Abstract The negotiations for a new instrument for the conservation and sustainable use of high-seas marine biodiversity (marine biodiversity beyond national jurisdiction; BBNJ) finally concluded after difficult negotiations. The BBNJ negotiations had to address a regime complex of sectoral and regional organizations regulating different aspects of marine biodiversity and a political struggle about the epistemologies that ought to inform marine biodiversity governance, which is driven by limited, unequally distributed, and contested knowledge. However, to be implemented, the new BBNJ Agreement will have to be equipped with expert authority to be able to address these challenges and make competent statements about the state of high-seas marine biodiversity. We address a gap in empirical work on expert authority in the regime complex by analyzing state references to the expertise of different international organizations in the BBNJ negotiations. Combining collaborative event ethnography and social network analysis, we show that states strategically and politically refer to the expertise of international organizations, and we coin the term authority shopping to describe this behavior.
Parenting styles are essential to meeting children's developmental needs, enhancing their overall life quality, and ensuring they grow up as responsible and competent adults. Pornography addiction has been examined in numerous studies in relation to parenting styles (authoritative, authoritarian, and permissive); however, there is little information available on Malaysian students attending private universities. The current study analysed the correlation between parenting style, self-efficacy, and pornography addiction among 295 private university students. Students were asked to respond to self-administered online questionnaires. The instruments adopted in this study include the Pornography Addiction Screening Tool, the General Self-Efficacy Scale, and the Parental Authority Questionnaire. The findings showed that there are significant relationships between parenting styles, self-efficacy, and pornography addiction. Further analysis of Spearman's correlation found positive and statistically significant relationships between both fathers' and mothers' authoritarian and permissive parenting styles and pornography addiction. The correlation between both fathers' and mothers' authoritative parenting styles and pornography addiction was negligible and statistically insignificant. The relationship between fathers' parenting styles and pornography addiction was weaker compared to mothers'. Self-efficacy had a significant and positive correlation with pornography addiction. This study suggests that parenting styles and self-efficacy are crucial criteria for early psychological growth, with self-efficacy increasing students' confidence to strive in chosen activities and resist destructive behaviours. Implications for university educators and counsellors, academicians, community leaders, and lawmakers are highlighted to help overcome the growing addiction to pornography among Malaysian youths, particularly at the university level.
"De Europese grondrechten (EU en EVRM) zijn belangrijker dan ooit voor diverse terreinen van het Nederlandse bestuursrecht en overheidsaansprakelijkheidsrecht. Welke ontwikkelingen op het terrein van deze grondrechten en het Nederlandse bestuursrecht staan ons de komende jaren te wachten? Deze uitgave biedt diepgaand en actueel inzicht."--
This book advances a counter-intuitive thesis: modern attacks on the global ecological balance are exclusively the result of processes of social domination, whether they are based on class, gender or nation. If this is the case, then it follows that ecological struggle and social struggle are one and the same thing. The approach is inspired by Marx's theory, as revisited through Bourdieu and Foucault, Rawls and Habermas, and Ostrom and Wallerstein. Based on a new concept, that of metastructure which defines the relationship between the structural and the symbolic, it confronts contemporary debates on class, gender andcoloniality, as well as on the state, the nation and the World-System. Global social-ecological destruction is thus analysed on three registers: that of capital, which produces for profit; that of (supposed) competent authority, which produces to produce; and that of the nation, which produces to conquer. Consumerism follows from productivism, not the other way around. The question of need takes precedence over that of desire. This metastructural configuration poses the imperative constantly renewed to counter the blind logic of capital with a rational logic of organisation, and, at the same time, to counter the logic of the organisers through a democratic discursive logic. This latter is the recourse of common people. The Global South is on the front line of this struggle; and women's struggle bears its own decisive ecological impulse.
Mission command and command and control are not separate processes that commanders must choose between. Mission command is the approach, or the way the Army has chosen to perform command and control functions. Mission command leverages all competent leaders across the battlefield with a shared understanding of the mission and the commander's intent to exercise disciplined initiative to accomplish missions. Mission command does not relinquish a commander's authority, it is a philosophy of pushing the authority down to enable subordinate leaders. But, mission command must be trained.
The text concerns the legal basis of the CJEU judgment of 15 July 2021 in case C 791/19 1European Commission v. The Republic of Poland. In this judgment, the Court adjudicated regarding the EU compliance of the national regulations governing the system of the organs of judicial authority. Against this background, it is argued that the system of the organs of judicial authority in any EU Member State does not fall within the competence granted to the EU, but remains solely within the competence of the Member State. The CJEU is empowered to adjudicate only within the scope of competences conferred upon the EU. The CJEU is not competent to take over the competences of the organs of state power of Member States or to thereby force them to adopt particular legal solutions. Any action taken by the CJEU without a proper legal basis has but the appearance of adjudication. In the authors' opinion, the CJEU judgment raises many doubts as to its compliance with EU law.
Abstract The article deals with three admissibility decisions by the United Nations Committee on the Rights of the Child where it found that it was competent to consider the merits of individual complaints against France submitted by relatives of French children staying in Syrian prison camps. Paving the way for the Committee subsequently to hold that France had violated the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, the decisions are noteworthy for the Committee's expansive notion of extraterritorial jurisdiction, which also has been adopted in other cases on the same subject, but also beyond. The article highlights two methodological features of the decisions that are closely related, notably their departure from generally accepted principles of treaty interpretation and their alignment with arguments submitted by the third-party interveners. It is argued that these features effectively undercut the authority of the Committee's practice as source material when subjecting the treaty to legal interpretation.
The world of post-truth is a world of intense disinformation, an offensive of pseudoscience and widespread skepticism about expert knowledge. It is a world in which the terms of the political game are imposed by illiberal democrats who undermine the authority of scientific institutions. The liberal-democratic politicians have had to take up the gauntlet thrown down to them in this way. However, according to the book's author, they have not been followed by liberal theorists. Liberal theorists have never attempted to confront the pessimistic vision of a world in which citizens cannot distinguish expert from pseudo-expert and science from pseudo-science. The dominant liberal theories are based on the assumption that citizens are either competent to participate in major political decisions or that they can easily acquire such competence. The book strikingly explores a very different perspective. How would the theory and practice of liberal democracy have to change if we assume that laypersons will never appreciate the relevance of the arguments put forward by experts?
Criticises the carefree optimism of liberal theory towards the problem of expert knowledge Argues that post-truth is here to stay, as democracy will never be based on rational argument aloneContends that we cannot overcome epistemic dependence of citizens on experts – but sometimes it can be bypassedSuggests that we need to understand the natural limitations of expert knowledge and not be easily discouraged by expert failuresThe world of post-truth is a world of intense disinformation, an offensive of pseudoscience and widespread scepticism about expert knowledge. It is a world in which the terms of the political game are imposed by illiberal democrats who undermine the authority of scientific institutions. The liberal-democratic politicians have had to take up the gauntlet thrown down to them in this way. However, according to the book's author, they have not been followed by liberal theorists. Liberal theorists have never attempted to confront the pessimistic vision of a world in which citizens cannot distinguish expert from pseudo-expert and science from pseudo-science. The dominant liberal theories are based on the assumption that citizens are either competent to participate in major political decisions or that they can easily acquire such competence. The book strikingly explores a very different perspective. How would the theory and practice of liberal democracy have to change if we assume that laypersons will never appreciate the relevance of the arguments put forward by experts?
This study uses leadership trait analysis to examine the link between personality and policy regarding South Korea's Sunshine Policy toward North Korea and demonstrates that Kim Dae-jung's personality characteristics largely accounted for this policy's content, process, and outcome. With an analytical focus on the decision-making system, this study finds that Kim's formal model was characterized by a control deemed inherently more indirect, subtle, and socialized than direct, personalized, or outright. Specifically, this type of control can be attributed to Kim's personality traits, such as a persistently high need for power and relationship focus, along with other idiosyncratic style variables, such as disinclination toward interpersonal conflict, a sense of efficacy, and a sophisticated cognitive quality. President Kim's resulting management style had the effect of empowering members of his advisory group and invigorating the policy process. In addition, the president's trusted chief of staff, who served as a competent and thoughtful custodian manager with substantial authority, helped manage the system effectively and enhanced its stability. The study concludes that Kim Dae-jung's management style, incorporating socialized control over decision-making, combined with his advocate leadership style in implementation (marked by a relentless push for his rapprochement agenda and a tendency to challenge constraints indirectly), helped accelerate the overall policy process. This contributed to the improvement of inter-Korean relations during his presidency. (Pac Aff/GIGA)
The article is devoted to the study of the prerequisites of the right to sue in modern conditions. The foundations of the traditional doctrine of the prerequisites and conditions for applying to the court with a statement of claim were laid in the early Soviet period, including in the works of outstanding scientists of the Institute of State and Law of the Russian Academy of Sciences. Currently, procedural legislation in Russia is characterized by a pronounced differentiation of procedural forms of protection. If in the Soviet period all civil cases were considered and resolved by a court of general jurisdiction within the framework of a single civil procedure, today administrative and arbitration proceedings have received the status of an independent form of protection. Accordingly, there was a problem of criteria for distinguishing the entire array of civil cases not only within the judicial system, but also according to the applicable procedural forms of protection of violated rights, freedoms and legitimate interests. We are talking about the jurisdiction of civil cases – the basic prerequisite of the right to sue. Despite the refusal of the legislator to use this term, the main task of the holder of the violated right when applying for judicial protection is still to determine the competent judicial authority. In addition, his duty is also to determine the procedural legislation applicable in the case (this can be called the "applicability of the procedural form"). Another prerequisite for the right to initiate a civil case is the applicant's compliance with the mandatory pre-trial (claim) procedure for dispute settlement in a number of civil cases. Based on the theoretical analysis of the categories "civil case", "out-of-court dispute settlement", research of the legal nature of Civil Law, conclusions and proposals for improving the current procedural legislation are formulated.
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When Napoleon Bonaparte staged a coup d'état to oust the civilian government of the Directorate in France, he justified his actions as necessary to save the spirit of the Revolution. The army, in Napoleon's view, had a solemn obligation to defend the nation against threats both at home and abroad.The notion that a military, as guardians of a national spirit, has the right to seize the authority of the state became known as Bonapartism. This seemingly persistent belief in certain militaries in Africa emphasizes the need for comprehensive reform.Military regimes can perceive themselves to be better at governance than civilians. The simplicity of efficiently carrying out orders stands in stark contrast to the seemingly endless bureaucracy impeded by incompetence and corruption. In crises where politics leads to impasses in service delivery, the military's projection as being "above politics" can help it seize and keep power in fragile states.Despite the anti-French rhetoric of coup leaders in Africa, many of them nonetheless invoke this spirit of Bonapartism in acting to "save" the state. As the French Revolution began to eat itself under the Reign of Terror, for Napoleon the only means to preserve the Revolution was for its defenders to remove the civilian leadership by force.This was no singular event. Several times in the 19th and 20th centuries, the French army forced dramatic changes in the state whenever the national spirit had been challenged. Bonapartism furthermore formed a significant part of military formation in France's colonies, particularly in Africa.The problem with Bonapartism is that it has greatly undermined attempts to professionalize security forces. When we speak of professional soldiers outside of a (former) colonial setting, we mean a trained soldier who readily accepts and defends civilian authority. Such a situation is so taken for granted today that we do not always appreciate how necessary this is for a thriving democracy.If a military perceives itself to be better, more competent, or in some way less fallible than the civilian government, then a risk of Bonapartism can persist regardless of how well trained they might be. U.S. training of officers, such as those in Niger, may unintentionally lead to a growing confidence in the military about their competence and increase the risk of a takeover.The officers leading the coups in Niger and Gabon cite persistent civilian misrule, aided in no small part by continued French dominance in domestic political and economic policies in both countries, as the primary justification for their intervention. They present themselves as acting in the best interests of the nations they are nominally intended to protect. Seizing power away from incompetent civilians is merely a continuation of their duty.Scenes of crowds celebrating the removal of decades-long dictatorships do indicate at least a modicum of legitimacy for the military's actions in Gabon. Many coup leaders across Africa have justified their actions on the demonstrable misrule by civilian governments. In almost every scenario, however, the coup leaders merely became the new dictators. These actions further emulate Napoleon's hold on power, although few did so as blatantly as Jean-Bedel Bokassa of the Central African Republic, who declared himself Emperor 4 December 1977.Bonapartism is not solely a francophone problem and can exist in any state with weak democratic institutions. In the cases of Zimbabwe and Egypt, despite the civilian façade, the spirit of Bonapartism still lingers. For both states, the military has long been the true source of the state's authority.Zimbabwe's elections are a mere formality, a political tradition rather than any substantive effort to change the civilian authority. Aside from the Egyptian military's brief foray into relinquishing power to the Muslim Brotherhood in 2012, the civilian leadership serves at the pleasure of the military, not the electorate. When the military felt that Egypt was at risk under the leadership of the Brotherhood, they acted to save the state by retaking authority, a quintessential Bonapartist action.The coup in Sudan that ousted Omar al-Bashir was a remarkably similar instance of a military acting to change the civilian leadership during a crisis. However, the current infighting among senior officers points to an entirely different matter. It's actually a misnomer to refer to states like Sudan as "weak." Rather, the problem lies in the fact that the state is too powerful in relation to other aspects of the society, particularly the economy.Such states are the 'only game in town' in terms of attaining mobility, income, and basic security. Fights over who controls the state become so violent because of a lack of options. As long as other sectors remain underdeveloped, the risks of coups will persist. In such cases, it may well be counter-productive to invest too much in the militaries, and making control of the military all the more tempting.There are steps the African Union and other international bodies can take to militate against Bonapartism. The first concerns the AU's Lomé Declaration of 2000, which established a norm against unconstitutional regime changes by stating that any extra constitutional changes in a government is grounds for immediate suspension. In practice, this commitment has been far from rock solid, with the AU making numerous exceptions over the years.Moreover, tougher penalties could be applied, especially in the form of mandating Security Sector Reform (SSR) as necessary processes to return to the AU.SSR entails a comprehensive overhaul of a state's security sector. The security sector includes not only the military but also the police, judiciary, and any intelligence services. Importantly, SSR requires more than mere training, as the Niger and Burkina Faso cases demonstrate. Therein lies the rub of military governance and strengthening democracies: the only body with the authority to restructure the military is the military itself.Save for the odd counter-example, democratic promises by army officers have rarely been realized. Even in instances where elections have been held, the military nonetheless retains inordinate influence over the civilian leadership, and the threat of future coups persists.SSR is neither cheap nor easy to adequately implement. One of the most important factors is rewriting a constitution with sufficient judicial strength to ensure that an elected legislative body has the ultimate authority over all security forces. Doing so must result in the end of Bonapartism for the military and the conclusion that they are not the sole nor ultimate defenders of the nation.The rush to hold elections after a coup is often seen as an act of good faith by coup-leaders to return a country to democracy. However, to be a democracy does not only mean having elections, as democracy contains a set of values, including civilian oversight and regulation of all coercive forces in a state.Every soldier needs to be educated on the importance of civilian leadership as they are far more likely to know what is in the best interests of the civilian population than a general. Military training by foreign experts without complementary democracy training is, as Niger bears out, counter-productive to the overall mission objectives of combating Islamist insurgencies. US foreign military training reportedly includes instruction on safeguarding democracy and human rights.While US policy is to immediately halt all military aid following a coup, the policy has not always been strictly enforced, more rigorous enforcement may be more effective in the long term. These recent coups raise the difficult question on the efficacy of democracy and human rights training for militaries who are evidently not receptive to the message.Louis-Napoleon Bonaparte attempted a similar overthrow of a civilian government as his more illustrious uncle in 1851. This more foolhardy power grab led Karl Marx to quip that "history repeats itself, the first as tragedy, the second as farce." Unless the right lessons are learned, the Bonapartism lurking in African militaries will continue the tragedy of military rule.
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"I don't think that [the war] is a stalemate," Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelensky told NBC News' Meet the Press on Sunday."They thought they would checkmate us, but," he insisted, "this didn't happen." According to recent interviews, his military leadership disagrees. His political inner circle thinks his insistence is delusional.Zelensky is facing pressure both from within Ukraine and from without. Growing pressure from within is coming from both the political and military leadership; growing pressure from without is coming from Ukraine's key partners.The battle is largely being played out in the Western media. Most intimately, Zelensky has faced criticism from his political inner circle. TIME magazine reports that some of the president's advisors have become worried that his "belief in Ukraine's ultimate victory over Russia . . . "verg[es] on the messianic." One of Zelensky's "closest aides" said that Zelensky "deludes himself." The aide complained, "We're out of options. We're not winning. But try telling him that."Some Zelensky aides say his intransigence hampers Ukraine's ability to adapt to the changed reality on the battlefield and worry that negotiating a settlement with Russia remains "taboo."Domestic criticism is also coming from the top levels of the military. Zelensky is reportedly in conflict with his generals over the conduct of the counteroffensive and over his demands to defend Bakhmut and Avdiivka at any cost, which the military leadership sees as a strategic mistake that is already hurting Ukraine dearly in soldiers and equipment. A senior Ukrainian military officer said that orders from the president's office are, at times, disconnected from the battlefield reality and defended some front-line commanders who have begun second-guessing and refusing "orders from the top."Zelensky's struggle with his generals intensified on November 3 when Zelensky fired General Viktor Khorenko, the commander of Ukraine's special operations forces. The commander-in-chief of the Ukrainian army, General Valery Zaluzhny, did not request his dismissal. The New York Times reports that "It was unclear whether General Zaluzhny, the overall commander of Ukraine's forces, knew in advance of the planned dismissal" and that "[t]he firing appeared to undercut General Zaluzhny's authority."The firing took U.S. military officers, who "described a close and effective working relationship with" Khorenko, by surprise. Khorenko's special operations forces had had some success with long-range strikes and sabotage operations behind Russian lines. But the NYT reports that there had been tension over what the military had "perceived as politically guided decisions on strategy" that had been ineffective and costly.Zelensky's tensions with his generals reached a peak with Zaluzhny's November 1 interview with The Economist. He asserted that the war had reached a "stalemate." He conceded that "There will most likely be no deep and beautiful breakthrough."What's worse is that Zaluzhny implied that the stalemate would evolve into defeat for Ukraine. A stalemate entails a long war of attrition. In a companion essay published simultaneously by The Economist, he explained that a long war "as a rule, in most cases, is beneficial to one of the parties to the conflict. In our particular case, it is the russian [sic] federation, as it gives it the opportunity to reconstitute and build up its military power."Zaluzhny said that in a prolonged war, Ukraine will run out of the "required volume" of missiles and ammunition while Russia, despite sanctions, is increasing its production capabilities. And even if it didn't run out of weapons, he added, it will run out of men: a war of attrition "leads to the lack of Ukraine's ability to achieve superiority over the enemy in reserves by increasing their number." A close Zelensky aide told TIME that, even if the United States gave Ukraine all the weapons it needed, Kyiv doesn't "have the men to use them."Zelensky's office censured Zaluzhny, saying it "eases the work" of Russia and stirs "panic" among Ukraine's Western partners. The New York Times calls the censure "a striking public rebuke that signaled an emerging rift between the military and civilian leadership."In addition to the pressure coming from within Zelensky's inner political and military circle, diplomatic pressure is also coming from Zelensky's international partners. A November 3 NBC News article reported that "U.S. and European officials have begun quietly talking to the Ukrainian government about what possible peace negotiations with Russia might entail to end the war." The article went on to say, citing one current and one former senior U.S. official familiar with the discussions, that "the conversations have included very broad outlines of what Ukraine might need to give up to reach a deal."The quiet talks suggest agreement by the U.S. and its European allies with Zaluzhny that Ukraine may not achieve its goals on the battlefield, that the realization of their aspirations may continue to dim with prolonged battle, and that some concessions may need to be made.There is a remarkable convergence in the language used by the U.S. and European officials and the language used by Zaluzhny and Zelensky's aides. NBC reports that the conversations "began amid concerns among U.S. and European officials that the war has reached a stalemate." NBC reports that, like Zaluzhny, "[s]ome U.S. military officials have privately begun using the term 'stalemate' to describe the current battle in Ukraine."Like Zaluzhny and Zelensky's aides, "Biden administration officials also are worried that Ukraine is running out of forces." According to "people familiar with the matter," NBC reported, "President Joe Biden has been intensely focused on Ukraine's depleting military forces." "Manpower," one of those sources is quoted as saying, "is at the top of the administration's concerns right now." Echoing the "close Zelensky aide" quoted in TIME, the same source said, "The U.S. and its allies can provide Ukraine with weaponry, but if they don't have competent forces to use them it doesn't do a lot of good."These concerns, NBC reported, have led U.S. officials to concede privately that "Ukraine likely only has until the end of the year or shortly thereafter before more urgent discussions about peace negotiations should begin."That leaves only a couple of months. With the battlefield turning against Ukraine despite Zelensky's intransigent "belief in Ukraine's ultimate victory over Russia," the pressure targeted at Zelensky seems to be building, from both within and without,, to turn to the diplomatic front and face the beginning of the end of the war.