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The Congress Party's landslide victory at the 2009 general election should not overshadow the changes that have come about since the earlier stages of its political dominance. Its political stronghold has decreased even though it has benefited from the majority rule electoral system. The Congress Party must now enter coalitions. In a wider sense, the party system itself has evolved, as has the nature of the Indian political elite. Adapted from the source document.

DRAWING ON THE ISREAL EXPERIENCE, THE AUTHOR SUGGESTS THAT IN DOMINANT PARTY SYSTEMS WHERE A PLURALITY PARTY MUST BE INCLUDED IN EVERY WINNING COALITION, COALITIONS LARGER THAN NECESSARY TO WIN ARE FORMED, THE PLURALITY PARTY IS CAPABLE OF MAXIMIZING THE MOST SIGNIFICANT PAYOFFS, AND HENCE IT HAS LITTLE TO LOSE BY FORMING LARGER COALITIONS AND ALLOCATING SECONDARY PAYOFFS.

What kinds of districts do Latinos and African Americans represent? Are biracial coalitions forming to elect minority candidates in state legislatures? Is it easier for minorities to get elected in lower chamber districts? This article addresses these questions to assess whether Latinos are indeed becoming more alienated from African Americans. Using data from six diverse states and Congress, this article explains the conditions under which African Americans and Latinos are elected to some of the most important legislative institutions in the United States. Among the key findings are that biracial coalitions are not electing minority legislators in all of the states studied. That is, African American majority districts elect African Americans and Latino majority districts elect Latinos. In the U.S. House, however, African American members do benefit from Latino voters. Adapted from the source document.

How are party coalitions shaped and reshaped? Elected officials choose coalitions to win elections, but they must work to maintain those coalitions. Non-elected political actors, advancing an ideology at odds with the party coalition, can undermine the party. This article explores this possibility in the case of partisan change on slavery in the Antebellum United States. Intellectuals in 1850 divided into two camps over slavery and the other major issues of the day at a time when slavery cross-cut the two parties in Congress. The ideological division matches one that develops in Congress a decade later, suggesting that the parties responded not just to electoral incentives, but also to this elite division. [Reprinted by permission of Sage Publications Ltd., copyright holder.]

Following the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in August 1990, the UN Security Council issued a series of resolutions exerting increasing pressure on lraq. This process started with Resolution 660/ 90, condemning the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, and reached its highest point with Resolution 678/90, which authorized the use of force against Iraq after the deadline of 15 January 1991. These resolutions were the legal umbrella under which was built the largest international military coalition to be employed in combat since World War ll. Countries from Africa, Europe, East Asia, the Pacific, North America, South America, and South Asia joined forces with nations of the Middle East. 1 The ground forces were provided by twenty-five countries, the naval forces came front twenty-three, and the air forces from fourteen

Governments in Italy both change and remain the same. From 1946 to 1992 the Christian Democratic Party always held governing power. But almost no cabinet stayed in office more than a few years, and many governments collapsed after only a few months. How can instability coexist with stability in this way? How can gvvernments break up at such low cost and with so little effect on alternation? These questions are rooted in - but not resolved by - the available game-theoretic literature on coalitional behavior. My answer is that politicians' purposive actions can reduce the costs of coalition. I argue that the costs of making, breaking, and maintaining coalitions depend on political institutions and on the array of parties and voters in policy space. Institutional and spatial conditions structure politicians' opportunities and attempts to lower costs. Under some conditions, as I show, coalitions are cheap, and politicians can easily make coalition even cheaper. The inference is that this framework comprehends both Italy's extremes and the degrees of stability found in other parliamentary democracies. (American Political Science Review / FUB)

Governments in Italy both change and remain the same. From 1946 to 1992 the Christian Democratic Party always held governing power. But almost no cabinet stayed in office more than a few years, and many governments collapsed after only a few months. How can instability coexist with stability in this way? How can governments break up at such low cost and with so little effect on alternation? These questions are rooted in—but not resolved by—the available game-theoretic literature on coalitional behavior. My answer is that politicians' purposive actions can reduce the costs of coalition. I argue that the costs of making, breaking, and maintaining coalitions depend on political institutions and on the array of parties and voters in policy space. Institutional and spatial conditions structure politicians' opportunities and attempts to lower costs. Under some conditions, as I show, coalitions are cheap, and politicians can easily make coalitions even cheaper. The inference is that this framework comprehends both Italy's extremes and the degrees of stability found in other parliamentary democracies.