Suchergebnisse

In Africa coup plots are by far the most common challenge to the continuity of regimes. In this paper we investigate proneness to coups by drawing on our previous work on proneness to civil war. The most striking aspect of our results is the similarity in the causes of coups and civil wars. Standard indicators of grievance such as political repression and economic inequality do not feature as significant influences. A common core of economic factors underpins proneness to coups and civil wars: low income and a lack of growth. Both are also subject to 'traps' – once a coup or civil war has occurred, further events are much more likely. We have attempted to investigate whether policies that favor the military reduce the risk of coups, but have found that if anything, their effect is perverse: high military spending may even increase the risk of a coup.

Previous studies have attested to leaders "coup-proofing" their regimes by reducing the ability or disposition of their armies to seek their removal. The following article tests the utility of these efforts. "Structural" coup-proofing such as counterbalancing is expected to reduce the ability to organize a coup plot by creating substantial coordination obstacles to soldiers. Coup-proofing by spoiling militaries with organizational resources is expected to reduce the willingness to intervene. However, increased organizational resources are expected to increase the army's capabilities, thereby increasing the likelihood of a coup's success. The theory is empirically tested using a selection model with a global sample from 1961 to 2000. Findings suggest that both coup-proofing strategies are effective deterrents of coup activity and, more generally, that characteristics of the military appear to be far more important than economic influences on coups.

Présentation de l'éditeur : "L'objectif de ce livre est de présenter le système constitutionnel turc en prenant appui sur les règles du texte fondamental de 1982 ainsi que sur la jurisprudence constitutionnelle et la pratique politique qui les accompagnent. Cette nouvelle édition prend en compte l'évolution significative du principe constitutionnel de laïcité, la tentative de coup d'Etat de juillet 2016, les derniers changements constitutionnels survenus en 2017 et la transformation corrélative et préoccupante du régime politique turc. L'ouvrage rend hommage au Professeur Ibrahim Ö. Kaboglu qui, victime de la purge massive du régime, n'exerce plus ses fonctions d'universitaire au sein de la Faculté de droit de l'Université de Marmara"

This paper specifies and estimates a model of the structural determinants of coups d'état for the new states of black Africa in the years from 1960 through 1975. Results indicate that (1) both social mobilization and the presence of a dominant ethnic group are destabilizing (these effects are additive); (2) multipartyism is destabilizing while electoral turnout in the last election before independence is stabilizing; (3) multipartyism is particularly destabilizing where a dominant ethnic group exists; (4) the presence of such a group reduces (but does not eliminate) the stabilizing effect of turnout; and (5) multipartyism has no pronounced effect on elite instability where turnout is high. Taken together, these patterns account for over four-fifths of the variance in coups d'état in black Africa in the period.

The Basotho nation and its proto state came into being in the first half of the 19th centmy. In 1868 the territory became the colonial possession of the British Crown. As a colonial possession, Britain entrenched its colonial policies in a newly acquired territoiy. Its loss of political sovereignty and indigenous independencewas implicit in the Annexation Proclamation which declared that "the said tribe of the Basotho shall be, and shall be taken to be to all intents and pmposes British subjects, and the territoiy of the said tribe shall be, and shall be taken to be British territory". Bringing the Basotho under British subjugation meant an end to and the amelioration of the communal practices and the beliefs of the Basotho. As British subjects, the Basotho had to conform to the voice of the new masters. This conformity was emphasised in the churches, schools and communal assemblies (Lipitsong) under the supervision of the British officials. Some chiefs collaboratedwith the new rulers to suppress possible insurrection among the Basotho.

The capitalist peace thesis argues transnational economic ties have a pacifying effect on interstate relations. An extension of this literature reports that economic ties can prompt belligerents in civil conflicts to peacefully resolve their disputes and can attract third-party intervention from states with strong economic ties. This pacifying effect of economic ties, we argue, is applicable in the context of coups d'état: as a state becomes more economically interdependent with the rest of the world, the opportunity costs of domestic political disturbances are raised for both the targeted state and its financial partners. These costs – potential economic losses and a damaged economic reputation – influence belligerents in the state to use constitutional means to resolve their disputes while providing stronger incentives to foreign economic partners to influence the calculus of these belligerents as they consider the coup attempt. We test this argument quantitatively by investigating the influence of a dozen indicators of economic openness on coups in a global sample of states from 1952 to 2007. Our findings demonstrate the applicability of the capitalist peace thesis to coups d'état, manifestations of political uncertainty that are less likely to be accompanied by substantial loss of life or destruction of infrastructure.

ObjectivesWe seek to investigate the impact of preferential trade agreements (PTAs) on coups d'état. We argue that signing PTAs lowers the risk of coups because it acts as a credible commitment of signatory countries to pursuing long‐term economic benefits, which further reduces potential challengers' incentives to initiate coups. In addition, the effect of PTAs is larger in democracies because democratic signatories are perceived to be more credible in upholding treaty commitments than their authoritarian counterparts.MethodsWe employ binary time‐series cross‐sectional (BTSCS) models to examine a sample of 154 countries between 1960 and 2012.ResultsWe find that signing PTAs reduces risks of coups, especially in countries with higher levels of democratic development.ConclusionsOur study sheds light on how PTAs can prolong leader survival through reducing the likelihood of coups and contributes to emerging studies on the consequences of signing PTAs in the age of economic globalization.

Described here is a new data set including all successful coups d'état (80), failed coup attempts (108) and reported coup plots (139) for all 48 independent sub-Saharan African (SSA) states for the 46-year period from January 1956 until December 2001. Elite political instability (PI) in this form remains widespread in SSA, in contrast to other regions of the global South. Military-led PI has been shown to adversely affect economic growth and human development in SSA, and is a major cause of the current African 'crisis'. The frequency of these instability events is given for each state for all 46 years and for the two periods 1956–79 and 1980–2001. A Total Military Intervention Score (TMIS) for each state is calculated and examined over time to explore trends in coup behaviour. The distribution of these events among major African regions is presented. Appendix A lists all coups and failed coups by state and date. Major findings are that military interventions have continued to be pervasive in Africa, despite democratisation trends since 1990; that coups, failed coups and coup plots form a syndrome of military-led PI; that colonial heritage is unrelated to coup activity; that the chance of success when launching a coup attempt has averaged more than 40% since 1958; that once a successful coup has occurred, military factionalism often leads to more coup behaviour; that except for a declining rate of success once a coup is undertaken, there is no major difference between 1956–79 and 1980–2001; that no trends of increasing or decreasing coup behaviour are evident, except that up to around 1975 as decolonisation progressed, TMIS also increased; and that West Africa is the predominant centre of coup activity in SSA, although all African regions have experienced coups. States that have been free of significant PI since 1990 are examined and those with institutionalised democratic traditions appear less prone to coups.