Suchergebnisse

Uz temeljna ustavna načela vladavine prava i podjele vlasti, načelo kolektivne i pojedinačne ministarske odgovornosti jamac je demokratskog legitimiteta uprave, koji leži u neprekinutom lancu delegacije i odgovornosti od birača prema parlamentu, od parlamenta do ministra te od ministra kroz sve razine uprave do razine najbliže građanima. U ovom radu razmatra se ustavnopravna osnovanost demokratskog legitimiteta neovisnih regulatornih tijela, s posebnim osvrtom na načelo ministarske odgovornosti. Poredbeno se obrađuju primjeri iz europskih država, gdje neovisnost regulatornih tijela ne zadire u temeljna ustavna načela. Zaključno se nastoji utvrditi u kojoj mjeri formalno utvrđena politička neovisnost jamči takvu neovisnost u materijalnom smislu te se razmatraju neke od najutjecajnijih teorija koje o svrsi osnivanja neovisnih regulatornih tijela nudi politička znanost. ; In addition to the fundamental constitutional principles of the rule of law and separation of powers, the principle of collective and individual ministerial responsibility is the guarantee of the democratic legitimacy of administration that lies in the unbroken chains of delegation and accountability from voters to Parliament, from Parliament to the minister, and from the minister through all levels of administration, to the level closest to citizens. This paper examines the theoretical constructions of the democratic legitimacy of independent regulatory authorities from the constitutionalist point of view, with particular reference to the principle of ministerial responsibility. It further discusses comparative examples from European countries where the independence of the regulatory authorities does not violate fundamental constitutional principles. In conclusion, this paper seeks to determine the extent to which formally established political independence guarantees such independence in the material sense, bearing in mind some of the most influential theories on the purpose of the establishment of independent regulatory authorities

The author looks into the position of the Constitutional Court in the light of the proposed Constitutional Law on amendments & modifications of the Constitutional Law on the Constitutional Court that would change some powers of the Constitutional Court. A short historical review shows that the Croatian people belong to the European civilizational setting, as evidenced by numerous documents & statutes that have regulated the rule of law in Croatia. According to the Croatian Constitution, the Constitutional Court is assigned a special place outside the system of the division of power into the legislative, the executive, & the judiciary; it is a special constitutional category that cannot be under the scrutiny of law since it scrutinizes laws. The author goes on to enumerate the changes in the jurisdiction & the operation of the Court envisaged in this new proposal of the Constitutional Law. The author concludes that constitutional courts are the very core of Western democracy & that they protect constitutions as a constantly developing living form. 59 References. Adapted from the source document.

Using the contemporary system theories, the author primarily points to the asymmetry of the constitutional law & the political processes it so rarely regulates. Then he goes on to analyze the historical process of separating the custom law, oral law & written law, of the court & the courtroom, the law & the constitution, the constitution & its interpretation, the constitution's interpretation, & the constitutional theory, & concludes his study with a description of the difference between constitution & democracy in the postmodern categorical optics. Adapted from the source document.

Iako su SAD jedna od država koja ne predviđa oblike neposredne demokracije na razini federacije, ustavi članica američke federacije prihvaćaju instituciju ustavne i zakonodavne inicijative – jedan od ključnih elemenata za njihovo razlikovanje od Ustava SAD-a. Građani 24 savezne države SAD-a neposredno su od 1904. do kraja 2005. odlučivali o 2.155 ustavnih i zakonskih prijedloga, u 21. stoljeću Amerikanci očekuju širenje novog ustavnog populizma – uporabe institucija neposredne demokracije. Autorice tumače ustavna rješenja i stvarne učinke primjene navedenih institucijana oblikovanje državne politike u tim državama. ; Although the USA is one of the states that does not have provisions for the forms of direct democracy at federal level, the constitutions of American federal states have accepted the institute of constitutional and legal initiative, which is one of the key elements that differs them from the Constitution of the United States of America. The citizens of 24 American federal states directly decided about 2,155 constitutional and law drafts between 1904 and 2005. The American people expect the institutions of direct democracy to be used more extensively in the 21st century. The authors explain constitutional solutions and the effects of implementation of these institutes on the shaping of state policies in the respective federal states. The institute is used for bypassing the state legislatures in order to limit their freedom of action by constitutionalising the political choices. Tax- -reduction initiatives limit the revenues legislatures can levy and spend, and thus control the damage. This institute is becoming a means of launching changes in different public areas, such as taxes and expenditures, campaign financing, public education. However, the state legislatures can limit effects of the successful initiatives by withholding financial aid necessary for their implementation. State policy does not finish at the moment the initiatives are adopted by citizens. Sanctions depend on citizens' ability to establish the facts about the compliance with the decisions made by direct citizens' participation, and on clarity of the texts adopted by initiatives.

Using Luhmann's terminology, the author promotes the thesis that internal changes of constitutions are a nondemocratic constitutional/legal process & thus a political problem; ie, a constitution is exposed to political life, but also to an unmarked place within a constitutional system. This place is marked by constitutional judges who change constitutions on a case-by-case basis, either innovatively, precedently, or, of course, nondemocratically. Since democratic politics & constitutional law are different forms of activity, the question is which is the criterion for appraising the new things. How, then, to reject something as unlawful & nonpolitical? The author claims that this judgment can only be done by people with a refined moral sense. This requires the inclusion of those who create & interpret constitutions as the law of the polity so they ought to be selected very carefully. Thus, citizens are doubly burdened: (1) They have to understand constitutional changes to perceive their interest in them. (2) They have to appreciate the architects of constitutions to trust them. 15 References. Adapted from the source document.

In the second part of the text the author looks into the paradox of the concept of justice as discerned by Jacques Derrida, & analyzes the tradition of the European constitutional law. Since the constitution & politics are discordant & semantically irritating mediums, the author argues that the European Union is an open semantic relationship of legal acquisitions & political processes. The European Union should be explained by means of contemporary, postmodernist theories derived from the linguistic & deconstructivist reversals of the modern substantial rationalism, universalism & cosmopolitism. Consequently, the constitution & the law are not underpinned by the political or any other specific power; on the contrary, it is the unspecific power of the constitution & the law that enables the gradual development & strengthening of the European law & the constitution without the extra constitutional authorities as the disguised power that traditionally legitimizes law. References. Adapted from the source document.

In the wake of the 'Kant revival,' which has spawned a plethora of works on his philosophy by its contemporary interpreters & advocates such as Herbert Schnadelbach, Hans Lenk, Konrad Cramer, Wilhelm Vossenkuhl, Volker Gerhardt, Karl-Otto Apel, Otfried Hoffe & others (whose studies were published this year under the title of Kant in der Diskussion der Moderne), the author tries to prove, by means of an analysis of Kant's treatise Uber den Gemeinspruch: Das mag in der Theorie richtig sein, taugt aber nicht fur die Praxis, that not only did Kant in his later works draft & expound the program of a practical philosophy of morality & right, politics, & history, but also that in the last three chapters of this work, this philosophy evolves into a modern liberal theory of morality, state law, & international or "international civil" law built around the central principle of Kant's practical philosophy: "Was aus Vernunftgrunden fur die Theorie gilt, das gilt auch fur die Praxis.". Adapted from the source document.

The author discusses the provisions of the German Constitution & the practice of the German Federal Constitutional Court relevant for ratification of the Maastricht treaty & German membership in the European Union. In that context, the Brunner case decided by the Federal Constitutional Court is discussed. This decision has removed constitutional obstacles & has confirmed the constitutionality of ratification of the Maastricht Treaty. The author suggests that the Constitutional Court has strengthened its position & defined itself as a safeguard of German state sovereignty & an obstacle to the creeping extension of powers of the EU at the expense of its member states. At the same time, Constitutional amendments were adopted to protect the German federal structure & affirm the role of German Lander in supranational decision-making processes. The author suggests that the practice of the German Federal Constitutional Court fits well in the general trend of strengthening the role of the judiciary with regard to both the national & supranational balance of power. Adapted from the source document.

U tekstu se rastvara pojam "dekonstrukcije" administrativne države u SAD-u kao njen reprezentativni primjer. Polazeći od dominacije moderne administrativne države, puna slika suvremenog konstitucionalizma u SAD-u mora uključivati administrativni konstitucionalizam kao svekoliko razumijevanje i interpretaciju suvremene administrativne države i njene strukture od strane agencija i drugih aktivnih aktera upravnoga prava. Administrativni konstitucionalizam danas je jedan od najintenzivnije izučavanih predmeta istraživanja komparativnog ustavnog i upravnog prava. Razlog egzegeze ovoga pitanja nisu samo njegove različite dimenzije već i činjenica da on predstavlja glavni mehanizam kojim se danas elaborira i implementira ustavno značenje. ; This paper opens up the concept of "deconstruction "of administrative states in the USA as its representative example. Starting from the domination of a modern administrative state, the full picture of modern constitutionalism in the USA must include administrative constitutionalism as overall understanding and interpretation of a modern administrative state and its structure by agencies and other active participants in administrative law. Administrative constitutionalism is today one of the most intensively studied subjects of investigation of comparative constitutional and administrative law. The reason for exegesis of this issue is not only its various dimensions but also the fact that it represents the main mechanism which today elaborates and implements constitutional meaning.

The author analyzes the relationship between constitutional law & political reality. Using historical material on German constitutional legal practice to analyze this relationship, the author concludes that a good constitution can function solely in the setting of a good political culture. The citizenry of a certain political culture always goes hand in hand with a good constitution. Adapted from the source document.

Haberle claims constitutional law is a comparative experiential science closely linked with political science with which it shares the research subject. The constitutional state has been going through a permanent process of changes; the central question is who is the prime mover of constitutional changes: constitutional/legal institutions, constitutional/legal science, & political science or public opinion & political culture of citizens? By analyzing the recent history of the changes of the German constitutions he suggests that all these factors contribute to constitutional changes. Nevertheless, as an expert for law & political science, who considers himself as belonging to the wider European scientific community, Haberle thinks that the decisive influences in constitutional changes stem from legal & political sciences & concludes: Sine qua (scientia) mortalium vita non regitur liberaliter (Without science, mortals do not command their life freely). Adapted from the source document.

The author analyzes the tension which exists in constitutional states between the popular sovereignty & the constraints of the people by constitutional order. After explaining & historically interpreting the significance of popular sovereignty as well as the danger hidden in the unequivocal adherence to this principle, he describes the functioning of popular sovereignty in several European constitutions. Most of them express certain misgivings about the people & its direct participation, so that its activities are limited to constitutionally predictable decisions. The author also highlights certain ethical dilemmas & perimeters of popular sovereignty. Constitutional state is based on the compromise between the liberal & the democratic principle; recently, this compromise has been endangered in some newly-created constitutional regimes by non-liberal democracy or the disequilibrium between these two principles. Adapted from the source document.