Suchergebnisse

This work presents the results of empirical research of the relation among authoritarianism, political worldview, and party choice. Based on the existing research, the starting assumption is that authoritarianism is largely typical for the electoral body of the "right-wing" parties as well as for the conservative worldview. The specially designed scale for measuring authoritarian/conformist tendencies has shown a marked mono- dimensionality and inner consistency. The findings have confirmed the initial assumption; they have also shown a relatively regular correspondence between a party's p0sition on the "left-right" spectrum and the degree of authoritarianism of its electoral body. The sole exception is a higher degree of authoritarianism of HDZ's electoral body than that of HSP's, which may be explained by the fact that the applied scale has measured solely the attitude towards authority and conformity and not the attitude towards minority groups, which is a component of the famous "F" scale. Also, it has been shown that the voters of the so-called "modernist" worldviews (liberal, social-democratic) are significantly less authoritarian than the voters of the so-called "conservative" worldviews (democratic-Christian, Christian- socialist, traditional, or conservative). (SOI : PM: S. 209)

Historiography under communism, influenced and often motivated by anti-religious and anti-Catholic presuppositions, has held that the opposition of the Catholic Church to legislation and ideology inspired by liberalism in Croatia at the end of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth centuries was not only conservative, but insisted on the identification of Catholicism and Croathood. Historiography termed this supposed trend derogatively as "clericalism". Strecha argues that the term was a bit too strong, and pleads for the term "political catholicism", which in the Croatian context could be named "Catholic Croathood". The author argues that Strecha's terminological suggestion is not only even more confusing, but that he continues the anti-Catholic prejudices of the established historiography. He shows how Strecha simply repeats previously reached conclusions, which were simply repetitions of the anti-Catholic stances of the time. (SOI : CSP: S. 186)

The author discusses the crucial question of whether Serbia truly pursues the path of modernization and European integration, or just a simulation of these processes. The author proposes the thesis that there are numerous obstacles on Serbia's transitional path toward the (post)modern European society. Therefore, he tries to discover the essential reasons for the citizens' reluctance and resistance, the reasons which are related to the modernization of the Serbian society. Serbia is today at the crossroads of the traditional and modern understanding of life. It contains some elements of (post)modernization, but still with a strong influence of its traditional (conservative) heritage. The processes of re-traditionalization (re-mythologization and pseudo-mythologization) represent a major obstacle to the liberation of the society from the grip of the past and to its orientation towards European values. According to the author, the main creators of retrograde flows can be found in the political establishment of contemporary Serbia. He labels them, ironically and derogatorily, the 'guardians' of tradition, who use demagogic statements, populist paroles, and media information control (for their personal and party interests) to slow down Serbia on its European path.

deologically speaking, the initiators of founding all the political parties in Serbia were young intellectuals educated abroad. The ideology of political liberalism was brought to Serbia by young knowledgeable people educated in the West: Milovan Janković, Jevrem Grujić, Vladimir Jovanovic, Stojan Bošković, Filip Hristić, Đorđe Cenić and many more who published and initiated liberal-democratic ideas during the Peter Assembly in 1848. Only with St Andrea Assembly in 1858 did the Serbian Civil rebirth begin. During this assembly two political groups finally divided: the liberals and the conservatives. The most important attainment of the St Andrea Assembly in 1858 was the Act of National Assembly. This act initiated the introduction of the representative system in Serbia. In political history, the period from 1858 to 1869 represents the birth of the representative system in Serbia. The introduction of the representative system in Serbia by the Constitution of 1869 created the necessary political preconditions for organizing modern political parties. Regular political elections and participation of the Parliament in the legislative process resulted in a easier binding of the like-minded politicans with their political liders to whom it was important to strenghten their bonds with their electors. The fact that the constitutional elections took place every three years and that the Assembly took place every year led to the strenghening of the political parties in the state, since more thriving layers of society started entering the National Assembly, the delegates who infuenced the political life. After the Constitution of 1869 was enforced, the liberals are gathered under Jovan Ristić, and later the young oppositional conservatives are gathered. In the same time a third political party emerged, the supporters and followers of Svetozar Marković. The organized political parties did not emerge immediately after the Regent's Constitution although it guaranteed a selection of political rights and freedom necessary for the emergence of the political parties, such as voting right, the freedom of speech and the freedom of press. This poses a question why did it never happen? The answer is to be looked into the intention of the Regency and later Regent Milan to unable the education of the political parties. In a situation when the Regency was closer to conservative than liberal ideas, it was hard to discuss organized political parties. The non-existence of political discipline as well as well political programs adversely affected the emergence of modern political parties. 277 Assembly Elections of October 1874 had a great impact on the history of political parties in Serbia. After the elections, a few political parties emerged in the Assembly: St Andrea Liberals under Jevrem Grujić, Libears under Ristić, Conservatives under Jovan Marinović, the beginnings of Young Conservatives and People's Party of the future Radicals. The organizing of political parties was sped up by young intellectuals gathered round the paper "Videlo" and connected with the People's party in the National Assembly. The beginning of 1881 saw the emergence of modern organized political parties in Serbia: People's Radical Part, Progressive Party and Liberal Party. Until that period delegates in the National Assembly mainly performed individually, and after 1881 they perform in accordance with political program, respecting political discipline. In view of organization and the functioning, the radicals went further, because they realized that organization is of utter importance for successful functioning and development of political parties. Pera Todorovic was given most credit for organizing the Radical Party. His organization contributed a round of hierarchical organizational units starting with local committees in every small town, counties, and to the Main Committee as the supreme organ of the party. Speaking about organization of the other two political parties it could be said that they too emerged with statues similar to the radical one. However, they never occupied such number of members as the Radical Party. The main characteristic of the political life in Serbia during the 80s of the 19th century consisted of bitter fights between the Radical and the Progressive Party in which King Milan Obrenovic sided with the Progressive Party. He was the reason why the radicals, although during the period 1882-1883 in majority, they never succeeded to come to power nor for the years to come. Dedicated to unable radicalism in Serbia, Milan showed even greater resistance toward the liberal reforms and greater affection toward emergence of personal regime. After the Timok Rebellion many radical leaders were convicted for many years, and the political leader Nikola Pasic was in emigration. Among the radicals, involving even those in the custody, slowly awareness was raised that the accord with the crown was necessary. Treaty with the radicals was initiated by King Milan so as to reinforce his personal strength, decreased in the war with Bulgaria. Although hungry for power, the radicals denounced the king's offer in Nis at the beginning of 1886. Radical leaders signed a treaty with liberals instead of progressives in 1887. The King did not have many possibilities, either to give radicals power and concede defeat or to draw back. Radical-liberal coalitional government gave great attention to the constitutional problem solving. Due to the fact that the first coalitional government was short-lived, it did not solve any problems. Similar situation happened with the first homogenous radical government that did not succeed anything more than its program, due to the fact that it was smothered by the King Milan's party. The Constitutional reform of 1888 had a big impact on political and constitutional life of Serbia. The multiannual struggle of the People's Radical Party was crowned by passing the constitution by the principle of majority. 278 The position of the Radical Party is changed from the ground, because it came to power and made its own cadre consisting of young intellectuals. Oversight over the whole work of the radical government from 1889 to 1892 shows that the radicals on the one hand showed great effort to introduce the constitution into the political life of Serbia, and on the other to limit the ruler's power. However, it is important not to forget the fact that the parliamentary regime on whom so many radicals insisted was more and more changing into a totalitarian one-party system. The parliamentary system that enabled the absolute power of the Radical Party in all state institutions was short-lived. King Alexander had an immense wish to stop as soon as possible with all the new-laid things that were introduced by the parliamentary system and that is the reason he was constantly fighting with the political parties and very frequently insisted on coup. In 1894 he suspended the 1888 Constitution and reenacted the 1869 one. After that, a regime based on self-will came to power, which lasted until 1901, year when King Alexander passed a new constitution. Political life in time of self-willed regime of king Alexander was very tough, because the ruler denounced the parties with the basic idea: "to renounce with parliamentarism if we wish to arrange this state properly". The last Obrenovic tried to denounce the existence of the Constitution, the government and the National Assembly by conducting various experiments. His "neutral" governments, which consisted of unforced political personnel, were under his impact. The whole political system turned round one political person, the king, which succeeded in dividing and manipulating the political parties. Neutralizing the People's Radical Party dominance could not have lasted any longer, due to the fact that it was impossible that the party with the biggest support be in opposition any longer. The king's wedding to Draga Masin represents a turning point in political life of Serbia. The shackles of the self-willed regime started to diminish, because the king wanted "to please the parties and the nation, so that they would accept the queen." The king's compromise with the strongest party in the country did not achieve results, due to the fact that among them existed huge differences in view of "state conceptions". The radicals advocated for parliamentary monarchy in which the power would belong to the most popular party, whereas the crown advocated the constitutional monarchy in which the ruler would be a puppet in enforcing the power of the National Assembly. Co-operational politics between the king and the radicals were short-lived, since it turned out that the representatives of the two opposite state conceptions were incapable of reaching an agreement. Shorty, the king realized that the treaty with the radicals was impossible to be kept and decided to return to previous politics, as before signed by the treaty in 1901. The renewed return to the self-willed regime sped up the preparations of the conspirators that in the night of May 28th/June 10th/ May 29th June 11th staged a coup.

У овом раду дискутује се o позиционирању кључних друштвено-политичких актера у савременој Србији у контексту прихватања скупа симбола јавног наратива дефинисаног као "европске вредности". На примеру одржавања тзв. "Параде поноса", разматра се однос медија и елита према једном догађају који се перципира као суштински услов за "европске интеграције", али према коме истовремено постоји амбивалентан однос, проистекао из етаблираног традиционалистичког политичког дискурса, који подразумева отпор према прихватању сексуалних различитости. Циљ овог рада је да укаже на комплексну природу идентификовања основних симболичких вредности друштва у савременој Србији, која се испољава, пре свега, у виду хегемонијских борби које се воде на линији промоције конзервативних вредности, насупрот ономе што се доживљава као "опасни" уплив либералних "европских" идеја, попут промоције права сексуалних мањина. У раду се анализирају медијски наративи везани за одржавање "Параде поноса" 2010. и 2014. године, са циљем утврђивања промене наратива у склопу декларисаног "европског пута" Србије, и то, пре свега, кроз деловање и позиционирање кључних актера, од политичких елита до припадника екстремно десних организација и навијачких група. ; This paper discusses the position of the key social and political actors in contemporary Serbia, referring to the broadly accepted concept defined as "European values". The article focuses on the so-called "Belgrade Pride Parade", a highly contested event in the Serbian public, which is at the same time considered as the essential part of the EU accession process. Through the analysis of the media discourses related to the "Pride" events in 2010 and 2014, the paper shows the complex relation between the officially proclaimed politics of "European integration" and still very strong nationalist discourses, inherited from the 1990s. The aim of the article is to analyse the present hegemonic struggles between the political forces defending "traditional", conservative values and the political agents that promote "dangerous", liberal "European" ideas, such as protecting the rights of sexual minorities. The comparative analysis of the media representation of two events in 2010 and 2014 shows the changes in the public narrative. I argue that the violent clashes that occurred in 2010 Belgrade Pride Parade between the police and the members of right wing organisations were mostly the result of the lack of the political will among the Serbian elites, followed by ambivalent media representations, promoting at the same time the necessity of accepting "European values" and justification of violence. On the other hand, the absence of violent events in 2014 shows the will of the state apparatus to secure the "Pride". However, the media reports on the event, as well as the public statements made by Serbian officials, still remain ambivalent towards the very nature of the "Pride", justifying it only by the pressure made by the EU and the protection of constitutional rights. Moreover, the presence of new narratives in the media, discussing the high price of organizing such event, shows the shift in the public discourse from common nationalist arguments to the new, neoliberal rhetoric. This change doesn't indicate the radical shift of the social climate in Serbia from conservative to liberal, but, more likely, establishes Serbia as just one of the many states on the European periphery, operating within wider framework of neoliberal agendas. ; Тема броја – Конфликт и помирење на Балкану (ур. Александар Крел) / Topic of the Issue - Conflict and Reconciliation in the Balkans (ed. Aleksandar Krel)

Radom se želi prikazati kako je tekla borba Filis Šlafli i njenih saborkinja protiv usvajanja Amandmana o jednakim pravima u Ustav Sjedinjenih Američkih Država, kao i kako bi imenovani amandman, prvi put predstavljen američkoj javnosti čak davne 1923. godine, mogao da izmeni društveno—političke prilike u kojima žive američke žene. Velikim delom rad je nastao na osnovu izvora koje su iza sebe ostavile učesnice borbe za, odnosno protiv usvajanja Amandmana o jednakim pravima. Nakon uvodnog prikaza ranog istorijata odnosa javnosti prema amandmanu, našu pažnju ćemo usmeriti na jačanje vatrene opozicije amandmanu na čije čelo je stala Filis Šlafli. Takođe, ispitaćemo strukturu i razmere nasleđa ove konzervativne ikone koje nastavlja da igra značajnu ulogu na političkoj pozornici Amerike. The paper seeks to show how Phyllis Schlafly and her female comrades' struggled against ratification of the Equal Rights Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, as well as how the named Amendment, which was introduced to the American public back in 1923. for the first time, would change the socio-political circumstances in which contemporary American women live. For the big part, this work is based on the sources left by the participants in this fight for equal rights. After the introductory presentation of the early history of the Equal Rights Amendment, we will direct our attention to the making of the fiery opposition where Phyllis Schlafly stood as the official leader, and examine the structure and proportions of the legacy of this conservative icon which perpetuates to play a paramount role at the American political stage.

The author examines attempts to reform the communist systems in Europe during the 1960s, especiallly as they relate to the process of election to organs of government in Croatia and Yugoslavia in 1967 and 1969. Issues surrounding the legitimacy of government, economic development, and internal political and national tensions provided the impetus for the growth of the reform movement. Economic reforms were geared towards recognition of market forces, while political reforms revolved around a general democratization of the system. The allowance for "slightly greater freedom" in politics meant minimum tolerance of diversity including national rights as well. The growing strength off the reform movement quickly revealed the threat reform posed to the fundamental social relations upon which the communist model of society was based. Reform especially threatened the dominant role played by the communist party. Conservative forces predominated in the ensuing political struggle, and the curtailment of reformist tendencies was also influenced by the involvement of the USSR. An example of the curtailment of reformist tendencies were the elections to the Croatian Sabor and the Federal Assembly of Yugoslavia. A relative liberalization of elective processes to the legislative branch took place when more than one candidate was allowed to run for a single mandate. In many instances during the 1967 elections, struggles between the candidate supported by the League of Socialists, the official candidate, and an independent, or "unofficial" candidate, were common. The loss of total control over the electoral process was viewed unfavourably by the ruling party and the former control over elections was quickly reestablished. (SOI : CSP: S. 346)

The article presents a public echo of the 1966 party conference which dealt with the misuses of the State Security Services (SDS). The issue is described in four parts; the Brijuni Plenary as a subject of investigation in domestic and foreign literature; chronology of events; discussions in political organizations and newspapers; the dossiers - police documentation on citizens. In the literature. the political fall of Aleksandar Rankovic, the founder and for a long time leading figure of that agency, is considered as a political struggle for power or the outcome of the confrontation between "reformist" and "conservative" stream in the Union of the SKJ. The chronology deals with the time between the "Plenary", July 1 - 2, 1966 and the adoption by the Federal Parliament of Yugoslavia of the new law of internal affairs by the end of the same year. In December of that year Josip Broz Tito issued a clemency to S. Rankovic and fifteen other highest officials of that agency. The discussion in the political organizations and newspapers showed that political activists, and "simple" people as well, think that the responsibility for the misuses lie not only on individuals but on the way the organization was structured and on the unlimited power it had. The party leadership tried to subdue those criticisms. because they did not want to be left without the most valuable partner in the system of power. The public was also made aware of a great number of private dossiers - the police documentation on citizens which came into existence in the preceding twenty years. The most diligent was the SDS in Croatia, which amassed one million three hundred thousand such dossiers. (SOI : CSP: S. 489)

radu se analiziraju vrednosne orijentacije studenata. U istraživanju u kome su učestvovali studenti (N=635) Univerziteta u Rijeci primenjena je anketa. Glavna teza teorije modernizacije jeste da se promene u socioekonomskoj sferi društva reflektiraju na njegov sistem vrednosti. Zato u savremenim društvima slabe tradicionalne a jačaju moderne i postmoderne vrednosti. Specifičnost bivših socijalističkih društava odnosi se na to da je u njima, nakon protivrečnog procesa polumodernizacije, došlo do intenzivnog procesa retradicionalizacije. Tranzicija mlade generacije u odraslo doba događa se u konkretnom društvenom kontekstu za koji je karakterističan "sukob" suprotstavljenih vrednosti. Stoga je važno ispitati koje društvene vrednosti mladi prihvataju. Najpre se to odnosi na studentsku populaciju, s obzirom na to da je to resurs iz kog će se u budućnosti regrutovati društvena elita. U radu se problematizuju sledeća pitanja: U kojoj meri suprotstavljeni procesi modernizacije i retradicionalizacije društva ostavljaju traga na vrednosne orijentacije studenata? U kojoj meri se stavovi studenata razlikuju s obzirom na socijalne karakteristike njihovih porodica? Statistička obrada je obuhvatila univarijatnu, bivarijatnu i multivarijatnu analizu. Rezultati pokazuju da većina studenata prihvata postmoderne vrednosti (multikulturnost), a vrlo malo njih prihvata tradicionalne vrednosti (klerikalizam i etnocentrizam). Utvrđena je veza između tradicionalnih vrednosnih orijentacija i konzervativnih porodičnih obrazaca. S tim u vezi je zaključak da su rezultati u saglasnosti sa hipotezom o liberalizujućem efektu obrazovanja. ; This paper analyses the students' value orientations based on the survey conducted at the University of Rijeka (N=635). The main thesis of the theory of modernization is that changes in the socioeconomic sphere of society generate changes in its predominant value system. Therefore, in the modern societies, the weakening of the traditional and the strengthening of modern and postmodern values can be observed. This was particularly noticeable in the ex-socialist societies whose social and political transitions were generally followed by the process of intensive retraditionalization. The transition of younger generation to adulthood is taking place in the specific context of the postsocialist and post-war transformation of a society, which is characterized by the "clash" of opposing social values. Therefore, it is important to explore which social values are embraced by the young people. This is particularly important in the context of student population, because many of them will become representatives of the future social elites. The paper seeks to address the following questions: To what extent the opposing processes of modernization and re-radicalization of post-socialist societies effects students' expectance of different value orientations? To what extent different family backgrounds effect students' adoption of traditional, modern or postmodern values? Data analysis was carried out through univariate, bivariate and multivariate statistical procedures. The results of our research show that students chiefly support the postmodern values (multiculturalism) and chiefly do not support the traditional values (clericalism and ethnocentrism). Furthermore, the analysis has established a link between students' orientation to traditional values and existence of conservative patterns in their family background. The findings of our research support the main hypothesis of the theory of liberalizing effect of education. ; Zbornik rezimea / 24. Međunarodna naučna konferencija "Pedagoška istraživanja i školska praksa

Ova disertacija nudi odgovor na pitanje zbog čega, 17 godina od otpočinjanja demokratske transformacije, službe bezbednosti u Srbiji ne samo da nisu reformisane u potpunosti već je napredak ostvaren u pojedinim oblastima reforme bezbednosno-obaveštajnog sistema skroz urušen, te postoji jak trend povratka na staro. Autor koristi koncept reforme sektora bezbednosti i iz njega izvedene elemente reforme službi bezbednosti, koji služi da se utvrdi željeno stanje u transformaciji službi bezbednosti iz tajne policije u savremene bezbednosno-obaveštajne službe. U radu se koristi i istorijski institucionalizam, koji omogućava da se istraže uslovi, događaji, procesi i akteri koji su uticali na tokove, ishode i domete reforme službi bezbednosti u Srbiji 2000–2017. godine. Posebna pažnja posvećuje se utvrđivanju značaja nasleđa, neformalnih institucija, interesa i odnosa moći između aktera, kao i ideacionih faktora u oblikovanju njihovih odluka u ključnim momentima političkih promena, odnosno kritičnim tačkama reforme službi bezbednosti. Nalazi disertacije potvrdili su glavnu postavku istorijskog institucionalizma: institucije se teško menjaju, a promena službi bezbednosti, kao veoma zatvorenih i konzervativnih aktera koji su navikli na neformalnosti, još je teža. Da bi do promene došlo, neophodno je da politički akteri preduzmu sveobuhvatne i korenite reforme u skladu s konceptom reforme službi bezbednosti, i to u ranim fazama kritičnih tačaka, jer rane odluke utiču na dalji tok i domete reforme. Svaka nepotpuna promena službi bezbednosti omogućava opstanak starih neformalnih pravila koja otežavaju buduće opsežnije promene, te u nepovoljnim političkim uslovima ugrožavaju i napredak ostvaren u pojedinim oblastima reforme bezbednosno-obaveštajnog sistema. ; This dissertation seeks to explain not only why Serbia's security services have not been comprehensively reformed – 17 years since the onset of the country's transition to democracy – but also why progress achieved through certain aspects of security and intelligence service reform has been completely undone, resulting in a powerful regressive trend. In order to establish the desired outcomes of transforming the security services from a secret police force into modern security and intelligence services, the author relies on the concept of security sector reform and elements of security service reform derived therefrom. The paper also draws on historical institutionalism, facilitating exploration of the conditions, events, processes and actors that have influenced the trends, outcomes and scope of security sector reform in Serbia from 2000 to 2017. Particular attention is paid to determining the importance of institutional heritage, informal institutions, interests and power relations between actors, as well as the ideological factors that shaped their decisions at key moments of political change – i.e. during junctures critical for security sector reform. The dissertation's findings confirm the main premise of historical institutionalism: that institutions resist change, and none more so than those as closed, conservative and accustomed to informality as the security services. For change to be enacted, political actors must embark upon comprehensive and deep-rooted reforms that adhere to the principles of security service reform. And they must do so early on in the transition process, since decisions made ahead of time shape the further course and scope of reform. Every incomplete transformation of the security services allows their old, informal habits to persist, hindering more profound change in the future and, in times of political turmoil, endangering the progress achieved in particular aspects of security and intelligence service reform.