Suchergebnisse

State responsibility — Claims — In general — Agreement between Israel and Federal Republic of Germany of September 10, 1952, for settlement of claims — Waiver by Government of Israel of further claims on behalf of nationals — Payment of compensation to individuals by Government of Israel — The law of Israel.

Aliens — Expulsion of — Competent Authority — Renvoi — Privileged Aliens

Aliens — Expulsion of — "Renvoi" — "Competent Authority" — Reasons for "Renvoi".

International organization — European Coal and Steel Community — Compensation payments to Belgianmines — Whether threat to reduce or withdraw compensation amounts to discrimination forbidden by Treaty.International organization — European Coal and Steel Community — High Authority of — Competence of — Whether competent to fix selling price of Belgian coal — Absence of express power in Treaty — Whether competence may be implied — Convention containing Transitional Provisions, Section 26 — Détournement de pouvoir — Relevance of wrong motives — Primary and subsidiary aims — Effect of error.

Not long ago—early in 1954—the world observed a debate at Berlin between diplomats of East and West who offered their alternatives for solving the German problem. The Soviet solution as set forth by Vyacheslav Molotov, the Soviet Foreign Minister, was to use Germans as pawns in a diplomatic maneuver whose object was clearly to wreck Western European integration and to strengthen the Soviet Union. The solution proposed by the Western diplomats, John Foster Dulles, Anthony Eden and George Bidault, was to regard Germans as equals with whom they would negotiate a solution to Germany's problems. The Soviets have used the satellite East German regime to parrot their program and they have groomed it to neutralize Germany or lead it into the Communist camp. The Western diplomats have concluded that in order to obtain a lasting German settlement there must be free elections to establish an all-German government, which would be competent to negotiate about Germany's future and would be free to join the Western Alliance, if it chose to do so.

Treaties — Conclusion and operation of — Entry into force — Whether one paragraph of an article can enter into force before another paragraph — Effect of both paragraphs as integral parts of article — Treaty establishing European Coal and Steel Community, Article 65 — Date of entry into force of Article 65 (1) prohibiting restrictive agreements — Whether Article 65 (1) intended to enter into force before Article 65 (2).Treaties — Interpretation of — Principles and rules of — Meaning and principal object of treaty — Convention on Transitional Provisions annexed to Treaty establishing European Coal and Steel Community.Court of Justice of European Coal and Steel Community — Competence to pronounce upon questions of municipal law.339International organization — European Coal and Steel Community — Treaty establishing Community, 1951, Article 65 — Convention containing Transitional Provisions — Date of entry into force of Article 65 (1) prohibiting restrictive agreements — Whether any derogation from this date for particular provision in Article 65 — Relevance of motive of evasion in making trade regulations — Whether Article 65 (1) intended to enter into force before Article 65 (2) — Meaning and purpose of Convention containing Transitional Provisions — Powers exercised by Governments of member States during transitional period — Whether identical with powers of High Authority after establishment of Common Market — Détournement de pouvoir — Violation of Treaty — Alleged duty of High Authority to apply municipal law in determining validity of trade regulations made before entry into force of Treaty — Law applied by High Authority — Article 8 of Treaty — Whether competent to apply municipal law of member States — Whether High Authority concerned with validity of trade regulations under municipal law when exercising its functions under Article 65 (2).

A certain small group of men (hereafter called "the team") shares an intention, the implementation of which requires at least a once-for-all decision of some public authority. The most obvious procedure is to plead in favor of that decision with the holders (or holder) of the competent authority. The next most obvious is to win over people who have easy and habitual access to the decision-maker or makers. These first and second procedures can be practiced under any regime.

Aliens — Expulsion of — Authority Competent to Expel — The Law of Belgium.

Choices made in coalition formation are costly to participants, complex, and difficult to measure with precision because observable coalitions are multi-person, non-zero-sum games. At least eight decision costs are included in the process. The purpose of this paper is to identify them and to examine their usefulness in explaining coalition formation. Decisions include: (1) information costs, (2) responsibility costs, (3) intergame costs, (4) costs of division of payoffs, (5) dissonance costs (6) inertia costs, (7) time costs, and (8) persuasion costs.Coalition building is an essential aspect of decision making within any political system. Whether one is studying the behavior of a municipal planning commission, a committee or sub-committee of a legislative body, the United Nations Security Council, or any other decision-making institution in which more than one person is involved in reaching a decision, the essential problem is often one of establishing a winning coalition within the entire group membership. A winning coalition is any portion of the group that can decide to do or not to do something that is on the agenda of the group and over which it has competent authority. The requirements of what constitutes a winning coalition are determined by the formal and informal rules of the game. Most commonly, one of the rules is that a winning coalition must consist of one-half the members of the group plus one and this assumption is made for purposes of this paper. The size of the coalition needed is important for individual and coalition strategies, but it is not important conceptually. That is, the problems involved in securing a winning coalition on the United States Supreme Court when only four votes are needed in order to agree to hear a case affects the strategy of the members of the court, but is of no theoretical importance to coalition formation.

Warfare on land — Occupation of enemy territory — Legislative functions of Occupant — Order of occupation authorities extending right of audience in courts of occupied area to advocates of occupying State not normally qualified to practise there — Compatibility with Hague Rules, Article 43 — Whether courts of occupied area competent to review discretion of occupying authority — Right of Israeli advocate to appear in civil court in occupied "West Bank" area — The law of Jordan.

Unconventional warfare is governed by inter national law. In the context of the cold war, it must be con sidered in relation to both international and internal war. In international war, volunteers are lawful, as are troops belonging to an authority not recognized by the enemy. Guerrillas are lawful combatants if they belong to an organized resistance movement of a party to the conflict, are commanded by persons responsible for their subordinates, wear a fixed distinctive sign, carry their arms openly, and obey the laws and customs of war. Lawful participants in a levée en masse must comply with the last two conditions. In countering guerrilla activity, reprisals may not be used against prisoners of war or civilians in occu pied territory. Hostages may, in general, not be taken. If in habitants in guerrilla areas are deported, their welfare must be safeguarded. Captured unlawful combatants can only be sen tenced by a competent tribunal. In occupied territory, the death penalty against an unlawful combatant is only possible if the pre-occupation law of that territory allowed it. Espio nage, sabotage, corruption, and propaganda may be employed in war. In civil and colonial war, both sides must obey the code laid down in Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions of 1949.

Expert knowledge is central to modern professionals, serving to legitimize professional authority, autonomy, & prestige. The rapid growth of new knowledge introduces problems for the members of the profession who must continually update their expertise in order to maintain their professional status as well as to provide competent client care. The problems imposed by the expansion of new knowledge may also be compounded by the deterioration of previously held knowledge. Members of the US dental profession are examined in an attempt to provide data on the general question of the factors associated with the emergence of knowledge obsolescence. A national probability sample of 770 dentists responded (43% response rate) to a mailed questionnaire which asked them to assess the current status of their knowledge of dental skills & expertise in 20 areas of "standard" areas, & in 20 "emerging" areas. These perceived obsolescence scores then became the basis of an examination of the correlates of obsolescence. A set of hypotheses were tested which related obsolescence to professional age, patient load, professional orientation, professional activities, & integration into the dental community. Each was found to be associated, albeit modestly, to levels of obsolescence. These career & structural variables suggest that vulnerability to obsolescence may be located in the nature & dynamics of the professional role. 1 Table. AA.

Modern legislation, in Canada as elsewhere, has entrusted important functions to boards or commissions and has conferred very wide powers upon them. The basic purpose of such legislation is to supplement legislatures, courts of law, and ministers of the Crown by providing these venerable institutions with subordinate agencies which, within a strictly limited sphere, can act more effectively.The legislative functions of a board consist in making regulations with the force of law. These regulations often require the approval of the supreme executive authority. They provide a necessary type of legislation which our legislatures, let us say it quite brutally, are not competent to consider in detail.A second function of boards is to decide disputes. Not only do they supplement the action of the legislatures in cases in which it is likely to be cumbersome or ineffective, but they also replace judicial action in cases in which it is disliked or distrusted. Although control by courts of law may remain formally unimpaired, boards acting within the scope of the law which creates them are able to interfere, ostensibly in the public interest as they themselves define it, with many established or traditional rights.A third function of boards is administrative. They are in principle able to act with complete immunity from the political pressures to which a minister of the Crown may quite properly be exposed. Their administrative work is facilitated by their legislative and judicial powers and part of their usefulness derives from their ability to combine three functions which cannot be conveniently—and perhaps cannot be safely—combined at higher levels.

Sovereignty and independence — In matters of domestic jurisdiction — Charter of the United Nations, Article 2, paragraphs 1 and 7 — Action in the Congo — Whether amounting to intervention in domestic affairs of Republic of the Congo — Connection between maintenance of internal law and order and maintenance of international peace and security.Treaties — Interpretation of — Principles and rules of interpretation — Subsequent conduct of parties — Interpretation of constituent instrument of international organization — Relevance of practice within organization — Distinction between practice of organ of organization and subsequent conduct of parties to treaty.International organization — The United Nations — General Assembly — Competence and functions in maintenance of international peace and security — Articles 11, 12, 14 and 24 of the Charter — Meaning of "action" in Article 11 — Whether restricted to "enforcement action" — Competence of General Assembly to set up a United Nations Force — Status of UNEF — Applicability of Article 43 to UNEF.International organization — The United Nations — General Assembly — Budgetary authority of — Article 17 of the Charter — Whether Assembly competent to deal with costs of peace — keeping operations — Relevance of Articles 11 and 43.International organization — The United Nations — Interpretation of Charter of — "Enforcement action" under Chapter VII — Peacekeeping operations — Nature of — Whether UNEF and ONUC comprise enforcement action — Meaning of "action" in Article 11 — Whether restricted to "enforcement action".International Court of Justice — Advisory jurisdiction — Competence — Discretionary nature of — Circumstances in which Court may decline to give advisory opinion.International organization — The United Nations — Interpretation of Charter of — "Expenses of the Organization" (Article 17, paragraphs 1 and 2) — Whether costs of UNEF and ONUC are such expenses — Meaning of "budget" in Article 17, paragraph 1 — Whether "expenses" limited to expenditure incurred for purposes of the United Nations — Ultra vires expenditure — Criteria for — Relevance of identity of organ taking particular action — Distinction between ultra vires act of organ and ultra vires act of Organization — Conditions for validity of act of Organization — Effect of invalidity — Principles of interpretation of Charter Ordinary meaning — Intention of parties — Whether confined to intention of original signatories — Purposes of the Organization — Effective interpretation — Travaux preparatoires — Relevance of practice — Distinction between practice of organ of Organization and subsequent conduct of parties to treaty — Relevance of practice of majority of Member States — Whether States voting against recommendatory resolution are bound to contribute financially to Its execution.