Suchergebnisse

Traditionally the state is defined in terms of three criteria: the people, the territory and the government. G. Jellinek and M. Riomeris were among the first to name these criteria. What is typical about this position is that the sovereignty of the state and the sovereignty of the people may not coincide. Thus the scholars do not raise the question about the legitimacy of the government. Where state is able to ensure that its orders are abided by, it is held that the degree of power is sufficient. The concept precludes non–democratic regimes from discussion about legitimacy of the power. The modern doctrine of constitutionalism bases the government and the legitimacy of governmental decisions on the principle of the sovereignty of the people. The stance holds that the government has to receive the power from the sole sovereign i. e. the people. This type of authorization is only possible through the democratic procedure. Therefore, when we require legitimacy of the state, we identify the concept of the sovereignty of people and the concept of the sovereignty of the state and thus indirectly point to the democratic political regime, which is the sole guarantor of manifestation of the sovereignty of the nation. Without changing the established traditional trinomial structure the author proposes that when identifying the criteria of the statehood the criteria of the power as the criteria of the legitimate power should be regarded, which equals to the authorization of the sovereign people to act for its benefit. From the point of view of the constitutional doctrine, international recognition may not be regarded as criterion which expresses statehood. International recognition only guarantees that the state will be treated on the basis of well established international norms. Even though international recognition does not solve the key issue for to be or not to be the state, it may nevertheless be important, as states which do not represent sovereignty of the nation will not be treated as democratic in the international community and this subsequently may determine their fate. ; Straipsnyje nagrinėjami valstybingumo kriterijai konstitucinės teisės mokslo aspektu. Įžanginėje darbo dalyje argumentuojamas temos aktualumas. Tolesnėje straipsnio dalyje stengiamasi apžvelgti ir išanalizuoti visus valstybingumo kriterijus ir jų objektyvų reikšmingumą. Toliau dėstant mėginama išskirti, kurie kriterijai yra būdingi konstitucinei, o kurie tarptautinei teisei. Kaip pagrindiniai įvardijami tie, kurie nekelia abejonių dėl savo objektyvumo konstitucinės teisės mokslo aspektu. Atskleidžiant valstybingumo požymius daugiausiai diskutuojama dėl suvereniteto ir tarptautinio pripažinimo kriterijų ir jų reikšmingumo. Kiti valstybingumui būdingi, bet išreiškiantys kitų mokslų (tarptautinė teisė, istorija) specifiką kriterijai įvardijami kaip fakultatyviniai. Darbe naudojami istorinis, istorinis–lyginamasis, indukcinis, lyginamosios analizės metodai. Straipsnio pabaigoje formuluojamos išvados.

Provisional Investigation Commission of the Parlament - one of the family of internal structures. They are divided into commissions of inquiry of national importance and the issues of interim study committees. The first group of the operating results for the main use of family functions - passing laws, the parliamentary control, creation of institutions and officials on the state budget and approving and monitoring its implementation. The second group of the Commission for an opinion, or a withdrawal of a member of the Parlament of immunity and whether there are grounds for an impeachment process.

Provisional Investigation Commission of the Parlament - one of the family of internal structures. They are divided into commissions of inquiry of national importance and the issues of interim study committees. The first group of the operating results for the main use of family functions - passing laws, the parliamentary control, creation of institutions and officials on the state budget and approving and monitoring its implementation. The second group of the Commission for an opinion, or a withdrawal of a member of the Parlament of immunity and whether there are grounds for an impeachment process.

The aim of this article is to find out why the Constitutional Court, while examining constitutional justice cases, formulating the provisions of the official constitutional doctrine and, finally, choosing a specific solution of the case, could or sometimes even should take into consideration soft law norms and the constitutional law development tendencies. The legal effects produced by the soft law was undeniably recognized in Garibaldi's case by the Court of Justice of European Union and the obligation for national courts implementing the EU law to pay attention to the EU's soft law norms was settled out. Most likely this obligation means that national courts have to prove that they are familiar with the appropriate soft law norms and after choosing their own solution meeting soft law norms or not, they should indicate the reasons of chosen different interpretation than recommended. It can be stated that the necessity to pay respect to the soft law in constitutional jurisprudence in appropriate cases is inevitable, if the Constitutional Court do not seek to isolate itself from European and international constitutional context. It is even more so, when there are no binding acts in the specific field of law. It goes without saying that the Constitutional Court would rely on such documents only if there will be no contradictions with the constitutional provisions and will correspond to the particularities of national legal system. Soft law can be perceived as the source of inspiration for judges examining constitutional justice cases and formulating constitutional doctrine and as the signpost for lawmaking subjects adopting binding acts. Sometimes soft law can help understand the complicated or unclear provisions of binding acts and foresee possible consequences, and sometimes it is the only legal act regulating some sort of relationships, especially when it concerns new challenges arising to the changing societies (such as technological progress that obviously will affect human rights and freedoms etc.). There is no reason to invent the new definitions pertinent to the constitutional justice case if they are enshrined in the legal act, even if it is soft, adopted by the competent institution of constitutional law. Soft law is often taken into consideration in the texts of constitutional judgments as a part of international context of the case, as explanatory documents of the notions or examined principles, as the strengthening piece of chosen reasoning and sometimes even as the part of interpretation of constitutional norms. The jurisprudence of Lithuanian, Latvian and Moldovan constitutional courts was analyzed in order to prove the expansion of the use of soft law and the necessity to continue to do so. The constitutional soft law regulates issues common to all the democratic states as it is based on universally recognized principles of democracy, the rule of law and protection of human rights. Adopted mostly by the European Commission "For the Democracy through Law" (known as Venice Commission) it proposes legal regulation and some solutions of the constitutional problems that are not adopted or implemented in the national legal system, but should be followed by all the states which have chosen the path of democracy. Therefore, it is not only possible, but sometimes it is necessaire to let the soft law guide. And as the constitutional soft law is based on the values that could be derived from almost all democratic constitution, the possibility that there could be contradiction with the national constitutional provision or that it could menace to the principle of the supremacy of the Constitution doesn't seem very plausible.

The aim of this article is to find out why the Constitutional Court, while examining constitutional justice cases, formulating the provisions of the official constitutional doctrine and, finally, choosing a specific solution of the case, could or sometimes even should take into consideration soft law norms and the constitutional law development tendencies. The legal effects produced by the soft law was undeniably recognized in Garibaldi's case by the Court of Justice of European Union and the obligation for national courts implementing the EU law to pay attention to the EU's soft law norms was settled out. Most likely this obligation means that national courts have to prove that they are familiar with the appropriate soft law norms and after choosing their own solution meeting soft law norms or not, they should indicate the reasons of chosen different interpretation than recommended. It can be stated that the necessity to pay respect to the soft law in constitutional jurisprudence in appropriate cases is inevitable, if the Constitutional Court do not seek to isolate itself from European and international constitutional context. It is even more so, when there are no binding acts in the specific field of law. It goes without saying that the Constitutional Court would rely on such documents only if there will be no contradictions with the constitutional provisions and will correspond to the particularities of national legal system. Soft law can be perceived as the source of inspiration for judges examining constitutional justice cases and formulating constitutional doctrine and as the signpost for lawmaking subjects adopting binding acts. Sometimes soft law can help understand the complicated or unclear provisions of binding acts and foresee possible consequences, and sometimes it is the only legal act regulating some sort of relationships, especially when it concerns new challenges arising to the changing societies (such as technological progress that obviously will affect human rights and freedoms etc.). There is no reason to invent the new definitions pertinent to the constitutional justice case if they are enshrined in the legal act, even if it is soft, adopted by the competent institution of constitutional law. Soft law is often taken into consideration in the texts of constitutional judgments as a part of international context of the case, as explanatory documents of the notions or examined principles, as the strengthening piece of chosen reasoning and sometimes even as the part of interpretation of constitutional norms. The jurisprudence of Lithuanian, Latvian and Moldovan constitutional courts was analyzed in order to prove the expansion of the use of soft law and the necessity to continue to do so. The constitutional soft law regulates issues common to all the democratic states as it is based on universally recognized principles of democracy, the rule of law and protection of human rights. Adopted mostly by the European Commission "For the Democracy through Law" (known as Venice Commission) it proposes legal regulation and some solutions of the constitutional problems that are not adopted or implemented in the national legal system, but should be followed by all the states which have chosen the path of democracy. Therefore, it is not only possible, but sometimes it is necessaire to let the soft law guide. And as the constitutional soft law is based on the values that could be derived from almost all democratic constitution, the possibility that there could be contradiction with the national constitutional provision or that it could menace to the principle of the supremacy of the Constitution doesn't seem very plausible.

The article examines the problems arising in legal science and practice with regard to the compatibility of the wording of court judgments terminating criminal proceedings with the presumption of innocence, the possibility of finding that the defendant has committed a criminal offense and granting civil damages to the victim when criminal proceedings are terminated upon expiry of the statute of limitations, and the possibility to grant civil damages when the proceedings are terminated on the grounds of release from criminal liability. The purpose of the article is to assess whether the provisions of international law, European Union law and constitutional law can be interpreted as allowing the termination of a case in the above-mentioned manner. This objective is pursued through an analysis of the European Convention of Human Rights, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union and Directive (EU) 2016/343 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 March 2016 on strengthening certain aspects of presumption of innocence and the right to be presented at the trial in criminal proceedings, jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights, the Court of Justice of the European Union, constitutions of Lithuania and other European states, rulings of Constitutional Courts. The article concludes that the principle of presumption of innocence enshrined in the European Convention on Human Rights does not in itself preclude a court terminating criminal proceedings for limitation, to find in the reasoning of the judgement that the accused has committed a criminal offense, and at the same time to grant civil damages to victim. Termination of proceedings in this way may be lawfully applied when the court examines the merits of the accusation, all questions of fact and law, guaranteeing all the rights of the defense, thus when the proceedings are discontinued after reaching the final phase of the ordinary hearing that is after the final speeches of the prosecution and defense (for example, by a judgment of the court of first instance). There is no sufficient basis to conclude that the other analyzed legal acts of international law and European Union law establish different requirements and prohibit to terminate proceedings in the specified way. The presumption of innocence enshrined in the Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania allows, and the constitutional right of victims to compensation, which must be effective, forms the basis for finding in the reasoning part of the judgment terminating proceedings rendered after full hearing of the case providing rights of defense that the defendant has committed incriminated offence and basis for satisfying civil claim of the victim whether the proceedings are terminated by applying a statute of limitations or releasing the defendant from criminal liability.

The article examines the problems arising in legal science and practice with regard to the compatibility of the wording of court judgments terminating criminal proceedings with the presumption of innocence, the possibility of finding that the defendant has committed a criminal offense and granting civil damages to the victim when criminal proceedings are terminated upon expiry of the statute of limitations, and the possibility to grant civil damages when the proceedings are terminated on the grounds of release from criminal liability. The purpose of the article is to assess whether the provisions of international law, European Union law and constitutional law can be interpreted as allowing the termination of a case in the above-mentioned manner. This objective is pursued through an analysis of the European Convention of Human Rights, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union and Directive (EU) 2016/343 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 March 2016 on strengthening certain aspects of presumption of innocence and the right to be presented at the trial in criminal proceedings, jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights, the Court of Justice of the European Union, constitutions of Lithuania and other European states, rulings of Constitutional Courts. The article concludes that the principle of presumption of innocence enshrined in the European Convention on Human Rights does not in itself preclude a court terminating criminal proceedings for limitation, to find in the reasoning of the judgement that the accused has committed a criminal offense, and at the same time to grant civil damages to victim. Termination of proceedings in this way may be lawfully applied when the court examines the merits of the accusation, all questions of fact and law, guaranteeing all the rights of the defense, thus when the proceedings are discontinued after reaching the final phase of the ordinary hearing that is after the final speeches of the prosecution and defense (for example, by a judgment of the court of first instance). There is no sufficient basis to conclude that the other analyzed legal acts of international law and European Union law establish different requirements and prohibit to terminate proceedings in the specified way. The presumption of innocence enshrined in the Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania allows, and the constitutional right of victims to compensation, which must be effective, forms the basis for finding in the reasoning part of the judgment terminating proceedings rendered after full hearing of the case providing rights of defense that the defendant has committed incriminated offence and basis for satisfying civil claim of the victim whether the proceedings are terminated by applying a statute of limitations or releasing the defendant from criminal liability.

The article examines the problems arising in legal science and practice with regard to the compatibility of the wording of court judgments terminating criminal proceedings with the presumption of innocence, the possibility of finding that the defendant has committed a criminal offense and granting civil damages to the victim when criminal proceedings are terminated upon expiry of the statute of limitations, and the possibility to grant civil damages when the proceedings are terminated on the grounds of release from criminal liability. The purpose of the article is to assess whether the provisions of international law, European Union law and constitutional law can be interpreted as allowing the termination of a case in the above-mentioned manner. This objective is pursued through an analysis of the European Convention of Human Rights, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union and Directive (EU) 2016/343 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 March 2016 on strengthening certain aspects of presumption of innocence and the right to be presented at the trial in criminal proceedings, jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights, the Court of Justice of the European Union, constitutions of Lithuania and other European states, rulings of Constitutional Courts. The article concludes that the principle of presumption of innocence enshrined in the European Convention on Human Rights does not in itself preclude a court terminating criminal proceedings for limitation, to find in the reasoning of the judgement that the accused has committed a criminal offense, and at the same time to grant civil damages to victim. Termination of proceedings in this way may be lawfully applied when the court examines the merits of the accusation, all questions of fact and law, guaranteeing all the rights of the defense, thus when the proceedings are discontinued after reaching the final phase of the ordinary hearing that is after the final speeches of the prosecution and defense (for example, by a judgment of the court of first instance). There is no sufficient basis to conclude that the other analyzed legal acts of international law and European Union law establish different requirements and prohibit to terminate proceedings in the specified way. The presumption of innocence enshrined in the Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania allows, and the constitutional right of victims to compensation, which must be effective, forms the basis for finding in the reasoning part of the judgment terminating proceedings rendered after full hearing of the case providing rights of defense that the defendant has committed incriminated offence and basis for satisfying civil claim of the victim whether the proceedings are terminated by applying a statute of limitations or releasing the defendant from criminal liability.

The article examines the problems arising in legal science and practice with regard to the compatibility of the wording of court judgments terminating criminal proceedings with the presumption of innocence, the possibility of finding that the defendant has committed a criminal offense and granting civil damages to the victim when criminal proceedings are terminated upon expiry of the statute of limitations, and the possibility to grant civil damages when the proceedings are terminated on the grounds of release from criminal liability. The purpose of the article is to assess whether the provisions of international law, European Union law and constitutional law can be interpreted as allowing the termination of a case in the above-mentioned manner. This objective is pursued through an analysis of the European Convention of Human Rights, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union and Directive (EU) 2016/343 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 March 2016 on strengthening certain aspects of presumption of innocence and the right to be presented at the trial in criminal proceedings, jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights, the Court of Justice of the European Union, constitutions of Lithuania and other European states, rulings of Constitutional Courts. The article concludes that the principle of presumption of innocence enshrined in the European Convention on Human Rights does not in itself preclude a court terminating criminal proceedings for limitation, to find in the reasoning of the judgement that the accused has committed a criminal offense, and at the same time to grant civil damages to victim. Termination of proceedings in this way may be lawfully applied when the court examines the merits of the accusation, all questions of fact and law, guaranteeing all the rights of the defense, thus when the proceedings are discontinued after reaching the final phase of the ordinary hearing that is after the final speeches of the prosecution and defense (for example, by a judgment of the court of first instance). There is no sufficient basis to conclude that the other analyzed legal acts of international law and European Union law establish different requirements and prohibit to terminate proceedings in the specified way. The presumption of innocence enshrined in the Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania allows, and the constitutional right of victims to compensation, which must be effective, forms the basis for finding in the reasoning part of the judgment terminating proceedings rendered after full hearing of the case providing rights of defense that the defendant has committed incriminated offence and basis for satisfying civil claim of the victim whether the proceedings are terminated by applying a statute of limitations or releasing the defendant from criminal liability.

The Constitutional Court of the Republic of Lithuania can be distinguished from the general competence and special courts for its particular purpose, i.e. it ensures the precedence of the Constitution within the legal system and the constitutional legitimacy. Following the Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania, the Constitutional Court resolves whether laws and other legal acts passed by the Seimas do not contravene the Constitution. Within the hierarchy of the sources of law, the laws stand out for the regulatory character, particular procedure of their adoption, legal effect. Considering the scope of the regulatory framework of the laws, which is really encompassing, or the fact that namely the laws should regulate the most relevant social relations and, furthermore, acknowledging the fact that the subordinate legislation is adopted following the laws, it is highly important that the laws do not contravene the constitutional regulation, do not infringe personal rights and lawful interests, but, on the contrary, ensures them. Consequently, during the verification of the constitutionality of the given legislation the Constitutional Court shall bear the role of great significance. Upon the recognition of the laws as inconsistent with the Constitution, the Constitutional Court also eliminates them from the legal system. Only the Constitutional Court is granted constitutional authorizations to give an official interpretation of the Constitution. Such judicial interpretation binds all the institutions, including the Seimas also. This study provides the analysis of the jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Lithuania by assessing the compliance of the laws with the Constitution and, partially, the assessment of this practice in the Lithuanian legal science. The paper overviews the research conducted by the Constitutional Court on the constitutionality of laws according to the contents of the rules, the scope, the form of the regulation and the procedure of the adoption, signing, promulgation and enforcement established under the Constitution thereof. Moreover, it focuses on the constitutional requirements for the legislator formulated by the Constitutional Court, as well as the reasons that predetermine the cases when the laws are declared as being inconsistent with the Constitution. Furthermore, this research gives a brief analysis of the status of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Lithuania and its competence, with further reference to the evaluation of the legal regulation gaps in the acts adopted by the Constitutional Court and conception of the acts adopted by the Constitutional Court. Finally, separate sections of the present paper include the conception of the law and the constitutional law within the Lithuania's legal system, the assessment of their correlation and some of the problem-oriented issues associated herewith.

The Constitutional Court of the Republic of Lithuania can be distinguished from the general competence and special courts for its particular purpose, i.e. it ensures the precedence of the Constitution within the legal system and the constitutional legitimacy. Following the Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania, the Constitutional Court resolves whether laws and other legal acts passed by the Seimas do not contravene the Constitution. Within the hierarchy of the sources of law, the laws stand out for the regulatory character, particular procedure of their adoption, legal effect. Considering the scope of the regulatory framework of the laws, which is really encompassing, or the fact that namely the laws should regulate the most relevant social relations and, furthermore, acknowledging the fact that the subordinate legislation is adopted following the laws, it is highly important that the laws do not contravene the constitutional regulation, do not infringe personal rights and lawful interests, but, on the contrary, ensures them. Consequently, during the verification of the constitutionality of the given legislation the Constitutional Court shall bear the role of great significance. Upon the recognition of the laws as inconsistent with the Constitution, the Constitutional Court also eliminates them from the legal system. Only the Constitutional Court is granted constitutional authorizations to give an official interpretation of the Constitution. Such judicial interpretation binds all the institutions, including the Seimas also. This study provides the analysis of the jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Lithuania by assessing the compliance of the laws with the Constitution and, partially, the assessment of this practice in the Lithuanian legal science. The paper overviews the research conducted by the Constitutional Court on the constitutionality of laws according to the contents of the rules, the scope, the form of the regulation and the procedure of the adoption, signing, promulgation and enforcement established under the Constitution thereof. Moreover, it focuses on the constitutional requirements for the legislator formulated by the Constitutional Court, as well as the reasons that predetermine the cases when the laws are declared as being inconsistent with the Constitution. Furthermore, this research gives a brief analysis of the status of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Lithuania and its competence, with further reference to the evaluation of the legal regulation gaps in the acts adopted by the Constitutional Court and conception of the acts adopted by the Constitutional Court. Finally, separate sections of the present paper include the conception of the law and the constitutional law within the Lithuania's legal system, the assessment of their correlation and some of the problem-oriented issues associated herewith.

The advent of constitutional review and the growth of constitutional jurisprudence and its significance to the whole Lithuanian legal system should require detailed analysis of procedures by which the Constitutional Court examines the constitutionality of legislation and other matters falling within its competence, however the legal mind tends to pay relatively little attention to the constitutional justice procedure giving the priority to the look "from the outside" – a final act of a Constitutional Court, but not to the look "from the inside" – a procedure by which the final act is adopted. Thus in the numerous scholarly legal literature about the Constitutional Court there are relatively few research articles dedicated to the issues of constitutional justice procedure. One of the main reasons why these issues are left aside, like not requiring more scientific knowledge, is some uncertainty regarding the position from which they should be dealt with. There is no theoretical consensus about the question, whether legal norms and other provisions governing the procedures by which the Constitutional Court examines the constitutionality of legislation and other matters falling within its competence, to be considered as forming any independent part of the legal system. If so, whether this part of the legal system can be titled a branch of law? This article seeks to prove that constitutional justice procedure law, as a separate procedural branch of law, is substantiated not only by interfaces with other procedural branches of law, but also by the fact, that this area of law is governed by ordinary law acts and therefore can not be considered a procedural segment of the constitutional law. The autonomy of this branch of law is also evidenced by 2 classic features of separation of branches of law: separate legal subject matter and method. Although constitutional justice procedure law, as separate branch of law, can not be accepted without some doubt, especially given the fact that other procedural branches of law are characterized by a far greater intensiveness of regulation, however this branch of law is growing due to the Constitutional Court's development of its jurisprudence. This article also draws attention to the fact, that formation of this branch of law has not only a theoretical, but also a practical significance – it would attract more attention of the legal mind to the issues of constitutional justice procedure and provide systematic approach to the problematic aspects of this process and comprehensive discussions will certainly serve the development of constitutional justice procedure in Lithuania.

The advent of constitutional review and the growth of constitutional jurisprudence and its significance to the whole Lithuanian legal system should require detailed analysis of procedures by which the Constitutional Court examines the constitutionality of legislation and other matters falling within its competence, however the legal mind tends to pay relatively little attention to the constitutional justice procedure giving the priority to the look "from the outside" – a final act of a Constitutional Court, but not to the look "from the inside" – a procedure by which the final act is adopted. Thus in the numerous scholarly legal literature about the Constitutional Court there are relatively few research articles dedicated to the issues of constitutional justice procedure. One of the main reasons why these issues are left aside, like not requiring more scientific knowledge, is some uncertainty regarding the position from which they should be dealt with. There is no theoretical consensus about the question, whether legal norms and other provisions governing the procedures by which the Constitutional Court examines the constitutionality of legislation and other matters falling within its competence, to be considered as forming any independent part of the legal system. If so, whether this part of the legal system can be titled a branch of law? This article seeks to prove that constitutional justice procedure law, as a separate procedural branch of law, is substantiated not only by interfaces with other procedural branches of law, but also by the fact, that this area of law is governed by ordinary law acts and therefore can not be considered a procedural segment of the constitutional law. The autonomy of this branch of law is also evidenced by 2 classic features of separation of branches of law: separate legal subject matter and method. Although constitutional justice procedure law, as separate branch of law, can not be accepted without some doubt, especially given the fact that other procedural branches of law are characterized by a far greater intensiveness of regulation, however this branch of law is growing due to the Constitutional Court's development of its jurisprudence. This article also draws attention to the fact, that formation of this branch of law has not only a theoretical, but also a practical significance – it would attract more attention of the legal mind to the issues of constitutional justice procedure and provide systematic approach to the problematic aspects of this process and comprehensive discussions will certainly serve the development of constitutional justice procedure in Lithuania.

The advent of constitutional review and the growth of constitutional jurisprudence and its significance to the whole Lithuanian legal system should require detailed analysis of procedures by which the Constitutional Court examines the constitutionality of legislation and other matters falling within its competence, however the legal mind tends to pay relatively little attention to the constitutional justice procedure giving the priority to the look "from the outside" – a final act of a Constitutional Court, but not to the look "from the inside" – a procedure by which the final act is adopted. Thus in the numerous scholarly legal literature about the Constitutional Court there are relatively few research articles dedicated to the issues of constitutional justice procedure. One of the main reasons why these issues are left aside, like not requiring more scientific knowledge, is some uncertainty regarding the position from which they should be dealt with. There is no theoretical consensus about the question, whether legal norms and other provisions governing the procedures by which the Constitutional Court examines the constitutionality of legislation and other matters falling within its competence, to be considered as forming any independent part of the legal system. If so, whether this part of the legal system can be titled a branch of law? This article seeks to prove that constitutional justice procedure law, as a separate procedural branch of law, is substantiated not only by interfaces with other procedural branches of law, but also by the fact, that this area of law is governed by ordinary law acts and therefore can not be considered a procedural segment of the constitutional law. The autonomy of this branch of law is also evidenced by 2 classic features of separation of branches of law: separate legal subject matter and method. Although constitutional justice procedure law, as separate branch of law, can not be accepted without some doubt, especially given the fact that other procedural branches of law are characterized by a far greater intensiveness of regulation, however this branch of law is growing due to the Constitutional Court's development of its jurisprudence. This article also draws attention to the fact, that formation of this branch of law has not only a theoretical, but also a practical significance – it would attract more attention of the legal mind to the issues of constitutional justice procedure and provide systematic approach to the problematic aspects of this process and comprehensive discussions will certainly serve the development of constitutional justice procedure in Lithuania.

The advent of constitutional review and the growth of constitutional jurisprudence and its significance to the whole Lithuanian legal system should require detailed analysis of procedures by which the Constitutional Court examines the constitutionality of legislation and other matters falling within its competence, however the legal mind tends to pay relatively little attention to the constitutional justice procedure giving the priority to the look "from the outside" – a final act of a Constitutional Court, but not to the look "from the inside" – a procedure by which the final act is adopted. Thus in the numerous scholarly legal literature about the Constitutional Court there are relatively few research articles dedicated to the issues of constitutional justice procedure. One of the main reasons why these issues are left aside, like not requiring more scientific knowledge, is some uncertainty regarding the position from which they should be dealt with. There is no theoretical consensus about the question, whether legal norms and other provisions governing the procedures by which the Constitutional Court examines the constitutionality of legislation and other matters falling within its competence, to be considered as forming any independent part of the legal system. If so, whether this part of the legal system can be titled a branch of law? This article seeks to prove that constitutional justice procedure law, as a separate procedural branch of law, is substantiated not only by interfaces with other procedural branches of law, but also by the fact, that this area of law is governed by ordinary law acts and therefore can not be considered a procedural segment of the constitutional law. The autonomy of this branch of law is also evidenced by 2 classic features of separation of branches of law: separate legal subject matter and method. Although constitutional justice procedure law, as separate branch of law, can not be accepted without some doubt, especially given the fact that other procedural branches of law are characterized by a far greater intensiveness of regulation, however this branch of law is growing due to the Constitutional Court's development of its jurisprudence. This article also draws attention to the fact, that formation of this branch of law has not only a theoretical, but also a practical significance – it would attract more attention of the legal mind to the issues of constitutional justice procedure and provide systematic approach to the problematic aspects of this process and comprehensive discussions will certainly serve the development of constitutional justice procedure in Lithuania.