The Impact of the International Competition Network on Competition Advocacy and Global Competition Collaboration
In: European Competition Law Review, Band E.C.L.R., Heft 10
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In: European Competition Law Review, Band E.C.L.R., Heft 10
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In: Peter Freeman, Competition Night?, February 2009, Concurrences N° 1-2009, Art. N° 23260, https://www.concurrences.com/en/review/issues/no-1-2009/foreword/competition-night-23260
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In: The Antitrust bulletin: the journal of American and foreign antitrust and trade regulation, Band 37, Heft 2, S. 337-385
ISSN: 1930-7969
In: Global Competition Policy (Online) June 2009
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Working paper
Testimony issued by the General Accounting Office with an abstract that begins "The major network carriers dominate traffic at most of their large hubs and extensive evidence exists that fares in markets where competition is absent are consistently above competitive levels. GAO believes that the oversight scheme contemplated when the industry was deregulated--with antitrust enforcement by the Department of Justice (DOJ) and oversight of unfair trade practices by the Department of Transportation (DOT)--has not been entirely successful in preserving and ensuring competition. Although the current legislative scheme grants explicit authority for DOT to regulate unfair competitive practices, the legislation does give DOT substantial leeway on the scope of its action. Thus, with the range of competitive challenges confronting the industry and directly affecting consumers, especially in the face of unprecedented industry consolidation, GAO believes there is merit in the overall intent of the proposed Aviation Competition Restoration Act to direct DOT to actively monitor the state of competition in the industry and to institute remedial actions as appropriate."
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The article illustrates the competition in politics which takes place in two parallel dimensions, i.e. during regular electoral campaigns and during the period of debating the final version of the legislation. One of the ways to the appropriate treatment of competition in politics is focusing research efforts on the analysis of political entrepreneurs behavior. It involves obtaining an advantage over players aiming to achieve identical objectives through the use of various instruments which exert influence on the preferences of political consumers as well as public decision of politicians and bureaucrats. The author argues that these behaviors are an adjustment to the conditions in which competition takes place on the political market. The methodology adopted in the study based on the hypothesis that individuals make public choices thus affecting the final outcome of the political process, and a direct relationship between the private cost and private benefit, which is a fundamental feature of the market selection, can be transferred to the analysis of public sphere.
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The article illustrates the competition in politics which takes place in two parallel dimensions, i.e. during regular electoral campaigns and during the period of debating the final version of the legislation. One of the ways to the appropriate treatment of competition in politics is focusing research efforts on the analysis of political entrepreneurs behavior. It involves obtaining an advantage over players aiming to achieve identical objectives through the use of various instruments which exert influence on the preferences of political consumers as well as public decision of politicians and bureaucrats. The author argues that these behaviors are an adjustment to the conditions in which competition takes place on the political market. The methodology adopted in the study based on the hypothesis that individuals make public choices thus affecting the final outcome of the political process, and a direct relationship between the private cost and private benefit, which is a fundamental feature of the market selection, can be transferred to the analysis of public sphere.
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In: Journal of peace research, Band 39, Heft 4, S. 435-446
ISSN: 0022-3433
In: Polis: the journal for ancient greek political thought, Band 1, Heft 1, S. 11
ISSN: 2051-2996
In: Routledge library editions. Economics, 103
Dealing with general economic theory, other than employment theory, the book discusses the theory of pure and monopolistic competition - with a special emphasis upon welfare aspects. Beginning with an analysis of the consumer and of the individual firm, the main stress is nevertheless placed on the analysis of the economic system as a whole.
In: European Competition and Regulatory Law Review (CoRe) Pre-Print Version, 1/2017 4-10
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Working paper
We consider a dynamic (differential) game with three players competing against each other. Each period each player can allocate his resources so as to direct his competition towards particular rivals -- we call such competition selective. The setting can be applied to a wide variety of cases: competition between firms, competition between political parties, warfare. We show that if the players are myopic, the weaker players eventually loose the game to their strongest rival. Vice versa, if the players value their future payoffs high enough, each player concentrates more on fighting his strongest opponent. Consequently, the weaker players grow stronger, the strongest player grows weaker and eventually all the players converge and remain in the game.
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