Suchergebnisse

U svibnju 2013. godine ponovno je izmijenjen i dopunjen Pomorski zakonik Republike Hrvatske. Promjene su, među ostalima, i u dijelu o prijevozu putnika i njihove prtljage. Ovim izmjenama i dopunama vodilo se računa o usklađivanju s normama Europske unije. Posebno izdvajam zakonski tekst o obvezi primjene Uredbe 392/2009 Europskog parlamenta i Vijeća o odgovornosti prijevoznika u prijevozu putnika morem u slučaju nesreća. Time se Republika Hrvatska (a prije toga i ratifikacijom u veljači 2013.) obvezala primjenjivati Protokol, odnosno Atensku konvenciju iz 2002. o prijevozu putnika i njihove prtljage morem, uz intervenciju Međunarodne pomorske organizacije (IMO) u tekst Konvencije zbog visine odgovornosti, kako to vrijedi za cijelo područje EU-a. Prihvaćanjem spomenute Uredbe pruža se veća zaštita putniku jer se u međunarodnoj plovidbi i u nacionalnoj plovidbi brodovima klase A i B uvodi objektivna odgovornost za njegovu smrt ili tjelesnu ozljedu u slučaju pomorske nesreće. Na prijevoz putnika i prtljage u nacionalnoj plovidbi brodovima koji ne spadaju u klasu A i B primjenjuju se postojeće odredbe Pomorskog zakonika koje su se prije njegove izmjene zasnivale na Atenskoj konvenciji iz 1974. ( s protokolima), a to znači i daljnja primjena pretpostavljene krivnje. ; Maritime Law of the Republic of Croatia was changed and amended in May, 2013. Changes are, among other things, related to carriage of passengers and their luggage. These changes and amendments served for harmonization with European Union norms. I specially point out the legal text about the obligation of applying Regulation No 392/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council on the liability of carriers of passengers by sea in the event of accidents. With that the Republic of Croatia (and before that with ratification in February 2013) committed itself to applying Protocol or Athens Convention from 2002 relating to the carriage of passengers and their luggage by sea, with intervening of the International Maritime Organization (IMO) in the text of the Convention due to the level of responsibility, as it is valid for the entire EU area. Adopting the mentioned Convention offers better protection to passengers because during the international and national carriage by A and B class ships objective responsibility for his death or bodily harm in the event of accident is introduced. The existing regulations of the Maritime Law, which were based on the Athens Convention from 1974 (with protocols) before its change, are used for the national carriage of passengers and luggage by ships which are not class A or B and that means further applying of presumed guilt.

How is law as both a set of standards of conduct and a way of reasoning related to politics, economy and culture? The approach to the problem taken in the paper is practical and instrumental rather than theoretical for its own sake. The aim is to appraise the subject-matter with a view of facilitating its change towards the basic values of the inquiry. Since the values are postulated by a stipulative definition of law, which implies relations of law to politics, economy and even culture, it may appear that the approach unduly trivializes rather than solves the problem. The approach may nonetheless be valid, if the stipulated definition of law is sufficiently integral, that is, inclusive. To that end the paper attempts to integrate into the stipulated definition of law three major philosophical traditions, which are still building blocks of -- and hence the keys to -- contemporary doctrines and cultures. In the classical (ontological) key (which is analysed in the first part of the paper) law is conceived of as a constituting and correcting aspect of the whole consisting of politics, economy, law and religion qua centerpiece of culture. In the modem (epistemological) key (analysed in the second part of the paper) ideas of law range from the conceptions that law is the constituent of modem social systems and hence an indispensable means of identifying modem social phenomena to the theories that law, as well as politics, economy and culture, is a phenomenon reducible to its natural causes. In the contemporary (linguistic) key (also in the second part) law, which is the constituent even of religion, can be understood only from within of the culture -- including politics and economy -- into which it is woven. The three traditions differ most markedly in their views of the contact between reason and action. In contrast to the classical tradition, which recognizes that reason can be action-guiding, reason and action are in the epistemological key separated by a logical gap, whereas in the linguistic key they are hardly distinguishable. The triple solution of the problem of inquiry increases both heuristic and practical potentials of the stipulated definition of law. By integrating diverse philosophical traditions, the definition is serviceable to the integrity of a pluralistic legal order, that is, to achieving the postulated basic values within the limits of the law. However, the approach taken in the paper, while more inclusive than more partisan approaches, is still merely an approach which is in the final analysis also partisan. Moreover, when seen from a culture that has not been integrated by the definition, the approach may be parochial or even inimical. Adapted from the source document.

How is law as both a set of standards of conduct and a way of reasoning related to politics, economy and culture? The approach to the problem taken in the paper is practical and instrumental rather than theoretical for its own sake. The aim is to appraise the subject-matter with a view of facilitating its change towards the basic values of the inquiry. Since the values are postulated by a stipulative definition of law, which implies relations of law to politics, economy and even culture, it may appear that the approach unduly trivializes rather than solves the problem. The approach may nonetheless be valid, if the stipulated definition of law is sufficiently integral, that is, inclusive. To that end the paper attempts to integrate into the stipulated definition of law three major philosophical traditions, which are still building blocs of -- and hence the keys to -- contemporary doctrines and cultures. In the classical (ontological) key (which is analysed in the first part of the paper) law is conceived of as a constituting and correcting aspect of the whole consisting of politics, economy, law and religion qua centerpiece of culture. In the modern (epistemological) key (analysed in the second part of the paper) ideas of law range from the conceptions that law is the constituent of modern social systems and hence an indispensable means of identifying modern social phenomena to the theories that law, as well as politics, economy and culture, is a phenomenon reducible to its natural causes. In the contemporary (linguistic) key (also in the second part), law, which is the constituent even of religion, can be understood only from within of the culture -- including politics and economy -- into which it is woven. The three traditions differ most markedly in their views of the contact between reason and action. In contrast to the classical tradition, which recognizes that reason can be action guiding, reason and action are in the epistemological key separated by a logical gap, whereas in the linguistic key they are hardly distinguishable. The triple solution of the problem of inquiry increases both heuristic and practical potentials of the stipulated definition of law. By integrating diverse philosophical traditions, the definition is serviceable to the integrity of a pluralistic legal order, that is, to achieving the postulated basic values within limits of the law. However, the approach taken in the paper, while more inclusive than more partisan approaches, is still merely an approach, which is in the final analysis also partisan. Moreover, when seen from a culture that has not been integrated by the definition, the approach may be parochial or even inimical. Adapted from the source document.

The article deals with international legal regulation of protection & sustainable use of watercourses with special reference to the Sava River Basin. This regulation is considerably developed on universal, regional & sub regional international levels by a substantial number of declaratory, treaty & other acts dealing with the subject. In case of the river Sava the basic frame for regulation is on the European level: the documents concerning the Danube River as a whole, & particularly the Framework Agreement on the Sava River Basin. The author stresses that adoption & ratification of this document is probably one of the biggest step forward in co-operation between Slovenia, Croatia, B&H, & Serbia & Montenegro. References. Adapted from the source document.

Iako su SAD jedna od država koja ne predviđa oblike neposredne demokracije na razini federacije, ustavi članica američke federacije prihvaćaju instituciju ustavne i zakonodavne inicijative – jedan od ključnih elemenata za njihovo razlikovanje od Ustava SAD-a. Građani 24 savezne države SAD-a neposredno su od 1904. do kraja 2005. odlučivali o 2.155 ustavnih i zakonskih prijedloga, u 21. stoljeću Amerikanci očekuju širenje novog ustavnog populizma – uporabe institucija neposredne demokracije. Autorice tumače ustavna rješenja i stvarne učinke primjene navedenih institucijana oblikovanje državne politike u tim državama. ; Although the USA is one of the states that does not have provisions for the forms of direct democracy at federal level, the constitutions of American federal states have accepted the institute of constitutional and legal initiative, which is one of the key elements that differs them from the Constitution of the United States of America. The citizens of 24 American federal states directly decided about 2,155 constitutional and law drafts between 1904 and 2005. The American people expect the institutions of direct democracy to be used more extensively in the 21st century. The authors explain constitutional solutions and the effects of implementation of these institutes on the shaping of state policies in the respective federal states. The institute is used for bypassing the state legislatures in order to limit their freedom of action by constitutionalising the political choices. Tax- -reduction initiatives limit the revenues legislatures can levy and spend, and thus control the damage. This institute is becoming a means of launching changes in different public areas, such as taxes and expenditures, campaign financing, public education. However, the state legislatures can limit effects of the successful initiatives by withholding financial aid necessary for their implementation. State policy does not finish at the moment the initiatives are adopted by citizens. Sanctions depend on citizens' ability to establish the facts about the compliance with the decisions made by direct citizens' participation, and on clarity of the texts adopted by initiatives.

Kant's philosophy in its entirety outgrew its Humeist heritage of rational empiricism, ie, relativism. This relativism is particularly unwelcome in the realm of morality -- hence his philosophy of a priori concepts. Since law, as the minimum of morality, would be invalidated by the political (value) relativism, Kant has no politics apart from law -- specifically civil, Roman law -- which he declares natural (& absolutely rational). Roman private legal principles are the axiomatic foundations on which a structure of deductional theorems of political reasoning is erected. Ubi ius ibi remedium is the central principle, which serves to deny & circumvent rights -- including the right to revolt -- that would make up a set of political supra "rights." In the age of enlightened absolutism -- a schematic derivative of the philosophy of rationalism -- government ceased to be diffuse. Its bearers became too unequivocal, & the whole system turned into a highly visible & assailable target. For Kant (as well as for Hobbes), anarchy is the worst form of tyranny. While Montesquieu & Rousseau sought refuge from tyranny in the diffusion of power, & Raynal & Mably claimed that the right to resist oppression is not only the ultimate remedium but a civil duty, Kant (long before the French revolution & Burke) considers as nonpermissible not only the right to resist oppression but also that against revolutions instigated by legitimate sovereigns. Adapted from the source document.

The starting point in this article is Hegel's mature understanding of civil society as the birthplace of the modern meaning of the concept. Since this understanding is primarily the consequence of Hegel's coming to terms with political economy, the author problematizes Hegel's first attempt at incorporating modern economic topics into ethical totality in the 1802 Article on Natural Law. It is shown how the fundamental paradox of the first variety of Hegel's science of the state is his effort to renew the classical natural law framework in circumstances of modern economic & political life. It is for this reason that Hegel fails to see the full extent of the emancipatory potential & the specifically modern character of the system of economic & private-legal interdependence of individuals, thus, on the one hand, interpreting these as the consequence of the disintegration of antique ethical life while, on the other hand, in the construction of ethical totality, placing its members in the estate of the unfree. It is precisely due to this historical point of origin of these systems & the ways they incorporate into ethical totality that the article on natural law, concludes the author, cannot be seen as the place where Hegel finally formulated his theory of civil society. Adapted from the source document.

The successive stages of development of constitutional democracy in the USA, in particular the experience of "judicial supervision paradox," show us that the U.S. Supreme Court performed at least two different functions: (1) norm enforcement, & (2) policy-making through re-examination & interpretation of the Constitution & the laws in cases brought before the Court. Dissent among American legal experts related to this & other matters prove that debates on judicial activism are not a thing of the past. Still, both advocates & critics of judicial activism share the view that judges have been an important part of the American constitutional process since its inception. The Marbury v. Madison case (1803) affirmed the institution of judicial supervision & denoted a gradual shift of judicial power into the field of public law. Thus further expansion & transformation of judicial power was made possible. In this article, the author establishes a connection between judicial activism & judicial supervision, & adheres to the standpoint that the "judicializing aspect of modern liberalism" deserves as much attention as any other aspect of democratization. Adapted from the source document.

Having in mind the long evolution of constitutions & constitutional politics & the universal appeal of the process of the interplay between virtue & demagogy that occurs during presidential elections, the author touches on several topics. The first are the standard "dogmatic" comparative provisions regarding the election of the head of state which the author looks into through the constitutional-legal prism of the so called selection effect. As the institution of the president of the republic exists in many constitutions & is thus among the most significant institutionalized aspects of political & social life of every country, the author focuses on the extent in which that institution in the electoral context contributes to the affirmation of republicanism, democracy & public sphere. The author concludes that the election of presidents & the effects of electoral selection, among other things, affect the process of political integration that ought -- to not only in Croatia but everywhere & due to a plethora of reasons -- promote the universally accepted ontological principles of contemporary constitutional-democratic state. Appendixes, References. Adapted from the source document.

The author deals with the role of constitutional courts in democracies. Though they have religious roots, nowadays they are entirely secularized because interpretation of constitutions is neither a religious event nor are constitutions the Scriptures. Since constitutions today are exposed to a more rapid political change, constitutional courts are the institutions that determine the validity of political projects, which makes them political actors. Although they make decisions based on relatively patent constitutional/legal criteria, they nevertheless contradict the dominant democratic principle. This friction is more pronounced in the field of symbolic politics in which decisions are brought via political argumentation circumventing the formal criteria. Political individuality of constitutional courts consists in moderating the process of political bargaining beyond the principle of democratic majority. The author concludes that their primary task is to maintain a sensitive balance, with uncertain results. 16 References. Adapted from the source document.

The idea of the existence of the legal foundations of the opposition implies granting certain rights to opposition that finds in the parliament a privileged means of its expression & recognition. The diversified "statute of the opposition" is the basic feature of contemporary constitutional democracies, both traditional & "nouveau." The text points to the terminological & other differences between the opposition as an institution & other forms in which parliamentary opposition finds its affirmation, as well as to the means apportioned to the opposition, both in the rule-of-law states & in the new democracies, including Croatia. Adapted from the source document.

Language plays the central role in the process of creation of a national identity. In the establishment of the supranational European identity, however, multilingualism is a democratic necessity guaranteeing equality to all European Union citizens. The decisions made by the European institutions influence everyday life of the citizens of the Union and for their legitimacy it is of the utmost importance that the citizens take an active part in the decision making process free of language barriers. In accordance with the EU language policy which guarantees an equal status to all the official languages of its member states -- once Croatia becomes a member of the Union the Croatian language will enjoy the position of an official language of the EU. In order to ensure Croatian citizens equality before the law and free access to the EU legislation, Croatia has the responsibility of translating the so called acquis communautaire, i.e. the total body of EU law, into Croatian and transpose it into its national legislation. The translation of the acquis must guarantee that the EU law is unequivocally interpreted and implemented and this can only be possible if the EU legal terminology is consistently and unambiguously used. Upon the Croatian accession to the EU, the Croatian translation of the acquis will be published in the special edition of the Official Journal of the EU and will become legally binding and used as the fundamental text for the interpretation and application of EU law in Croatia. Adapted from the source document.

Language plays the central role in the process of creation of a national identity. In the establishment of the supranational European identity, however, multilingualism is a democratic necessity guaranteeing equality to all European Union citizens. The decisions made by the European institutions influence everyday life of the citizens of the Union and for their legitimacy it is of the utmost importance that the citizens take an active part in the decision making process free of language barriers. In accordance with the EU language policy which guarantees an equal status to all the official languages of its member states -- once Croatia becomes a member of the Union the Croatian language will enjoy the position of an official language of the EU. In order to ensure Croatian citizens equality before the law and free access to the EU legislation, Croatia has the responsibility of translating the so called acquis communautaire, i.e. the total body of EU law, into Croatian and transpose it into its national legislation. The translation of the acquis must guarantee that the EU law is unequivocally interpreted and implemented and this can only be possible if the EU legal terminology is consistently and unambiguously used. Upon the Croatian accession to the EU, the Croatian translation of the acquis will be published in the special edition of the Official Journal of the EU and will become legally binding and used as the fundamental text for the interpretation and application of EU law in Croatia. Adapted from the source document.

Language plays the central role in the process of creation of a national identity. In the establishment of the supranational European identity, however, multilingualism is a democratic necessity guaranteeing equality to all European Union citizens. The decisions made by the European institutions influence everyday life of the citizens of the Union and for their legitimacy it is of the utmost importance that the citizens take an active part in the decision making process free of language barriers. In accordance with the EU language policy which guarantees an equal status to all the official languages of its member states -- once Croatia becomes a member of the Union the Croatian language will enjoy the position of an official language of the EU. In order to ensure Croatian citizens equality before the law and free access to the EU legislation, Croatia has the responsibility of translating the so called acquis communautaire, i.e. the total body of EU law, into Croatian and transpose it into its national legislation. The translation of the acquis must guarantee that the EU law is unequivocally interpreted and implemented and this can only be possible if the EU legal terminology is consistently and unambiguously used. Upon the Croatian accession to the EU, the Croatian translation of the acquis will be published in the special edition of the Official Journal of the EU and will become legally binding and used as the fundamental text for the interpretation and application of EU law in Croatia. Adapted from the source document.

The author criticizes the universalism of democracy as a world model. He argues that WWI has been insufficiently explored from the perspective of the clash of two democratic concepts. The outcome of that war heralded the long-term victory of the Franco-American universalist concept of democracy over the traditional British concept of democracy. This has greatly influenced the political & philosophical understanding of democracy as the universalist elements of democratic constitutions have prevailed, while awareness of the historically evolved institutions of democracy has been suppressed. The author shows that the emergence of fundamental rights had nothing to do with their universalist natural-law version, since in England & Germany, there were pre-forms rooted in the specific legal traditions of those countries or regions. Since the creation of a world democratic state is not feasible, there is no genuine significance of the universalist democracy. In his conclusion, the author promotes the acceptance of the traditional concept of democracy modeled after British democracy, which would strengthen the UN & international law. This would be particularly important in today's circumstances & conducive to the acknowledgment of various traditions &, consequently, to a variety of systems of government. Adapted from the source document.