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The Constitution is the cornerstone of American government, hailed as one of the greatest contributions of the Western Enlightenment. While many seem content simply to celebrate it, those most familiar with the document invariably find it wanting in at least some aspects. This unique volume brings together many of the country's most esteemed constitutional commentators and invites them to answer two questions: First, what is the stupidest provision of the Constitution? "Stupid" need not mean evil. Thus, a second, related question is whether the scholar-interpreter would be forced to reach truly evil results even if applying his or her own favored theory of constitutional interpretation. The contributors include Lawrence Alexander, Akhil Reed Amar, Jack Balkin, Philip Bobbitt, Gerard Bradley, Rebecca Brown, Steven Calabresi, Lief Carter, Christopher Eisgruber, Lawrence Sager, Marie Failinger, Daniel Farber, James Fleming, Mark Graber, Stephen Griffin, Gary Jacobsohn, Randall Kennedy, Lewis LaRue, Theodore Lowi, Earl Maltz, Michael McConnell, Matthew Michael, Robert Nagel, Daniel Ortiz, Pamela Karlen, Michael Paulsen, Robert Post, Lucas Powe, Dorothy Roberts, Jeffrey Rosen, Frederick Schauer, Michael Seidman, Suzanna Sherry, David Strauss, Laurence Tribe, Mark Tushnet, and John Yoo

Scholars have shown that written constitutions may be informally amended in various ways, for instance by judicial interpretation, statute, or executive action. But scholars have yet to fully appreciate that written constitutions may also be informally amended by desuetude. Informal amendment by constitutional desuetude occurs when a constitutional provision loses its binding force upon political actors as a result of its conscious sustained nonuse and public repudiation by political actors. Though it is a species of informal amendment, constitutional desuetude possesses unique properties. Constitutional desuetude reflects the informal repeal of a constitutional provision as a result of the establishment of a new constitutional convention. Despite its obsolescence, the desuetudinal constitutional provision remains entrenched in the constitutional text. Consequently, although informal amendment generally leaves the constitutional text entrenched, unchanged and politically valid, this particular variation of informal amendment leaves the text entrenched and unchanged but renders it politically invalid. In this paper, I illustrate and theorize the phenomenon of informal amendment by constitutional desuetude with reference to the Canadian Constitution, I construct an analytical framework for identifying constitutional desuetude in other jurisdictions, I distinguish constitutional desuetude from other forms of obsolescence, and I also explore the costs of constitutional desuetude.

In evaluating the success of the American constitutional system, constitutional theorists often focus their attention on the broad structures through which constitutional law is made--for example, the existence of multi-member courts a majority of whose members usually must agree on the text of a single opinion or the difference in training and life experiences that judges have in comparison with legislators. The same theorists tend to pay little attention to a related set of institutional arrangements that are more recent in their development--for example, the proliferation of amicus briefs filed by advocacy groups, the substantial increase in the use of law clerks, or the degree to which public awareness of the content of Supreme Court opinions is increasingly mediated through ideologically-committed talking heads. This paper makes two related points: First, it argues that constitutional theorists have drastically underestimated the degree to which the content and tenor of constitutional law turns on the second, more novel set of institutional arrangements. Second, it argues that the very distinction between the two categories is ephemeral; both the more traditional and the more novel institutional structures of the American constitutional courts are nominal and historically contingent. The paper concludes with an argument that the two sets of institutions can be--and must be--jointly theorized under the rubric of "constitutional culture."

Virtually all constitutional scholars agree, and the Supreme Court has uniformly held, that our entire system of constitutional democracy is premised in important part on the dictate of judicial review, i.e., the power of the judiciary to exercise the final say as to the meaning of the countermajoritarian Constitution's provisions. Absent judicial review, the fundamental speed bumps to tyranny that the Framers so carefully inserted into our political structure would be rendered all but useless at best and a fraud on the electorate at worst. Yet puzzlingly, most of the very same scholars and judges assume that the very political branches that the Constitution is designed to restrain will fully control the remedies to be issued. Thus, all the political branches need to do to avoid constitutional control is deny the courts any power to enforce their decisions. Such a logically inconsistent dichotomy indirectly destroys the essence of the judicial review process that is so central to American constitutional democracy. Yet neither constitutional scholars nor the Supreme Court have recognized either the serious logical flaw or the potentially grave practical dangers in vesting in the very branches sought to be controlled by the Constitution the final power to determine the scope—indeed, the existence—of remedies to enforce constitutional dictates. This Article explains the inherent theoretical and practical link between constitutional review and constitutional remedies, demonstrating that full control of constitutional remedies belongs in the judiciary, not the political branches. It then explains how judicial inference of constitutional remedies in the face of textual silence on the issue can be justified by principled theories of textual interpretation, highlights the inadequacy of scholarly work in this area, and answers potential counterarguments. Finally, it applies this theory of constitutional remedies to the Supreme Court's implied remedies jurisprudence.

The idea of supra-constitutionality was formulated in the science of constitutional law in the second quarter of the 20th century and associated with the names of M.Hauriou and K.Schmitt, who for the first time noticed the possibility of the existence of norms that are higher than the constitution. This article is an attempt to give the doctrine of supra-constitutionality an actual theoretical and dogmatic meaning in the context of the study of the material limits of constitutional changes. The doctrine of supra-constitutionality claims to play an important role in explaining that unchangeable norms can exist in constitutional law and that they cannot be excluded, changed, limited, overcome, affected by the other sources of constitutional law, including the constitution itself. Supra-constitutionality is viewed as a characteristic of unchangeable constitutional norms that constitute the material limits of constitutional changes. Supra-constitutionality presupposes the existence of norms that surpass the rest of the constitutional norms and predetermine their content through the definition of what can, should and should not be included in the constitution or excluded from it. The basis of constitutional supra-constitutionality is the argument of hierarchical differentiation. In addition to recognizing unchangeable constitutional norms as supra-constitutional, the article raises the question of the existence of natural law and international law supra-constitutional norms. Natural law supra-constitutional norms have an external and non-positive character. They are not enshrined in the constitution, but stem from a reasonably understood concept of what is due in the most civilized societies, which is determined by the constitutional court. International law supra-constitutionality is understood as the superiority of the norms of international law over the constitution. It has an external and positive character. International law supra-constitutionality can cause political objections from opponents of the absolute rule of international law. Supra-constitutional constitutional, natural and international law norms can come into conflict with each other. The paradox of the doctrine of supra-constitutionality lies in the fact that it creates a hierarchy of norms within the constitution itself, distinguishing between simple and supra-constitutional constitutional norms, or distinguishes certain non-positive norms that are outside the constitution, as having priority over the constitution, or puts some norms of international law over all norms of national law, including the constitution. The purpose of the doctrine of supra-constitutionality is to preserve the inviolable fundamental (natural or generally recognized) values, which justifies its logical flaws and paradoxicality.

"Am 15. Februar 2009 stimmten knapp 55 Prozent der Venezolaner für eine Verfassungsreform, mit der dem amtierenden Präsidenten Hugo Chávez die unbegrenzte Wiederwahl ermöglicht wird. Nur drei Wochen zuvor war in Bolivien gleichfalls mittels eines Referendums eine neue Verfassung angenommen worden. Bereits am 28. September des Vorjahres hatten die Ecuadorianer in einer Volksabstimmung dem Entwurf für eine neue Verfassung zugestimmt. Verfassungsreformen sind in Lateinamerika zurzeit in Mode: Seit 1990 wurden insgesamt sieben neue Verfassungen und 239 einfache Verfassungsänderungen verabschiedet. Die jüngsten Reformen spiegeln allgemeine Trends wider, weisen aber auch einige spezifische Merkmale und Neuerungen auf. Dazu gehört, die Rechte der indigenen Bevölkerung zu stärken und den 'plurinationalen' Charakter der Staaten hervorzuheben. Die beiden neuen Verfassungen von Bolivien und Ecuador sind mit jeweils mehr als 400 Artikeln die bei weitem umfangreichsten Verfassungen in Lateinamerika. Sie enthalten eine Vielzahl von Versprechungen (wie das Anrecht auf ein 'gutes Leben') und legen wichtige Politikinhalte (vor allem in der Wirtschafts- und Sozialpolitik) fest. Verfassungen werden in Lateinamerika relativ häufig reformiert, sei es durch die Verabschiedung neuer Verfassungen, sei es durch einfache Verfassungsreformen. Dieser Trend hat sich in den vergangenen Jahren verstärkt. Die Verfassungstexte werden immer umfangreicher und führen zu einer Konstitutionalisierung von Politikfeldern. Viele der gegenwärtigen Verfassungsreformen weisen eine starke machtpolitische Komponente auf. Sie wurden von den amtierenden Präsidenten initiiert und festigen deren Position. Teilen der Verfassungsreformen kommt hingegen symbolischer Charakter zu, indem sie den Bürgern weitreichende Versprechungen machen ('Verfassungspopulismus'), deren Umsetzbarkeit jedoch zweifelhaft erscheint. Die Wahrscheinlichkeit immer neuer Verfassungsreformen ist mit den letzten Referenden gerade in den drei genannten Ländern eher größer als kleiner geworden." (Autorenreferat)