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Constructivismabout practical judgments, as I understand it, is the notion that our true normative judgments represent a normative reality, while denying that that reality is independent of our exer-cise of moral and practical judgment. The Kantian strain of practical constructivism (through Kant himself, John Rawls, Christine Korsgaard, and others) has been so influential that it is tempting to identify the constructivist approach in practical domains with the Kantian development of the out-look. In this essay I explore a somewhat different variety of practical constructivism, which I callAristotelian Constructivism. My aim is to establish conceptual space for this form of constructivism by indicating both in what ways it agrees with its Kantian counterparts and in what ways it differs. I argue that Aristotelian Constructivism is on one sense more faithful to the constructivist enterprise than the Kantian varieties, in that its understanding of both the establishment of practical truthandthe vindication of the theory itself is constructivist.

This article shows the relevance of Oakeshott's political philosophy for the contemporary constructivist debate in International Relations. First, the article argues that Oakeshott's perspective stresses that political institutions are based on norms and relationships which result from human understanding. Second, it elaborates on Nicholas Rengger's recent work and reveals that Oakeshott's On Human Conduct presents considerations pertaining to international politics that are consistent with his broader political philosophy. These observations concern the nature of war, the historical role of colonialism and the evolution of international society. Third, this article discusses Terry Nardin's notion of 'practical association' and Christian Reus-Smit's criticism of it. It contends that international civil association is a relationship between states based on understood and socially constructed moral values and practices. Finally, the article claims that customary international law declares and reflects these values and practices. As such, it reveals that Oakeshott's notion of authority and his theory of civil association illuminate the possibility of an international legal order without a legislative office. This is of particular relevance also because of the Hobbesian influence on Oakeshott. Overall, this article illustrates how Michael Oakeshott's theory of civil association sheds light on the nature of international society and law.

Epistemology, as I understand it, is a branch of philosophy especially concerned with general questions about how we can know various things or at least justify our beliefs about them. It questions what counts as evidence and what are reasonable sources of doubt. Traditionally, episte-mology focuses on pervasive and apparently basic assumptions covering a wide range of claims to knowledge or justified belief rather than very specific, practical puzzles. For example, traditional epistemologists ask "How do we know there are material objects?" and not "How do you know which are the female beetles?" Similarly,moralepistemology, as I understand it, is concerned with general questions about how we can know or justify our beliefs about moral matters. Its focus, again, is on quite general, pervasive, and apparently basic assumptions about what counts as evidence, what are reasonable sources of doubt, and what are the appropriate procedures for justifying particular moral claims.

Albert Weale's Democratic Justice and the Social Contract is an important book. It offers an innovative and original (proceduralist) account of justice. In so doing, it places what Brian Barry called 'the empirical method' at the centre of normative political philosophy's attempts to generate determinate answers to moral questions. This article-written from the perspective of someone sympathetic to both the commitment to mutual advantage and the empirical method – focuses on the kind of argument it is that Weale is offering and in particular on the nature of his constructivist project. It argues that Weale's commitment to equality lies outside the constructivist project and that this undermines his aspiration to genuine constructivism. The article goes on to consider, on the basis of arguments found in Democratic Justice and the Social Contract, various ways in which Weale might have grounded his egalitarian commitments from within the constructivist project.

Abstract
In these comments, I share some remarks concerning two main points lying at the core of Gava's book Kant's Critique of Pure Reason and the Method of Metaphysics: Gava's reconstruction and account of a transcendental deduction, its relation to a metaphysical deduction, and more specifically his reading of the B-Deduction. I will discuss Gava's arguments in order to highlight the key tenets of his interpretation and raise questions related to (1) the meaning and scope of the notion of 'transcendental'; and (2) the commitment to – and the extent of – what we might call 'cognitive constructivism'.

The article is devoted to the problems of civilizational analysis of Russian his­tory. The author shows, that the "civilizational method" is not at all a panacea for ideologized unprofessionalism and a guarantee of scientific correctness. The ma­jor authors in the field of Russian history avoided using the concept of "civiliza­tion", and spoke either about Russian state (Karamzin, S. Solovyov), or about Russian people(Polevoy), or about Slavic cultural and historical type (Dani­levsky). This proves that operating with the philosophically rich concept of "civ­ilization" is fraught with its own limitations and costs, in addition to the tempta­tions and some analytical advantages. The author believes that when using the concept of "Russian civilization", it is necessary to take into account the pres­ence in our culture of a large layer of "ironic literature" on the topic of excessive generalizations: "History of the Village Goryukhino" by Pushkin, "History of the city [Glupov]" by Saltykov-Shchedrin, "History of the Village Brehov" by Mozhaev, etc. The author, relying on the typology of civilizations by A. Toyn­bee, N. Berdyaev and his own developments (since the 1980s), believes that the civilizational process in Russia took place, firstly, in the mode of "continuity through catastrophes", and, secondly, it took place not only in confrontation with other civilizations, but also in a struggle with its own, internal "barbarism".

InPolitical Liberalism, John Rawls employs a distinctive method of "political constructivism" to establish his well-known principles of justice, arguing that his principles are suited to bridge the ineradicable pluralism of liberal societies and so to ground an "overlapping consensus." Setting aside the question of whether Rawls's method supports his principles, I argue that he does not adequately defend reliance on this particular method rather than alternatives. If the goal of Rawls's "political" philosophy is to derive principles that are able to overcome liberal pluralism, then another and simpler method should be employed. The "method of convergence" would develop liberal principles directly from the convergence of comprehensive views in existing societies, and so give rise to quite different moral principles.

This paper aims to investigate whether and in what respects the conceptions of the body and of agency that Judith Butler develops in Bodies That Matter are useful contributions to feminist theory. The discussion focuses on the clarification and critical assessment of the arguments Butler presents to refute the charges of linguistic monism and determinism.