Suchergebnisse

Im Anschluss an John Rawls entwickelt der Autor eine praktisch-politisch relevante und kritische Konzeption idealer Theorie. Dies erfolgt auf der Grundlage einer Auseinandersetzung mit der Kritik an idealer Theorie durch Autoren wie Amartya Sen und Raymond Geuss. Als Antwort auf Sen wird eine Konzeption von Machbarkeitsrestriktionen für ideale Theorie entwickelt, insbesondere für die Konstruktion idealer institutioneller Gesellschaftsentwürfe. Als Antwort auf Geuss werden konstruktivistische Ansätze zur Konstruktion normativer Theorien diskutiert und für eine Konzeption idealtheoretischen Denkens argumentiert, die eine kritische Perspektive auf den Status Quo erlaubt.

Cover -- Half Title -- Title Page -- Copyright Page -- Table of Contents -- Preface -- Introduction: The Rawlsian Background -- PART I EQUALITY -- 1 Equality -- 2 What Is the Point of Equality? -- 3 A Defense of Luck Egalitarianism -- PART II JUSTICE -- 4 Rescuing Justice from Constructivism and Equality from the Basic Structure Restriction -- 5 Justice and Boundaries -- 6 Capabilities and Resources -- PART III LIBERTY -- 7 The Instability of Freedom as Noninterference: The Case of Isaiah Berlin -- 8 Can Positive Freedom Be Saved? -- 9 The Myth of "Merely Formal Freedom" -- PART IV DEMOCRACY -- 10 Democracy Is Not Intrinsically Just -- 11 The Authority of Democracy -- 12 Reflections on Deliberative Democracy -- PART V HUMAN RIGHTS -- 13 The Dark Side of Human Rights -- 14 World Poverty and Human Rights -- 15 Capabilities and Social Justice -- About the Contributors -- Source Credits -- Index

Who's afraid of inertia? The Cartesian-Newtonian legacy reconsidered / Sarah Ellenzweig -- Varieties of vital materialism / Charles T. Wolfe -- Plastic matters / Jess Keiser -- Deleuze and new materialism: naturalism, norms, and ethics / Keith Ansell-Pearson -- Materialism, old and new, and the party of humanity / Catherine Wilson -- Engendering new materializations: feminism, nature, and the challenge to disciplinary proper objects / Angela Willey -- What sort of thing is the social? Or, Durkheim and Deleuze on organization and infrastructure / Ian Lowrie -- The cognitive nonconscious and the new materialism / N. Katherine Hayles -- Scale variance and the concept of matter / Derek Woods -- Detachment theory: agency, nature, and the normative nihilism of new materialism / Lenny Moss -- Materialism, constructivism, and political skepticism: Leibniz, Hobbes, and the erudite libertines / Mogens Lærke -- Normativity matters: philosophical naturalism and political theory / Christian J. Emden -- Concluding (Irenic) postscript: naturalism as a response to the new materialism / John H. Zammito.

In den aktuellen Debatten der Sozialen Arbeit sind systemische und konstruktivistische Überlegungen etabliert. In diesem Kontext finden sich Positionen die der Individualisierung jeglicher Verantwortung das Wort zu reden scheinen. Dem wird hier als ein spezifischer systemisch-konstruktivistischer Ansatz der Relationale Konstruktivismus entgegen gestellt, der die für die Soziale Arbeit notwenige Betrachtung der Subjekte in ihren Umwelten (person in environment) ermöglicht. Dies ist zugleich ein Plädoyer für eine relationale Soziale Arbeit, die weiterhin die Zuständigkeit für die Beachtung und Bearbeitung der Schnittstelle zwischen Individuum und Gesellschaft behält. Der von Björn Kraus vertretene erkenntnistheoretische Ansatz des Relationalen Konstruktivismus mag eine mögliche Antwort auf die auch für eine relationale Soziale Arbeit notwendige Frage nach deren erkenntnistheoretischen Voraussetzungen liefern und zu einem sprachlichen und analytischen Instrumentarium beitragen, das für eine professionelle Praxis genutzt werden kann. Das wird im Rahmen des Beitrags exemplarisch an den Kategorien der Lebenswelt und der Lebenslage, sowie der Macht erörtert.

In recent years, some theorists have raised their distrust in metaethical research. Such worries include concerns about the intelligibility of metaethical discourse; claims about the meaninglessness of metaethical discussions; and finally the idea that metaethical debates are to be addressed by substantive theorizing only, namely that metaethical discussions are actually dealt by engaging in first-order, normative discourse. According to these worries, metaethics is either useless or just is a part of normative ethics and metaethicists are either hopeless, or simply in denial about what they are doing. Prominent examples of such convictions are Roanld Dworkin [Dworkin 1996, 2011] and Catherine Korsgaard [Korsgaard 2003]. I call this "metaethical quietism". Such aggressive attitude has also been prominent in mainstream political philosophy since Rawls. According to Rawls, political philosophy should not engage with questions of the ontology of morals, or metaethics in general, to be more practically useful. In this paper, I question whether quietism can be successful and argue that metaethical inquiry may be useful to normative theorizing. The paper proceeds as follows: first, I consider and rebut Dworkin and Korsgaard's arguments for metaethical quietism. Second, I compare them to Rawls's political liberalism and argue that, despite some common aims, Rawls's approach differs significantly from theirs. Finally, I consider whether metaethics can be useful to political philosophy. In attacking metaethics, Dworkin and Korsgaard have different aims. The first wants to rule out all forms of scepticism about values made possible by defending any kind of Archimedeanism. A theory is Archimedean if it purports to "stand outside a whole body of belief and to judge it as a whole from premises or attitudes that owe nothing to it" [Dworkin 1996, 88]. The latter, on the contrary, presents a theory of the practical function of moral concept as a broad charge against moral realism, intended as a metaphysical theory about normative entities, which exist independently of moral concepts. Despite such differences, they can be considered metaethical quietists for they share three main claims: 1) there is no metaethical grounding for normative ethics, thus morality is autonomous; 2) we should give up on metaphysics, moral theories need to be metaphysically light ; 3) moral philosophy is to provide normative judgments and practical solutions to moral problems and, thus, moral philosophy is to be considered eminently practical. Considering these three points, it might be possible to wonder whether Rawls's political liberalism should be considered a form of metaethical quietism. Indeed, holding that non-moral theses are irrelevant to the justification of moral theories, Rawls defends moral theory as a discipline independent from any philosophical inquiry [Rawls 1974]. Moreover, proposing a freestanding conception, neutral towards any moral and philosophical doctrine to provide the basis for an overlapping consensus, political liberalism explicitly aims not to appeal to any metaphysics to sustain itself [Rawls 1993]. Finally, political liberalism employs political constructivism, which "deliberately stays on the surface, philosophically speaking" [Rawls, 1985]. However, despite these apparent similarities, there is a fundamental difference between Rawls's account and Dworkin and Korsgaard's metaethical quietism. Although Dworkin and Korsgaard present their positions as if they were opposing metaethics as a theoretical enterprise, they cannot help to work within its field. Dworkin presents a two-step argument against metaethics contending that the distinction between normative and metaethical claims dissolves because it is not possible to have a metaethical proposition neutral about the content of substantive moral claims. Metaethics fails to be neutral, the argument goes, if two conditions apply: if it is possible to find a plausible normative interpretation of metaethical claims; and it is also possible to demonstrate that metaethical claims are philosophically distinct from normative propositions. Contra Dworkin, it is important to stress that providing cases in which the two conditions apply is not enough to prove that all possible metaethical claims are in fact normative. Consider the following proposition "there is a right answer to the question whether X is morally right". This is a distinct metaethical claim, not committed to any normative view for it is consistent with both X being morally right, or X being morally wrong. More generally, it is possible to wonder whether anti-Archimedeanism can be defended without taking an Archimedean standpoint: does not anti-Archimedeanis need Archimedean leverage to be consistent? If Dworkin says that his anti-Archimedeanist position is indeed metaethical, his account is self-refuting. If he succeeds in showing that anti-Archimedeanism is actually a part of normative philosophy, it is not clear why he engages in a debate he considers non-existent. Korsgaard, on the contrary, argues for a sharp contrast between theoretical and practical reasonings, which have different kinds of content. In this sense, theoretical reasoning purports to describe reality, whether practical reasoning refers to the solution of a practical problem. Korsgaard seems to think that since theoretical and practical reasoning are different in content and metaethics regards itself as a theoretical discipline, it is misplaced. Indeed, moral concepts are practical and, thus, "there is [no] difference between doing metaethics and doing normative or practical ethics." [Korsgaard 2003, 121] However, if Korsgaard is aiming to go "beyond" metaethical debates, it is not clear why she engages with and directly challenges traditional metaethical theories, such as realism and expressivism. Moreover, it is possible to argue that Korsgaard is just defending a peculiar metaethical theory, a sort of response-dependence realism [McPherson 2010]. Dworkin and Korsgaard endorse metaethical quietism in order to defend the idea that normative ethics is autonomous in the sense of not being influenced by non-moral theories. However, their views cannot really do without metaethics, so I now consider whether Rawls's political constructivism can achieve such aim. Rawls claims the autonomy of political philosophy and he maintains his political conception to be "robust", so that changes in other related fields of inquiry do not challenge its justification. In this sense, Rawls is more radical than Dworkin and Korsgaard for he argues for the independence of political philosophy not only from metaethics, but also from substantive moral theories. Moreover, he does not question the value of metaethics per se: from his point of view, citizens can discuss metaethical questions as much as they want. However, a political philosopher who wants to provide a solution to a practical problem (in his case that of the stability for the right reasons in liberal pluralistic societies) needs to avoid such questions. Metaethical issues are misplaced in political philosophy because they rely on a different ground. This is why political constructivism does not compete with moral intuitionism or Kantian constructivism. It simply does not engage with questions about the nature of moral propositions. Here Rawls's proposal resembles Rorty's invite to "stop the debate" for it pragmatically does not work [see, Rorty 1982], and his attempt to reconcile different worldviews looks like a Wittgensteinian therapy for liberal societies. I call this, "philosophical quietism". It seems that quietism wants to secure the independence and autonomy of normative theory. The discussion above shows that such a strategy is at least problematic. And if metaethics can be considered an independent field of inquiry (though it may not be neutral) it seems that there are certain problems, relevant also to political philosophy, that need to be addressed by metaethical inquiry to be correctly evaluated. One the most long-standing problems in political philosophy is that of disagreement in pluralistic society, but disagreement is a traditional and inescapable subject for metaethicists. Indeed, it makes a difference whether disagreement is dealt from a relativistic, subjectivist, or objectivist perspective for this affects how moral disputes are to be considered and handled. If emotivism turns out to be correct disagreements are to be settled by persuasion, whereas if moral realism is true a posteriori argument are going to be weighted more than if error theory is correct. The point is that if political philosophers are to address the problem of disagreement, metaethical understanding is fundamental to assess the object of inquiry. Different understandings of disagreement, let them be more ore less consistent with our experience, imply different normative answers. In this sense, disagreement is a paradigmatic case for the need of metaethical understanding in political philosophy.

Part I : general concepts -- The concept of disease / Dominic Sisti and Arthur L. Caplan -- Disease, illness, and sickness / Bjorn Hofmann -- Health and well-being / Daniel M. Hausman -- Disability and normality / Anita Silvers -- Mechanisms in medicine / Phyllis Illari -- Causality and causal interference in medicine / Julian Reiss -- Frequency and propensity : the interpretation of probability in causal models for medicine / Donald Gillies -- Reductionism in the biomedical sciences / Holly K. Andersen -- Realism and constructivism in medicine / Jeremy R. Simon -- Part II : specific concepts -- Birth / Christina Scèhues -- Death / Steven Luper -- Pain, chronic pain, and suffering / Valerie Gray Hardcastle -- Measuring placebo effects / Jeremy Howick -- The concept of genetic disease / Jonathan Michael Kaplan -- Diagnostic categories / Annemarie Jutel -- Classificatory challenges in psychopathology / Harold Kincaid -- Classificatory challenges in physical disease / Mathias Brochhausen -- Part III : research methods (a) evidence in medicine -- The randomized controlled trial : internal and external validity ./ Adam La Caze -- The hierarchy of evidence, meta-analysis, and systematic review / Robyn Bluhm -- Statistical evidence and the reliability of medical research / Mattia Andreoletti and David Teira -- Bayesian versus frequentist clinical trials / Cecillia Nardini -- Observational research / Olaf M. Dekkers and Jane P. Vandenbroucke -- Philosophy of epidemiology / Alex Broadbent -- Complementary/alternative medicine and the evidence requirement / Kirsten Hansen and Klemens Kappel -- Part III : research methods (b) other research methods -- Models in medicine / Michael Wilde and Jon Williamson -- Discovery in medicine / Brendan Clarke -- Explanation in medicine / Mèael Lemoine -- The case study in medicine / Rachel A. Ankeny -- Values in medical research / Kirstin Borgerson -- Outcome measures in medicine / Leah McClimans -- Measuring harms / Jacob Stegenga -- Expert consensus / Miriam Solomon -- Part IV : clinical methods -- Clinical judgment / Ross Upshur and Benjamin Chin-Yee -- Narrative medicine / Danielle Spencer -- Medical decision making : diagnosis, treatment, and prognosis / Ashley Graham Kennedy -- Part V : variability and diversity -- Personalized and precision medicine / Alex Gamma -- Gender in medicine / Immaculada de Melo-Martâin and Kristen Intemann -- Race in Medicine / Sean A. Valles -- Atypical bodies in medical care / Ellen K. Feder -- Part VI : perspectives -- The biomedical model and the biopsychosocial model in medicine / Fred Gifford -- Models in mental illness / Jacqueline Sullivan -- Phenomenology and hermeneutics in medicine / Havi Carel -- Evolutionary medicine / Michael Cournoyea -- Philosophy of nursing : caring, holism and the nursing role(s) / Mark Risjord -- Contemporary Chinese medicine and its theoretical foundations / Judith Farquhar -- Double truths and the postcolonial predicament of Chinese medicine / Eric I. Karchmer -- Medicine as a commodity / Carl Elliott

This volume is a collection of twelve original essays written in honor of Christine Korsgaard, on the occasion of her retirement from teaching. These articles address questions about the foundations of morality, the nature of normativity, conceptions of the self and of agency, moral responsibility, obligations to non-human animals, constructivism in ethics, and the relations between Kant's ethics, religion, and politics. Contributors include both colleagues and students of Korsgaard: Stephen Darwall, Kyla Ebels-Duggan, Barbara Herman, Richard Moran, Japa Pallikkathayil, Faviola Rivera-Castro, T.M. Scanlon, Tamar Schapiro, Sharon Street, David Sussman, Sigrún Svavarsdóttir, and J. David Velleman.

Se propone una discusión de los aportes de tres teorias actuales influyentes en el pensamiento critico latinoamericano: la teoria del discurso de Ernesto Laclau, la epistemologia del presente potencial de Hugo Zemelman y la filosofia de la liberación de Enrique Dussel. El objetivo del articulo es analizar en estas propuestas el lugar teórico e histórico que tienen los sujetos politicos que disputan la constitución del orden social y los aportes de estas teorias para la comprensión de los movimientos sociales en América Latina.

The article is focused on the overlapping consensus model in the space of public morality and possibilities of its practical realization for the development of public consent. In his search for reliable arrangement of public unity John Rawls defines comprehensive moral doctrines and political doctrines as beliefs within private and public spheres, respectively. Overlapping consensus provides public consent in the public space (concerning political doctrines), beyond beliefs of private sphere (comprehensive moral doctrines). Moral values of overlapping consensus form the sphere of public morality, effective in definite historic democratic society. Rawls called it a well-ordered society. Definite historic character of a well-ordered society is predetermined by corresponding background culture. The latter can be implied as the experience of citizenship, conditioned by peculiarities of social insti- tutions of Modernity. It is immediate immanent axiological accompaniment of the public life, background one concerning explicit ethical normative programs and strategies of acting by individuals in public life, directed on optimization of public interaction. Moral values within overlapping consensus are minimalistic (because of their set able to unite all mem- bers of a society is the basic one for all of them, irrespectively to their comprehensive moral doctrines, i.e. poor in content, laconic one), contextual (module/ flexible, relevant to public spiritual requests, transforming during the search for integrity minimum) and uni- versal in their imperative power. Overlapping consensus makes impossible transformation of any comprehensive moral doctrine into the regulative idea of public life and set formal horizontal social interaction, which is corrected in real time mode. ; Увагу у статті зосереджено на розгляді моделі перехресного консенсусу у просторі суспільної моралі та можливостей її практичної реалізації задля розбудови суспільної згоди. У пошуках надійних механізмів суспільної єдності Джон Ролз розрізнює всеохопні моральні доктрини та політичні доктрини як переконання в межах приватної та публічної сфер відповідно. Пере- хресний консенсус забезпечує суспільну згоду в публічному просторі (щодо політичних докт- рин), залишаючи поза своєю орбітою переконання приватної сфери (всеохопні моральні докт- рини). Моральні цінності перехресного консенсусу утворюють сферу суспільної моралі, дієву в конкретно-історичному демократичному суспільстві, яке Ролз називає добре впорядкованим суспільством. Конкретно-історичний характер добре впорядкованого суспільства зумов- лений відповідною фоновою культурою, яку можна імплікувати як досвід громадянськості, визначений особливостями соціальних інституцій Модерну, що є безпосереднім іманентним духовно-ціннісним супроводом суспільного життя, фоновим щодо експліцитних ціннісно-нор- мативних програм та стратегій вчинення індивідів у суспільному житті, зорієнтованих на оптимізацію суспільної взаємодії. Моральні цінності в межах перехресного консенсусу є міні- малістськими (оскільки їх набір, спроможний об'єднати всіх членів суспільства, є базовим для них усіх, безвідносно до сповідуваних ними всеохопних доктрин, тобто змістовно бідним, ла- конічним), контекстуальними (модульними/рухливими, релевантними суспільним духовним запитам, змінюваними в ході пошуку об'єднавчого мінімуму) та універсальними в своїй зо- бов'язувальній чинності. Перехресний консенсус унеможливлює перетворення будь-якої все- охопної моральної доктрини на реґулятивну ідею суспільного життя і задає формальну гори- зонтальну суспільну взаємодію, кориґовану в режимі реального часу.

'Making Identity Count' presents a new constructivist method for the recovery of national identity, applies the method in nine country cases, and draws conclusions from the empirical evidence for hegemonic transitions and a variety of quantitative theories of identity

Explores the application of constructivist theory to international relations. The text examines the relevance of constructivism for empirical research, focusing on some of the key issues of contemporary international politics: ethnic and national identity; gender; and political economy.

Constructivism's basic premise - that individuals and groups are shaped by their world but can also change it - may seem intuitively true. This book lays out concepts and tools for those seeking to apply the constructivist approach in research. It is intended for those trying to sort out appropriate methods for empirical research.