In this paper, we introduce political competition in a sequential move tax competition game between two regions for foreign owned mobile capital. It shows that in case of sequential move, political delegation takes place only in the follower region, not in the leader region. Moreover, political competition need not necessarily lead to higher tax rate in equilibrium. These results are in the sharp contrast to the existing results.
We show that, in the case when innovations are for sale, increased product market competition, captured by reduced product market profits, can increase the incentives for innovations. The reason is that the incentive to innovate depends on the acquisition price which, in turn, might increase despite firms in the market making lower profits. We also show that stricter, but not too strict, merger and cartel policies tend to increase the incentive for innovations for sale by ensuring the bidding competition for the innovation and by increasing the relative profitability of being the most efficient firm in the industry. Moreover, it is shown that increased intensity of competition can increase the relative profitability of innovation for sale, relative to innovation for entry.
The notion of workable or effective competition is at the centre of EU competition law and policy, as it strives to achieve and maintain it. Some scholars do not mention it at all. Those who refer to it either do not explain it in any way or explicate it very shortly. In fact, the concept is too important to be ignored totally or elucidated briefly. The objective of this article is to provide a comprehensive analysis of the concept by focusing on the theory of workable or effective competition. It is argued that effective competition is the key for an in-depth study of the political economy (i.e. real policy goals, economic rationale behind individual competition rules, institutional requirements, and implications for distribution of wealth) of EU competition law and policy.
The notion of workable or effective competition is at the centre of EU competition law and policy, as it strives to achieve and maintain it. Some scholars do not mention it at all. Those who refer to it either do not explain it in any way or explicate it very shortly. In fact, the concept is too important to be ignored totally or elucidated briefly. The objective of this article is to provide a comprehensive analysis of the concept by focusing on the theory of workable or effective competition. It is argued that effective competition is the key for an in-depth study of the political economy (i.e. real policy goals, economic rationale behind individual competition rules, institutional requirements, and implications for distribution of wealth) of EU competition law and policy. Full text available at:https://doi.org/10.22215/rera.v1i1.161
Testimony issued by the General Accounting Office with an abstract that begins "The major network carriers dominate traffic at most of their large hubs and extensive evidence exists that fares in markets where competition is absent are consistently above competitive levels. GAO believes that the oversight scheme contemplated when the industry was deregulated--with antitrust enforcement by the Department of Justice (DOJ) and oversight of unfair trade practices by the Department of Transportation (DOT)--has not been entirely successful in preserving and ensuring competition. Although the current legislative scheme grants explicit authority for DOT to regulate unfair competitive practices, the legislation does give DOT substantial leeway on the scope of its action. Thus, with the range of competitive challenges confronting the industry and directly affecting consumers, especially in the face of unprecedented industry consolidation, GAO believes there is merit in the overall intent of the proposed Aviation Competition Restoration Act to direct DOT to actively monitor the state of competition in the industry and to institute remedial actions as appropriate."
The article illustrates the competition in politics which takes place in two parallel dimensions, i.e. during regular electoral campaigns and during the period of debating the final version of the legislation. One of the ways to the appropriate treatment of competition in politics is focusing research efforts on the analysis of political entrepreneurs behavior. It involves obtaining an advantage over players aiming to achieve identical objectives through the use of various instruments which exert influence on the preferences of political consumers as well as public decision of politicians and bureaucrats. The author argues that these behaviors are an adjustment to the conditions in which competition takes place on the political market. The methodology adopted in the study based on the hypothesis that individuals make public choices thus affecting the final outcome of the political process, and a direct relationship between the private cost and private benefit, which is a fundamental feature of the market selection, can be transferred to the analysis of public sphere.
The article illustrates the competition in politics which takes place in two parallel dimensions, i.e. during regular electoral campaigns and during the period of debating the final version of the legislation. One of the ways to the appropriate treatment of competition in politics is focusing research efforts on the analysis of political entrepreneurs behavior. It involves obtaining an advantage over players aiming to achieve identical objectives through the use of various instruments which exert influence on the preferences of political consumers as well as public decision of politicians and bureaucrats. The author argues that these behaviors are an adjustment to the conditions in which competition takes place on the political market. The methodology adopted in the study based on the hypothesis that individuals make public choices thus affecting the final outcome of the political process, and a direct relationship between the private cost and private benefit, which is a fundamental feature of the market selection, can be transferred to the analysis of public sphere.
We consider a dynamic (differential) game with three players competing against each other. Each period each player can allocate his resources so as to direct his competition towards particular rivals -- we call such competition selective. The setting can be applied to a wide variety of cases: competition between firms, competition between political parties, warfare. We show that if the players are myopic, the weaker players eventually loose the game to their strongest rival. Vice versa, if the players value their future payoffs high enough, each player concentrates more on fighting his strongest opponent. Consequently, the weaker players grow stronger, the strongest player grows weaker and eventually all the players converge and remain in the game.
Warlords compete for turf that provides them with rents and 'taxable' resources but they can also offer a semblance of security within their respective territories. This article first examines two economic models of warlord competition. Because such competition takes place through the use of force or the threat of the use of force, more competition typically leads to lower material welfare as resources are wasted on unproductive arming and fighting. This is in contrast to ordinary economic models, in which typically greater competition leads to higher material welfare. Furthermore, rents from oil, diamonds, and even foreign aid crowd out production. In extreme cases this crowding out of ordinary production can be complete, whereby all economic resources can be devoted to the unproductive competition for rents. The article then reviews factors that lead either to actual war or to peace in the shadow of war. Because war is destrucrive, human beings are typically risk averse, and there exist numerous complementarities in production and consumption, we can expect peace in the shadow of war to be most often preferable by all parties. Actual war can take place because of incomplete information about the preferences and capabilities of the adversaries but also, somewhat surprisingly, when the shadow of the future is long.
We consider a dynamic (differential) game with three players competing against each other. Each period each player can allocate his resources so as to direct his competition towards particular rivals -- we call such competition selective. The setting can be applied to a wide variety of cases: competition between firms, competition between political parties, warfare. We show that if the players are myopic, the weaker players eventually loose the game to their strongest rival. Vice versa, if the players value their future payoffs high enough, each player concentrates more on fighting his strongest opponent. Consequently, the weaker players grow stronger, the strongest player grows weaker and eventually all the players converge and remain in the game.
Is science a 'market of ideas'? Not according to the economics of science. Science is competitive, but scientific competition is not market competition. Nor is scientific competition the same as competition between universities. Scientific competition is, first of all, competition between individual scientists. Current science policies shift the boundary between scientific competition, where scientists provide public goods in the hope to acquire status among their peers, and market competition in science, where the results of research are private property protected by patents or other means, in favor of the market. However, the economic ring of the political slogans cannot conceal a serious lack of understanding of scientific competition behind the reform proposals.
What are the implications of Big Data and Big Analytics on competition policy? EU and US competition authorities are currently grappling with this question. The EU Commission has recently issued preliminary results of its e-commerce sector inquiry. The European Data Protection Supervisor and the UK House of Lords, among others, have issued reports and convened roundtables on the issue. The OECD will host in late 2016 an enforcer roundtable on this subject. The significance of these inquires cannot be overstated, as their conclusions will determine the dynamics of future technology markets and level of antitrust intervention.
Corporate tax levels have fallen substantially in Europe during the last decades. A broad literature has identified tax competition as one reason for this decline in corporate tax levels. However, none of these studies explicitly asks the question whether tax competition within regions is different from tax competition across regions, e.g. due to global regionalism of foreign direct investments. This is a crucial question to answer in order to discuss the desirability of tax harmonization in a distinct region, for example, within the European Union. Therefore, the study aims to give hints on the question whether the decline in corporate tax levels in Europe is mainly driven by tax competition between EU member states or by pressure from other world regions. The results of this study, which makes use of tax reaction functions, indicate that there is evidence for tax competition within Europe, whereas there is no robust evidence that European countries compete with countries from other world regions.
The paper provides an equilibrium analysis of how countries compete for migrants. The type of competition (tax or transfer competition) depends on whether the competing countries have similar policy preferences. With symmetric preferences, countries compete in taxes for migrants. With asymmetric preferences, migration competition takes place in income support levels. The results are robust to the degree of mobility and to whether high-income or low-income households are mobile. The results are relevant, e.g., for federal policies that tackle inefficient migration competition and for evaluating whether a country may wish to adopt unilateral 'migration-purchase' policies.
The process of innovation is driven by two main factors: new inventions and institutions supporting the transformation of inventions into marketable innovations. This paper proposes a new institution, called a semi-public competition, that has been neglected by the economic literature but exists frequently in practice. I show how semi-public competitions can mitigate a dilemma that arises at an early stage of innovative activity and specify the conditions under which a semi-public competition can increase welfare. The results suggest that governments promote knowledge about the semi-public competition mechanism but refrain from direct public funding of competitions.
