Introduction : 50 ans après les coups d'État en Uruguay et au Chili, quels défis pour les politiques éducatives et la démocratisation des institutions ?
In: IdeAs: Idées d'Amériques, Heft 23
ISSN: 1950-5701
In: IdeAs: Idées d'Amériques, Heft 23
ISSN: 1950-5701
In: Politique africaine, Band 171-172, Heft 3, S. 241-260
Le Niger connaît un équilibre précaire depuis que le général Abdourahamane Tiani a renversé le président Bazoum, le 26 juillet 2023. Sur la base de témoignages directs et d'entretiens menés à Niamey, Paris et Dakar, ainsi que par téléphone, cet article examine les événements des derniers mois en analysant les éléments ayant contribué à la consolidation du pouvoir par l'armée, tant du point de vue des facteurs internes qu'externes. Au départ, le régime militaire a réussi à rallier une partie de la population en se positionnant comme un vecteur du changement. Alors que les coups d'État au Niger ont toujours débouché sur des régimes de transition ayant permis le retour à la démocratie depuis plus de deux décennies, le dernier intervient dans un contexte régional sahélien où les militaires au pouvoir semblent faire peu de cas des délais impartis.
In: Journal of Asian and African studies: JAAS
ISSN: 1745-2538
The immediate post-colonial Africa was hitherto noted for incessant military incursions into politics, but the waves of democratisation that swept through Africa from the late 1970s to the 1990s led to the acceptance of liberal democracy as the most desirable political system. Over the past decade, stakeholders in Africa's democratisation have had to ask whether democracy is being consolidated on the continent. Despite the promise of democracy, most African countries have failed to attain political development beyond what has become the 'ritualistic' conduct of elections and political transitions. The inability to institutionalise democracy has become more evident with several military coup d'états in the past 2 years on the continent. Through unstructured interviews, the article historicises military coups, examines their root and immediate causes and explores whether military coups constitute a democratic reversal in Africa. Indeed, consolidating democracy and restoring civilian governments to power have become cumbersome due to the complicit roles of external actors and foreign powers.
In: African affairs: the journal of the Royal African Society, Band 122, Heft 489, S. 587-601
ISSN: 1468-2621
Abstract
This briefing explores the factors that led to the consolidated position of the Nigerien Security and Defence forces in support of the coup d'état launched the night of 26th July 2023. The initial blockade of the former President's palace by the head of the Presidential Guard and 350 of its members looked like a mutiny. However, instead of moving swiftly to end the blockade, commanders from across the security forces appeared on national television that night to announce a coup. We show how dominant theories that have been used to explain the coup's (unlikely) success, including those relying on patrimonialism and coups as intra-military coordination games, do not adequately explain the support for the coup across rank and file, and the direction the coup took once announced. We argue that this coup cannot be fully explained without considering how the coup leaders advanced powerful ideological messages to garner support. By making the coup about 'correcting' the government's counter-insurgency strategy and regaining Niger's sovereignty through the removal of French counter-terrorism troops from the country, members of the military believed that everyone else would support the coup, thus making it less likely that they would resist the coup leaders.
In: Africa today, Band 70, Heft 1, S. 74-100
ISSN: 1527-1978
Abstract: Mali, once argued to be a democratic model for Africa, is in a state of perennial crisis, the result of poor governance, unmet democratic expectations, and competition for domestic political legitimacy among the political class, the military, and religious leaders. After the 1991 revolution, international donors poured money into Mali to promote democratization. Meanwhile, most Malian citizens were becoming increasingly disconnected from a growing political class dependent on these funds. This article shows how popular protests led to both the reversal of family-law reform and the instigation of military coups d'état. The lack of accountability of the political class and the influx of donor money have contributed to increased popular perceptions of state corruption and impunity. Peace and security are impossible amid governance failures and serial coups d'état. This article explains the political consequences of the breakdown of popular trust and political legitimacy of the ruling elite and argues that restoring trust and legitimacy is a critical element to rebuilding Mali.
In: Statistics, Politics, and Policy, Band 14, Heft 3, S. 331-355
ISSN: 2151-7509
Abstract
This essay responds to recent critiques of the U.S. State Department's inconsistent application of congressionally mandated foreign-aid restrictions following several successful coups d'état in countries receiving USAID foreign assistance. This demographic analysis, which conforms to an age-structural modeling and forecasting protocol that was originally developed for U.S. strategic intelligence efforts, finds: (1.) a disproportionately high level of coup vulnerability (the probability of experiencing a successful coup) among youthful countries (median age equal to or less than 25.5 years), particularly among states in the early-youthful segment of this phase (median age equal to or less than 20.5 years); and (2.) a dramatic one-time decline in coup vulnerability among all phases of the age-structural transition following the end of the Cold War. This essay's two-decade forecast of an expected gradual decline in coups is consistent with the slow and halting pace of age-structural change that is currently projected by the 2022 revision of the UN Population Division's medium scenario for countries along the equatorial midriff of Africa, and in parts of the Middle East and southcentral Asia. These findings support an alternative criticism – not of the U.S. State Department's reluctance to restrict foreign assistance to coup perpetrators, but of currently mandated restrictions that neglect to exempt USAID programs known to advance the age-structural transition (i.e. those that extend girls' educational attainment, improve access to family planning and other reproductive health services, or expand women's autonomy and rights).
In: International social science journal, Band 73, Heft 250, S. 1019-1034
ISSN: 1468-2451
World Affairs Online
This book examines the responsibility of judges of domestic courts following unconstitutional usurpation of power of government (coups d'tat). It explores judges' liability for failing to discharge their judicial duty independently and impartially, and the criminality of usurpers and their accomplices and collaborators for their violation of fundamental rights and freedoms or commission of crimes of international concern. Written by a highly regarded non-Western author, the book is coherent and meticulously researched, covering an approach to coups in an insightful and fascinating fashion. It includes a sophisticated and thorough analysis of the relevant comparative jurisprudence of domestic and international courts, with concrete examples of the best practices among decisions of domestic courts in countries that have experienced coups d'tat. With an increasing global interest in the phenomenon of coups, democratic backsliding and the place and role of the judiciary as the only hope to rein in acts of unconstitutional usurpation of power, the book will be essential reading for members of the legal profession, those cherishing democracy as well as students and researchers in constitutional law, law and political science, public international law, international human rights law, international criminal law, regime changes, transitional justice and international organizations.
Cover -- Half Title -- Title -- Copyright -- Table of Contents -- Preface -- List of Abbreviations -- 1 Introduction -- Overview -- Scope of this book -- Modus operandi of unconstitutional usurpation of power -- Judges' roles in unconstitutional usurpation of power -- Practical challenges -- Methodological and related normative questions -- 2 Legal bases to assess the lawfulness of unconstitutional usurpation of power -- Legal bases used to validate coups -- Legal bases used to invalidate coups -- Concluding remarks -- 3 Permissible parameters for judges in post-coup suppression of fundamental rights and freedoms -- International conventions and rules of customary international law on the protection of fundamental rights and freedoms -- States of emergency and derogation of fundamental rights and freedoms -- Military tribunals -- Law enforcement measures -- Refusal to render judgments on 'political questions' -- Concluding remarks -- 4 Availability or non-availability of defences for judges in relation to judicial responsibility post-coups -- Individual criminal responsibility arising from judges' roles in an oppressive regime -- Independence of judiciary and allegiance to the new 'constitutional' order -- Superior orders -- Duress -- Judicial immunity -- Concluding remarks -- 5 Amnesties, pardons, immunities and other restrictions on the prosecution of usurpers of power and their accomplices or collaborators -- Amnesties, pardons and immunities -- Statutes of limitations -- Transitional justice -- A right balance -- Concluding remarks -- 6 International or extra-territorial criminal prosecution of coups-related crimes of international concern -- Prosecution before the International Criminal Court, ad hoc international tribunals and hybrid courts -- Prosecution in foreign courts exercising universal jurisdiction -- 7 Epilogue -- Index.
In: Armed forces & society, S. 0095327X2311694
ISSN: 1556-0848
Coup "handbooks" emphasize the capture the incumbent leader as a key objective for plotters to enact successful regime change. However, the literature has yet to empirically assess this relationship. We also lack a robust understanding of how leaders prevent their own capture during coups d'état. Using novel data on leader statuses during coups from 1950 to 2017, I find evidence that incumbent leader capture has a positive and significant relationship with the likelihood of coup success. The findings also suggest that leader capture will be less likely if the regime pre-emptively creates a counterweight presidential guard unit, responsible for providing proximate security for the core leadership. These data and findings provide new insights into the dynamics of in-progress coups, focusing on the operational strategies employed by both sides. It also demonstrates the diversity of independent effects that specific types of counterweight forces have on specific coup outcomes, encouraging further study in this area.
In: Policy Press scholarship online
Using a mixed methods approach, this book examines the role played by regional organisations (ROs) following the occurrence of a coup d'état. It analyses which factors influence the strength of reactions demonstrated by ROs and explores which different post-coup solutions ROs pursue.
"Polarized American Democracy identifies four major ideological drivers of possible civil war, ten arenas of ongoing nonviolent civil war that have become increasingly foci for micro-level violence, and a dozen alternative scenarios in which civil war could break out very soon. This book suggests remedies for such nonviolent civil wars, by reviewing governmental and military resources and counteracting the ideological contest through political innovations. The analysis here flows from the sociological Mass Society Paradigm, which argues that democracy's survival depends upon civil society relaying the needs of the people to government and providing effective pressure for corrective action"--
Blog: Global Voices
A wave of coups d'état and the subsequent withdrawal of international military allies has facilitated the rise of Jihadist groups in the Sahel region.
In: Obrana a strategie: Defence & strategy, Band 23, Heft 2, S. 039-061
ISSN: 1802-7199
It is generally accepted that attempts at coup d'état have decreased since the end of the Cold War. But this does not mean that coup attempts will not occur in the future. With the recent two military coups in Thailand and Myanmar, all the continental states in Southeast Asia have entered authoritarian rules. This article explores when coups possibly occurred in the cases of Thailand in 2014 and Myanmar in 2021 that experienced overthrowing the civilian governments and the rise of the military in power. The Early Warning Signals (EWS) recently endorsed to investigation of the likelihood of military coups and qualitative analysis of collected data on factors affecting such incidents were combined to better explain the situations. From this approach, this article found that Group Grievance and Security Apparatus indicators in the Fragile States Index are important factors leading to the occurrence of military coups in the two countries. Also, from the qualitative analysis, a political culture relying on on iconic political leaders in the two countries has been a negative influence that deludes democratization and challenges civilian rule.