In this paper, we introduce political competition in a sequential move tax competition game between two regions for foreign owned mobile capital. It shows that in case of sequential move, political delegation takes place only in the follower region, not in the leader region. Moreover, political competition need not necessarily lead to higher tax rate in equilibrium. These results are in the sharp contrast to the existing results.
In static general equilibrium models considering imperfectly competitive goods markets, the effectiveness of fiscal policy to stir output is shown to be greater than in the walrasian case. However, labour is the only input in these models. Here, I develop a simple intertemporal model allowing us to study the steady-state role of optimal capital stock in the fiscal policy transmission mechanism. I demonstrate the results depend strongly on the set of parameter values chosen and on the output definition. Using plausible calibrations the multiplier is larger in the walrasian case for small initial government purchases, and smaller for intermediate values.
We show that, in the case when innovations are for sale, increased product market competition, captured by reduced product market profits, can increase the incentives for innovations. The reason is that the incentive to innovate depends on the acquisition price which, in turn, might increase despite firms in the market making lower profits. We also show that stricter, but not too strict, merger and cartel policies tend to increase the incentive for innovations for sale by ensuring the bidding competition for the innovation and by increasing the relative profitability of being the most efficient firm in the industry. Moreover, it is shown that increased intensity of competition can increase the relative profitability of innovation for sale, relative to innovation for entry.
The OECD Competition Committee together with delegates from the Health Committee discussed the role of competition in the provision of hospital services in February 2012. This document includes an executive summary of that debate and the documents from the meeting: an analytical note by Mr. Frank Maier-Rigaud (OECD), two expert papers from Mr.
The Board considers all competitive extracurricular activities--academic, artistic and athletic--an integral part of the total educational program. Competitive activities shall be under the same administration and control as the rest of the school program and closely articulated with it. Competitive activities can provide pupils with valuable experiences and opportunities. In this district, the emphasis in any competition--intramural or interscholastic--shall be on providing such experiences and opportunities rather than on producing winning teams or providing entertainment. Practice for or performance in any competitive event shall not interfere with the regular educational program. The Board shall approve all proposed interscholastic competition, either as a schedule or as a discrete event, whichever is appropriate. The Board must approve membership in any leagues, associations and conferences, and any agreements with other schools for a series of games or events. The Chief School Administrator shall approve contests of any kind between and among the schools of the district. The Board shall appoint coaches, advisors, physicians and other necessary supervisory personnel upon recommendation of the Chief School Administrator. The Chief School Administrator shall also ensure that training programs/regulations are developed for all extracurricular athletic activities and that all physical facilities involved in any competition in which district schools take part shall be adequate, safe and sanitary. Public recognition shall be given to participants in academic or artistic competitions in the same measure as to athletic competitors. The district's Affirmative Action resolution and Plan for Equity in school and classroom practices shall apply to determining eligibility for competition, approval of each competitive activity in which pupils officially represent the district, and district expenditure to provide facilities and coaches.
The paper argues that internal sub-state dynamics can systematically account for the variety of forms in which politicians organize cross-jurisdictional interaction in dual federal systems. Most generally, majoritarian executive-legislative relations tend to weaken the institutionalization of intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), while power-sharing executive-legislative relations tend to facilitate it. Moreover, depending on the type of power-sharing mechanisms in the single arenas-non-compulsory or compulsory- the mutual integration of IGOs is rendered more or less difficult. The institutionalization of IGOs is affected by the following mechanisms: Firstly, given one-party majority cabinets, complete government alternations (which are much less likely given coalition or oversized governments) strongly alter actors ’ interest constellations over time, thereby increasing the costs of maintaining stable cross-boundary intergovernmental relations. Secondly, the heavy impact of a potential electoral loss induces politicians to shift the blame to the other governments in the system, thereby undermining the potential for cross-boundary cooperation. Thirdly, one-party governments (in contrast to coalitions) decrease the value of IGOs as instruments to save transaction costs because the number of involved actors is lower. Finally, autonomy losses caused by intergovernmental cooperation are higher for parties which govern alone.