In this paper, we introduce political competition in a sequential move tax competition game between two regions for foreign owned mobile capital. It shows that in case of sequential move, political delegation takes place only in the follower region, not in the leader region. Moreover, political competition need not necessarily lead to higher tax rate in equilibrium. These results are in the sharp contrast to the existing results.
This paper presents findings from a study of prequalification in architectural competitions in Sweden. The aim was to develop knowledge of how organizers in Sweden select architects/teams to invited competitions. Prequalification is a selection procedure used early in the competition process for identifying suitable candidates for the following design phase. Usually three to six architectural firms/ teams are invited to develop design solutions for the competition task. The research question is about how the organizers find these candidates. There are ten competitions examined in the study. Five municipal competitions and five organised by government clients. The reason for the selection of cases is that the public sector is a major organizer of competitions in Sweden. The methodology of the investigation is a combination of mapping, case studies and document review. Results show that there are 375 applications from architects in the competitions. 43 architect firms/teams (11 %) have been invited to competitions. The vast majority of the applications (84 %) came from Sweden. This is explained by the fact that organizers require Swedish as the competition language. All the organizers used a selection process that included two distinct phases. The clients start by checking whether the applications meet the requirements specified in the invitation. This is followed by an evaluative phase with assessment of the architectural offices professional profile, supported by relevant reference projects and personal references. Decisive in the final assessment is the organizer's evaluation of the candidates' ability to produce the project with architectural quality, to combine creative solutions with functional demands and to cooperate with developers and contractors. The assessment in the second evaluative phase is performed with the support of three different models: voting among reviewers, scoring merits in applications or by an overall assessment of candidates. ; QC 20120604
For the past two decades, Michael Porter's work has towered over the field of competitive strategy. On Competition, Updated and Expanded Edition brings together more than a dozen of Porter's landmark articles from the Harvard Business Review. Five are new to this edition, including the 2008 update to his classic "The Five Competitive Forces That Shape Strategy," as well as new work on health care, philanthropy, corporate social responsibility, and CEO leadership. This collection captures Porter's unique ability to bridge theory and practice. Each of the articles has not only shaped thinking, but also redefined the work of practitioners in its respective field. In an insightful new introduction, Porter relates each article to the whole of his thinking about competition and value creation, and traces how that thinking has deepened over time. This collection is organized by topic, allowing the reader easy access to the wide range of Porter's work. Parts I and II present the frameworks for which Porter is best known--frameworks that address how companies, as well as nations and regions, gain and sustain competitive advantage. Part III shows how strategic thinking can address society's most pressing challenges, from environmental sustainability to improving health-care delivery. Part IV explores how both nonprofits and corporations can create value for society more effectively by applying strategy principles to philanthropy. Part V explores the link between strategy and leadership
The paper provides an equilibrium analysis of how countries compete for migrants. The type of competition (tax or transfer competition) depends on whether the competing countries have similar policy preferences. With symmetric preferences, countries compete in taxes for migrants. With asymmetric preferences, migration competition takes place in income support levels. The results are robust to the degree of mobility and to whether high-income or low-income households are mobile. The results are relevant, e.g., for federal policies that tackle inefficient migration competition and for evaluating whether a country may wish to adopt unilateral 'migration-purchase' policies.
The paper provides an equilibrium analysis of how countries compete for migrants. The type of competition (tax or transfer competition) depends on whether the competing countries have similar policy preferences. With symmetric preferences, countries compete in taxes for migrants. With asymmetric preferences, migration competition takes place in income support levels. The results are robust to the degree of mobility and to whether high-income or low-income households are mobile. The results are relevant, e.g., for federal policies that tackle inefficient migration competition and for evaluating whether a country may wish to adopt unilateral migration-purchase policies.
In: in ASIAN CAPITALISM AND THE REGULATION OF COMPETITION: TOWARDS A REGULATORY GEOGRAPHY OF GLOBAL COMPETITION LAW 123-143 (Michael W. Dowdle, John Gillespie & Imelda Maher eds., Cambridge University Press, 2013)
We consider a dynamic (differential) game with three players competing against each other. Each period each player can allocate his resources so as to direct his competition towards particular rivals -- we call such competition selective. The setting can be applied to a wide variety of cases: competition between firms, competition between political parties, warfare. We show that if the players are myopic, the weaker players eventually loose the game to their strongest rival. Vice versa, if the players value their future payoffs high enough, each player concentrates more on fighting his strongest opponent. Consequently, the weaker players grow stronger, the strongest player grows weaker and eventually all the players converge and remain in the game.
We consider a dynamic (differential) game with three players competing against each other. Each period each player can allocate his resources so as to direct his competition towards particular rivals -- we call such competition selective. The setting can be applied to a wide variety of cases: competition between firms, competition between political parties, warfare. We show that if the players are myopic, the weaker players eventually loose the game to their strongest rival. Vice versa, if the players value their future payoffs high enough, each player concentrates more on fighting his strongest opponent. Consequently, the weaker players grow stronger, the strongest player grows weaker and eventually all the players converge and remain in the game.