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The Supreme Court of Tennessee has been faced with few major Constitutional Law problems during the period under consideration. Statistically, the action of the Court in invalidating one law out of almost a score that were attacked before it on the basis of constitutional defect suggests an attitude of judicial restraint toward the product of a coordinate branch of government. The relatively small number of constitutional questions raised-- and many of them were obviously make-weight rather than points of principal reliance-- suggests a general awareness of the Court's stability and the unlikelihood of its departing from established precedent. Similarly, regard for the precedent established in Plessy v. Ferguson, with its "separate but equal" doctrine, was a major factor in the decision of two federal district courts in Tennessee involving alleged deprivation of constitutional rights in the furnishing of educational and recreational facilities to Negroes. It was not a year for the expansion or contraction of doctrines of constitutionality previously established, although in one instance at least it appears that some "new law" was made.

In 1970 Belgium established three Communities: the French, Flemish and German-speaking Communities. It was then in 1980 that three regions were set up: Walloon, Flemish and Brussels. Further amendments to the Constitution were made on 7 and 15 July 1988, as well as a special law of 8 August 1988 amending the original law of 8 August 1980. It is essential to say that most of the changes and principles governing the organisation and functioning of both the three Communities and the three regions date back to 1970 and 1980. The international nature of the Community's role in 1970 is significant. In 1980, an Arbitration Court was provided for by the Constitution and established to settle conflicts between the laws and decrees of the Communities and the Regions. The Federal State is characterised by two features: autonomy and co-operation. In 1988, the Arbitration Court continued the work of constitutional justice and verifies the conformity of laws or decrees with the provisions of international law and in particular European law. ; En 1970 la Belgique a instauré trois Communautés : les Communautés française, flamande et germanophone. Puis c'est en 1980 que se sont mises en place trois Régions : wallonne, flamande et bruxelloise. De nouveaux amendements à la Constitution ont été faits le 7 et le 15 juillet 1988, ainsi qu'une loi spéciale du 8 août 1988 qui est venue modifier la loi originale du 8 août 1980. Il est indispensable de dire que l'essentiel des changements et des principes d'organisation et de fonctionnement des trois Communautés aussi bien que des trois Régions datent de 1970 et de 1980. Le caractère international du rôle que les Communautés ont joué en 1970 est significatif. En 1980, une Cour d'arbitrage a été prévue par la Constitution et créée afin de régler les conflits entre les lois et les décrets des Communautés et des Régions. L'Etat fédéral se caractérise par deux traits : l'autonomie et la co-opération. En 1988 la Cour d'arbitrage poursuit l'oeuvre de justice constitutionnelle et vérifie la ...

The impact of EU membership on the UK constitution has been profound. In the Miller (Article 50) case, the Supreme Court described the effect of the European Communities Act 1972 (ECA) – the means by which EU membership was given effect within the UK – as being unprecedented in constitutional terms. Not only did it provide for a new source of law, and a new constitutional process for making law in the UK, it also fundamentally changed the UK's system of government and the way in which we think about the location and exercise of public power.

The authors survey the recent developments in Florida constitutional law, focusing on the powers and duties of the three branches of state government. Their discussion includes an analysis of the recent constitutional amendment modifying the jurisdiction of the supreme court.

This is the first event of the Transsystemic Law Series ; The University of Victoria follows a transsystemic method of teaching and thinking about law to educate across different legal orders, emphasize the relevance of Indigenous legal traditions to Canada, and contribute to understandings of law that are different from long-established legal views. Join the second presentation of our Transsystemic Law Series. Professor John Borrows will explain why a transsystemic approach to constitutional law contributes not only to understanding how different communities organize as distinctive political units, but also to giving Indigenous legal traditions equal footing with common and civil law traditions in Canada. ; UVic Graduate Student Law & Society Research Group ; Faculty ; Unreviewed

This article draws on the tradition of cosmopolitanism to offer a normative framework for the integration of democratic constitutional systems. The laterally conducted constitutional integration, which takes place outside formal institutional settings, remains under-theorized despite its transformative effect on constitutional law around the world. This article uses Kant's tripartite system of public law as presented in Perpetual Peace – ius civitatis (domestic political right), ius gentium (international political right), ius cosmopoliticum (cosmopolitan right) – to explain, defend and steer ongoing phenomena of constitutional integration. By contrast to other scholarly accounts, which associate a cosmopolitan view to top-down approaches to institutional reform at the international level or to universal moral demands, my account takes domestic constitutionalism as both starting and end points. In this sense, I defend a bottom-up version of cosmopolitanism. Cosmopolitanism from the ground-up preserves the primacy of the domestic jurisdictions: each domestic constitutional order retains the filter of its own discourse and structures as it integrates and internalizes the experiences of other constitutional orders. Cosmopolitanism helps to understand ongoing phenomena of constitutional integration because it rejects methodological nationalism in constitutional analysis. It also justifies these phenomena by showing that cross-jurisdictional integration is compatible with the constitutional democratic commitment to self-government.

This chapter provides an overview of the emerging field of transnational constitutional law (TCL). Whilst questions of constitutional law are typically discussed in the context of a specific domestic legal setting, a salient strategy of TCL is to understand constitutional law and its values by placing them 'in context' with existing and evolving cultural norms and political, social and economic discourses and struggles. Drawing on socio-legal investigations into the relationships between law and non-law and the significance of legal pluralism, TCL considers what role constitutional law and its values might play in shaping and bringing about social and legal transformation within an emerging global economic order in which non-territorially confined spaces of struggle involve transnational actors and social formation dynamics. TCL thus emerges out of constitutional law in a transnational legal context. Based on Zumbansen's concept of Transnational Law (TL) as a methodological framework to study the Actors, Norms and Processes of legal formations in a global context, rather than positing TL as a distinct legal field, we examine transnational constitutional law phenomena in their social, political and economic contexts. This allows us to revisit and reassess well-known constitutional law concepts such as the rule of law, equality and access to justice in a new light, in particular where we confront – in this paper – legacies of these concepts in both the Global North and South. This engagement renders visible lived experiences of constitutional law and constitutionalism in local and transnational contexts, drawing attention to the growing number of those who have, through processes of globalisation, fallen out of, or were never made party to, the Western 'social contract'. We present TCL as emerging on two levels. On a macro level, studies of comparative constitutional law and post-colonial approaches to law shine light on processes of globalisation and financialization as they manifest themselves in conflictual dynamics within trade law, and international human rights law, with regard to civil, socio-economic and cultural rights. TCL also emerges on a micro level through careful ethnographic and anthropological studies that examine different forms of what Saskia Sassen persuasively coined "Expulsions", meaning struggles and resistance against different forms of expropriation, eviction or alienation, within volatile economic and political landscapes. Finally, our transnational critique of the 'rule of law' reflects our hope for a 'thick' and historically reflective RoL concept. In

Proportionality has been used as an analytical method in the constitutional jurisprudence of courts around the world, including in Australia. The method has not, however, been free from controversy. Since its first introduction into Australian constitutional law, there have been debates regarding the appropriateness of proportionality testing in this context.To date, these debates have been lacking in one important respect: they have not been sufficiently grounded in theory. In times when the global literature on the subject was relatively nascent and applications in comparative constitutional contexts sparse, the under-theorisation of Australian proportionality was understandable. This is no longer the case. The burgeoning international literature and jurisprudence in this field has in recent years generated a rich body of judicial and academic thought from which to elicit a properly theorised consideration of proportionality. Drawing on these resources, this thesis proposes a theoretical framework for proportionality. It uses this framework to explore a key question in the Australian context: when is proportionality an appropriate analytical tool in constitutional jurisprudence? In examining this question, the thesis considers the primary concerns regarding the appropriateness of proportionality in Australian constitutional law and how these might be addressed. It also makes principled suggestions for the development of Australian doctrine.

Constitutional Law is "tough law." It is tough to master – tough to teach and tough to learn. There are several reasons for this thorough difficulty. First, it is not an exaggeration to say that the fate of the nation is often at stake in constitutional cases and controversies, and constitutional decisions have shaped our history as a people. Second, we Americans can lay claim to inventing the field, and we have been continuously preoccupied with reinventing it for more than two centuries of applied political philosophy. Third, the Supreme Court is one of the most fascinating institutions inside or outside government. Fourth, there is so much extant material - more than five hundred Talmudic volumes of the U.S. Reports full of majority, concurring, and dissenting opinions augmented by the interpretations and implementations of various other constitutional actors in the political branches. Fifth, every October Term's docket presents novel issues for decision, and each new nomination and confirmation renders much of constitutional law indeterminate, so there is a constant sense of uncertainty, anticipation, and discovery in the field. Sixth, constitutional analysis – if one thinks deeper and broader than mere doctrine and three-pronged tests – takes on metaphysical, quasi-religious qualities of immanence and transcendence that are far more profound than any other subject in law school. For these and other reasons, constitutional law is the toughest subject in the curriculum. This review essay will explain why the author uses Ronald D. Rotunda's casebook, Modern Constitutional Law and how he goes about teaching Constitutional Law.

Virtually all constitutional scholars agree, and the Supreme Court has uniformly held, that our entire system of constitutional democracy is premised in important part on the dictate of judicial review, i.e., the power of the judiciary to exercise the final say as to the meaning of the countermajoritarian Constitution's provisions. Absent judicial review, the fundamental speed bumps to tyranny that the Framers so carefully inserted into our political structure would be rendered all but useless at best and a fraud on the electorate at worst. Yet puzzlingly, most of the very same scholars and judges assume that the very political branches that the Constitution is designed to restrain will fully control the remedies to be issued. Thus, all the political branches need to do to avoid constitutional control is deny the courts any power to enforce their decisions. Such a logically inconsistent dichotomy indirectly destroys the essence of the judicial review process that is so central to American constitutional democracy. Yet neither constitutional scholars nor the Supreme Court have recognized either the serious logical flaw or the potentially grave practical dangers in vesting in the very branches sought to be controlled by the Constitution the final power to determine the scope—indeed, the existence—of remedies to enforce constitutional dictates. This Article explains the inherent theoretical and practical link between constitutional review and constitutional remedies, demonstrating that full control of constitutional remedies belongs in the judiciary, not the political branches. It then explains how judicial inference of constitutional remedies in the face of textual silence on the issue can be justified by principled theories of textual interpretation, highlights the inadequacy of scholarly work in this area, and answers potential counterarguments. Finally, it applies this theory of constitutional remedies to the Supreme Court's implied remedies jurisprudence.

Pathetic argument, or argument based on pathos, persuades by appealing to the emotions of the reader or listener. In Aristotle's classic treatment, it exists in parallel to logical argument, which appeals to deductive or inductive reasoning, and ethical argument, which appeals to the character of the speaker. Pathetic argument is common in constitutional law, as in other practical discourse--think of "Poor Joshua!"--but existing accounts of constitutional practice do not provide resources for understanding the place of and limitations upon such appeals when they appear in judicial opinions. This Article begins to fill that gap. Pathetic argument is one of the acceptable modes of persuasion that constitutional argument shares with other deliberative domains, though at its best it can be used to amplify arguments within the set of discourses--text, history, structure, precedent, and consequences--that make constitutional law a distinctive form of politics. Normatively, appeals to emotion are most easily justified in opinions that seek to declare rather than apply law; in separate writings; when addressed to accepted subjects of constitutional argument rather than the ultimate outcome in the case; and when they arouse other-regarding rather than self-regarding emotions. A nuanced account of the proper place of pathetic argument in constitutional law is instrumental to understanding what it means to engage, and not to engage, in constitutional discourse.

Pathetic argument, or argument based on pathos, persuades by appealing to the emotions of the reader or listener. In Aristotle's classic treatment, it exists in parallel to logical argument, which appeals to deductive or inductive reasoning, and ethical argument, which appeals to the character of the speaker. Pathetic argument is common in constitutional law, as in other practical discourse — think of "Poor Joshua!" — but existing accounts of constitutional practice do not provide resources for understanding the place of and limitations upon such appeals when they appear in judicial opinions. This Article begins to fill that gap. Pathetic argument is one of the acceptable modes of persuasion that constitutional argument shares with other deliberative domains, though at its best it can be used to amplify arguments within the set of discourses — text, history, structure, precedent, and consequences — that make constitutional law a distinctive form of politics. Normatively, appeals to emotion are most easily justified in opinions that seek to declare rather than apply law; in separate writings; when addressed to accepted subjects of constitutional argument rather than the ultimate outcome in the case; and when they arouse other-regarding rather than self-regarding emotions. A nuanced account of the proper place of pathetic argument in constitutional law is instrumental to understanding what it means to engage, and not to engage, in constitutional discourse.

Pathetic argument, or argument based on pathos, persuades by appealing to the emotions of the reader or listener. In Aristotle's classic treatment, it exists in parallel to logical argument, which appeals to deductive or inductive reasoning, and ethical argument, which appeals to the character of the speaker. Pathetic argument is common in constitutional law, as in other practical discourse-think of "Poor Joshua!"- but existing accounts of constitutional practice do not provide resources for understanding the place of and limitations upon such appeals when they appear in judicial opinions. This Article begins to fill that gap. Pathetic argument is one of the acceptable modes of persuasion that constitutional argument shares with other deliberative domains, though at its best it can be used to amplify arguments within the set of discoursestext, history, structure, precedent, and consequences-that make constitutional law a distinctive form of politics. Normatively, appeals to emotion are most easily justified in opinions that seek to declare rather than apply law; in separate writings; when addressed to accepted subjects of constitutional argument rather than the ultimate outcome in the case; and when they arouse other-regarding rather than selfregarding emotions. A nuanced account of the proper place of pathetic argument in constitutional law is instrumental to understanding what it means to engage, and not to engage, in constitutional discourse.

Several of the Supreme Court's most controversial constitutional doctrines hinge on claims about electoral accountability. Restrictions on the President's power to remove agency heads are disfavored because they reduce the President's accountability for agency actions. Congress cannot delegate certain decisions to agencies because then Congress is less accountable for those choices. State governments cannot be federally commandeered because such conscription lessens their accountability. And campaign spending must be unregulated so that more information reaches voters and helps them to reward or punish incumbents for their performances. There is just one problem with these claims. They are wrong—at least for the most part. To illustrate their error, I identify four conditions that must be satisfied in order for incumbents to be held accountable. Voters must (1) know about incumbents' records, (2) form judgments about them, (3) attribute responsibility for them, and (4) cast ballots based on these judgments and attributions. I then present extensive empirical evidence showing that these conditions typically are not met in the scenarios contemplated by the Court. The crux of the problem is that voters are less informed than the Court supposes, more likely to be biased by their partisan affiliations, and less apt to vote retrospectively than in some other way. Accountability thus does not rise in response to the Court's interventions—at least not much. The qualifiers, though, are important. If the Court's claims are mostly wrong, then they are partly right. If accountability does not rise much due to the Court's efforts, then it does go up a bit. These points are established by the same studies that document the general inadequacy of the Court's reasoning. With respect to certain voters in certain settings, accountability is influenced by presidential control over agencies, congressional delegation to agencies, federal commandeering of state governments, and regulation of campaign spending. That is why this Article ...

The article analyzes the process of constitutional law updating. However, we note that, of course, national law plays a significant role in direct law enforcement activities, but the role of global law is increasingly present. Changes on a global scale have affected constitutional law. This influence has a dual nature. Firstly, constitutional law as a branch of national law is changed and transformed in accordance with the recognized latest international legal standards, or implements positive foreign practice. We should note that today there is a number of social problems of a global nature, which can be solved only by international cooperation, including issues of counter-terrorism, security issues, legal regulation of relations in the information sphere and more. Therefore, the development of uniform mechanisms must be agreed at the national level, so they are implemented in the constitutional legal framework. The current trend of democratization of power relations is especially noted. It is noted that this does not automatically lead to the real rule of law, but the means of democratic transformation are introduced into the institutional mechanism of state power. Secondly, the changes affected constitutional law as a science and an academic discipline. Expansion of educational programs related to modern legal systems, comparative research, interpretation of foreign law, and knowledge in the field of constitutional law of foreign countries - an urgent requirement of modern legal science. Globalization as a modern general factor in the transformation of the entire legal reality is a catalyst for the development of the legal system, including constitutional law. The assertion of the principles of the rule of law, constitutionalism and humanism remain axiological determinants of the national law of civilized people. Legal globalization combines a system of national, international and even positive foreign processes, which in symbiosis leads to the renewal of constitutional law.