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The author's comprehensive research project, of which this article is but an introductory outline, inquires into the kind of history written out by the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY). In order to investigate the interrelation between criminal law & history, the author faced the following question: what would the history of the disintegration of Yugoslavia & of conflicts in its territory look like if all we had were the judgments of the Hague Tribunal? The author bases his reply on an analysis of first-instance judgments of the Trial Chamber, from which he singles out "historical facts," & rejects the reflections of the Chamber on legal & procedural issues. As a model case he uses the first ICTY judgment pronounced against Dusko Tadic (the trial started on May 7, 1996, & the judgment was pronounced a year later). Although he estimates that the first judgment was not written in an optimal way, the author deems that most preliminarily established historical facts were relevant to historiography, & that, in particular, the judgment offers a universally acceptable notion of the history of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia & of socialist Yugoslavia. He is of the opinion that the extensive documentation of ICTY (the "Hague Tribunal") will have a major influence on the work of future generations of historians. Such a unique & replete archive of historical material is increasingly available to the public & to scientists through ICTY's online database. The most recent scientific works dealing with the former Yugoslavia also make use of the Tribunal's judgments & documentation. Scientists will have to pay due attention to the narratives included therein. Adapted from the source document.

U ovom se članku govori o političkome kontekstu i pravnome okviru za uspostavu suvereniteta Republike Hrvatske te se ukazuje na legalnost vojno-redarstvenih akcija s obzirom na odredbe tuzemnoga i međunarodnoga prava. Riječ je i o političkome i pravnome okviru u kojemu su nastale srpske autonomne oblasti, odnosno paradržavna tvorevina Republika Srpska Krajina na državnome teritoriju Republike Hrvatske. ; This paper speaks about political context and legal framework for establishing sovereignty of the Republic of Croatia. It points out legality of military-police actions with regard to provisions of domestic and international law. The subject is also political and legal framework in which Serbian autonomous territories were established or parastate creation Republic of Serbian Krajina in the state territory of the Republic of Croatia.

The main proposition of this paper is that the Croatian legal framework for higher education fails to meet the criteria of the internal market of the EU. In the first part, the author draws a distinction between education as public good and education as service, and explains how EU law affects the regulatory autonomy of the Member States in the area of higher education. In the second part, the author analyses hitherto identified barriers to the exercise of market freedoms created by national legal frameworks of higher education. The third part discusses the Croatian legal framework and tests it against EU standards. The author concludes that deficiencies of Croatian higher education law are partly caused by the ignorance of policy makers and partly by the structural weakness of the negotiating process, where chapters are negotiated independently from one another and focused on formal fulfilment of benchmarks. Adapted from the source document.

In this text, the authors' starting point is that the modern conception of representation, decisively connected with the state as modern type of political order, not only represents a radical cut with regard to pre-modern forms of representation, but is also the result of evolution through which many key elements of the antique and medieval perception of representation were built into the modern perception. This is confirmed by two eminently modern theories of representation: the theory of Hobbes and the theory of Hegel. In both cases, the theories prove to be largely based on the antique and medieval legal-political heritage. With Hobbes, the basis consists primarily of the idea of legal representation, and with Hegel, of the idea of identity representation. Both ideas are gradually developed in civil law and canon law. This part of the text focuses on the part of history of representation which culminated in the perception of representation according to the model of legal representation. For this purpose, the authors first discuss the definition of representation in the Roman period and in early Christianity, and then they investigate how the antique heritage was reinterpreted in medieval civil law and canon law. Adapted from the source document.

The authors of this text consider the third form of representation developed in the medieval doctrine of corporation, the so-called identity or pars pro toto representation. It concerns a relationship in which a part of the corporation -- council, assembly, or some members -- is considered identical to the whole body of the corporation in terms of its activity. The main purpose of identity representation is to mediate the idea of legal unity of corporation with the multitude of its members or parts of which it consists: by the act of representation different parts of the corporation form its legal unity at the moment of reaching decisions. Unlike in agency representation, the position of the representative is thus not the consequence of authorisation or of the transfer of power of action by those represented: the representative and the represented are not two separate legal entities; rather, it is considered that with the action of its "elevated" part, the corporation acts by itself. The text presents three fundamental subtypes of identity representation: Marsilius of Padua's valentior pars, rendering majority decisions on issues concerning the corporation as a whole, and a permanent representative body. Special attention is given to the Conciliar Movement in which identity representation played an important part, and to the first association of representation through identity with the idea of authorisation in the thought of Nicholas of Cues. The text looks into estate assemblies of German Lander (provinces) in the period prior to the French Revolution as an example of historic institutionalisation of identity representation. Adapted from the source document.

How is law as both a set of standards of conduct and a way of reasoning related to politics, economy and culture? The approach to the problem taken in the paper is practical and instrumental rather than theoretical for its own sake. The aim is to appraise the subject-matter with a view of facilitating its change towards the basic values of the inquiry. Since the values are postulated by a stipulative definition of law, which implies relations of law to politics, economy and even culture, it may appear that the approach unduly trivializes rather than solves the problem. The approach may nonetheless be valid, if the stipulated definition of law is sufficiently integral, that is, inclusive. To that end the paper attempts to integrate into the stipulated definition of law three major philosophical traditions, which are still building blocks of -- and hence the keys to -- contemporary doctrines and cultures. In the classical (ontological) key (which is analysed in the first part of the paper) law is conceived of as a constituting and correcting aspect of the whole consisting of politics, economy, law and religion qua centerpiece of culture. In the modem (epistemological) key (analysed in the second part of the paper) ideas of law range from the conceptions that law is the constituent of modem social systems and hence an indispensable means of identifying modem social phenomena to the theories that law, as well as politics, economy and culture, is a phenomenon reducible to its natural causes. In the contemporary (linguistic) key (also in the second part) law, which is the constituent even of religion, can be understood only from within of the culture -- including politics and economy -- into which it is woven. The three traditions differ most markedly in their views of the contact between reason and action. In contrast to the classical tradition, which recognizes that reason can be action-guiding, reason and action are in the epistemological key separated by a logical gap, whereas in the linguistic key they are hardly distinguishable. The triple solution of the problem of inquiry increases both heuristic and practical potentials of the stipulated definition of law. By integrating diverse philosophical traditions, the definition is serviceable to the integrity of a pluralistic legal order, that is, to achieving the postulated basic values within the limits of the law. However, the approach taken in the paper, while more inclusive than more partisan approaches, is still merely an approach which is in the final analysis also partisan. Moreover, when seen from a culture that has not been integrated by the definition, the approach may be parochial or even inimical. Adapted from the source document.

How is law as both a set of standards of conduct and a way of reasoning related to politics, economy and culture? The approach to the problem taken in the paper is practical and instrumental rather than theoretical for its own sake. The aim is to appraise the subject-matter with a view of facilitating its change towards the basic values of the inquiry. Since the values are postulated by a stipulative definition of law, which implies relations of law to politics, economy and even culture, it may appear that the approach unduly trivializes rather than solves the problem. The approach may nonetheless be valid, if the stipulated definition of law is sufficiently integral, that is, inclusive. To that end the paper attempts to integrate into the stipulated definition of law three major philosophical traditions, which are still building blocs of -- and hence the keys to -- contemporary doctrines and cultures. In the classical (ontological) key (which is analysed in the first part of the paper) law is conceived of as a constituting and correcting aspect of the whole consisting of politics, economy, law and religion qua centerpiece of culture. In the modern (epistemological) key (analysed in the second part of the paper) ideas of law range from the conceptions that law is the constituent of modern social systems and hence an indispensable means of identifying modern social phenomena to the theories that law, as well as politics, economy and culture, is a phenomenon reducible to its natural causes. In the contemporary (linguistic) key (also in the second part), law, which is the constituent even of religion, can be understood only from within of the culture -- including politics and economy -- into which it is woven. The three traditions differ most markedly in their views of the contact between reason and action. In contrast to the classical tradition, which recognizes that reason can be action guiding, reason and action are in the epistemological key separated by a logical gap, whereas in the linguistic key they are hardly distinguishable. The triple solution of the problem of inquiry increases both heuristic and practical potentials of the stipulated definition of law. By integrating diverse philosophical traditions, the definition is serviceable to the integrity of a pluralistic legal order, that is, to achieving the postulated basic values within limits of the law. However, the approach taken in the paper, while more inclusive than more partisan approaches, is still merely an approach, which is in the final analysis also partisan. Moreover, when seen from a culture that has not been integrated by the definition, the approach may be parochial or even inimical. Adapted from the source document.

The starting point in this article is Hegel's mature understanding of civil society as the birthplace of the modern meaning of the concept. Since this understanding is primarily the consequence of Hegel's coming to terms with political economy, the author problematizes Hegel's first attempt at incorporating modern economic topics into ethical totality in the 1802 Article on Natural Law. It is shown how the fundamental paradox of the first variety of Hegel's science of the state is his effort to renew the classical natural law framework in circumstances of modern economic & political life. It is for this reason that Hegel fails to see the full extent of the emancipatory potential & the specifically modern character of the system of economic & private-legal interdependence of individuals, thus, on the one hand, interpreting these as the consequence of the disintegration of antique ethical life while, on the other hand, in the construction of ethical totality, placing its members in the estate of the unfree. It is precisely due to this historical point of origin of these systems & the ways they incorporate into ethical totality that the article on natural law, concludes the author, cannot be seen as the place where Hegel finally formulated his theory of civil society. Adapted from the source document.

The successive stages of development of constitutional democracy in the USA, in particular the experience of "judicial supervision paradox," show us that the U.S. Supreme Court performed at least two different functions: (1) norm enforcement, & (2) policy-making through re-examination & interpretation of the Constitution & the laws in cases brought before the Court. Dissent among American legal experts related to this & other matters prove that debates on judicial activism are not a thing of the past. Still, both advocates & critics of judicial activism share the view that judges have been an important part of the American constitutional process since its inception. The Marbury v. Madison case (1803) affirmed the institution of judicial supervision & denoted a gradual shift of judicial power into the field of public law. Thus further expansion & transformation of judicial power was made possible. In this article, the author establishes a connection between judicial activism & judicial supervision, & adheres to the standpoint that the "judicializing aspect of modern liberalism" deserves as much attention as any other aspect of democratization. Adapted from the source document.

Language plays the central role in the process of creation of a national identity. In the establishment of the supranational European identity, however, multilingualism is a democratic necessity guaranteeing equality to all European Union citizens. The decisions made by the European institutions influence everyday life of the citizens of the Union and for their legitimacy it is of the utmost importance that the citizens take an active part in the decision making process free of language barriers. In accordance with the EU language policy which guarantees an equal status to all the official languages of its member states -- once Croatia becomes a member of the Union the Croatian language will enjoy the position of an official language of the EU. In order to ensure Croatian citizens equality before the law and free access to the EU legislation, Croatia has the responsibility of translating the so called acquis communautaire, i.e. the total body of EU law, into Croatian and transpose it into its national legislation. The translation of the acquis must guarantee that the EU law is unequivocally interpreted and implemented and this can only be possible if the EU legal terminology is consistently and unambiguously used. Upon the Croatian accession to the EU, the Croatian translation of the acquis will be published in the special edition of the Official Journal of the EU and will become legally binding and used as the fundamental text for the interpretation and application of EU law in Croatia. Adapted from the source document.

Language plays the central role in the process of creation of a national identity. In the establishment of the supranational European identity, however, multilingualism is a democratic necessity guaranteeing equality to all European Union citizens. The decisions made by the European institutions influence everyday life of the citizens of the Union and for their legitimacy it is of the utmost importance that the citizens take an active part in the decision making process free of language barriers. In accordance with the EU language policy which guarantees an equal status to all the official languages of its member states -- once Croatia becomes a member of the Union the Croatian language will enjoy the position of an official language of the EU. In order to ensure Croatian citizens equality before the law and free access to the EU legislation, Croatia has the responsibility of translating the so called acquis communautaire, i.e. the total body of EU law, into Croatian and transpose it into its national legislation. The translation of the acquis must guarantee that the EU law is unequivocally interpreted and implemented and this can only be possible if the EU legal terminology is consistently and unambiguously used. Upon the Croatian accession to the EU, the Croatian translation of the acquis will be published in the special edition of the Official Journal of the EU and will become legally binding and used as the fundamental text for the interpretation and application of EU law in Croatia. Adapted from the source document.

Language plays the central role in the process of creation of a national identity. In the establishment of the supranational European identity, however, multilingualism is a democratic necessity guaranteeing equality to all European Union citizens. The decisions made by the European institutions influence everyday life of the citizens of the Union and for their legitimacy it is of the utmost importance that the citizens take an active part in the decision making process free of language barriers. In accordance with the EU language policy which guarantees an equal status to all the official languages of its member states -- once Croatia becomes a member of the Union the Croatian language will enjoy the position of an official language of the EU. In order to ensure Croatian citizens equality before the law and free access to the EU legislation, Croatia has the responsibility of translating the so called acquis communautaire, i.e. the total body of EU law, into Croatian and transpose it into its national legislation. The translation of the acquis must guarantee that the EU law is unequivocally interpreted and implemented and this can only be possible if the EU legal terminology is consistently and unambiguously used. Upon the Croatian accession to the EU, the Croatian translation of the acquis will be published in the special edition of the Official Journal of the EU and will become legally binding and used as the fundamental text for the interpretation and application of EU law in Croatia. Adapted from the source document.

Leaving aside Hobbes's ideological preferences in the conflict regarding the structure of the English political body in the 17th century, the text deals with the way in which democracy is valued in his key theoretical-political works. The author does this on two levels: first, he examines the status of democracy within the framework of Hobbes's doctrine of state forms. In spite of some of its shortcomings, in none of the three variants of his science of politics does Hobbes deem that there is a rational justification for discarding democracy as one of three equally ranked forms of state. Second, the author inquires into the more general thesis of the democratic character of Hobbes's understanding of the state regardless of its form. Various elements of Hobbes's science of politics are thereby taken into account: legal equality of parties to the social contract, their status as authors of sovereign power, their freedom as subjects and the duties of the sovereign. The analysis thereof points to the necessity of a differentiated answer to the question regarding the democratic character of Hobbes's theory of state. Adapted from the source document.

Responding to criticisms & discussions about the non-existence of European Union's human rights policy, the article claims that this policy exists although it has been developing inconsistently both at the level of the Union's internal affairs & at the level of its relations with third countries. The second key hypothesis of the article refers to the institutional implementation mechanisms of the Union's human rights policy which, according to the author, require new positioning & better coordination. The article firstly analyses the development of the human rights policy in the Union's internal affairs from the Stauder Case in 1969 to recent discussions on the legal force of the Union's Charter of Fundamental Rights & the accession of the Union to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights & Fundamental Freedoms. The second part of the article gives an overview of human rights policy development in the Union's external relations from the Fourth Lome Convention to the European Neighbourhood Policy. The paper ends with an analysis of the features common to the Union's human rights policy implementation mechanisms focusing on the role of the Commission, the Parliament & the Council of the Union. The article points to the lack of institutional harmonization using the European Instrument for Democracy & Human Rights as an example & sees in the establishment of the EU Agency for Fundamental Rights the need to introduce changes in the implementation of the human rights policy. In a conclusion, the author identifies the complexity & fragmentation of the Union as a system on the one hand and, on the other hand, the omnipresence of human rights protection & promotion in the Union's public policies as the key factors encumbering the control over the human rights policy implementation & the cause of its perceived deficit. Adapted from the source document.