists frequently join forces to influence policy, yet the success of active lobbying coalitions remains a blind spot in the literature. This article is the first to test how and when characteristics of active coalitions increase their lobbying success. Based on pluralist theory, one can expect diverse coalitions, uniting different societal interests, to signal broad support to policy makers. Yet, their responsiveness to this signal (i.e., signaling benefits) and contribution incentives within the coalition (i.e., cooperation costs) are likely to vary with issue salience. This theory is tested on a unique data set comprising 50 issues in five European countries. Results reveal a strong moderating effect of salience on the relationship between coalition diversity and success: On less salient issues, homogenous coalitions are more likely to succeed, whereas the effect reverses with higher salience, where diverse coalitions are more successful. These findings have implications for understanding political responsiveness and potential policy capture.

Theoretical models of government formation in political science usually assume that the head of state is non-strategic. In this paper, we analyze the power of an agenda setter who chooses the order in which players are recognized to form coalitions in simple games. We characterize those sets of players which can be imposed in the equilibrium coalition and show that the only decisive structures where the agenda setter can impose the presence of any minimal winning coalition are apex games, where a large player forms a winning coalition with any of the small players.

Theoretical models of government formation in political science usually assume that the head of state is non-strategic. In this paper, we analyze the power of an agenda setter who chooses the order in which players are recognized to form coalitions in simple games. We characterize those sets of players which can be imposed in the equilibrium coalition and show that the only decisive structures where the agenda setter can impose the presence of any minimal winning coalition are apex games, where a large player forms a winning coalition with any of the small players.

Coalition governments are the norm in parliamentary democracies. Yet, despite the predominance of this type of government, political scientists have only recently started to investigate how voters approach elections when a coalition government is the likely outcome. Such elections present additional uncertainty and complexity for voters compared with elections in plurality systems, where party choice translates more directly into a choice of government. These factors have lead to the assumption that strategic voting is unlikely to occur in systems that produce coalition governments. In this introductory article to the special issue on Voters and Coalition Governments, we consider whether voters have the capacity to anticipate specific coalition outcomes and propose a framework for understanding the conditions that lead to strategic voting in both plurality and proportional systems.