Lobbying in Coalitions
In: Lobbying in the European Union, S. 24-59
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In: Lobbying in the European Union, S. 24-59
In: Harvard political review, Band 31, Heft 2, S. 31
ISSN: 0090-1032
In: Zwischen Anpassung und Konfrontation, S. 145-203
In: The Indian journal of political science, Band 58, Heft 1-4, S. 68-78
ISSN: 0019-5510
In: Parliamentary affairs: a journal of comparative politics, Band XXX, Heft 1, S. 107-111
ISSN: 1460-2482
In: Parameters: the US Army War College quarterly, Band 1, Heft 1
ISSN: 2158-2106
In: Current history: a journal of contemporary world affairs, Band 60, Heft 354, S. 90-94
ISSN: 1944-785X
In: Current history: a journal of contemporary world affairs, Band 60, Heft 354, S. 90-94,117-118
ISSN: 0011-3530
World Affairs Online
In: Presidential studies quarterly: official publication of the Center for the Study of the Presidency, Band 30, Heft 1, S. 47-78
ISSN: 1741-5705
In: Presidential studies quarterly, Band 30, Heft 1, S. 47-78
ISSN: 0360-4918
In: American behavioral scientist: ABS, Band 24, Heft 5, S. 633-647
ISSN: 1552-3381
In: American behavioral scientist: ABS, Band 24, Heft 5, S. 633-648
ISSN: 0002-7642
In: Annual review of political science, Band 13, S. 81-100
ISSN: 1545-1577
Most theoretical studies of coalition politics have focused on, selection, rather than accountability: Coalition partners are selected according to the proximity of their positions in a Euclidean policy space. This proximity, together with institutional attributes of the party systems or the coalitions, serves also to explain, the duration of the coalition. Empirical studies of retrospective voting, often with little connection to accountability theory, have generally concluded that the political survival of coalitions is, considerably independent from elections. Such results, however, refer to governments as a whole. In this work, voters allocate rewards and punishments for past outcomes focusing on the prime ministers and their parties. If differences in clarity of responsibility exist, they do not seem to produce greater economic accountability of single-party governments-it is similarly limited under both coalition and single-party governments. Coalitions, however, increase the risks of losing office due to political crises, rather than elections. Prime ministers can respond to challenges by reshuffling the government or the coalition. Because such crises are launched under economic conditions that improve the welfare of citizens, coalitions may undermine democratic accountability. Adapted from the source document.
In: Legislative studies quarterly, Band 35, Heft 4, S. 519-543
ISSN: 0362-9805